Punjab-Haryana High Court
(O&M) Bhupinder Singh vs Punjab State Etc on 7 March, 2026
1
RSA-605
605 of 1995
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-605 of 1995
Bhupinder Singh
......Appellant
Versus
The Punjab State and others
......Respondents
Sr. No. Particulars Details
1. The date when the judgment is reserved 13.02.2026
2. The date when the judgment is pronounced 07. 03.2026
3. The date when the judgment is uploaded on the website 09.03.2026
4. Whether only operative part of the judgment is Full
pronounced or full judgment is pronounced
5. The delay, if any, of the pronouncement of full Not applicable
judgment, and reasons thereof
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAMIT KUMAR
Argued by:: - Ms. Sukhmani Patwalia, Advocate and
Mr. Gaurav Jagota, Advocate,
for the appellant.
Mr. Satnampreet Singh Chauhan, DAG, Punjab.
NAMIT KUMAR, J.
1. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the
judgment and decree dated 15.09.1994,, passed by the Court of learned
Additional District Judge, Amritsar,, vide which the appeal preferred by
the respondents has been allowed and the judgment and decree dated
22.01.1994,, passed by learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Amritsar,
whereby suit of the appellant-plaintiff
appellant for declaration was decreed, has
been set aside.
2. Parties to the lis are being referred to as per their status
before the trial Court. The pleaded case of the plaintiff is that he joined
police force on 23.10.1981
23.10.198 as Constable. He proceeded on seven days'
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sanctioned leave on 27.02.1987 to attend a marriage in Madhya
Pradesh. Unfortunately, while in Durg, Madhya Pradesh, on
04.03.1987, plaintiff was arrested in case FIR No.282/1987 registered
under Sections 395/397/398 IPC, Section 25 of the Arms Act; FIR
No.294/87
o.294/87 registered under Section 394 IPC and FIR No.287/87
registered under Section 307 IPC at Police Station Chhowant, District
Durg, Madhya Pradesh. Information regarding his arrest was sent by
the Superintendent of Police, Durg, Madhya Pradesh, to the
Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala. Acting on the said information,
Senior Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala, vide order dated
16.06.1987, removed the plaintiff from service with immediate effect
while exercising powers vested in him by virtue of Ru
Rule 16.1 of the
Punjab Police Rules and Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India,
by recording that he was satisfied that in the interest of security of the
State of Punjab, it was not expedient to hold an enquiry against the
plaintiff and that plaintiff
plaintiff was guilty of such mis
mis-conduct which render
him to be removed from service of the Punjab Police Department. The
said order was despatched to the plaintiff at his home address at Village
Khanowal, Tehsil Ajnala. However, since the plaintiff was in cus
custody
in Durg at that time, he could not get the order and failed to file appeal
against his removal from service. No personal hearing was given to
him before his dismissal from service. Plaintiff was acquitted by the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Durg (M.P.) vide judgment
dated 12.07.1990. When the plaintiff came back home, he learnt about
the order of his removal from service, in the month of July, 1990. The
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time for filing appeal before the DIG had already expired, so he was
prevented from
from filing the appeal. Thus, he served a notice under
Section 80 CPC upon the defendants, but to no avail. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the order dated
16.06.1987, passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Kap
Kapurthala,
removing the plaintiff from service with immediate effect is wrong,
illegal, arbitrary, malafide, cryptic, capricious, wanton, without
jurisdiction, non-speaking
non speaking and non est having been passed in violation
of mandatory, statutory police rules and the provisions of the
Constitution of India, thus, ultra vires the Constitution and void ab
initio and hence inoperative against the plaintiff and the plaintiff
continues to be a Constable in District Punjab, Kapurthala, as before
16.06.1987 and is entitled to all the pay, power and privileges of the
post of Constable.
3. Upon being served, defendants contested the suit by filing
a written statement
stat taking various preliminary objections. On merits
merits, it
was admitted that the plaintiff worked in the defendant
defendant-department and
was granted casual leave for eight days. He absented himself from duty
without any further leave or permission. He was arrested in three
criminal cases in Durg, Madhya Pradesh
Pradesh. The implication of the
plaintiff in a case of dacoity was a grave misconduct done by him.
Therefore, holding of an enquiry against the plaintiff was not expedient
due to interests of security of the State. Therefore, he was rightly
removed from service by the Senior Superintendent of Police,
Kapurthala, by exercising powers vested in him by virtue of Rule 16.1
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of the Punjab Police Rules and Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of
India. From the pleadings
pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed
by the trial Court: -
"1. Whether the suit is within time? OPP
2. Whether the order dated 16.6.87 is illegal void and
in-operative
operative against the rights of the plaintiff? OPP
3. If issue No.2 is proved
proved, whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the declaration and consequential relief
prayed for? OPP
4. Relief.
4. The trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated
22.01.1994, after appreciating evidence and hearing learned counsel for
the parties, recorded the finding that the suit filed by the plaintiff was
within limitation and consequently issue No.1 was decided in favour of
the plaintiff,
plaintiff issues
ssues No.2 and 3 were also held in favour of the plaintiff
and decreed the suit of the plaintiff to the ef
effect that order dated
16.06.1987, passed by Senior Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala,
removing the plaintiff from service with immediate effect was illegal,
null, void, in-operative
in operative and not binding on the plaintiff and plaintiff
was held entitled for all
al his back wages and other regular benefits. The
defendants were directed to pay his back wages and other regular
benefits within three months from the passing of the order. However,
department was granted liberty to initiate departmental proceedings
afresh
esh as per law, if deemed necessary.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court
Court,
the defendants filed an appeal, which was allowed by the First
Appellate Court,
Court vide judgment and decree dated 15.09.1994
15.09.1994, and
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judgment and decree of the trial
trial Court was set aside
aside. Hence, the instant
Regular Second Appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is erroneous, as
it has erred in law in allowing the appeal filed by the respondents and
setting aside the well-reasoned
well reasoned judgment and decree of the trial Court
Court.
She further contended that the order passed by the respondents
dispensing with the departmental enquiry
nquiry is wholly laconic and is not
germane to the requirements of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of
India, as the disciplinary authority can exercise power under Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India only when it is not expedient to
hold departmental inquiry. In the present case, there was no necessity
orr reason to pass order of removal of the appellant from service by
dispensing with the departmental inquiry by invoking Article 311(2)(b)
of the Constitution of India.
India. The First Appellate Court failed to
appreciate that the respondents ought to have recor
recorded in writing its
satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry
contemplated under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India,
however, in the present case, neither the department recorded its
satisfaction nor the same was conveyed
conveyed to the appellant. She further
contended that mere registration of an FIR is not a ground to dispense
with the enquiry and dismiss an employee by invoking Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India.
India Shee further contended that in the
present case there is violation of Rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules.
She further contended that judgment and decree passed by the first
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appellate Court being perverse is liable to be set aside. In support of
her contentions, learned counsel has placed relia
reliance upon the
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sudesh Kumar v. State of
Haryana and others, 2005(11) SCC 525; Union of India v. Tulsiram
Patel, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1416;
1416 Civil Appeal No.10587 of 1983
- Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, decided on 27.11.1990
and the judgments of this Court in CWP-7514
7514 of 2022 - Harjit Singh
v. State of Punjab and others, decided on 16.11.2022; Darshan Jit
Singh Dhindsa v. State of Punjab,
Punjab, 1993(1) SCT 338
338; Constable
Harinder Kumar v. State of Punjab
Punjab and another, 2014(1) SCT 733
733;
CWP-8612
8612 of 2021 - Baljinder Singh v. State of Punjab and others,
decided on 13.05.2024; CWP-2448
CWP 2448 of 2020 - Sher Singh v. State of
Punjab and others, decided on 26.08.2022
26.08.2022; Prem Saran Bansal v.
State of Punjab and others, 2014(4)
2014(4) SCT 481 and CWP-1059 of 2015
- Ashok Puri v. State of Punjab, decided on 24.08.2015
24.08.2015.
7. Per contra, learned State counsel contended that the
judgment and decree passed by the first appellate Court is perfectly
legal and valid. He contended that the First Appellate Court has rightly
observed that the appellant was arrested in a case of attempt to dacoity
and was involved in three criminal cases in Durg, Madhya Pradesh and
such misconduct is an anti-national
anti national activity and it was a sufficient
ground for dispensing with the regular enquiry.
8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
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9. The question of law which arises for consideration in the
present appeal is as to whether the punishing au
authority was empowered
to dispense with the departmental enquiry against the appellant by
invoking Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India before removing
him from service?
10. Admittedly, appellant joined Punjab Police as Constable
on 23.10.1981. He proceeded on sanctioned leave on 27.02.1987 for
seven days to attend a marriage at Durg, Madhya Pradesh. In Durg, he
was arrested in a bank dacoity case. On information received from
Superintendent of Police, Durg, Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala,
vide order dated 16.06.1987, removed the appellant from service,
without holding any departmental enquiry, by recording that it was not
expedient to hold an
an enquiry against the appellant, by invoking
provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. Thereafter,
the appellant was acquitted by the Court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Durg, vide judgment dated 12.07.1990. The suit filed by the
appellant against the order dated 16.06.1987 was decreed, however, in
appeal by the respondents, the findings of the trial Court have been
reversed and suit of the appellant-plaintiff
appellant plaintiff has been dismissed.
11. It would be apt to reproduce the order date
dated 16.06.1987,
whereby the plaintiff was removed from service. The same reads as
under: -
"ORDER
ORDER
Whereas Constable Bhupinder Singh No.336/KPT is
guilty of such misconduct as renders him liable to removal
from service of Punjab Police Deptt.
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And whereas, I am satisfied that in the interest of
the security of the State of Punjab, it is not expedient to
hold an enquiry against the aforesaid Co
Constable
Bhupinder Singh No.336/KPT
PT as required by clause (2) of
Article 311 of the Constitution of India for his remova
removal
from Govt. service.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in
me by virtue of Punjab Police Rules 16.1 read with Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, I, K.L. Lekhi, IPS,
Superintendent of Police, do hereby remove the aforesaid
Constable
able Bhupinder Singh No.336/KPT from Govt.
Service of the Police Deptt. with immediate effect.
Attested Sd/- K.L. Lekhi
Head Clerk Superintendent of Police,
Kapurthala."
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sudesh Kumar (supra) had
held that enquiry under Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the
same is an exception. The authority dispensing with the enquiry must
satisfy for reasons to be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold enquiry. In the said judgment
judgment it has been held as under: –
“11.
11. It is now established principle of law that an inquiry
under Article 311(2) is a rule and dispensing with the
inquiry is an exception. The authority dispensing with the
inquiry under Article 311(2)(b) must satisfy for reasons to
be recorded that it is not reasonably practicable to hold
an inquiry. A reading of the termination order by invoking
Article 311(2)(b), as extracted above, would clearly show
that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned as to why
it is not reasonably
onably practicable to hold an inquiry. The
reasons disclosed in the termination order is that the
complainant refused to name the accused out of fear of
harassment; the complainant, being a foreign national, is8 of 17
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may not be reasonably practicable to bring him to the
inquiry. This is no ground for dispensing with the inquiry.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, by order dated
23rd December, 1999, the Visa of the complainant was
extended up to 22nd December, 2001. Therefore, there
was no difficulty in securing the presence of Mr. Kenichi
Tanaka in the inquiry.”
To the same effect is the judgment of a Division Bench of
this Court in Darshan Jit Singh Dhindsa (supra)
(supra), wherein it has been
held ass under: –
“6.
6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Singh’s case
(supra) has categorically laid down that on the
satisfaction of the condition i.e. existence of a situation
where an enquiry is not reasonably practicable; which the
disciplinary authority by recording iin writing its reasons
for his satisfaction with respect to practicability of holding
an enquiry in the existing facts, situation or other
surrounding circumstances prevailing on the date of
passing the order or dismissal, the enquiry could be
dispensed withh by the disciplinary authority. It is only
when the disciplinary authority comes to above conclusion
and records the finding, that the enquiry can be dispensed
with, and the compliance under Article 311(2) is not
required. It was categorically observed th
that the reasons
recorded for the subjective satisfaction of the disciplinary
authority are subject to judicial scrutiny. It was made
incumbent for the Court to interfere if it is found that the
reasons recorded for dispensing with the enquiry are
arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous
consideration or merely an abuse to dispense with the
enquiry. Holding of an enquiry should not be lightly9 of 17
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made in Ikramuddin Ahmed Borah’s case (supra).
7. The morsel information available on record and
imbibed in the order is only to the effect that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry. It would be
expedient to reproduce the satisfaction recorded by the
Appointing Authority in his own words, which runs as
under :-
“And whereas I am satisfied that the circumstances
of the case are such that it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry in the manner
provided in the Police Rule 16.24 of Punjab Police
Rules, 1934, terrorists or their supporters may
cause bodily harm
arm to the Enquiry Officer or the
witnesses.
Now, therefore, I S.C Jain, Indian Penal Code,
Senior Superintendent of Police, Hoshiarpur, in
exercise of my powers vested in me by virtue of
proviso to Article 312(2)(b) of the Constitution of
India read with PPR 16.1, 1 do hereby dismiss 1.
Darshanjit Singh”.
Factually, the allegations made against the petitioner for
dismissing him from service is that he had got links with
Sikh extremists and hence is unsuitable to be retained in
disciplined force of police.
8. There is no gain saying that the order of dismissal was
passed on 9.7.1986 when a letter was addressed by
Superintendent of Police (J) dated 19.6.1986 informing
Senior Superintendent of Police, Gurdaspur that the
petitioner is suspected to have links with Sikh extremists,
in view of the facts stated in the said letter. He further
conveyed that Director General of Police had ordered that
petitioner be dismissed from service under Article 311 of
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the Constitution of India and further to be detained under
NSA. It is not disputed that the District Magistrate,
Gurdaspur, came to the conclusion that there is no
material on record to detain the petitioner under the NSA.
Except a bare letter from the office of the Director
General of Police, there is not an iota of material or
events by reference to which, it could have been
reasonably attributed to the petitioner that he had links
with the terrorists. In the course of arguments an attempt
was made to point out that there was a statement of
Tarsem Singh Kohar, recorded
corded by the C.I.A. Inspector,
(during his investigation that he had been visiting Qadian
where Darshanjit Singh was posted as Station House
Officer. In spite of a number of adjournments given, no
such statement was brought to our notice nor any such
statement
ement was before the disciplinary authority while
coming to the subjective satisfaction of the necessity of
dispensing with the enquiry under Article 311(2)(b) of the
Constitution.
9. In our considered view, there is nothing on record from
which one can come
me to the conclusion that holding of an
enquiry is or was not practicable. Even the charge of
petitioner having links with the extremists is too vague
particularly in view of the service record of the petitioner
prior to his dismissal whereby commendation certificates
were issued for the courageous acts performed by the
petitioner in curbing the terrorists activities. Mere
reproduction of the words of the statute are not sufficient
to justify the finding of fact with respect to the satisfaction
of the authority
rity concerned. We find no reasons either
recorded on the file or on the other itself, on scrutiny of
which, one could have come to a conclusion that the
appointing authority had come to the subjective
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satisfaction for dispensing with the enquiry. In view of
facts and circumstances, observed above, it can be
reasonably inferred that the appointing authority was
prima facie influenced by the letter addressed from the
DGP office, ordering dismissal of the petitioner. The
enquiry against the petitioner appears to have been
dispensed with on excusals. The appointing authority has
given his conclusion for dispensing with the enquiry but
has not stated any reason for coming to such a conclusion.
Nothing has been pointed out as to what impelled the
appointing authority
rity to come to a conclusion with respect
to impracticability of holding an enquiry or even simply
giving a show cause notice to the petitioner for his having
links with undesirable elements and calling for his
explanation which might have satisfied the ap
appointing
authority with respect to the defence of the petitioner. The
cardinal principles of natural justice cannot be dispensed
with on mere pretexts real or imaginary.
10. In the light of the documents placed on record before
us we are of the considered view that there was no
material before the authorities to come to a conclusion
regarding the non-practicability
practicability of holding the enquiry or
any material connecting petitioner’s assumed links with
the terrorists.
11. A perusal of the order of the appointin
appointing authority
would show that some statement of Tarsem Singh Kohar to
the effect that he used to visit Qadian was taken into
consideration but even this statement would not lead to an
inference that Darshanjit Singh petitioner did not make
any effort to arrest
st him. Even the allegation that one
Pehalwan was rounded up who was released later on and
though it was attributed that Tarsem Singh Kohar got him
released from the petitioner, does not lead to an inference
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that the petitioner had links with the extremist
extremists. These are
mere allegations which are not supported by any material
on record. Even the statement of Tarsem Singh Kohar is
not on record. Thus, the appointing authority or the
appellate authority never had an opportunity to read the
statement of Tarsem. Singh Kohar. There is nothing on the
record what the said Tarsem Singh stated and in what
context it was stated by him. In the absence of any
material, it would be too much to infer that mere
allegations of the facts, would be deemed to be proved
facts.
12.
2. In view of the findings returned above, we need not
deal with the other submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. The order of dismissal on the
face of it, having been passed under the orders of the
Director General of Police, without application of
independent mind or satisfaction of the appointing
authority, cannot be sustained. Thus the orders Annexures
P-3, P-8 and P-10
10 are hereby quashed. This writ petition
is accordingly allowed and the respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner
titioner with all other consequential reliefs
including the back wages. There would be no order as to
costs. The respondents would, however, be at liberty to
proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with
law.”
Learned Single Judge of this Cour
Court in Harjit Singh (supra)
has held that mere registration of FIR is no ground to invoke the
provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India. In the said
judgment it has been held as under: –
“6. Mere registration of an FIR would not be a sufficient
ground to invoke Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of
India to dispense with holding of a departmental inquiry13 of 17
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conviction, the situation is altogether
ltogether different as has been
specified in Article 311 (2) (a) of the Constitution of India.
As noticed above, adequate reasons have to be given in the
order of dismissal as to why it would not be reasonably
practicable to hold a departmental inquiry. In the
judgment rendered by this Court in CWP 13847 of 1995
titled Constable Harinder Kumar v. State of Punjab and
another decided on 24.10.2013
24.10.2013, the delinquent was
dismissed from service on registration of two FIRs, one
under Section 401 IPC and the other uunder Section 25
Arms Act, 1959 without holding any departmental inquiry
on the grounds that the activities of the delinquent were
highly prejudicial and detrimental to police working as
well as against public interest, therefore he was not fit to
be retained
ed in the police force. It was held that mere
registration of FIR is not a valid ground to dispense with
holding a regular inquiry.”
13. It is apparent that no reasons whatsoever have been
recorded by the competent authority in the impugned order to show as
to why it was not practicable to hold an enquiry. Mere registration of
an FIR would not be a sufficient ground to invoke Article 311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India to dispense with holding of a departmental
enquiry while dismissing a delinquent emp
employee. The appellate Court
has failed to consider that adequate
adequate reasons have to be given in the
order of dismissal as to why it would not be reasonably practicable to
hold a departmental enquiry. A reasonable opportunity of hearing
enshrined in Article 311(2)
311(2) of the Constitution of India would include
an opportunity to defend himself and establish his innocence by cross
cross-
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examining the prosecution witnesses produced against him and by
examining the defence witnesses in his favour, if any. The appellant
could
ld do this only if enquiry would have been held where he was to be
informed of the charges levelled against him. However, in the instant
case the mandate of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India has been
violated, depriving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
appellant. Nothing has been pointed out as to what impelled the
punishing authority to come to a conclusion with respect to
impracticability of holding an enquiry or even simply giving a show
show-
cause notice to the appellant. Punishing authority
authority statutorily as well as
on the pedestal of principles of natural justice
justice, is bound to follow
cardinal principles of natural justice,
justice which cannot be dispensed with
merely on one pretext or the other. It cannot be lost sight of the fact
that when right of defending himself in a departmental enquiry is lost to
a delinquent, duty of punishing authority becomes even further onerous
to strictly
ictly follow the legal mandate while justifying dispensing with
regular departmental enquiry. The Senior Superintendent of Police,
Kapurthala, was bound to refer the case of the appellant to the District
Magistrate, who after a preliminary enquiry, was to decide whether
departmental enquiry should have been held against him or criminal
prosecution should have been launched. Only a message from the
Superintendent of Police, Durg, Madhya Pradesh, to the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala, that the appellant has been
arrested in a criminal case, does not justify that no enquiry was required
to be held against the appellant. Thus, there is nothing on record to
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show that the punishing authority was satisfied that it was not
practicable to hold enquiry against the appellant. In the considered
view of this Court, there is nothing on record from which it can be
concluded that holding of an enquiry is or was not practicable. Even
the appellant was acquitted in the cases
case registered against him at Durg,
Madhya
dhya Pradesh.
Furthermore, in the order of dismissal dated 16.06.1987, it
is stated by the punishing authority that ‘…………
‘…………I am satisfied that in
the interest of the security of the State of Punjab, it is not expedient to
hold an enquiry against the aforesaid Co
Constable Bhupinder Singh
No.336/KPT
PT as required by clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India for his removal from Govt. service. Now, therefore, in exercise
of the powers vested in me by virtue of Punjab Police Rules 16.1 read
with
ith Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, I, K.L. Lekhi, IPS,
Superintendent of Police, do hereby remove the aforesaid Constable
Bhupinder Singh No.336/KPT from Govt. Service of the Police Deptt.
with immediate effect.’ The said order is patentl
patently illegal for the reason
that if it was a case of dispensing with the enquiry in the interest of the
security of the State, the order should have been passed under Article
311(2)(c), however, the powers have been invoked by the punishing
authority under Article
Ar 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, which
also shows that there is no proper application of mind on the part of the
punishing authority while dispensing with the enquiry.
14. Both the Courts have concurrently held that the suit filed
by the plaintiff
ntiff was within limitation as the order of dismissal from
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service was never conveyed to the appellant
appellant-plaintiff and after acquittal
in the criminal cases when he came to know about his dismissal from
service, he immediately filed the suit. The said findi
finding has not been
questioned by the State of Punjab by filing any appeal or cross
cross-
objections in the present appeal.
15. During the course of hearing, it has been pointed out that
appellant-plaintiff
plaintiff has attained the age of superannuation during the
pendency of the appeal. Therefore, in this view of the matter, it would
not be useful to remand back the case of the appellant to the
respondents to hold an enquiry and pass consequential orders.
16. In view of the above, the question of law is answered in
favourr of the appellant-plaintiff.
appellant Consequently, the present appeal is
allowed. Judgment and decree of the first appellate Court is set aside
and that of the trial Court is restored. It is accordingly ordered that
appellant is deemed to have been reinstated in service w.e.f. 16.06.1987
and is entitled for 50% back wages. Decree-sheet be prepared
accordingly.
17. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(NAMIT KUMAR)
07.03.2026 JUDGE
R.S.
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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