Calcutta High Court
Nitya Ranjan Mallick vs Punjab National Bank & Anr on 20 May, 2026
Author: Amrita Sinha
Bench: Amrita Sinha
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Original Side
Present :- Hon'ble Justice Amrita Sinha
WPO No. 684 of 2024
Nitya Ranjan Mallick
Vs.
Punjab National Bank & Anr.
For the writ petitioner :- Mr. Sudeep Sanyal, Sr. Adv.
Mrs. Tutun Das, Adv.
Ms. Ketaki Ghosh, Adv.
For the PNB :- Mr. S. M. Obaidullah, Adv.
Mr. R. N. Majumder, Adv.
Hearing concluded on :- 07.04.2026
Judgment on :- 20.05.2026
Amrita Sinha, J.:-
1. The petitioner was serving as a general clerk in the United Bank of India,
currently merged with the Punjab National Bank. A disciplinary proceeding
was initiated against him and he was placed under suspension with effect
from 10th November, 1994. Subsistence allowance was paid to him. Charge
sheet was issued on 30th January, 1996. An enquiry was conducted and the
petitioner was provided opportunity to defend himself. The enquiry report
was submitted on 19th June, 1998.
2. The disciplinary authority passed order of dismissal of the petitioner from
service without notice on 25th March, 1999. Appeal was preferred by the
petitioner on 8th May, 1999 mentioning that the grounds of appeal would be
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submitted at the time of hearing. The petitioner submitted his grounds of
appeal on 1st October, 2010.
3. A writ petition being WP No.13950 (W) of 2012 was filed by the petitioner
alleging non-disposal of his appeal. The said writ petition was heard and
disposed of by the Court on 14th August, 2023 directing the competent
appellate authority to consider and dispose of the appeal within four months
by passing a reasoned order after giving the petitioner opportunity of hearing
and to allow the petitioner to rely upon relevant documents in support of his
defence.
4. After issuance of the charge sheet against the petitioner and during
pendency of the departmental proceeding, the Branch Manager of the bank
where he was serving, filed a written complaint against him before the police
giving rise to Bongaon Police Case no. 35 dated 15th February, 1995 under
Sections 420/468/467/471/409 of the Indian Penal Code. Charge sheet in
the criminal case was filed against the petitioner on 19th March, 1999. On
trial of the criminal case the petitioner stood acquitted vide judgment dated
25th February, 2010 passed by the learned Judge, Special Court, Prevention
of Corruption Act, Barasat, North 24 Parganas.
5. The sheet anchor of the petitioner's submission is that as the departmental
proceeding and the criminal proceeding stood initiated on self-same charges
and as the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case by the
competent court of law, accordingly, the order of dismissal passed against
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him by his employer ought to be revoked and he ought to be reinstated in
service along with all service benefits.
6. It has been submitted that both the proceedings were initiated approximately
at the same point of time. The departmental proceeding ought to have been
kept in abeyance till the disposal of the criminal case. It has been contended
that the employer deliberately proceeded with the disciplinary proceeding
and passed the order of dismissal on surmises and conjectures. None of the
persons whose bank account were alleged to have been tampered by the
petitioner ever affirmed such allegation in the criminal proceeding. On the
contrary, they deposed that their bank account was never tampered, nor
their signature forged.
7. The petitioner alleges bias on the part of the employer. It has been argued
that the findings in the departmental enquiry are not based upon any
evidence. Absurd evidence or no evidence cannot substitute the truth.
8. It has been contended that the bipartite agreement entered upon by the
bank and the workmen on disciplinary action and procedure therefor
provides that when trial in a criminal proceeding commences, the
departmental proceeding should be stayed. If the delinquent is acquitted of
the charges, he should not be dismissed from service but be treated 'as on
duty' during the period of suspension and the procedure adopted for
discharge should be followed.
9. The petitioner submits that he was dismissed from service after the trial in
the criminal proceeding commenced. The appeal against the order of
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dismissal was kept pending for nearly twenty-two years and was decided by
the appellate authority upon direction passed by this Court, mechanically
without proper application of mind. By that time the petitioner stood
acquitted from the criminal charges by the competent court. The appellate
authority acted contrary to the terms and conditions of the bipartite
agreement.
10. The petitioner prays for a direction upon the bank to revoke the order of
dismissal and to treat him on duty during the entire period of his suspension
and to pay him full pay and allowances in terms of the bipartite agreement.
11. In support of his submission the petitioner relies upon the Terms of
Settlement of Memorandum of Settlement dated 10th April, 2002 wherein the
disciplinary action and the procedure therefor are mentioned. The said terms
and conditions lay down that if an employee is acquitted it shall be open to
the management to proceed against him under the provisions relating to
discharges. If the management, after enquiry, decides not to continue him in
service, he shall be liable only for termination of service with three months'
pay and allowances in lieu of notice. The employee is deemed to have been
on duty during the period of suspension, if any, and shall be entitled to full
pay and allowances.
12. In support of the submission that the petitioner ought to be paid full wages
and allowances and all other privileges for the period of suspension, learned
advocate for the petitioner relies on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble
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Division Bench of this Court in Amiya Kumar Biswas -vs- United Bank of
India & Ors. reported in 2006 SCC Online Cal 205 : (2006) 4 CHN 53.
13. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Bank of Baroda -vs- S. K. Kool (dead)
through legal representatives & Anr. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 715
wherein the Court held that employees who are otherwise entitled to
superannuation benefit under the Regulations, if visited with the penalty of
removal from service with superannuation benefits, shall be entitled to those
benefits. Any employee visited with the same penalty but not eligible for
superannuation benefit under the Regulations, shall not be entitled to that.
14. Learned advocate for the petitioner relies on the judgment delivered by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Maharana Pratap Singh vs. The
State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 890, wherein the
Court, inter alia, held that while exercising powers under Article 226/ 227 of
the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers that are available
to an appellate court. It is the decision-making process that falls for
scrutiny. The High Court can rectify errors of law or procedural
irregularities, if any, that lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice or breach
of the principle of natural justice. The departmental authorities are obligated
to provide a fair opportunity to the parties.
15. Learned advocate representing the bank opposes the submission and
prayers made by the petitioner. An issue regarding maintainability of the
writ petition has been raised by the bank. It has been submitted that the
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writ petitioner, being a 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
cannot seek redressal of his dispute which is in the nature of an 'industrial
dispute' under Article 226 of the Constitution. It has been submitted that
the petitioner ought to have approached the Industrial Tribunal in
accordance with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for relief.
16. It has been submitted that the bipartite agreement entered into by and
between the bank and the workmen will be applicable in respect of the
petitioner. The said agreement has been entered under the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. For enforcement of any terms and conditions
in the bipartite agreement, the petitioner ought to approach the Industrial
Tribunal for resolution of his dispute.
17. It has been contended that the writ petition ought not to be entertained on
the ground of availability of efficacious alternate remedy which is statutory
in nature.
18. In support of such submission learned advocate appearing for the bank
relies upon the order passed by this Court on 14th October, 2015 in WP
24866 (W) of 2015 in the matter of Indranil Bose vs. United Bank of India
& Ors. wherein the Court was pleased not to entertain the writ petition
preferred by a workman of the bank.
19. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of A.P. Foods vs. S.Samuel & Ors. reported in
(2006) 5 SCC 469 wherein the Court held that when alternate remedy is
available under the Industrial Disputes Act, the High Court should not have
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entertained the writ petition and should have directed the petitioner to avail
the statutory remedy. The Court also observed that a writ petition under
Article 226 should not be entertained when statutory remedy is available
under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.
20. Defending the acts and action of the bank on merit, learned advocate relies
on the affidavit in opposition affirmed by the Chief Manager of the Punjab
National Bank. The charges against the petitioner have been highlighted. It
has been pointed out that an Enquiry Officer was engaged to enquire into
the charges levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner along with his co-
employee appeared before the Enquiry Officer and put forward his defence
which was duly considered.
21. The report of the Enquiry Officer clearly disclose that the charges levelled
against the petitioner stood proved. By an order dated 25th March, 1999, the
disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from service without notice.
The appeal preferred by the petitioner was duly considered by the appellate
authority and the same also stood dismissed.
22. It has been argued that the criminal case and the disciplinary proceeding are
two different and separate proceedings. In the departmental proceeding, the
sophisticated rule of evidence does not always apply. The departmental
proceeding was conducted by a quasi-judicial authority. Fullest opportunity
was given to the petitioner to defend himself. The petitioner submitted
defence exhibits and he contested his case along with his co-employee. There
has not been any violation of the principle of natural justice.
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23. It has been argued that the order passed by the learned trial Court clearly
records that the charges levelled against him could not be proved because of
lack of documentary evidence. The petitioner was only given the benefit of
doubt in the criminal proceeding.
24. In support of the submission that strict maintenance of procedural law is
not required to be followed in a disciplinary proceeding, learned advocate for
the petitioner relies on the following decisions in support of his case.
i. State Bank of India & Anr. vs. K.S Vishwanath reported in (2022) 15
SCC 190.
ii. Lalit Popli vs. Canara Bank reported in (2003) 3 SCC 583.
iii. Sub-Divisional Officer, Konch vs. Maharaj Singh reported in (2003) 9
SCC 191.
iv. Tara Chand Vyas vs. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority & Ors.
reported in (1997) II LLJ 26, 1997 SCC (L & S) 1241 (para 2).
v. State Bank of India & Ors. vs. T.J. Paul reported in (1999) 4 SCC 759.
vi. Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager & Ors. vs. Nikunja
Bihari Patnaik reported in (1996) SCC (L & S) 1194.
vii. Union Bank of India vs. Vishwa Mohan reported in (1998) 4 SCC 310.
viii. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. vs. P. Chandra Mouli & Anr.
Reported in (2009) 13 SCC 272.
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ix. Divisional Controller KSRTC (NWKRTC) vs. A.T. Mane reported in (2005)
3 SCC 254.
x. Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. vs.
P.C. Kakkar reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364.
xi. P. Rajan Sandhi vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2010) 10 SCC
338.
xii. Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank & Anr. reported in
(2007) 9 SCC 15.
xiii. J.D. Jain vs. Management, State Bank of India reported in AIR 1982
SCC 673.
xiv. Judgment dated 19.07.2024 passed in APO 65 of 2022 in the matter of
Rana Mazumder vs. Punjab National Bank (Formerly known as United
Bank of India) & Ors..
xv. Judgment dated 04.12.2023 passed in WPA 3689 of 2017 in the matter
of Sri Sanjib Roy vs. Punjab National Bank & Ors..
25. The respondent bank prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
26. To controvert the contention raised by the bank regarding maintainability of
the writ petition despite existence of an alternative remedy, learned advocate
for the petitioner relies on the decision delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation &
Anr. Vs. Krishna Kant & Ors. reported in (1995) 5 SCC 75 wherein a
three-judge bench of the Court, inter alia, held that where disputes arise
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from general law of contract, a Suit filed in the Civil Court cannot be said to
be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an
‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
27. The Court further held that the policy of law emerging from Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative
dispute mechanism to the workmen. The powers of the Courts and Tribunals
under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are far more extensive and they can
grant relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an
end to an industrial dispute.
28. The petitioner also relies on the judgment delivered by a three-judge bench
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajasthan State Road
Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa (2) reported in
(2009) 4 SCC 299 wherein the Court inter alia held that, it would not be
correct to contend that only because the employee is also a workman within
the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ipso facto the Civil Court
will have no jurisdiction.
29. The Court clarified that if infringement of any provision of the Act is alleged,
the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may be held to be barred, but if the Suit is
based on the violation of the principles of common law or constitutional
provisions or on other grounds, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may not be held
to be barred.
30. The judgment delivered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the matter of The Premiere Automobiles Ltd. -vs- Kamlekar
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Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors. reported in (1976) 1 SCC 496 has
been relied upon by the petitioner in support of the submission that the writ
petition will be maintainable as the dispute in question cannot be said to be
an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act. The petitioner
would seek remedy under the common law thus leaving it to the election of
the petitioner to choose his remedy either before the Tribunal or the Civil
Court. The petitioner, in the instant case, chose to enforce his right under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
31. The petitioner also relies upon the judgment delivered by this Court in U. N.
Pandey -vs- Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. reported in 1999 SCC Online
Cal 486 : (2000) 1 CHN 155 wherein the Court held that a ‘workman’
within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 of an
employer who is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution,
can initiate writ proceeding when his fundamental rights are violated by his
employer. The workman can initiate writ proceeding when the disciplinary
proceeding initiated by the employer is arbitrary and when he is deprived of
his livelihood not in accordance with the procedure established by law
thereby violating Article 21 of the Constitution.
32. The principle that statutory remedy for infringing common law right does not
oust equitable remedy has been relied upon.
33. I have heard and considered the rival submissions made on behalf of both
the parties.
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34. On perusal of the materials on record it appears that, the fact that the
petitioner was serving as a general clerk, who will fall under the expression
of ‘workman’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as claimed by the
bank, is not disputed by the petitioner. The bank contends that the writ
petition at the instance of the workman will not be maintainable; whereas,
the petitioner contends that the writ petition by the workman will not be ipso
facto barred.
35. According to the petitioner, the writ petition will be maintainable as the
appellate authority acted without jurisdiction in not reversing the order of
dismissal after the order of acquittal was passed in favour of the petitioner
by the competent criminal Court. By such illegal exercise of jurisdiction, the
fundamental right of the petitioner enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution has been infringed.
36. According to the petitioner, he has a right to choose between the Tribunal
and the writ Court. The petitioner opted to approach the writ Court.
37. It is settled law that remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
cannot be completely ousted only on the ground of availability of alternative
remedy. It is a self-imposed restriction practiced by the Court. The remedy
that is available has to be an efficacious one. It is the discretion of the writ
Court whether or not to exercise jurisdiction in a particular set of facts and
circumstances. The bank qualifies as ‘State’ under Article 12 of the
Constitution and a writ petition against the bank is not an absolute bar.
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38. In view of the fact that the petitioner is a septuagenarian claiming his
terminal dues, rejecting his writ petition filed in July 2024 by remanding
him to the Tribunal for adjudication of his disputes, may not be an
efficacious remedy available to him. The proceeding before the Tribunal may
consume some time for adjudication. At such advanced age it may not be
easy for the petitioner to proceed with his case from scratch. The petitioner
ought not to feel that he was deprived justice. Further delay in disposal of
his case which was initiated by issuance of a charge sheet way back in 1996,
will not be proper. Accordingly, to put a quietus to the dispute, the Court is
minded to dispose of the writ petition on merits.
39. It is made abundantly clear that the issue of maintainability of the writ
petition at the instance of the petitioner workman is not being decided in the
instant writ petition and the writ petition is being entertained and
adjudicated on merits keeping in mind the advanced age of the petitioner,
the efficacious remedy available to the litigant in the writ proceeding for early
disposal of his grievance.
40. Krishnakant (supra), Bal Mukund Bairwa (supra), The Premier Automobile
Limited (supra) and U. N. Pandey (supra) relied upon by the petitioner deals
with the issue of maintainability of the writ petition even though alternative
remedy is available. Indranil Bose (supra) and A. P. Foods (supra) relied by
the bank lays down that writ petition at the instance of the workman should
not be entertained. The reason for entertaining the writ petition filed by the
petitioner workman, despite objection raised by the bank, has been
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discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. The Court would
not like to deal with the judgments referred to by the parties separately.
41. Primary submission of the petitioner is that as he has been acquitted in the
criminal proceeding which was initiated against him and as the charges in
the disciplinary proceeding and the criminal proceeding are nearly the same,
the impugned order of his dismissal from service passed in the disciplinary
proceeding is liable to be set aside and all consequential benefits ought to be
released in his favour.
42. The petitioner heavily relies on the fact that none of the consumers of the
bank deposed against him in the departmental proceeding and no financial
loss was caused to the bank. The disciplinary authority was of the clear view
that funds were withdrawn by the petitioner from the customers’ account
against fictitious credit given by him. The funds were the bank’s fund and
not the customers’ fund which was involved. Material management exhibits
revealed that the petitioner admitted in an unequivocal and unconditional
manner the act which was committed by him.
43. The bank clearly held that mere replenishment of fund which was
fraudulently withdrawn by him does not absolve him of the charges levelled
against him. Bank’s contention is that the petitioner committed fraud on the
bank by forging signature of account holders. He also released withdrawal
form and received payment thereof. He even went to the extent of removing
the original ledger sheets of the concerned ledger after making fake credit
entries and replacing them with new sheets.
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44. It is seen from records that the petitioner was given reasonable opportunity
of hearing to defend himself. As many as thirty-six hearings were conducted,
ninety-two management exhibits were produced and six management
witnesses were examined. The petitioner and his defence representative
produced four defence exhibits. Written argument filed by the petitioner was
also considered by the enquiry officer. The witnesses were duly cross
examined by the defence representative of the petitioner. Despite granting
several opportunities to the petitioner to disprove the charges levelled
against him, he failed to come out clean.
45. Another ground taken by the petitioner assailing the order passed in the
disciplinary proceeding is that suspicion can never take the place of proof.
The petitioner harps upon the point that as he has been acquitted in the
criminal proceeding on conclusion of the trial, the order of the disciplinary
authority ought to be revoked.
46. On a perusal of the judgment passed by the competent Court relied upon by
the petitioner it appears that the Court held that the prosecution failed to
prove the charges beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and the petitioner
was given the benefit of doubt. The Court held that the prosecution case
advanced upon surmise and guess.
47. The points for determination before the learned trial Court was whether the
accused, i.e., the petitioner herein, being a public servant, entrusted with
the property which was forged by him and used as genuine with the
intention to cheat some persons in the capacity of being a public servant
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thereby committed criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 409 of
IPC and whether the accused committed any offence liable for punishment
under Sections 420/467/468 & 471 of IPC.
48. On a perusal of the enquiry report it is crystal clear that several charges
were levelled against the petitioner. The act of the petitioner was held to be
prejudicial to the interest of the bank. The enquiry officer has given detailed
analysis of the exhibits and the depositions given by the witnesses in the
examination and cross examination stage. The analysis and the conclusion
drawn by the enquiry officer by holding that the charges levelled against the
petitioner stood proved does not appear to be such that it requires
interference by the writ Court. The authority was of the confirmed opinion
that the act of the petitioner was not in the interest of the bank.
49. This is not a case where punishment has been imposed in the absence of
any evidence. Overwhelming evidence was produced and relied upon by the
bank to arrive at the conclusion that the act of the petitioner was prejudicial
to the interest of the bank leading to his dismissal from service.
50. The scope of interference in a disciplinary proceeding by the writ Court is
extremely limited. Judicial review by the Court is restricted to ensure that
the decision-making process does not suffer from any irregularity or
procedural infirmity. On a perusal of the documents placed before the Court
it does not appear that there has been any procedural lapse or any infirmity
in the decision-making process requiring interference by the Court.
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51. In Union of India & Anr. Vs Bihari Lal Sidhana reported in (1997) 4 SCC
385: AIR 1997 SC 3659 the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that
acquittal in a criminal case does not entitle a person to automatic
reinstatement. Only because the petitioner has been acquitted in the
criminal case does not give any right to the petitioner to be reinstated in
service.
52. In Maharana Pratap Singh (supra) relied by the petitioner the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that under Article 226 the High Court does not exercise
appellate powers. The decision-making process falls for scrutiny. Here, the
Court is satisfied that the decision-making process does not suffer from any
procedural lapse or irregularity calling for interference.
53. In S. K. Kool (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an employee
removed from service would be entitled to the superannuation benefit in
accordance with the prescribed Regulations. In the case at hand, the
petitioner has been dismissed from service without notice. The disciplinary
authority specified that he would not be entitled to any pay and allowances
save and except what has been paid as subsistence allowance and the period
of suspension will not be considered as qualifying service for any purpose.
The petitioner was paid the suspension allowance in accordance with his
service regulations and the same has been stopped in line with the
punishment imposed upon him.
54. K.S. Vishwanath (supra) inter alia held that the same charges and evidence
may lead to different results in two proceedings; finding of guilt in
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departmental proceeding and an acquittal in the criminal proceeding by
giving benefit of doubt. Here, two different conclusions have been reached in
two different proceeding. The same will not render a completed disciplinary
proceeding invalid nor will it affect the finding of guilt or consequential
punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee.
55. In Tara Chand Vyas (supra) it was inter alia held that the employees and
officers working in the banks are not merely the trustees of the society, but
also bear responsibility and owe duty to the society for effectuation of socio-
economic empowerment. The banking business and services are vitally
affected by catastrophic corruption. Any officer who fails to act in the
interest of the bank is liable to be dealt with appropriately in the disciplinary
proceeding.
56. In T.J.Paul (supra) the Court opined that proof of loss is not necessary and
the likelihood of loss is sufficient to take steps against the errant employee.
57. The Court refrains from referring to all the precedents relied upon by the
bank individually as the common string that runs through all the said
decisions is that the standard of proof in a criminal trial and a disciplinary
proceeding is different. In a criminal trial, the criminal intent of the accused
has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The principle of preponderance of
probabilities comes into play while deciding departmental proceeding. The
High Court merely acts as a supervisory authority and not as an appellate
one. It cannot reappreciate facts and evidences. As long as there is some
evidence relying on which conclusion has been arrived at by the authority,
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the said finding ought not to be interfered with unless the punishment
imposed is strikingly disproportionate.
58. In the instant case, the entire evidence led by the parties is based on facts
and information collected to prove the said facts. Writ court is not
empowered to act as the appellate authority. The Court is also not to re-
appreciate facts. The evidences that are already on record are enough and
sufficient to bring home the charges levelled against the petitioner.
59. Bank employees deal with public money and their integrity has to be
unquestionable. The faith of the general public on a bank where they deposit
their finances and other valuable articles is required to be kept intact. An
errant employee of the bank cannot and ought not to be permitted to make a
dent on the relationship between a customer and the banker or else the
entire banking system will collapse.
60. In B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors. ; (1995) 6 SCC 749 a three
judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that judicial review is meant
to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reached is necessarily correct in the eye
of the Court. In the case at hand, it appears that the authority reached a
finding which does not call for interference.
61. In Union of India & Ors. vs. Subrata Nath; reported in 2022 SCC Online
SC 1617; 2023(1) CHN (SC) 70 the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that
High Court cannot interfere with the punishment imposed till the
punishment shocks the conscience of the Court. Here, it doesn’t appear that
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the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is either disproportionate or
shocking in any manner.
62. In view of the discussions made herein above, the Court is of the considered
opinion that the petitioner has failed to make out a case calling for
interference by the Court. It appears that the bank did not take any step
contrary to the service rules and regulations. Hence, the prayer of the
petitioner cannot be allowed. No relief can be granted to the petitioner.
63. The writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
64. No costs.
65. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the
parties or their advocate on record expeditiously on compliance of usual
legal formalities.
(Amrita Sinha, J.)
