Jharkhand High Court
Nirmala Mishra vs State Of Jharkhand on 14 July, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
[2026:JHHC:20857-DB]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 169 of 2026
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1. Nirmala Mishra, aged about 61 years, wife of Late Vijay Kumar Mishra
2. Priyankar Kumar, aged about 42 years, son of Late Vijay Kumar Mishra
3. Prashant Kumar, aged about 37 years, son of Late Vijay Kumar Mishra
4. Sweta Kumari, aged about 34 years, Daughter of Late Vijay Kumar
Mishra
5. Supriya Kumari, aged about 30 years, Daughter of Late Vijay Kumar
Mishra
All residents of Village-Pipra, P.O. and P.S.-Pipra, District-Palamau,
Jharkhand.
.... .... Appellants/Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand.
2. Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand.
3. Additional Collector, Palamau, P.O. and P.S. Daltonganj, District-
Palamau.
4. Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Chhattarpur, P.O. and P.S. Chhattarpur,
District-Palamau.
5. Malti Devi, Wife of Binod Prasad Gupta,
Resident of Village Pipra, P.O. and P.S. Pipra, District-Palamau,
Jharkhand.
6. Brahamdutta Mishra
7. Sushil Mishra
8. Binod Mishra
All sons of Late Harihar Nath Mishra
9. Dayamanti Devi
10. Gayatri Devi
11. Kusum Devi
Daughters of Late Harihar Nath Mishra
12. Markandeya Mishra, son of Late Dharamdutta Mishra
13. Jaikendya Mishra, son of Late Dharamdutta Mishra
14. Indu Devi
15. Antima Devi
Both daughters of Late Dharamdutta Mishra.
16. Kamal Kishore Mishra, Son of Late Bishundutta Mishra
All residents of Village Pipra, P.O. and P.S. Pipra, District-Palamau,
Jharkhand.
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.... Respondents/Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the Appellants : Mr. Kundun Kumar Ambastha, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mrs. Oishi Das, Advocate, AC to AG
------
th
02/Dated: 14 July, 2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant intra-court appeal is under Clause-10 of Letters Patent directed
against the order/judgment dated 03.03.2025 passed by the learned Single
Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No. 907 of 2023, whereby and whereunder,
the writ petition has been dismissed filed by the writ petitioners.
2. Mr. Kundan Kumar Ambastha, learned counsel for the appellants has
submitted that the appeal is barred by limitation since it has been filed
after the delay of 175 days.
3. Mrs. Oishi Das, learned counsel for the respondents has strongly opposed
the delay condonation application and has submitted that the appeal since
has been filed after delay of 175 days and if the explanation furnished in
the delay condonation application will be taken into consideration, the
same is not sufficient cause to condone the said delay.
4. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties. This Court,
considering the submission made on behalf of the parties, is of the view
that this Court can only go into the merit of the instant case if the delay in
filing the instant appeal will be condoned by coming to the conclusive
finding based upon the explanation furnished in the delay condonation
application said to be sufficient cause, as such, the interlocutory
application being I.A. No. 4190 of 2026 is required to be considered first.
I.A. No. 4190 of 2026:
5. The instant appeal is admittedly barred by limitation since as per the office
note dated 06.10.2025, there is delay of 175 days in preferring the appeal,
therefore, an application being I.A. No. 4190 of 2026 has been filed for
condoning such delay.
6. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the instant intra-
court appeal has been field after inordinate delay of 175 days, deems it fit
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and proper, to first consider the delay condonation application before
going into the legality and propriety of the impugned order on merit.
7. Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant has submitted that delay in
preferring the appeal may be condoned by allowing the interlocutory
application on the basis of grounds shown therein treating the same to be
sufficient.
8. The grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal, as has been
mentioned in the interlocutory application is that after passing of the
judgment dated 03.03.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 907 of 2023, the
appellant/petitioner no.1 fell seriously ill in the last week of April, 2025
and she was confined to bed and advised for complete bed rest.
9. It has also been stated in the instant interlocutory application that due to
the illness of the appellant/petitioner no.1, the appellant/petitioner no.2
could not come to meet his counsel for filing the appeal against the
aforesaid judgment dated 03.03.2025.
10. It has been contended that after recovery of the appellant/petitioner no.1
from her illness, the appellant no.2 met his counsel in the third week of
September, 2025 and thereafter, the appeal was drafted and filed which
caused the inordinate delay of 175 days.
11. It has been submitted that the delay in filing the appeal is neither
intentional nor deliberate rather due to various reasons, particularly due to
the illness of appellant no.1, being beyond the control, the appeal could not
have been filed within time and if the delay is not condoned the appellants
will suffer irreparable loss and injury.
12. Per contra, Mrs. Oishi Das, learned AC to learned Advocate General while
vehemently opposing the instant delay condonation application has
submitted that even if the reason cited in the instant interlocutory
application for condoning the delay is accepted, then also, the medical
certificate of the appellant no.1’s illness, which has been appended as
annexure, is dated 02.05.2025 which falls well after the expiry of the
mandatory period of limitation, i.e., 30 days while the appeal itself was
filed much later, i.e., on 24.09.2025.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the aforesaid ground, has
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submitted that the instant interlocutory application is fit to be dismissed as
also the instant appeal.
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on delay condonation
applications and before considering the same, this Court, deems it fit and
proper to refer certain legal proposition, as has been propounded by the
Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach of the Court in
condoning the inordinate delay.
15. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to be rejected
on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the filing of appeal
suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the Court to consider the
application to condone the delay before entering into the merit of the lis.
16. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined in the
legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general
welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant
to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal
remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time, as has
been held in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh
Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
17. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corpn.
Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40) 67 IA 416, relied upon the
writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been
said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and
unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to
be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge
cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law,
postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognized by law.”
18. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, the Apex
Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days,
wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation
for condonation of delay had been given, held at paragraph-6 as under:
“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts
have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.”
19. While considering the similar issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Esha
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Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649,
wherein, it has been held as under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of
delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration.
It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said
principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious
matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal
parameters.”
20. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act with bona fide
motive and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part, the
period of limitation for filing the appeal expires, such lack of bona fide
motive and gross inaction and negligence are the vital factors which
should be taken into consideration while considering the question of
condonation of delay. Reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in State
of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr. Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013
SCC Online Guj. 4202, wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that
“Law having prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for
preferring the appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the
period of limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that
there should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the
appellant.”
21. In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India
Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court at paragraphs 27 to 29 as under:
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period
of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
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28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation
of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances,
the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies,
their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and
acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there
is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending
for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red
tape in the process. The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be
used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.”
22. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after referring to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Post Master General &
Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr., (supra) has held at
paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder:
“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again
and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special leave
petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to
deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of
Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no
purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are
stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-
1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was approached in
respect of the judgment delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and the Law
Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on
26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months’ time
to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate
of incompetence would there be for the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of
Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the Legal
Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals
within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These
kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more
admissible in view of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are
only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the
Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin
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of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the
situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these
files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the
application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we
impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the
Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited
within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s)
responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of
recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said
period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that
for any successive matters of this kind the costs will keep on going up.”
23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa
Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because sufficient
cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is no right to
the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause
has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition
precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the
court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to
be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire
whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the
matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is
at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for
consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the
discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot
justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time
available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of
bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the
court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider
the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in
our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and
relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in
the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the
present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be
exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general
criticism made against the appellant’s lack of diligence during the period
of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have
already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the
appellant’s application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the
period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground.
24. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause
for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether
it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a
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right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to
look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to
inaction and laches on its part.
25. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient
cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made
in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC
81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9
to 15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be
blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is
“adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the
purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more
than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to
accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing
in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of
a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford
sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for
the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be
exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was
prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn.
Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011
SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC
1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient
cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and
vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof
than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long
as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can
be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is
possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC
100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly
affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when
the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of
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limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision
to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The
statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but
it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to
secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken
diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time
become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty
than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to
disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions
should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation
of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment
or what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction, negligence or
laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7
SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973
SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17
SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR
1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a
case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has
to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means
an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the
court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for
want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case,
or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case
there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court
on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the
legislature.”
26. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
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However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient
ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by
any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is
bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath
Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan,
(1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,
(2012) 5 SCC 157.
27. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression
‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack
of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a
particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,
(2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within
the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any
other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of
bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether
explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be
dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula
for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in
taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with
the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition
by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of
explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more
so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to
the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the
courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the
time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which
should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the
explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or
arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing
enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis10
[2026:JHHC:20857-DB]terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of
such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter,
courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is
going to pass upon the parties either way.”
28. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the explanation
furnished in the delay condonation application to condone the inordinate
delay of 175 days in filing the appeal, is proceeding to examine as to
whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient explanation
for condoning the delay.
29. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein, expression
‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with which means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on
its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be
alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
30. It is evident from the explanation furnished, wherein, it has been stated in
the interlocutory application that after passing of the judgment dated
03.03.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 907 of 2023, the appellant/petitioner no.1 fell
seriously ill in the last week of April, 2025 and she was confined to bed
and advised for complete bed rest.
31. It has also been stated in the instant interlocutory application that due to
the illness of the appellant/petitioner no.1, the appellant/petitioner no.2
could not come to meet his counsel for filing the appeal against the
aforesaid judgment dated 03.03.2025.
32. It has been contended that after recovery of the appellant/petitioner no.1
from her illness, the appellant no.2 met his counsel in the third week of
September, 2025 and thereafter, the appeal was drafted and filed which
caused the inordinate delay of 175 days.
33. It appears from the stated grounds in the delay condonation application
that the cause has been tried to be shown that the appellant no.1 fell ill and
the appellant no.2 being the son was not in a position to meet his counsel
due to which the appeal could not have been filed in time but this Court is
of the view that the medical certificate of the appellant no.1 is dated
02.05.2025 which is two months after passing of the impugned judgment
and/or one month after expiry of the limitation period and even if the said
ground will be accepted then also the appeal has been filed much later, i.e.,
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[2026:JHHC:20857-DB]
on 24.09.2025 which is approximately four months after the issuance of
the medical certificate and there is no explanation to that effect in the
delay condonation application.
34. This Court is further of the view that the appeal has been preferred by
altogether five appellants (the original writ petitioners) and not by the
appellant no.1 or appellant no.2 alone and there is no explanation as to
why the remaining appellants/writ petitioners failed to file the appeal
within the limitation period during the alleged illness of the appellant no.1.
35. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the reason assigned
for condoning the delay in filing the appeal, cannot be said to be sufficient
explanation to condone the delay.
36. It needs to refer herein that the coordinate Bench of this Court has passed
an order in L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay
condonation application since the appeal was filed after delay of about 687
days without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
37. The reference of another case is required to be made herein of an order
passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019,
wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568 days was under
consideration.
38. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the reason furnished by
the State appellants therein to be sufficient cause on the ground of
movement of file from one table to another by putting reliance upon the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex as referred hereinabove.
39. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court by filing the
SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has challenged the order passed in
L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of 2022 has been
dismissed as would appear from the order dated 13.05.2022.
40. The Hon’ble Apex Court has dismissed one Special Leave to Appeal (C)
Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023 filed by the State of Jharkhand
which was filed against the order passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.99 of
2021, wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said
appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing of the appeal.
41. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C) Diary No.(S)
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No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of Jharkhand against the
order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court in L.P.A. No.401 of 2022,
wherein, the delay of 259 days was not condoned.
42. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as
also considering the fact that the delay has not sufficiently been explained,
the interlocutory application deserves to be dismissed.
43. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A. No. 4190 of
2026 is hereby, dismissed.
44. In consequence thereof, the instant Letters Patent Appeal also stands
dismissed.
45. Pending Interlocutory Application, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Sanjay Prasad, J.)
14th July, 2026
Saurabh/-
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 17.07.2026
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