Chattisgarh High Court
Niranjan Das vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 10 March, 2026
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2026:CGHC:11504
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ORDER RESERVED ON 28.02.2026
ORDER DELIVERED ON 10.03.2026
ORDER UPLOADED ON 10.03.2026
MCRC No. 1065 of 2026
Niranjan Das S/o Late Shri Laxminarayan Das Aged About 63 Years
R/o House No. 61, Rama Greens, Near Las Vista Society, Amlidih, VIP
Road, Labhandih, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Applicant (s)
versus
Directorate Of Enforcement Through Assistant Director, E.D. Raipur
Zonal Office, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s)
For Applicant (s) : Shri Arshdeep Singh Khurana, learned
counsel through VC assisted by Shri
Mayank Kumar, Advocate
For Respondent/ED : Shri Zoheb Hossain, Advocate through VC
assisted by Dr. Sourabh Kumar Pande,
Special Public Prosecutor
(HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ARVIND KUMAR VERMA)
C A V Order
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The present application is the first bail application filed by the
Applicant under Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 read with Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
in connection with ECIR No. ECIR/RPZO/04/2024 dated 11.04.2024
registered by the Directorate of Enforcement for the offences
punishable under Sections 3 and 4 of the PMLA. The said ECIR is
predicated upon FIR No. 04/2024 dated 17.01.2024 registered by ACB,
Raipur for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the
IPC read with Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, relating to the alleged liquor scam in the State of Chhattisgarh.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The genesis of the present proceedings traces back to a
prosecution complaint filed by the Income Tax Department bearing Ct.
Case No.1183/2022 under Sections 276C, 277 and 278E of the Income
Tax Act read with Sections 120-B, 191, 199, 200 and 204 IPC, on the
basis of which the Directorate of Enforcement registered ECIR No.
ECIR/RPZO/11/2022 (ECIR-11). The said ECIR was premised upon an
erroneous assumption that Section 120-B IPC by itself constituted a
scheduled offence under the PMLA. The validity of ECIR-11 was
subsequently challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Writ
Petition (Criminal) No.153 of 2023 by certain co-accused persons.
3. By orders dated 28.04.2023 and 18.07.2023, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court granted protection to the concerned petitioners and
stayed further proceedings in relation to ECIR-11. Eventually, the
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Supreme Court by judgment dated 08.04.2024 quashed the prosecution
complaint forming the basis of ECIR-11 holding that no scheduled
offence was made out and consequently there were no proceeds of
crime under the PMLA in relation thereto.
4. Prior thereto, upon realizing the absence of any scheduled
offence in ECIR-11, the Directorate of Enforcement had addressed a
communication dated 11.07.2023 under Section 66 of the PMLA to the
ACB, Raipur seeking registration of an FIR so as to create a predicate
offence. A similar communication was also sent to the Uttar Pradesh
Police on 28.07.2023. Pursuant thereto, FIR No.196/2023 dated
30.07.2023 was registered at Police Station Kasna, Greater Noida,
Uttar Pradesh under Sections 420, 468, 471, 473, 484 and 120-B IPC.
Subsequently, FIR No.04/2024 dated17.01.2024 was registered by
ACB/EOW, Raipur relating to the alleged liquor scam in the State of
Chhattisgarh, which was treated as the predicate offence for the
purposes of the PMLA. Immediately after the quashing of ECIR-11 by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Directorate of Enforcement registered
the present ECIR No. ECIR/RPZO/04/2024 on 11.04.2024 treating the
Chhattisgarh FIR as the underlying scheduled offence.
5. In the meantime, certain co-accused persons including the
Applicant had approached this Court seeking quashing of the predicate
offence FIR. During the pendency of those proceedings, the respondent
agency made a statement before this Court that no coercive action
would be taken against the applicants. However, the said petition was
eventually dismissed by order dated 20.08.2024 and the interim
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protection granted earlier stood vacated. The said order was thereafter
challenged before the Supreme Court in SLP (Criminal) No.12864 of
2024. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the petitions on
16.09.2025, issued a categorical direction to the investigating agencies
including the Directorate of Enforcement to conclude the investigation
and file the complaint or additional charge-sheet within a period of three
months.
6. The period stipulated by the Supreme Court expired on
15.12.2025. However, no prosecution complaint was filed by the
Directorate of Enforcement within the said period. Instead, the Applicant
came to be arrested by the Enforcement Directorate on 19.12.2025 in
the present ECIR after expiry of the time limit granted by the Supreme
Court. It is further the case of the Applicant that the arrest was effected
despite the fact that the Applicant was already in judicial custody in
relation to the predicate offence FIR and no permission to arrest was
obtained from the jurisdictional Special Court (PC Act), Raipur. It is also
contended that the arrest was not necessitated for any investigative
purpose and was carried out only after expiry of the time granted by the
Supreme Court for completion of investigation. Within seven days of the
arrest of the Applicant, the Directorate of Enforcement filed the fifth
supplementary prosecution complaint on 26.12.2025 arraying the
Applicant as an accused. The Applicant has since remained in judicial
custody.
7. It is the further case of the Applicant that the allegations against
him arise out of the alleged liquor policy of the State of Chhattisgarh
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and the functioning of the Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation
Limited (CSMCL). According to the Applicant, the purchase, sale and
distribution of liquor in the State was carried out under the aegis of
CSMCL and the Applicant had no role whatsoever in the functioning of
the said corporation. It is also asserted that a departmental inquiry
conducted by the jurisdictional Commercial Tax (Excise) Department did
not find any illegality in relation to the transactions in question.
8. The record further indicates that within seven days of the arrest of
the Applicant, i.e., on 26.12.2025, the Directorate of Enforcement
filed a prosecution complaint against the Applicant and 52 other
individuals (excluding five companies). Notably, apart from the
Applicant and one Ms. Saumya Chaurasia, none of the other
accused persons were arrested by the prosecuting agency despite
the fact that several of them are alleged to have played a more
significant role in the commission of the alleged offence of money
laundering and are alleged to have derived much larger proceeds of
crime.
9. It is also pointed out that as many as 29 officers of the Excise
Department were arraigned as accused persons without being
arrested by the Enforcement Directorate, thereby entitling them to
the benefit flowing from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Tarsem
Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement. However, despite the Applicant
also being an Excise Officer, he alone was singled out for arrest by the
Enforcement Directorate, which according to the Applicant
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demonstrates a selective and targeted approach adopted by the
investigating agency.
10. The Applicant thereafter preferred a bail application before the
learned Special Judge (PMLA), which came to be dismissed vide order
dated 23.01.2026, and the Applicant continues to remain in judicial
custody since then. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the Applicant has
approached this Court seeking enlargement on regular bail.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT
11. Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant submits as under:
I. Impugned order is legally unsustainable
It is submitted that the learned Special Judge (PMLA) has gravely
erred in dismissing the Applicant’s bail application vide order dated
23.01.2026 without properly appreciating the factual matrix and the
settled principles governing grant of bail. A perusal of the impugned
order would reveal that the learned Special Judge has merely
reproduced the allegations levelled by the prosecution and has failed to
undertake any meaningful analysis of the submissions advanced on
behalf of the Applicant. The order thus suffers from non-application of
mind and proceeds solely on the perceived gravity of the allegations
without considering the settled parameters governing the grant of bail.
II. Investigation qua the Applicant stands completed
12. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the investigation
qua the Applicant stands concluded and his further custodial detention
serves no investigative purpose whatsoever. It is submitted that the
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Applicant was arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement on
19.12.2025. Within seven days of such arrest, the ED filed the 5th
Supplementary Prosecution Complaint dated 26.12.2025, arraying the
Applicant as an accused. The complaint itself records that the
investigation in respect of the role of the arrested accused persons
stands complete. In such circumstances, when the investigating agency
itself admits completion of investigation qua the Applicant, his continued
incarceration becomes wholly unjustified. The Applicant has already
undergone ED custody and thereafter judicial custody and therefore
there remains no requirement of further custodial interrogation.
III. Arrest of the Applicant is in clear disregard of the order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court
13. It is submitted that the Supreme Court, vide order dated
16.09.2025, while dealing with the petitions relating to the alleged liquor
scam, had categorically directed the investigating agencies including
the ED to complete the investigation and file the complaint/additional
complaint within a period of three months, i.e., on or before 15.12.2025.
However the ED failed to file any complaint within the stipulated period.
Instead, the Applicant was suddenly arrested on 19.12.2025, i.e., four
days after the expiry of the deadline fixed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court.
14. Learned counsel submits that such conduct clearly demonstrates
that the arrest of the Applicant was not necessitated by any
investigative requirement but was undertaken solely to circumvent the
directions of the Apex Court and to prolong the Applicant’s pre-trial
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incarceration. The arrest thus stands in the teeth of the binding
directions of the Supreme Court and is nothing but a manifest abuse of
the process of law.
IV. Arrest was wholly unnecessary and mala fide
15. It is further submitted that during the entire three-month period
granted by the Supreme Court, the ED never deemed it necessary to
interrogate or arrest the Applicant. The sudden arrest immediately after
the expiry of the deadline clearly establishes that the arrest was not
driven by investigative necessity, and it was carried out only to prolong
the Applicant’s incarceration. This is further evident from the fact that
the prosecution complaint running into hundreds of pages and
supported by numerous documents was filed within seven days of the
arrest, thereby clearly demonstrating that all material was already
available with the ED and the arrest was neither necessary nor justified.
V. Selective and discriminatory arrest
16. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the conduct of the
ED in the present case clearly reflects a selective and pick-and-choose
approach. It is pointed out that the prosecution complaint names more
than 50 accused persons. Apart from the Applicant and one other
accused, none of the remaining accused persons were arrested.
Further as many as 29 officers of the Excise Department have been
arrayed as accused without arrest. Several other individuals who are
alleged to have derived substantially larger proceeds of crime have also
not been arrested. Despite being similarly placed, the Applicant alone
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has been singled out and arrested, which clearly demonstrates a
targeted and discriminatory exercise of power.
VI. Principle of parity squarely applies
17. It is submitted that the Applicant is also entitled to bail on the
principle of parity. It is submitted that several co-accused persons who
are alleged to have played a far more significant role in the alleged
scam have already been granted bail, including Anil Tuteja, Arvind
Singh,Trilok Singh Dhillon, Anwar Dhebar, Arun Pati Tripathi,
granted bail by the Supreme Court. Accused Chaitanya Baghel was
granted bail by this Court
In fact, six out of nine arrested co-accused persons have already
been enlarged on bail by the Supreme Court as well as the High court
primarily on the ground of prolonged incarceration and delay in trial.
Therefore, it is submitted that denial of bail to the present Applicant
would amount to discriminatory treatment, contrary to settled principles
governing grant of bail.
VII. Applicant’s role is demonstrably lesser
18. It is further submitted that even as per the case set up by the
prosecution, the alleged role attributed to the Applicant is substantially
lesser than that of several other co-accused persons who are alleged to
have derived enormous financial benefits from the alleged scam and
played a far more central role in the alleged conspiracy. Despite this,
those individuals have either been granted bail or have not even been
arrested, which clearly entitles the Applicant to the benefit of parity.
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VIII. Trial is unlikely to commence in the near future
19. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the trial in the
present case is likely to take considerable time. The prosecution
complaint itself indicates that over 80 accused persons have been
named, more than 117 witnesses are cited, Statements of over 200
individuals under Section 50 PMLA have been recorded. The
proceedings are presently at the pre-cognizance stage, and even
cognizance has not yet been taken.
20. After cognizance all accused persons will have to be heard,
documents will have to be supplied and scrutinized, thereafter
arguments on charge will be heard. Thus, it is evident that even the
framing of charges is not likely to take place in the near future, and the
trial itself will take several years.
IX. Continued incarceration violates Article 21
21. It is submitted that the right to speedy trial is a facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India, as repeatedly held by the Supreme Court. In
cases involving large number of accused and voluminous evidence, the
constitutional courts have consistently held that continued incarceration
pending trial becomes unjustified, particularly when the investigation is
already complete.
X. Object of bail is not punitive
22. it is submitted that the object of bail is neither punitive nor
preventive. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the presence
of the accused during trial. It is well settled that punishment begins only
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after conviction, and therefore pre-trial detention should not be
permitted to assume the character of punishment. In the present case,
the Applicant has already undergone significant incarceration, the
investigation is complete, the trial is unlikely to commence in the near
future. Thus, continued detention of the Applicant would amount to pre-
trial punishment, which is impermissible in law.
XI. Twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA satisfied
23. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the Applicant
satisfies the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA, inasmuch
as there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant is not
guilty of the alleged offence, and the Applicant is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. The Applicant has cooperated with the
investigation throughout and there is no allegation that he has
attempted to tamper with evidence or influence witnesses.
XII. Applicant has deep roots in society
24. It is submitted that the Applicant is a permanent resident and has
deep roots in society. There is no possibility of his absconding or
evading the process of law. The Applicant undertakes to fully cooperate
with the trial and abide by any conditions that may be imposed by this
Court.
25. Learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant, while reiterating the
submissions already advanced, further contended that the continued
incarceration of the Applicant serves no useful purpose, particularly
when the investigation in relation to the Applicant stands substantially
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concluded and the prosecution complaint has already been filed. He
submits that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prolonged
incarceration pending trial is a valid ground for grant of bail even in
cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Reliance is
placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Arvind Dharm v.
Directorate of Enforcement, wherein bail was granted on account of
delay even when the accused had undergone only three months of
custody.
26. It is further submitted that it is not even the case of the
Enforcement Directorate that the Applicant, if released on bail, would
either influence witnesses or tamper with evidence. Nor is it the case of
the respondent agency that the release of the Applicant would hamper
the course of investigation or trial. Thus, in the absence of any such
apprehension, continued detention of the Applicant becomes wholly
unjustified.
XIII. Failure of the Respondent Agency to Obtain Sanction for
Prosecution
27. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution complaint in
the present case has been filed without obtaining sanction for
prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C (now Section 218 BNSS) despite
the Applicant being a public servant at the relevant time. It is submitted
that the Enforcement Directorate itself admits that sanction for
prosecution was applied for only on 06.01.2026. However, the
prosecution complaint was filed earlier on 26.12.2025 without obtaining
sanction from the competent authority. In the absence of such sanction,
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cognizance of the offence cannot be taken by the Special Court,
thereby rendering the prosecution complaint legally infirm.
28. He submits that similarly placed co-accused Anil Tuteja and
Arun Pati Tripathi, who are also public servants and against whom
even graver allegations have been levelled, have already been granted
bail on account of non-obtaining of sanction for prosecution. It is further
contended that the argument advanced by the Enforcement Directorate
relying upon the proviso to Section 218 BNSS regarding deemed
sanction after 120 days is wholly misconceived. The said period itself
has not yet expired and therefore the agency cannot seek to justify the
continued incarceration of the Applicant on the assumption that
sanction would eventually be granted.
XIV. No Need or Necessity of Arrest
29. Learned counsel submits that the arrest of the Applicant was
wholly unnecessary and unjustified. It is pointed out that allegations
against the Applicant were first raised in the earlier ECIR bearing ECIR-
11, which has already been quashed by the Supreme Court on
08.04.2024. Even thereafter, in the present ECIR registered on
11.04.2024, the Applicant was not arrested for a considerable period
despite the filing of multiple prosecution complaints. Significantly, the
Applicant was arrested only on 19.12.2025 and the prosecution
complaint was filed within seven days of his arrest on 26.12.2025. This
clearly demonstrates that all material was already in possession of the
investigating agency and therefore there existed no investigative
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necessity for arrest. The belated arrest was thus effected only with a
view to prolong the Applicant’s pre-trial incarceration.
30. Learned counsel further submits that the Applicant had appeared
before the Enforcement Directorate on multiple occasions and
cooperated with the investigation. Even after his last appearance on
09.06.2025, no summons was issued to the Applicant for nearly six
months, after which he was suddenly arrested. It is further submitted
that the contention of the Enforcement Directorate that the Applicant
had not cooperated with the investigation is completely unfounded. It is
well settled that mere refusal to make a confession cannot be treated
as non-cooperation. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, as
well as the decisions in Santosh v. State of Maharashtra and Shally
Mahant @ Sandeep v. State of Punjab.
XV. Pick and Choose Investigation and Parity
31. Learned counsel further submits that the investigation conducted
by the Enforcement Directorate suffers from manifest arbitrariness and
a clear pick-and-choose approach. It is pointed out that a non-arrest
prosecution complaint has been filed against 58 co-accused persons,
including 29 officers of the Excise Department. All such individuals have
been arrayed as accused without arrest.
32. It is submitted that this Court itself has taken judicial notice of the
selective manner in which the investigation has been conducted while
granting bail to co-accused in the present case, including in the order
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passed in Chaitanya Baghel. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits that the Applicant also belonged to the Excise Department, and
therefore the principle of parity squarely applies in his favour.
33. It was further contended on behalf of the Applicant that several
other individuals who are alleged to have derived far greater proceeds
of crime in the alleged liquor scam have neither been arrested nor
proceeded against by the investigating agency. It was submitted that,
according to the prosecution itself, certain excise officers are alleged to
have collectively obtained proceeds of crime amounting to nearly ₹90
crores, with some individuals allegedly receiving amounts exceeding
₹12 crores, yet no coercive action has been taken against them. It was
also urged that key beneficiaries and facilitators of the alleged scam,
including distillers, manpower and cash-collection agencies, as well as
certain private individuals allegedly involved in transactions running into
hundreds of crores, have not been arrested by the Investigating Agency.
Similarly, Laxmi Narayan Bansal @ Pappu Bansal and Vikas
Agarwal @ Shubu (absconding) who are alleged to have received
proceeds of crime running into hundreds of crores, has also not been
arrested despite issuance of non-bailable warrants.
34. Further contention of the Applicant is that the prosecution has
primarily relied upon statements of certain individuals recorded in
earlier proceedings, which were subsequently retracted, and therefore
such statements cannot form the sole basis for attributing criminal
liability to him. However, as discussed hereinabove, the non-arrest of
certain other accused persons or the alleged magnitude of proceeds of
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crime attributed to them cannot, by itself, constitute a ground for grant
of bail to the Applicant, particularly when the prosecution attributes to
him a distinct and supervisory role in the alleged offence.
35. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that when persons
alleged to have played a far more significant role have either been
granted bail or have not been arrested at all, the Applicant is clearly
entitled to the benefit of parity. Reliance in this regard is placed upon
the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Vipin Yadav v. Directorate of
Enforcement.
XVI. Amount of Alleged Proceeds of Crime Irrelevant
36. It is further submitted that the allegation of the Enforcement
Directorate that the Applicant is alleged to have obtained proceeds of
crime of ₹18 crores cannot be a ground to deny bail. Under the scheme
of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the offence is attracted
upon laundering of proceeds of crime and no distinction in punishment
has been made on the basis of the quantum involved. Moreover, as per
the own case of the Enforcement Directorate, several other excise
officers are alleged to have obtained proceeds of crime exceeding ₹12
crores individually and approximately ₹90 crores cumulatively, yet they
have not been arrested.
XVII. Case Based on Retracted and Inadmissible Statements
37. Learned counsel for the applicant further submits that the entire
case of the prosecution rests upon retracted and legally inadmissible
statements. The Enforcement Directorate has primarily relied upon
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statements of Arun Pati Tripathi and Arvind Singh, which were
recorded in the proceedings arising out of ECIR-11, which itself has
already been quashed. Both the said statements have subsequently
been retracted by the makers, and therefore they cannot form the basis
for denying bail to the Applicant. Reliance in this regard is placed upon
the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Raman Bhuraria v.
Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine Del. 657.
38. Lastly, he submits that the arrest of the Applicant was wholly
unnecessary, the prosecution complaint has been filed without sanction
for prosecution, the investigation suffers from manifest arbitrariness and
selective action and the case of the prosecution is based primarily on
retracted and inadmissible statements. It is therefore submitted that the
Applicant has made out a strong case for grant of bail, and his
continued incarceration would be wholly unjustified.
REPLY/OBJECTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/ED
39. Per contra, Shri Hossain, learned counsel appearing for the
Directorate of Enforcement vehemently opposed the bail application
and made the following submissions:
It is submitted that the present case discloses a well-orchestrated
and systemic economic offence involving large-scale laundering of
proceeds of crime generated from illegal liquor operations in the State
of Chhattisgarh. The material collected during investigation clearly
demonstrates that the Applicant, while holding the office of Excise
Commissioner and subsequently Secretary, Excise, played a pivotal
and supervisory role in facilitating the illegal liquor syndicate, which
18resulted in generation of enormous proceeds of crime. The offence of
money laundering under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
is not an ordinary offence but constitutes a serious economic offence
having far-reaching consequences on the financial and economic fabric
of the country. The Supreme Court has consistently held that offences
under the PMLA must be viewed with greater seriousness, as such
offences affect not merely individuals but the economic stability and
integrity of the nation. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v.
Union of India (2022 SCC OnLine SC 929), wherein it has been
categorically held that the rigours contained in Section 45 of the PMLA
are mandatory in nature, and before granting bail the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail.
II. Rigours of Section 45 of PMLA
40. Learned counsel for the respondent/ED submits that a person
accused of an offence under the PMLA cannot be granted bail in a
routine manner. The statutory mandate contained in Section 45 of the
PMLA overrides the general provisions relating to bail under the Code
of Criminal Procedure. It is contended that the twin conditions stipulated
under Section 45 are mandatory, and unless the Court records a
satisfaction that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence, bail cannot be granted. Reliance in
this regard is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union
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of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad (2025 SCC OnLine SC 306), wherein it
has been reiterated that the conditions contained in Section 45 are
stringent and must be strictly complied with while considering bail under
the PMLA. It is submitted that in the present case, the Applicant has
failed to satisfy the mandatory twin conditions prescribed under Section
45, and therefore the bail application deserves to be rejected.
III. Prima Facie Case Established Against the Applicant
41. He submits that the Prosecution Complaint dated 26.12.2025,
along with the material collected during investigation, clearly
establishes a prima facie case of money laundering against the
Applicant. Investigation has revealed that after the Applicant assumed
charge as Excise Commissioner in May 2019, he entered into active
coordination with co-accused Anwar Dhebar and other members of the
liquor syndicate to facilitate an illegal scheme relating to the sale and
distribution of liquor in the State. Evidence collected during investigation
shows that the Applicant was in regular communication with Anwar
Dhebar, and examination of the WhatsApp chats and call detail records
shows that 39 calls were exchanged between them during the relevant
period, clearly indicating a pattern of close coordination. It is further
submitted that several District Excise Officers across 15 districts of the
State have recorded statements under Section 50 of the PMLA,
wherein they have categorically admitted that unaccounted “Part-B
liquor” was being sold through State-run liquor shops; they were
instructed by senior officers including the Applicant not to interfere in the
said illegal operations; even flying squads were directed to ignore the
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transportation and sale of such illegal liquor. These statements clearly
demonstrate that the illegal liquor operations were carried out with the
knowledge and protection of the Applicant, who was heading the Excise
Department at the relevant time.
IV. Policy Manipulation and Facilitation of the Liquor Syndicate
42. Learned counsel for the respondent/ED further submits that the
investigation has revealed that the Applicant played a key role in
manipulating excise policy and administrative decisions in order to
facilitate the illegal liquor syndicate. It has been established that the
landing price of country liquor was artificially increased during FY 2019-
20 and FY 2020-21, such increases lacked any cost-based justification,
and the same were intended to enable extraction of illegal commission
from liquor manufacturers.
43. Investigation further revealed that the introduction of the FL-10A
license and modifications in tender conditions relating to hologram
supply were designed to favour pre-selected vendors associated with
the liquor syndicate. The tender for supply of holograms was awarded
to M/s Prism Holography and Security Films Pvt. Ltd., with the
understanding that duplicate holograms would be supplied whenever
required by the syndicate. Statements recorded during investigation
clearly indicate that the Applicant, being the head of the Excise
Department, facilitated these policy changes and administrative
decisions, thereby enabling the illegal extraction of commission from
liquor suppliers.
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V. Illegal Collection and Distribution of Proceeds of Crime
44. It is next submitted that the investigation has further revealed a
systematic mechanism for collection and distribution of illegal proceeds
of crime generated from the sale of Part-B liquor. Evidence collected
during investigation shows that an amount of ₹150 per box of liquor was
collected as illegal commission, which was distributed among members
of the syndicate and certain officials. Out of the said amount ₹50 lakh
per month was delivered to the Applicant, an equal amount was paid to
the then Excise Minister and the remaining amount was distributed
among other officials and members of the syndicate. Statements of
Iqbal Khan and Kanhaiya Lal Kurre clearly describe the manner in
which cash was delivered to the official residence of the Applicant.
45. Based on the material collected during investigation, it has been
established that the Applicant acquired proceeds of crime to the tune of
approximately ₹18 crores.
VI. Evidence of Proceeds of Crime
45. It is further submitted that the investigation has revealed deposits
of unexplained funds in the bank accounts of the Applicant and his
family members. Approximately ₹73 lakh has been found deposited in
bank accounts of family members, including accounts of his son, who
admittedly had no independent source of income. The explanation
offered by the Applicant that the deposits were made from rental income
has been found to be wholly inconsistent with the financial records,
thereby strengthening the inference that the deposits represent
proceeds of crime.
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VII. Statements under Section 50 of PMLA
46. It is submitted that the statements recorded under Section 50 of
the PMLA constitute substantive evidence and are admissible in law.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgments of the Supreme
Court in Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of Enforcement (2018) 11 SCC
46; Tarun Kumar v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023 SCC OnLine
SC 1486); Satyender Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement
(2024 INSC 217).
47. In the aforesaid judgments, the Supreme Court has categorically
held that statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA are
admissible in evidence and can form the basis for establishing a prima
facie case at the stage of bail. It is therefore submitted that the
statements recorded during investigation clearly establish the
involvement of the Applicant in the commission of the offence of money
laundering.
VIII. Sanction for Prosecution Not a Ground for Bail
48. Learned counsel further submits that the contention of the
Applicant that sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC has not
been obtained is wholly misconceived. It is submitted that the alleged
acts of money laundering were not performed in discharge of official
duties, and therefore the question of sanction does not arise at this
stage. In any case, sanction for prosecution has already been applied
for before the competent authority and is presently under consideration.
It is further submitted that the absence of sanction, even if assumed,
would be a curable defect, and the issue can be raised at the stage of
23
cognizance or trial. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment
of the Jharkhand High Court in Pooja Singhal v. Directorate of
Enforcement (2025), wherein it was held that absence of sanction
does not vitiate the proceedings and cannot be a ground for grant of
bail.
IX. Parity Cannot Be Claimed
49. Learned counsel further submits that the Applicant cannot claim
bail on the ground of parity with other accused persons. The Supreme
Court in Tarun Kumar v. Directorate of Enforcement (2023) has
categorically held that parity is not the law and each bail application
must be examined on the basis of the individual role and involvement of
the accused. Similarly, in Sagar v. State of U.P. (2025 INSC 1370), the
Supreme Court held that parity cannot be treated as an absolute
ground for grant of bail.
50. In the present case, the Applicant occupied a position of highest
authority in the Excise Department, and the material on record shows
that he played a central role in facilitating the illegal liquor syndicate.
Therefore, the Applicant cannot claim parity with other accused
persons.
X. Gravity of the Offence
51. Learned counsel for the respondent/ED submits that the offence
in the present case involves large-scale corruption and generation of
illicit proceeds running into hundreds of crores, affecting the public
exchequer and undermining the regulatory framework governing liquor
distribution in the State. Economic offences of such magnitude have
24
been consistently treated by the Supreme Court as grave offences
affecting the economic health of the nation, and therefore require a
strict approach while considering bail.
52. Learned counsel for the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) has
placed the following further submissions:
It is submitted that the present case pertains to a large-scale and
well-organized economic offence involving generation and laundering of
massive proceeds of crime arising out of an illegal liquor syndicate
operating within the State of Chhattisgarh. The material collected during
investigation clearly demonstrates that the Applicant, while holding the
high public office of Excise Commissioner and Managing Director of the
Chhattisgarh State Marketing Corporation Limited, played a central and
supervisory role in facilitating the illegal scheme, thereby enabling the
generation and concealment of substantial proceeds of crime.
53. He contends that economic offences constitute a class apart and
must be approached with greater circumspection while considering the
question of grant of bail. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Amit
Kumar (2017) 13 SCC 751 and Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI
(20137 SCC 439 has categorically held that economic offences having
deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds must
be viewed seriously, as they pose a serious threat to the economic
health of the nation. Similarly, in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of
Enforcement (AIR 2019 SC 4198), the Supreme Court reiterated that
economic offences stand on a different footing from ordinary offences,
25
and the gravity of such offences must weigh heavily with the Court while
considering an application for bail.
XI. Non-Arrest of Co-Accused Not a Ground for Bail
54. Learned counsel submits that the contention raised on behalf of
the Applicant that several other accused persons have not been
arrested and therefore he is entitled to bail on the ground of parity is
wholly misconceived and legally untenable. It is submitted that the
investigation conducted by the ED revealed that a substantial portion of
the proceeds of crime generated from the illegal liquor operations had
been traced to various excise officers. After a detailed financial
investigation, the ED has been able to identify and attach the proceeds
of crime held by those officers in the form of immovable properties,
shares, mutual funds, insurance policies and deposits in bank accounts.
It is further submitted that almost the entire proceeds of crime held by
those officers have already been attached, and during the course of
investigation those officers fully cooperated with the investigating
agency, thereby obviating the necessity of arrest in their cases.
55. In contrast, the Applicant did not cooperate with the investigation
and deliberately avoided appearing before the ED despite repeated
summons. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai
Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452, wherein it has been held that mere non-
arrest of co-accused cannot be treated as a ground for grant of bail,
and each case must be examined on the basis of the individual role and
conduct of the accused concerned. It is further submitted that the
26
Applicant occupied the highest administrative position in the Excise
Department, and therefore his role stands on an entirely different
footing from that of other officers.
XII. Non-Cooperation by the Applicant
56. It is submitted that the Applicant did not cooperate with the
investigation despite repeated summons issued by the Directorate of
Enforcement. It is submitted that out of six summons issued to the
Applicant, he appeared only on three occasions and failed to comply
with the remaining summons. Even during the occasions when he
appeared before the ED, he did not extend meaningful cooperation and
withheld crucial information relating to the proceeds of crime. It is
further submitted that the Applicant deliberately failed to provide any
explanation regarding the source of funds relating to properties and
bank deposits standing in his name and in the names of his family
members, which were subsequently attached during the course of
investigation. The conduct of the Applicant clearly demonstrates that he
has not cooperated with the investigation, and therefore his case stands
on a completely different footing from that of other accused persons.
XIII. Magnitude of Proceeds of Crime
57. He submits that the investigation has revealed that the Applicant
procured proceeds of crime amounting to approximately ₹18 crores,
arising out of illegal liquor operations. Out of this amount, the ED has
already been able to attach properties worth ₹8.83 crores in the name
of the Applicant and his family members, while the remaining proceeds
of crime are suspected to have been concealed by him. During the
27
course of examination under Section 50 of the PMLA, the Applicant
failed to disclose the source of these funds, thereby strengthening the
inference that the assets represent proceeds of crime generated
through illegal activities.
XIV. Arrest After Two Years Fully Justified
58. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the contention
of the Applicant that he was arrested after a gap of two years from
registration of the ECIR is entirely misconceived. It is submitted that the
Applicant had earlier approached the Supreme Court challenging the
predicate FIR and was granted interim protection from taking
coercive action while directing him to cooperate with the investigation.
The said interim protection continued until 16.09.2025, when the
Supreme Court vacated the interim protection granted to the Applicant.
59. It is therefore submitted that prior to the vacation of the interim
protection granted by the Supreme Court, the Applicant could not have
been arrested and immediately upon the lifting of such protection, the
ED proceeded to take action in accordance with law.
XV. Filing of Prosecution Complaint within Seven Days of Arrest
60. Learned counsel further submits that the Applicant has attempted
to argue that the prosecution complaint was filed within seven days of
his arrest, thereby suggesting that his arrest was unnecessary. This
contention is wholly misconceived.
61. It is submitted that under Section 19 of the PMLA, an arrest can
only be effected when the authorized officer has reason to believe,
28
based on material in his possession, that the person concerned is guilty
of the offence of money laundering. Thus, the arrest of the Applicant
was made only after the investigating officer had gathered sufficient
material demonstrating his involvement in the offence. Reliance in this
regard is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Arvind
Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, wherein it has been held that
arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA must be preceded by the
formation of a reasoned belief based on material in possession of the
investigating officer.
XVI. Period of Incarceration Not Long Enough
62. Learned counsel for the respondent/ED submits that the
Applicant has sought bail on the ground of alleged prolonged
incarceration. However, the period of custody undergone by the
Applicant is barely about two months, which by no stretch of
imagination can be considered as a long period of incarceration. The
Supreme Court in Manish Sisodia v. CBI (2023 SCC OnLine SC
1393) has held that bail on the ground of delay in trial can be
considered only when the accused has undergone an inordinately long
period of incarceration coupled with the improbability of early
conclusion of trial. Similarly, in Udhav Singh v. Directorate of
Enforcement (2025 SCC OnLine SC 357), the Supreme Court clarified
that even a period of seven months of custody cannot be treated as
long incarceration.
63. Furthermore, various decisions of the Supreme Court have
refused bail even after prolonged custody, including:
29
Anil Tuteja v. Union of India – bail refused after 11 months and 24
days of custody.
Vedpal Singh Tanwar v. Directorate of Enforcement – bail refused
after 1 year 4 months of custody.
Shahnawaz Ahmed Jeelani v. Directorate of Enforcement – bail
refused after 1 year 6 months of custody.
Vipin Kumar Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement – bail refused
after 1 year 3 months of custody.
Bimal Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement – bail refused even
after more than two years of custody.
In light of these precedents, the Applicant’s custody of merely a
few weeks cannot be considered a valid ground for grant of bail.
XVII. Economic Offences Require a Strict Approach
64. Learned counsel for the respondent/ED submits that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that economic offences
involving large-scale financial irregularities must be viewed with greater
seriousness. In Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI (2013) 7 SCC 466, the
Supreme Court held that economic offences constitute grave offences
affecting the economy of the country and therefore must be treated
differently while considering bail. Similarly, in State of Gujarat v.
Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal (1987) 2 SCC 364, the Supreme Court
observed that economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State
must be dealt with sternly, as such offences undermine the faith of
society in the justice delivery system.
30
65. Recently, the Supreme Court in Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma
v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025 INSC 349) reiterated that the
PMLA has been enacted to combat the menace of money laundering
and to prevent the integration of proceeds of crime into the formal
financial system, and therefore courts must adopt a strict approach
while dealing with such offences. Similarly, in Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay
Pal Gupta, the Supreme Court observed that in offences of a pecuniary
nature where innocent individuals are cheated of their hard-earned
money, the Court must carefully balance the liberty of the accused
against the larger interests of society.
66. It is therefore submitted that the Applicant has played a central
role in facilitating the illegal liquor syndicate, the investigation has
revealed generation and concealment of substantial proceeds of crime,
the Applicant did not cooperate with the investigation, the period of
custody undergone by him is extremely short and the offence involved
is a grave economic offence affecting the financial integrity of the State.
It is therefore submitted that the Applicant does not deserve the
discretionary relief of bail, and the present bail application is liable to be
dismissed.
FINDINGS
67. Having heard learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant and
learned counsel representing the Directorate of Enforcement at length,
and having carefully perused the material placed on record including
the Prosecution Complaint, statements recorded under Section 50 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the documents annexed
31
with the pleadings and the judgments relied upon by the respective
parties, this Court proceeds to examine whether the Applicant has
made out a case for grant of bail.
68. It is to be noted that the present case arises out of allegations
pertaining to a large-scale liquor syndicate operating within the State of
Chhattisgarh, wherein it is alleged that illegal sale of liquor through
State-run outlets resulted in generation of enormous proceeds of crime
which were thereafter laundered through various channels. The
Applicant, at the relevant point of time, was occupying the position of
Excise Commissioner and Managing Director of the Chhattisgarh State
Marketing Corporation Limited, and according to the prosecution,
played a pivotal role in facilitating the said illegal scheme.
69. The Directorate of Enforcement, on the basis of material collected
during investigation, alleges that the Applicant received proceeds of
crime amounting to approximately ₹18 crores, out of which assets worth
₹8.83 crores have already been attached in his name and in the names
of his family members.
I. Applicability of Section 45 of the PMLA
70. Before adverting to the rival submissions in detail, it would be
apposite to note that the offence alleged against the Applicant falls
within the ambit of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and
therefore the rigours of Section 45 of the PMLA are attracted. The
Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2022
SCC OnLine SC 929) has categorically held that the twin conditions
32
contained in Section 45 are mandatory in nature. The Court while
considering an application for bail under the PMLA must record its
satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence; and the accused is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.
71. The said conditions have been reiterated by the Supreme Court
in subsequent judgments including Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad
and other decisions dealing with offences under the PMLA. Thus, while
considering the present bail application, this Court is required to
examine whether the Applicant has been able to satisfy the aforesaid
statutory conditions.
II. Role Attributed to the Applicant
72. From the material placed on record, it prima facie emerges that
the Applicant was occupying the highest administrative position in the
Excise Department during the relevant period and the investigation
conducted by the ED indicates that the illegal liquor operations were
carried out with the knowledge and facilitation of senior officials of the
department. Statements recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA from
several excise officers indicate that unaccounted liquor was sold
through government liquor shops and that the field officers were
instructed not to interfere with such operations. Certain statements also
refer to the alleged delivery of cash amounts to the Applicant.
73. At the stage of consideration of bail, this Court is not required to
conduct a meticulous examination of the evidentiary value of such
33
statements. However, the material placed on record by the prosecution,
at this stage, cannot be brushed aside as wholly improbable or lacking
in substance. The Supreme Court in Rohit Tandon v. Directorate of
Enforcement (2018) 11 SCC 46 and Tarun Kumar v. Directorate of
Enforcement has held that statements recorded under Section 50 of
the PMLA constitute relevant material which may be considered by the
Court at the stage of bail for determining the existence of a prima facie
case.
III. Non-Arrest of Co-Accused
74. A significant argument advanced on behalf of the Applicant is that
several other accused persons, including officers of the Excise
Department, have not been arrested by the investigating agency and
therefore the Applicant is entitled to bail on the ground of parity. This
submission, in the opinion of this Court, does not merit acceptance. The
Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai
Reddy (2013) 7 SCC 452 has clearly held that mere non-arrest of co-
accused cannot be treated as a ground for grant of bail, and that each
accused must be considered on the basis of his own role and conduct.
In the present case, the Applicant was holding the position of Excise
Commissioner and Managing Director of the State Marketing
Corporation, and the prosecution has attributed to him a significantly
larger and supervisory role in the alleged conspiracy. Thus, a
comparison with other officers who were subordinate to him or who
allegedly played different roles cannot be mechanically drawn.
34
IV. Delay in Arrest
75. Learned Counsel for the Applicant has contended that the
Applicant was arrested nearly two years after registration of the ECIR
and therefore his arrest was unnecessary. This argument also does not
persuade this Court.
76. It is not in dispute that the Applicant had earlier approached the
Supreme Court challenging the predicate offence FIR, and during the
pendency of the said proceedings interim protection from coercive
action had been granted in his favour. The said interim protection
remained in force until 16.09.2025, when the Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and vacated the interim protection. In view of the
subsistence of the said protection, the investigating agency could not
have proceeded to arrest the Applicant earlier. Therefore, the contention
that the arrest was belated or unnecessary does not hold merit.
V. Filing of Prosecution Complaint Shortly After Arrest
77. Another submission raised on behalf of the Applicant is that the
prosecution complaint was filed within seven days of his arrest, which
allegedly indicates that his arrest was not necessary. This Court is
unable to accept the said contention.
78. Under Section 19 of the PMLA, an arrest can only be effected
when the authorized officer has reason to believe, based on material in
his possession, that the accused is guilty of the offence of money
laundering. Therefore, the filing of the prosecution complaint shortly
after arrest cannot by itself lead to an inference that the arrest was
35
unwarranted, particularly when the investigating agency claims to have
gathered sufficient material prior to the arrest.
VI. Period of Custody
79. The Applicant has also sought bail on the ground that continued
incarceration would violate his personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution. However, the period of custody undergone by the
Applicant at present is barely about two months. The Supreme Court in
Manish Sisodia v. CBI (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1393) has held that the
ground of delay in trial can be invoked only when the accused has
undergone an inordinately long period of incarceration coupled with the
likelihood that the trial would not conclude within a reasonable time.
80. Similarly, in Udhav Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement (2025
SCC OnLine SC 357), the Supreme Court has clarified that even a
period of seven months of custody cannot be considered long
incarceration so as to justify grant of bail in a PMLA case. In the present
case, the period of custody undergone by the Applicant is significantly
shorter and therefore cannot be treated as a valid ground for grant of
bail.
VII. Gravity of the Offence
81. It is well settled that economic offences constitute a class apart
and must be viewed with a different approach while considering bail.
The Supreme Court in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI,
Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI, and State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar has
consistently held that economic offences involving large-scale financial
36
irregularities must be dealt with seriously, as such offences have far-
reaching consequences on the economic fabric of the country. Similarly,
in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, the Supreme
Court observed that economic offences stand on a different footing and
the gravity of such offences must weigh heavily with the Court while
deciding bail applications.
82. In the present case, the allegations pertain to generation and
laundering of substantial proceeds of crime through manipulation of the
liquor distribution system, which prima facie involves misuse of public
office and abuse of administrative authority. Such allegations, if
ultimately established during trial, would undoubtedly constitute serious
economic offences affecting public interest.
VIII. Satisfaction of Twin Conditions
83. Having considered the material placed on record, this Court is
unable to record a satisfaction at this stage that there exist reasonable
grounds for believing that the Applicant is not guilty of the offence
alleged against him. Consequently, the mandatory twin conditions
prescribed under Section 45 of the PMLA cannot be said to have been
satisfied.
CONCLUSION
84. Upon an overall consideration of the rival submissions advanced
by learned counsel appearing for the parties, the material placed on
record, and the legal principles governing the grant of bail under the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, this Court finds that the
37
Applicant has failed to make out a case warranting the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction of this Court in his favour.
85. The allegations in the present matter pertain to a well-structured
and systemic economic offence involving generation and laundering of
substantial proceeds of crime through manipulation of the liquor
distribution mechanism within the State. The material collected during
investigation, including the statements recorded under Section 50 of the
PMLA and the financial trail traced by the investigating agency prima
facie indicates the involvement of the Applicant, who at the relevant
point of time occupied the highest administrative position in the Excise
Department, thereby holding a position of considerable authority and
influence.
86. The argument advanced on behalf of the Applicant that several
other accused persons have not been arrested and therefore he is
entitled to bail on the ground of parity does not persuade this
Court. As consistently held by the Supreme Court, parity cannot be
claimed in a mechanical manner, and the role attributed to each
accused is required to be independently assessed. In the present case,
the prosecution attributes to the Applicant a distinct and supervisory
role in the alleged conspiracy, which stands on a different footing from
that of other accused persons. As per allegation of the prosecution
agency, he is one of the “kingpin” of the present crime of liquor scam.
87. Similarly, the contention regarding delay in arrest is also devoid of
merit, inasmuch as the record clearly reflects that the Applicant was
38
enjoying interim protection from coercive action pursuant to orders of
the Supreme Court, which continued until the dismissal of his petition
and vacation of such protection. In these circumstances, the
investigating agency cannot be faulted for not effecting the arrest during
the subsistence of the said protection.
88. Equally untenable is the submission that the filing of the
prosecution complaint shortly after the arrest of the Applicant renders
the arrest unnecessary. The statutory scheme of Section 19 of the
PMLA mandates that an arrest can be effected only when the
authorized officer has reason to believe, on the basis of material in his
possession, that the person concerned is guilty of the offence of money
laundering. Therefore, the mere proximity in time between the arrest
and the filing of the prosecution complaint cannot be construed as an
indication that the arrest lacked justification.
89. This Court also cannot lose sight of the fact that the Applicant has
undergone only a relatively brief period of custody, which by no stretch
of imagination can be described as prolonged incarceration so as to
justify the grant of bail on the touchstone of Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ground of
delay in trial becomes relevant only where the accused has undergone
an inordinately long period of incarceration coupled with the
improbability of the trial concluding within a reasonable time, a situation
which is clearly not attracted in the present case.
39
90. More importantly, the offence alleged against the Applicant falls
within the domain of serious economic offences, which, as repeatedly
observed by the Supreme Court, constitute a class apart and require a
cautious and stringent approach in matters concerning bail. Economic
offences involving abuse of public office and generation of illicit financial
gains strike at the very root of public trust in governance and have far-
reaching consequences on the economic and institutional integrity of
the State.
91. A substantial argument has been advanced on behalf of the
Applicant that several other accused persons, including officers of the
Excise Department and other individuals allegedly connected with the
liquor trade, have not been arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement
and therefore the Applicant is entitled to be enlarged on bail on the
ground of parity. It has been further contended that the prosecution
complaint itself reflects that as many as 58 co-accused persons,
including 29 Excise Department officials, have been arraigned
without arrest and were consequently released on bonds under Section
88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It has also been urged that
certain persons allegedly involved in the liquor trade and described as
key facilitators or beneficiaries have not been taken into custody,
thereby demonstrating that the investigating agency has adopted a
“pick and choose” approach while exercising its power of arrest.
This Court has given its thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid
submission. However, the contention of parity raised on behalf of the
Applicant does not merit acceptance.
40
92. It is trite law that parity cannot be claimed in a mechanical or
automatic manner and the Court, while considering a plea of parity, is
required to examine the individual role attributed to the accused, the
nature of allegations against him, and the material available on record.
Parity cannot be invoked merely on the ground that certain other
accused persons have not been arrested or have been granted bail.
The Apex Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai
Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452 has categorically held that the non-arrest of
other accused persons cannot by itself constitute a valid ground for
granting bail to another accused, particularly when the role attributed to
such accused stands on a different footing. The principle of parity
applies only where the role, circumstances and allegations against the
accused seeking bail are substantially similar to those of the co-
accused who have been granted bail.
93. In the present case, the material placed on record by the
prosecution prima facie indicates that the Applicant was occupying the
position of Excise Commissioner and Managing Director of the State
Marketing Corporation during the relevant period, thereby holding the
highest administrative authority within the Excise Department. The
prosecution attributes to him a distinct supervisory and decision-making
role in the alleged scheme, which allegedly enabled the operation of the
illegal liquor syndicate and the consequent generation of proceeds of
crime.
94. Thus, the role attributed to the Applicant cannot be equated with
that of several other officers or individuals who are alleged to have
41
played different or comparatively limited roles in the overall scheme.
The mere fact that certain other accused persons have been shown in
the prosecution complaint without arrest cannot automatically entitle the
Applicant to claim parity. Furthermore, the decision as to whether an
accused is required to be arrested during investigation depends upon
several factors, including the nature of allegations, the degree of
involvement of the accused, and the requirement of custodial
interrogation, and the investigating agency is vested with discretion in
this regard. The non-exercise of the power of arrest in respect of certain
other individuals cannot be treated as a determinative factor for
granting bail to the Applicant.
95. In this context, it is also relevant to note that the Supreme Court
has repeatedly observed that the principle of parity cannot override the
statutory restrictions governing the grant of bail under special statutes,
including the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. In view of the
aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Applicant cannot claim the benefit of parity merely on the ground
that certain other accused persons have not been arrested or have
been arraigned in the prosecution complaint without arrest. The
argument of parity raised on behalf of the Applicant therefore does not
advance his case for grant of bail.
96. In the backdrop of the aforesaid circumstances, and having
regard to the material placed on record by the investigating agency, this
Court is unable, at this stage, to record the satisfaction mandated under
Section 45 of the PMLA that reasonable grounds exist for believing the
42
Applicant to be not guilty of the offences alleged. The Applicant,
entrusted with a pivotal administrative post, owed a sacred duty under
statute to mechanize and safeguard the state exchequer–yet, he
stands accused of orchestrating a colossal loss running into crores,
siphoning public funds through deliberate malfeasance. This egregious
breach of fiduciary obligation, coupled with the gravity of the
allegations, the pivotal role attributed to him, the nascent stage of
investigation, and the voluminous material amassed by the prosecuting
agency, renders the mandatory twin conditions under Section 45 wholly
unsatisfied. In light of these compelling factors and the stringent
statutory bar on bail under the PMLA, no exceptional circumstances
have been demonstrated warranting the Applicant’s enlargement at this
juncture.
Accordingly, the present bail application, having failed to meet the
exacting threshold under Section 45 of the PMLA, stands rejected.
97. It is, however, clarified that all observations recorded herein are
strictly prima facie, arising solely from the material available at this
interlocutory stage for the limited purpose of adjudicating bail. These
shall not bind, influence, or prejudice the trial Court in any manner. The
learned trial Court shall independently adjudicate the guilt or innocence
of the Applicant, untrammelled (constraints) by the views expressed
here, and solely on the basis of evidence led during trial, affording both
sides a full opportunity to establish their respective cases.
(Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge
Digitally
signed by
SUGUNA
SUGUNA DUBEY
DUBEY Date:
2026.03.10
17:44:47
+0530
