Allahabad High Court
Netram vs State Of U.P. on 5 January, 2026
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:1039
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
A.F.R.
CRIMINAL MISC. BAIL APPLICATION No. - 17430 of 2024
Netram
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Upendra Kumar Singh
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
G.A.
Court No. - 71
HON'BLE NALIN KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant as well as the learned A.G.A for the State and perused the record.
2. This is the second application for grant of bail filed on behalf of the applicant – Netram with the prayer to enlarge him on bail in Case Crime No.324 of 2022, under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station Barkheda, District Pilibhit.
3. The first bail application of the accused-applicant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 6.6.2023 on merits.
4. It is alleged in the F.I.R. that within three years of marriage, the daughter of the informant was subjected to dowry death by her in-laws including the present accused applicant, who is the husband of the deceased. It is also alleged in the F.I.R. that a demand of additional dowry was made to the deceased and she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of the aforesaid demand and when the demand was not fulfilled, she was hanged by all her in-laws. F.I.R. was lodged on 5.8.2022 and investigation started which culminated into the charge-sheet and at present the trial is going on.
5. The instant application for grant of bail has been moved on the ground of delayed trial and long incarceration period of the applicant. It is urged by the learned counsel for the applicant that he has been languishing in jail since 26.08.2022. While disposing the first bail application of the applicant, the learned trial court was directed to expedite the hearing of the trial and to conclude the same preferably within a period of one year by this Court but till date trial has not been concluded. In the instant case charge-sheet was submitted on 22.10.2022 and cognizance was taken on 21.11.2022 and after committal of the matter, trial started before the trial court and out of total 30 witnesses, only 5 witnesses have been examined till date. It is further submitted that the applicant is an undertrial and the prosecution has miserably failed to produce witnesses before the trial court vigilantly and the trial court is also proceeding with the trial in a casual manner resulting into a long incarceration of the applicant without any fault on his part. The trial is delayed unnecessarily, hence, the applicant is entitled for grant of bail.
6. Per contra, learned A.G.A. opposed the prayer for bail and submitted that the first application for grant of bail of the applicant was rejected on merits by a detailed order passed by this Court. The trial started in the year 2023 and at present it is pending for evidence and the trial court is making sincere efforts and taking all the steps to procure the appearance of the witnesses in this case. The evidence of witnesses of fact has been concluded and now trial is pending for recording the evidence of formal witnesses only. The present accused applicant is the husband of the deceased and dowry death of his wife has been caused in his own house by way of hanging and there is ample evidence recorded during the course of trial which attributes the main role of causing dowry death of the deceased, who was the only child of her parents, to her husband, the present accused applicant. It is further submitted that the trial of this case is expected to be decided expeditiously hence, there is no ground to allow the instant bail application and the same is liable to be rejected.
7. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused / applicant and the learned State counsel and perused the record.
8. So far as the case in hand is concerned, it is apparent from the perusal of the record and copies of the order-sheet that the first date for recording the evidence of prosecution witnesses was fixed as 16.1.2023. Albeit it was a case relating to an undertrial but the learned trial court took no pain to ensure the presence of the witnesses before it to record their deposition promptly and as a matter of fact after 17.11.2023 when evidence of P.W.5 was recorded, no other witness turned till date before the trial court to record his deposition and the copies of the order-sheet further reflect that no effort was made by the learned trial court to ascertain their presence before the Court and only stereo type orders were passed on subsequent dates. This made the present accused applicant to appear before the Court from jail on each and every date without any fruitful proceedings on ground. Even the mandate provided under Section 309 Cr.P.C. (Section 346 B.N.S.S.) was also not paid any attention to and the Court took no interest or pain even to see whether the processes sent to the witnesses had been returned to the Court or not and consequently the accused applicant was compelled to move second application for grant of bail before this Court.
9. A perusal of the record reflects that the first bail application of the applicant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 6.6.2023 passed in Crl. Misc. Bail Application No.20730 of 2023 and the evidence on record and the complicity of the accused as well in the commission of the alleged offence have been discussed in the aforesaid order. The earlier bail application of the accused applicant was rejected by the Court after considering all the material facts, evidence on record and circumstances of the case on merits.
10. The Courts in India have always been vigilant to protect the constitutional rights and particularly the right to liberty of a person and this approach is echoed in a catena of decisions passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and this Court as well viz : Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713, Sanjay Chandra vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40 and Hussain Ara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC 98 and so on. The principle underlying these decisions establishes that no person can be deprived of his constitutional right to liberty which includes a speedy trial as well which is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution and for an inordinate delay in trial, right to bail accrues in favour of an undertrial.
11. But in the facts and circumstances of the instant case it would not be proper that only on the basis of delayed trial, the present second bail application of the applicant should be allowed. It is a case of dowry death of a young deceased which was caused in her matrimonial house within three years of her marriage by hanging. Accused-applicant is the husband of the deceased, the most responsible person to protect his wife from all the dangers, legally and morally. While considering the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant relating to the long incarceration of the undertrial and delayed trial, in my considered view it does not, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, ipso facto entitle him to bail. Delay in trial, by itself, cannot be the sole ground to enlarge the applicant on bail where the offence alleged is grave and punishable with upto life imprisonment.
12. In Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, 2024 INSC 92 [Criminal Appeal No.704 of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.10047 of 2023)], the Hon’ble Apex Court found that bail was pressed on ground of delayed trial but the evidence on record prima facie reveal the complicity of the accused as a part of the commitment of the offence and there were chances and every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of this case which might hamper the process of justice and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case it was held that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.
13. It is a trite law that the right to speedy trial, though guaranteed as a valuable constitutional protection under Article 21, cannot be stretched to a point where it overshadows the overwhelming circumstances of guilt that stand against the accused at this stage. Delay in trial, though regrettable, is not by itself a ground for bail in cases involving grave and heinous offences, particularly where the evidence links the accused to the commission of the crime. It is also well settled that though bail is the rule and jail an exception, the nature and gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused and the societal impact of releasing an accused charged with heinous offences are relevant considerations which cannot be overlooked. Hence, to uphold an accrual of right to bail of the accused only on the ground of delayed trial will not be correct innunciation of law.
14. It also must be taken into cognizance of that the person behind the bar has no control over the proceedings of the Court and this is the uncontaminated duty of the trial Court to make all the sincere efforts for the production of the witnesses before it and the undertrial has absolutely no role in the said procedure. The Courts must be aware of the fact that if the trial is delayed on account of non-appearance of witnesses and the undertrial is only visiting the Court on each and every date from jail only to put his signature over the order-sheet and get a new date and returns to jail to further put his appearance before the Court on the next date fixed only to take another date. This is a very sorry state of affairs to which every Court must take account of. A delayed trial is certainly nothing else but a denial of justice and it should never be forgotten that speedy trial is a benign right of the accused which must not be usurped in any condition. The Presiding Officer in the Court does not sit only to adjourn the case but to ensure an effective proceeding and in this way the Presiding Officer is a person most responsible for the production of witnesses and recording their depositions before the Court. It is a denial of valuable right of personal liberty and the concept of access to justice. That is the underlying reason in certain conditions like the present one, orders for expeditious disposal of the case are passed by the High Court exercising its supervisory power upon the Subordinate Courts and the instant case deserves the same treatment.
15. During course of submission a point arose that whenever a direction is issued to a Subordinate Court for the expeditious disposal of a case, it creates panic upon the Presiding Officer who is already overburdened with the huge pendency of cases before him and if such mandate is passed in several cases the other works of the Court are certainly hampered and most of his time and energy is engaged to ensure the compliance of the orders of the High Court.
16. The Court feels that whenever a direction is issued by this Court to the Subordinate Courts for the expeditious disposal of a trial / case, it never means to create any panic to the Court concerned. As a protector of the Constitution, this Court has a constitutional power and duty as well to have a control over the functioning of the District Courts and also to issue proper directions and guidance from time to time to the trial Courts as to in what manner a trial should be taken place and also to remind the Subordinate Courts of their rights and duties. A direction for the expeditious disposal of a case aims only to keep the proceedings of the Court moving in a right direction and speed and it never intends to put the Presiding Officers in a state of stress or to make them upset. The object and reason behind passing any order or any observation made by the higher Courts should always be kept into mind by the Subordinate Courts, as held in Union of India Vs. Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another, (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases 75. It is strongly impressed upon that an order passed for expeditious disposed of a case by this Court is binding upon not only the Court / Presiding Officer concerned but upon all the stake holders viz : police and executive officers, prosecution agency, staff, counsels, litigants etc. as well.
17. However, in the instant case, keeping in view the gravity and seriousness of the offence and other relevant parameters for grant of bail, as mentioned above, I am of the view that at this stage the delayed trial cannot be supposed to be a ground to allow this repeat bail application.18. The aforesaid view of this Court finds support from the legal dictum promulgated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a very recent case of Gulfisha Fatima Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 10 (delivered on 5th January, 2026) where the bail of the undertrial was refused in a very serious offence under U.A.P.A. and necessity to maintain a balance between Article 21 of the Constitution which protects a person’s right to life and liberty and nature of the offence and law prevailing thereon was impressed upon. The relevant paragraphs of the said decision are extracted below.
“42. The approach of addressing delay-related concerns through calibrated judicial supervision, rather than automatic enlargement on bail, stands reinforced by the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Saleem Khan4. In that case, despite the accused having remained in custody for over five years and the trial not having commenced, this Court declined to interfere with the rejection of bail qua one accused, while upholding bail granted to another, thereby reiterating that delay-based pleas must necessarily be adjudicated on an accused-specific footing. Significantly, even while acknowledging the constitutional imperative of a speedy trial, the Court did not eclipse the statutory rigour under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA but instead directed expeditious conclusion of the trial and cautioned against any conduct on the part of the accused that may further protract the proceedings. The decision thus affirms that prolonged custody, though a matter of concern, does not operate as an automatic ground for grant of bail where the statutory threshold continues to be attracted.”……….
“56. ……………………… Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.“……….
“226. Delay can warrant a more searching constitutional scrutiny. But it does not authorise the Court to dilute the statutory threshold by undertaking credibility findings. The balance must be maintained: constitutional concern is real, but statutory restraint is equally real. Where the prima facie threshold continues to be crossed, delay is met through expeditious trial directions and continued judicial monitoring, not by negating Section 43D(5).”……….
19. Abdul Rehman Antuley Vs. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 is another authority on the point as to whether the accused should be released on bail if allegedly there has been an unreasonable delay in the trial. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that whenever a complaint of infringement of right to speedy trial is made the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case and it is not possible in the very nature of things and present day circumstances to draw a time-limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go.
20. On the aforesaid subject, a co-joint reading of the decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ranjan Dwivedi v. CBI, (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 945, Ram Govind Upadhyay vs Sudarshan Singh & Ors., 2002 (3) SCC 598 and Rajesh Ranjan Yadav alias Pappu Yadav Vs. CBI, AIR 2007 SC 451 reminds that the Courts ought to be cautious in its approach in the interest of society in a matter which stands out to be a social crime of very serious nature and other incriminating factors when delay in conclusion of trial is pleaded and while paying attention to Article 21 which enshrines the fundamental right to individual liberty, a balance has to be struck between the right to individual liberty and the interest of the society at the same time and the crux would be that no right can be absolute and reasonable restrictions can be placed on them. No doubt an offence in the form of dowry death is a social crime.
21. Hence, delay alone cannot justify grant of bail considering the gravity of the offence and the restrictive statutory framework. Hence, it may be summed up that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offence as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. The second bail application of the accused applicant is hereby rejected.
22. However, the learned trial court is directed to make all possible endeavour to expedite the trial of the case following the mandate provided under Section 309 Cr.P.C. (Section 346 B.N.S.S.) and to conclude it expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of presentation of certified copy of this order before it. Trial court is also directed to send monthly report regarding the progress of the case to the Registry of this Court. If the trial is not decided within the aforesaid period, the applicant will be at liberty to move another application for grant of bail before this Court.
23. This Court sincerely feels that that the Court / Presiding Officer is not the only stake holder in the justice delivery system or for trial and disposal of a case, but there are several factors which create hindrance and obstructions in the smooth functioning of a Court and sometimes derail the normal functioning of the Court viz. lawyers strike and non-cooperation with the Court, lackadaisical approach of the prosecution agency, negligence on the part of police / administrative authorities, incompetency of staff, conduct of the parties / witnesses in a case in general creating obstruction in the judicial proceedings etc., hence, besides the Presiding Officer concerned, all the stake holders i.e. police and executive authorities, prosecution agency, counsels, parties to the case, staff etc. are also made bound by this order and it will be their responsibility also to assist the Court in every manner for the expeditious disposal of this case.
(Nalin Kumar Srivastava,J.)
January 5, 2026
ss
Â
Â