Chattisgarh High Court
Neeraj Prasad vs Smt. Gauri Prasad (Died And Deleted) on 6 April, 2026
1
AFR
Digitally
VISHAKHA signed by
BEOHAR VISHAKHA
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BEOHAR
FA No. 79 of 2022
Order Reserved on : 19.03.2026
Order Delivered on : 06.04.2026
1 - Neeraj Prasad S/o Late Ramanand Prassad (R.N.Prasad) Aged
About 48 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Twhsil And District
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Chandan Prasad (Death) Nill
2.1 - Smt. Manishi Prasad, W/o Late Chandan Prasad Aged About
42 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur
Chhattisgarh.
2.2 - Rishika Prasad, D/o Late Chandan Prasad, Aged About 13
Years Thorugh Its Guardian Smt. Manishi Prasad, R/o Gulab
Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
2.3 - Arya Prasad, S/o Late Chandan Prasad, Aged About 8 Years
Through Its Guardian Smt. Manishi Prasad, R/o Gulab Nagar,
Mopka, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Ranjan Prasad, S/o Ramanand Prasad (R.N. Prasad) Aged
About 43 Years R/o Gulab Nagar, Mopka, Tehsil And District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
... Appellants/Plaintiffs
versus
1 - Smt. Gauri Prasad (Died And Deleted) As Per Honble Court
Order Dated 29-01-2026.
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2 - Smt. Jayshree Sawarkar, W/o Narendra Kumar Sawarkar, Aged
About 50 Years R/o Rajkishor Nagar Holly Nursery School, Tehsil
And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
3 - Bank Of Baroda, Branch Office Birkona, Near Pt. Sundar Lal
Open Univeristy Birkona, Tehsil And District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.
4 - Bank Of Baroda, Through Regional Manager, Regional Office
Rosarb Branch, First Floor Mhavir Goshala Complex, Mohdapara,
K.K. Road, Raipur 492004 C.G.
5 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Bilaspur, District
Bilaspur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents/Defendants
(Cause-title taken from the Case Information System)
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For Petitioner :- Mr. Goutam Khetarpal, Advocate
For State :- Mr. Kanwaljit Singh Saini, Dy.G.A.
For Respondent No.2 :- Mr. Sajal Kumar Gupta, Advocate
For Respondents No. 3 & 4:- Mr. Ankit Singhal, Advocate
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal
& Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
CAV Order
Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.
1. This First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter to be referred as ‘CPC‘) has been preferred
by the appellants/plaintiffs calling in question the legality, validity,
and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 13.04.2022
passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.)
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in Civil Suit No. A/30/2020, whereby the plaint has been rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC holding that the suit is barred under
Section 34 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter
to be referred as ‘SARFAESI Act‘).
2. Following prayer has been made by the appellants/plaintiffs
by way of this appeal:-
“It is therefore prayer that the impugned
judgment passed by the 3rd Additional District
Judge, Bilaspur, C.G. parties Neeraj Prasad &
others Vs. Smt. Gauri Prasad & others may
kindly be set aside and allowed the
Appellants/plaintiffs appeal and restore the main
suit in the ends of justice.”
3. Briefly stated, the suit property was purchased by late
Ramanand Prasad, father of the appellants, by a registered sale
deed dated 11.12.2002. After his death on 08.05.2009, the property
devolved upon the appellants and Respondent No.1 as legal heirs.
It is the case of the appellants that Respondent No.1, without
consent of other co-heirs and without partition, got her name
mutated exclusively and executed a registered sale deed dated
03.07.2017 in favour of Respondent No.2. Respondent No.2
thereafter mortgaged the suit property with Bank of Baroda, and
upon default in repayment of loan, proceedings under Section
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13(4) of the SARFAESI Act were initiated and possession notice
dated 21.05.2019 was issued. The appellants filed a civil suit
seeking declaration of title to the extent of 75% share, cancellation
of the sale deed dated 03.07.2017, and permanent injunction
restraining the Bank from auctioning the suit property. During the
pendency of the suit, the respondent Bank filed applications under
Sections 13, 34, and 35 of the SARFAESI Act and under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, contending that the jurisdiction of the civil court was
barred. The learned trial Court accepted the said objections, relying
upon Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the judgment passed in
Jagdish Singh vs. Heeralal (2014) 1 SCC 479, and rejected the
plaint.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned
trial Court has committed a manifest error of law in rejecting the
plaint by holding the suit to be barred under Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act. It is contended that the provisions of Sections 13
and 17 of the said Act are not attracted in the present case
inasmuch as the appellants are neither borrowers nor guarantors,
but are claiming independent title over the suit property as co-heirs.
The suit, in essence, is one for declaration of title, cancellation of
the sale deed dated 03.07.2017 as null and void, and for grant of
permanent prohibitory injunction, which falls within the exclusive
domain of the civil court and not within the jurisdiction of the Debts
5
Recovery Tribunal. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court
has failed to consider this material aspect and has erroneously
ousted the jurisdiction of the civil court. The Debts Recovery
Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon complicated questions of title,
particularly between third parties who are not parties to the loan
transaction. Learned counsel also contends that while deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
the Court is required to confine itself strictly to the averments made
in the plaint alone, and the defence taken by the defendants,
whether in the written statement or in the application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, cannot be looked into. This being a settled
proposition of law, the impugned order suffers from serious legal
infirmity. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been
placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported
in (2025) 4 SCC 38 [Central Bank of India and another vs. Prabha
Jain and others] and also upon the decision of the High Court
reported in 2012 SCC OnLine MP 9514 [Smt. Prabha Jain vs.
Central Bank of India and others].
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submit that
the learned trial Court has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs
by holding the same to be barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It is contended that the subsequent
purchaser of the suit property had validly mortgaged the same with
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Bank of Baroda and obtained a loan, and upon default in
repayment, the secured asset was liable to be proceeded against
by the Bank in accordance with law. Consequently, proceedings
were initiated under the SARFAESI Act for enforcement of the
security interest. It is further submitted that once measures under
the SARFAESI Act have been invoked, the statutory remedy
available to the aggrieved party lies under Section 17 of the Act
before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and therefore, the jurisdiction
of the civil court is expressly barred under Section 34 of the said
Act. Learned counsel contends that the trial Court, after duly
considering the factual matrix and the legal position emerging from
Sections 13, 17, and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, has rightly rejected
the plaint as being barred by law, and the impugned order does not
call for any interference by this Court.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material available on record.
7. From a perusal of the order of the trial Court, it is evident that
reliance has been placed upon the decision in Jagdish Singh
(Supra). However, such reliance appears to be misconceived. The
said judgment pertains to cases involving borrowers and
guarantors in the context of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act,
and does not deal with disputes where third parties assert
independent title over the property. Therefore, the ratio of the said
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judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, where
the plaintiffs claim rights as independent co-heirs.
8. From a bare perusal of the plaint, it is quite vivid that the
plaintiffs have sought reliefs in respect of declaration of title,
declaration of their share in the suit property, declaration of sale
deed dated 03.07.2017 as null and void, declaration of their share
to the extent of 25% each in the entire suit land, further declaration
that the mortgage of the property is not in accordance with law, and
grant of permanent injunction restraining auction proceedings.
From the plaint, it further appears that there is a specific pleading
that the suit property originally belonged to their father late
Ramanand Prasad, who had acquired the same by way of a
registered sale deed dated 11.12.2002. The property, bearing Plot
No. 350, Khasra No. 804/5, admeasuring 2400 sq. ft., situated at
Mouza Mopka, Tehsil and District Bilaspur, Revenue Circle No. 19,
was thus the self-acquired property of the deceased. It is further
pleaded that in the year 2002 the land was duly diverted and
assigned Khasra No. 804/5 with Plot No. 350. After the death of
their father on 08.05.2019, Defendant No.1 (mother) got her name
mutated in the revenue records without the knowledge or consent
of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, she illegally sold the property vide sale
deed dated 03.07.2017 in favour of Defendant No.2, who, despite
having knowledge that the property was joint family property of the
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plaintiffs and Defendant No.1, purchased the same and
subsequently mortgaged it with Bank of Baroda, Birgaon Branch. It
is only upon publication of auction notice in the daily newspaper
that the plaintiffs came to know about such transactions, leading to
filing of the present suit.
9. From the nature of reliefs claimed in the plaint, it is apparent
that the core reliefs pertain to declaration of title, declaration of
share, and cancellation of the sale deed as null and void. These
reliefs fall within the exclusive domain of the civil court and cannot
be adjudicated by any other forum, including the Debts Recovery
Tribunal constituted under the SARFAESI Act.
10. This aspect has already been considered by the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Smt. Prabha Jain vs. Central
Bank of India and others reported in 2012 SCC OnLine MP 9514,
wherein it has been held that where the relief sought by the plaintiff
is essentially for declaration of title and related civil rights, the
jurisdiction of the civil Court is not barred under Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act, and such matters cannot be adjudicated by the
Debts Recovery Tribunal.
11. The aforesaid judgment of the High Court was assailed
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which came to be decided in
(2025) 4 SCC 38 [Central Bank of India and another vs. Prabha
Jain and others] and it was held as under :
9
“15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3
reliefs: (a) The first relief is in relation to a sale
deed executed by Sumer Chand / Jain in favour
of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati. (b) The second
relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed
by Pramod Jain in favour of the Bank. (c) The
third relief is for being handed over the
possession of the suit property.
16. So far as the first and second reliefs are
concerned, they are not in relation to any
measures taken by the secured creditor under
Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Rather,
they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken
prior to the secured creditor stepping into the
picture and well prior to the secured creditor
invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
23. Even if we would have been persuaded to
take the view that the third relief is barred by
Section 17(3) of the SARFAESI Act, still the
plaint must survive because there cannot be a
partial rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC. Hence, even if one relief survives, the
plaint cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC. In the case on hand, the first and second
reliefs as prayed for are clearly not barred by
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and arewithin
the civil court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the plaint
cannot be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
24. 1f the civil court is of the view that one relief
(say relief A) is not barred by law but is of the
10view that relief B is barred by law, the civil court
must not make any observations to the effect
that relief B is barred by law and must leave
that issue undecided in an Order 7 Rule 11
application. This is because if the civil court
cannot reject a plaint partially, then by the same
logic, it ought not to make any adverse
observations against relief B.”
12. From a perusal of the above judgment, it is evident that where
the principal relief sought by the plaintiffs is for declaration of title,
share, and cancellation of sale deed, the same lies within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the civil Court and not within the domain of
the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Consequently, Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act would not operate as a bar to such a civil suit.
Merely because an ancillary relief of injunction against auction
proceedings has been sought, the jurisdiction of the civil Court
cannot be ousted.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Karam Singh vs.
Amarjit Singh and Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2240, has held as
under:-
“5. The defendants (i.e. the contesting
respondents) filed an application under Order 7
Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 19083 for
rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is
hopelessly barred by time. In the application it
was, inter alia, stated that the will was set up in
11the year 1983 after the death of Kartar Kaur; the
mutation proceedings based on the will was
contested and therefore, the plaintiffs including
their predecessor in interest were fully aware of
the existence of the will; hence, the relief for
declaration qua the will, limitation of which is three
years, was hopelessly barred by limitation. It was
also contended that the plaintiffs’ stand that cause
of action had arisen on 20.07.2017 is incorrect
and wrong. In addition to above, it was stated that
plaintiffs have concealed a material fact regarding
filing of civil suit no. 648/2012, which was filed by
father of plaintiff no. 1, wherein the order of
mutation dated 28.05.2012 was challenged
without challenging the will and, therefore, the
plaint of the said suit was rejected under Order 7
Rule 11 of CPC vide order dated 17.05.2013. It
was thus claimed that the suit was also barred by
Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC.
18. In Indira v. Arumugam (1998) 1 SCC 614, this
court held that when the suit is based on title for
possession, once the title is established based on
relevant documents and other evidence, unless
the defendant proves adverse possession for the
prescriptive period, the plaintiff cannot be non-
suited. Consequently, when a suit is instituted for
possession, based on title, to defeat the suit on
the ground of adverse possession, the burden is
on the defendant to prove adverse possession for
the prescriptive period. This, therefore, in our
view, cannot be an issue on which the plaint could
12be rejected at the threshold. Moreover, the
plaintiffs herein, had clearly disclosed that they
had been contesting the will in the mutation
proceedings which culminated in the year 2017.
The suit was instituted within three years
thereafter to declare the mutation entry illegal.
Thus, considering that mutation proceedings are
summary in nature, the institution of the regular
suit questioning the same is not ex facie barred
by law.
19. That apart, where several reliefs are sought in
suit, if any one of the reliefs is within the period of
limitation, the plaint cannot be rejected as barred
by law by taking recourse to Order 7 Rule 11(d) of
CPC.”
14. In the matter of P. Kumarakurubaran vs. P. Narayanan and
Others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
“10. Having heard the learned counsel for the
parties and upon careful perusal of the pleadings,
the material on record, and the impugned
judgment, we find it necessary to examine
whether the rejection of the plaint under Order VII
Rule 11(d) CPC was justified in the facts and
circumstances of the present case. It is to be
pointed out at this juncture that though the
respondents/defendants sought to reject the plaint
on two grounds – valuation of the suit and
13limitation – the High Court rejected the plaint
solely on the ground that it was time-barred.
Accordingly, we shall confine our consideration in
this appeal to the issue of limitation.
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has
categorically averred in the plaint that he
executed the registered power of attorney in
favour of his father solely for the limited purpose
of constructing a house and carrying out related
activities. There is no express clause authorizing
his father to sell the suit property to any person
without the appellant’s consent and knowledge.
Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in
favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the
scope of the power of attorney, which raises
serious doubt about misuse of authority and
potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be
rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11
CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the
plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be
shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court
acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the
plaint and in holding that the matter ought to
proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising
its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC,
ought not to have interfered in the absence of any
jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s
order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial
factual disputes exist concerning limitation and
the scope of authority under the Power of
Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”
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15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Leelamma
Mathew vs. Indian Overseas Bank and Others (2023) 20 SCC 459
has held as under:-
“14.4. It is submitted that in terms of Section 34
of the SARFAESI Act, the jurisdiction of the civil
court is absolutely barred except in case the
plaintiff is able to show fraud or
misrepresentation. It is submitted that in the
present case from the communications on
record and that the possession was handed over
to the Bank pursuant to the order under Section
14 of the SARFAESI Act on 8-10-2007 and
thereafter the plaintiff made the payments on
various dates, leading to the issuance of the
sale certificate on 21-11-2007, which was
registered almost 3 years later on 1-2-2010, it is
very much clear that the plaintiff was aware of
the extent of the property and no case of fraud is
made out.
20. Now so far as the submission on behalf of
the plaintiff and the finding recorded by the High
Court that the suit was barred by Section 34 of
the SARFAESI Act is concerned, at the outset it is
required to be noted that the suit was for
damages/compensation, with respect to the
balance land, which could not have been
decided by the DRT or Appellate Tribunal,
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act shall be
applicable only in a case where the Debts
15Recovery Tribunal and/or Appellate Tribunal is
empowered to decide the matter under the
SARFAESI Act. The plaintiff was not challenging
the sale/sale certificate. The plaintiff claimed the
damages/compensation with respect to the less
area. Therefore, the High Court has seriously
erred in holding that the suit was barred by
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.”
16. Furthermore, in the matter of Rajiv Sareen vs. Divyanshu
Enterprises and Others 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8354, the High
Court of Delhi has held as under:-
“10. Respondent No. 3 thereafter filed an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC
seeking rejection of the plaint, which was
opposed by the Appellant. Upon consideration
of the pleadings and submissions, the learned
Single Judge allowed the said application and
rejected the plaint, recording the following
reasons:
i. No complaint was lodged by the Appellant
against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 despite
allegations of threat, coercion and undue
influence.
ii. The particulars of fraud were not specifically
pleaded by the Appellant and mere clever
drafting cannot be permitted to circumvent the
statutory bar under Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act.
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iii. Although the Appellant’s father was shown as
a party to the MoU, he did not sign the same,
rendering the document suspect and apparently
created subsequently.
iv. The Appellant’s plea of non-payment of sale
consideration is barred by Sections 91 and 92
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [hereinafter
referred to as ‘IEA’], since no oral evidence can
be led contrary to the recitals of the Sale Deed.
v. Non-payment of the entire sale consideration
does not constitute a valid ground for
cancellation of a registered sale deed.
vi. Under the recitals of the Sale Deed, the title
in the suit property stood transferred
immediately to Respondent No. 1.
11. On behalf of the Appellant, learned counsel
submits that the learned Single Judge erred in
holding the suit to be barred under Section 34
of the SARFAESI Act. Placing reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Central Bank
of India v. Smt. Prabha Jain1, it is urged that the
DRT-III has no jurisdiction to entertain or
adjudicate upon a claim for cancellation of a
registered Sale Deed. Accordingly, it is
contended that since such a relief falls outside
the scope of the SARFAESI Act, the civil suit
instituted by the Appellant was maintainable
before the Civil Court.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the
Respondent No. 3 supports the Impugned
Judgment and submits that the jurisdiction of
17the Civil Court stands expressly barred under
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. It is submitted
that the reliefs sought by the Appellant are
directly connected with the measures taken by
the secured creditor in exercise of powers
conferred under the said enactment.
Accordingly, it is contended that the learned
Single Judge has rightly rejected the plaint as
being barred by law.
16. It is trite law that while deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC,
the Court must confine itself to the averments
made in the plaint, which are to be read as a
whole, without reference to the defence of the
opposite party. The veracity or correctness of
the allegations is not to be adjudicated at this
preliminary stage.
23. It is also settled law that even if the Court is
of the opinion that the likelihood of success in
the suit is remote or minimal, such a view
cannot justify rejection of the plaint under Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The plaint can be
rejected only if it does not disclose a cause of
action or is clearly barred by any law on its face,
not merely because the claim may ultimately
fail.
24. Insofar as the question of jurisdiction is
concerned, the learned Single Judge’s
conclusion that the civil suit is barred under
Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be
18
sustained. The relief sought in the suit is for
cancellation of a registered sale deed. The
jurisdiction to cancel or set aside a registered
conveyance is not vested in the DRT, which is a
statutory forum of limited jurisdiction.”
17. Also, in the matter of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India
AIRONLINE 2004 SC 948, the Supreme Court held that exclusion
of civil court jurisdiction under Section 34 is not absolute and civil
court jurisdiction survives where the dispute involves allegations
requiring adjudication beyond the limited statutory jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, particularly where complicated questions of title arise.
18. Similarly, in the matter of Authorized Officer, State Bank of
Travancore v. Mathew K.C. AIR 2018 SUPREME COURT 676, the
Supreme Court reiterated that where effective statutory remedy
exists, ordinarily recourse must be taken under the SARFAESI
mechanism; however, such principle applies where the dispute
squarely falls within the Tribunal’s competence.
19. Likewise, in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and
Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust
and Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (2012) 8SCC 706,
the Supreme Court has categorically held that only plaint
averments are required to be examined while deciding an
application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and unless the statutory
19
bar is apparent on the face of the plaint, rejection thereof is
impermissible.
20. In the present case, the appellants claim independent title as
legal heirs of the deceased and have specifically challenged the
validity of the sale deed dated 03.07.2017. It is also their
categorical case that they are in continuous possession of the suit
property. The controversy involved in the present matter relates to
determination of title, validity of transfer effected by Defendant
No.1 in favour of Defendant No.2, and adjudication of rights of co-
heirs in the suit property. Such issues necessarily require a full-
fledged trial, appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, and
adjudication by a competent civil Court. These questions cannot be
decided in summary proceedings before the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, whose jurisdiction is limited in scope.
21. It is a settled proposition of law that while considering an
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
only the averments made in the plaint are required to be seen. The
plaint, in the present case, clearly discloses a cause of action and
raises triable issues requiring adjudication. Therefore, the rejection
of the plaint at the threshold by the learned trial Court is legally
unsustainable and contrary to settled principles of law.
22. In the present case, the learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate this settled legal position and has committed an error of
20
law in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of
Civil Procedure by holding the suit to be barred by jurisdiction. In
view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the learned trial Court has committed a jurisdictional
error in rejecting the plaint by misapplying Section 34 of the
SARFAESI Act, and the impugned order, therefore, deserves to be
set aside.
23. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
and decree dated 13.04.2022 passed by the learned 3rd Additional
District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. A/30/2020 is hereby
set aside. The plaint is restored to its original number. The matter is
remanded back to the learned trial Court for adjudication on merits
in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before
the trial Court on a date to be fixed by the said Court.
24. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge Judge
Vishakha
21
HEAD-NOTE
"Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only plaint
averments has to be considered, not the defence
of the defendant. Rejection of plaint is
impermissible where any relief claimed falls within
civil court jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Debt
Recovery Tribunal under the SARFAESI Act is
limited in nature.”
