Delhi High Court
National Insuance Co. Ltd vs Shehnaj Begum & Ors on 17 April, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 17th January 2026
Pronounced on : 17th April 2026
Uploaded on : 20th April 2026
+ MAC.APP. 888/2013
NATIONAL INSUANCE CO. LTD. .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Pankaj Seth, Advocate for
appellant along with Ms. Shruti
Jain, Advocate.
versus
SHEHNAJ BEGUM & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. S.N. Parashar, Advocate with
Mr. Ritik Singh, Advocate for
respondent nos. 1 to 3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed challenging the award dated 31st May
2013 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal [“Tribunal”], Tis
Hazari Courts, Central, in Claim Petition No. 557/2012 [“impugned
award”], whereby compensation of Rs. 18,01,864/- along with 9% interest
was awarded in a fatal accident case.
2. The Insurance Company asserts that the accident was not caused
due to the sole negligence of the respondent no.4/ driver of the offending
vehicle, and further submits that neither the eyewitnesses nor the
Investigation Officer (“IO”) were examined.
3. Moreover, the Tribunal erred in applying minimum wages in
absence of proof of occupation and income, and the claimants were not
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entitled to loss of dependency. There were other issues relating to the
computation of income on account of future prospects, deduction towards
personal expenses, loss of consortium, loss of love and affection, and
funeral expenses, and the award of penal interest.
Incident
4. On 7th October 2012, deceased persons were traveling on a
Rickshaw and, near Pratap Nagar Metro Pillar, Old Rohtak Road, were hit
by a truck bearing no. DL 1GB 6352 [‘offending vehicle’], driven by
Mohd. Ashraf/respondent no. 4. and owned by Mr. Chandan Kumar/
respondent no. 5, and insured by appellant/Insurance Company.
5. Sanjar Alam [injured] passed away due to the injuries and is
survived by his widow Shehnaj Begum, Manjilla Begum (sister), Shahista
Begum (sister), all of whom are the claimants. Sanjar Alam was brought
dead to the hospital; An FIR was lodged and a post-mortem was
conducted. Since, there were two deceased in the accident, the claim
petitions were disposed of by a common order.
Impugned Award
6. On the issue of negligence, Tribunal noticed the testimony of PW-
1 and PW-2, who though were not eyewitnesses, deposed essentially on
the nature of the accident.
7. The driver and the owner denied negligence on part of the driver
but did not put any suggestion to the claimant’s witnesses nor lead any
evidence. An FIR had been registered. As per the MLC, unknown
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deceased had been brought to the hospital with injuries arising out of the
motor vehicle accident. As per the post-mortem report, Sanjar Alam, died
due to ‘ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt force impact’. As per the
Mechanical Inspection Report, the offending vehicle had fresh damaged
parts on its front. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the accident was
caused due to the negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.
8. As regards the compensation, deceased was 22 years of age,
working as a rickshaw puller, contributing about Rs. 9,000/- per month,
and was survived by his widow and two minor sisters. His wife was eight
months pregnant at the time of the filing of the petition; however, the child
died after five days after birth.
9. Minimum wages of Rs. 7,254/-, as applicable to an ‘unskilled’
worker, were taken. Future prospects of 50% were added. Since there was
an issue relating to dependency of minor sisters, and there was no proof
regarding who was supporting them, loss of dependency was not granted
to them. 1/3rd was deducted as personal expenses of the deceased, there
being only a wife [respondent no.1]. At the time of the accident, relevant
multiplier was taken as ’18’. The compensation awarded was Rs.
18,01,864/- along with Rs. 10,000/- towards loss of estate, Rs. 1,00,000/-
towards loss of consortium, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards love and affection, and
Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses.
10. For ease of reference, a tabulation of the said compensation is as
under:
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S.No Heads Amount Awarded By Tribunal
1. Income of deceased Rs.7,254/-
[‘unskilled’]
2. Multiplier 18
3. Loss of Dependency Rs.15,66,864/-
4. Loss of Love and Affection Rs.1,00,000 /-
5. Loss of Consortium Rs.1,00,000 /-
6. Loss of Estate Rs.10,000 /-
7. Funeral Expenses Rs.25,000 /-
Total Compensation Rs.18,01,864/-
Interest 9%
Submissions made by parties
11. Appellant/Insurance company raised the issue that the rickshaw
was hit from the opposite side in the middle of the road, therefore, it could
not be concluded that it was the negligence of respondent no.4. It was
stated that no eyewitnesses were examined, nor was the IO examined, and
therefore such a conclusion could not have been drawn.
12. Reliance was placed on the decision in Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Meena Variyal, (2007) 5 SCC 428, to contend that a summary
procedure does not mean that a Tribunal should ignore basic principles of
law in claims for compensation. Further, there was a challenge to the
application of minimum wages, since there was no evidence that the
deceased was gainfully employed.
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13. On the deduction, towards personal expenses, it was contended
that 50% ought to have been deducted, considering that the
wife/respondent no.1 was the only dependent.
14. Penal interest at 12% was awarded for the default period, for
which reliance was placed on National Insurance Company Ltd. v
Keshav Bahadur and Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 370.
15. Counsel for the respondent, however, stated that as per the
decision in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana 2007 SCC
OnLine Del 1700, since there was no rebuttal and no complaint by the
driver, the reliance on the FIR was wholly legitimate.
16. Mr. Pankaj Seth, counsel for appellant/Insurance Company,
contented that principle of “res ipsa loquitur” ought to be applied and
assessment should be made on the basis of the principle of
‘preponderance of probabilities’, rather than merely relying upon the
principle laid in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpa Rana (supra), on
the basis of the FIR and the chargesheet. It was submitted that the
Tribunal had not applied its mind and had only made a cursory assessment
based on the FIR.
Analysis
17. In this regard, it is important to assess the extent to which the
Tribunal is obliged, or ought to be persuaded, by the filing of an FIR and
the filing of a chargesheet pursuant thereto. For the purpose of
determining negligence a Tribunal navigates through some basic
foundational principles to address pleas asserted by the parties on
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negligence. A more detailed examination of these foundational principles
is being provided here under.
18. At the outset, there is no doubt that negligence has to be proved, as
also stated in Meena Variyal (supra), and the relevant principles are
extracted as under:
“10. Before we proceed to consider the main aspect
arising for decision in this appeal, we would like to
make certain general observations. It may be true
that the Motor Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to
claims for compensation arising out of accidents, is
a beneficent piece of legislation. It may also be true
that subject to the rules made in that behalf, the
Tribunal may follow a summary procedure in
dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a
Tribunal approached with a claim for compensation
under the Act should ignore all basic principles of
law in determining the claim for compensation.
Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is a contract of
indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is
insured with the insurance company and it is being
driven by a driver employed by the insured, when it
meets with an accident, the primary liability under
law for payment of compensation is that of the
driver. Once the driver is liable, the owner of the
vehicle becomes vicariously liable for payment of
compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the
owner that is indemnified by the insurance company.
A third party for whose benefit the insurance is
taken, is therefore entitled to show, when he moves
under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that
the driver was negligent in driving the vehicle
resulting in the accident; that the owner was
vicariously liable and that the insurance company
was bound to indemnify the owner and consequently,
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satisfy the award made. Therefore, under general
principles, one would expect the driver to be
impleaded before an adjudication is claimed under
Section 166 of the Act as to whether a claimant
before the Tribunal is entitled to compensation for
an accident that has occurred due to alleged
negligence of the driver. Why should not a Tribunal
insist on the driver of the vehicle being impleaded
when a claim is being filed?.
(emphasis added)
Preponderance of Probability
19. However, an accident may have witnesses and, even if it does,
they may not come forward to give evidence. In such cases, the
investigation may also be constrained except for providing a site plan and
a mechanical inspection report. If there is no eyewitness, the only material
which the Tribunal, or in fact the prosecution in the criminal proceedings,
can rely upon is the statement of of any co-passengers who may have
survived or third-party eyewitnesses.
20. However, where nobody has survived in the accident and there is
no passerby to give evidence, there remains only reliance on a statement
made on behalf of the legal heirs of the deceased, which has limited
evidentiary value as far as the assessment of the negligence is concerned.
In such circumstances, the Tribunal is required to assess negligence on the
basis of the surrounding material placed on record, which necessarily
involves an evaluation on the touchstone of probability rather than strict
proof. The principle of preponderance of probabilities has been well
articulated in the following judgments.
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20.1 Bimla Devi v. HRTC (2009) 13 SCC 530:
“11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms
of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a
Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the
parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair
compensation in the event an accident has taken place by
reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It
is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to
the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a
sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that
would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that
death of the claimant’s predecessor had taken place by
reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the
same would be ignored only on the basis of a post
mortem report vis-`-vis the averments made in a claim
petition.
………
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly
taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be
borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a
particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible
to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely
to establish their case on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability. The standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.
For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken
into consideration the respective stories set forth by both
the parties.
16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent is
based on conjectures and surmises. While holding that
the police might have implicated the respondents, no
reason has been assigned in support thereof. No material
brought on record has been referred to for the said
purpose.”
(emphasis added)
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20.2 Dulcina Fernandes v Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013) 10 SCC
646:
“7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of
negligence on the part of the first respondent who was
driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was
required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly
not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
(emphasis added)
20.3 Mangla Ram v Oriental Insurance (2018) 5 SCC 656:
“24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V.
Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal [N.K.V. Bros. (P)
Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, (1980) 3 SCC 457 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein it was contended by the vehicle
owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident
had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim
under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This
Court negatived the said argument by observing that the
nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness,
punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence
sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The
observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw
some light as to what should be the approach of the
Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus:
(SCC pp. 458-59)
“3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our
country, specially when truck and bus drivers
operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness
often persuades the courts, as has been observed by
us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial
presumption in several cases based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take
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merely because of some doubt here or some
obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must
be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly
reasonable. The court should not succumb to
niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are
emphasising this aspect because we are often
distressed by transport operators getting away with
it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they
do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over
the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The
heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public
transport must bring owner and driver to their
responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State
must seriously consider no-fault liability by
legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the
inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony
practised by tribunals. We must remember that
judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of
the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation
for State relief against accidental disablement of
citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in
compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is
the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases
resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being
postponed by several years. The States must appoint
sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts
should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma
and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified
by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are
unjustly indifferent in this regard.”
………
27. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to
interfere in the first appeal filed by Respondents 2 & 3,
was absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum
of negligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually,
this view is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis
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done by the Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST 4701
was driven rashly and negligently by Respondent 2 when
it collided with the motorcycle of the appellant leading to
the accident. This can be discerned from the evidence of
witnesses and the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the
police, naming Respondent 2. This Court in a recent
decision in Dulcina Fernandes [Dulcina
Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] , noted
that the key of negligence on the part of the driver of the
offending vehicle as set up by the claimants was required
to be decided by the Tribunal on the touchstone of
preponderance of probability and certainly not by
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to
observe that the exposition in the judgments already
adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet against
Respondent 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in
driving the vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even
when the accused were to be acquitted in the criminal
case, this Court opined that the same may be of no effect
on the assessment of the liability required in respect of
motor accident cases by the Tribunal.”
(emphasis added)
20.4 Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC 510:
“12. In this context, we could refer to the judgments of
this Court in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal
[N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, (1980) 3
SCC 457 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 774] , wherein the plea that
the criminal case had ended in acquittal and that,
therefore, the civil suit must follow suit, was rejected. It
was observed that culpable rashness under Section 304-
AIPC is more drastic than negligence under the law of
torts to create liability. Similarly, in Bimla Devi v.
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SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)
1101] (“Bimla Devi”), it was observed that in a claim
petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988, the Tribunal has to determine the amount of
fair compensation to be granted in the event an accident
has taken place by reason of negligence of a driver of a
motor vehicle. A holistic view of the evidence has to be
taken into consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof
of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a
particular manner need not be established by the
claimants. The claimants have to establish their case on
the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be
applied while considering the petition seeking
compensation on account of death or injury in a road
traffic accident. To the same effect is the observation
made by this Court in Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim
Xavier Cruz [Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz,
(2013) 10 SCC 646 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 13] which has referred to the aforesaid
judgment in Bimla Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC,
(2009) 13 SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1
SCC (Cri) 1101] .
13. In that view of the matter, it is for the appellant herein
to establish negligence on the part of the driver of the
tanker lorry in the petition filed by him seeking
compensation on account of death of his son in the said
accident. Thus, the opinion in the final report would not
have a bearing on the claim petition for the aforesaid
reasons. This is because the appellant herein is seeking
compensation for the death of his son in the accident
which occurred on account of the negligence on the part
of the driver of the tanker lorry, causing the accident on
the said date. It is further observed that in the claim
petitions filed by the dependents, in respect of the other
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to similarly establish the negligence in accordance with
law.”
20.5 Geeta Dubey v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3779:
“20. Firstly, it is well settled that in claim cases, in case
the accident is disputed or the involvement of the vehicle
concerned is put in issue, the claimant is only expected to
prove the same on a preponderance of probability and
not beyond reasonable doubt. [See Sajeena Ikhbal v. Mini
Babu George, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2883]. We also
deem it appropriate to extract the following paragraphs
from the judgment of this Court in Bimla Devi v.
Himachal Road Transport Corporation, (2009) 13 SCC
530. Repelling similar contentions raised challenging the
accident and the involvement of the vehicle in question,
this Court held as follows:
“14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the
claimant’s witnesses might have occurred but the
core question before the Tribunal and consequently
before the High Court was as to whether the bus in
question was involved in the accident or not. For the
purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was
required to apply the principle underlying the
burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section
106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead
body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the
spot at such an early hour, which was required to be
proved by Respondents 2 and 3.
15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has
rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was
necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an
accident caused by a particular bus in a particular
manner may not be possible to be done by the
claimants. The claimants were merely to establish
their case on the touchstone of preponderance of
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probability. The standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For
the said purpose, the High Court should have taken
into consideration the respective stories set forth by
both the parties.
16. The judgment of the High Court to a great extent
is based on conjectures and surmises. While holding
that the police might have implicated the
respondents, no reason has been assigned in support
thereof. No material brought on record has been
referred to for the said purpose.””
(emphasis added)
20.6 ICICI Lombard v Rajani Sahoo (2025) 2 SCC 599:
“9. It is true that the Tribunal had looked into the oral
and documentary evidence including the FIR, final report
and such other documents prepared by the police in
connection with the accident in question. The Tribunal
had also taken note of the fact that based on the final
report, the driver of the offending truck was tried and
found guilty for rash and negligent driving. The High
Court took note of such aspects and found no illegality in
the procedure adopted by the Tribunal and consequently
dismissed the appeal.
10. In the contextual situation it is relevant to refer to a
decision of this Court in Mathew Alexander v. Mohd.
Shafi [Mathew Alexander v. Mohd. Shafi, (2023) 13 SCC
510 : 2023 INSC 621] , this Court held thus : (SCC p.
514, para 12)
………
12. … A holistic view of the evidence has to be taken into
consideration by the Tribunal and strict proof of an
accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular
manner need not be established by the claimants. The
claimants have to establish their case on the touchstone
of preponderance of probabilities. The standard of proof
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beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while
considering the petition seeking compensation on account
of death or injury in a road traffic accident. To the same
effect is the observation made by this Court in Dulcina
Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz [Dulcina
Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646 :
(2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 73 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 13] which
has referred to the aforesaid judgment in Bimla
Devi [Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1101] .”
11. Thus, there can be no dispute with respect to the
position that the question regarding negligence which is
essential for passing an award in a motor vehicle
accident claim should be considered based on the
evidence available before the Tribunal. If the police
records are available before the Tribunal, taking note of
the purpose of the Act it cannot be said that looking into
such documents for the aforesaid purpose is
impermissible or inadmissible.”
(emphasis added)
Inquiry Proceeding
21. Dovetailed with this aspect is the fact that Tribunal proceedings
are not strictly governed by the rules of procedures or evidence, but are in
the nature of an inquiry. For this also, reference may be made to the
following opinion of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509 and Anita Sharma v. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. (2021) 1 SCC 171. Relevant paragraphs of the said
judgements are extracted as under:
21.1 United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (supra):
“Nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988
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10. A claim petition for compensation in regard to a
motor accident (filed by the injured or in case of death,
by the dependent family members) before the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 165
of the Act is neither a suit nor an adversarial lis in the
traditional sense. It is a proceedings in terms of and
regulated by the provisions of Chapter XII of the Act
which is a complete code in itself. We may in this context
refer to the following significant aspects in regard to the
Tribunals and determination of compensation by the
Tribunals:
(i) Proceedings for award of compensation in regard
to a motor accident before the Tribunal can be initiated
either on an application for compensation made by the
persons aggrieved (the claimants) under Section 166(1)
or Section 163-A of the Act or suo motu by the Tribunal,
by treating any report of accident (forwarded to the
Tribunal under Section 158(6) of the Act as an
application for compensation under Section 166(4) of the
Act).
(ii) The rules of pleadings do not strictly apply as the
claimant is required to make an application in a form
prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading
where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the
Tribunal.
(iii) In a proceedings initiated suo motu by the
Tribunal, the owner and driver are the respondents. The
insurer is not a respondent, but a noticee under Section
149(2) of the Act. Where a claim petition is filed by the
injured or by the legal representatives of a person dying
in a motor accident, the driver and owner have to be
impleaded as respondents. The claimants need not
implead the insurer as a party. But they have the choice
of impleading the insurer also as a party-respondent.
When it is not impleaded as a party, the Tribunal is
required to issue a notice under Section 149(2) of the Act.
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If the insurer is impleaded as a party, it is issued as a
regular notice of the proceedings.
(iv) The words “receipt of an application for
compensation” in Section 168 refer not only to an
application filed by the claimants claiming compensation
but also to a suo motu registration of an application for
compensation under Section 166(4) of the Act on the
basis of a report of an accident under Section 158(6) of
the Act.
(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and
determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an
adversarial litigation. On receipt of an application (either
from the applicant or suo motu registration), the Tribunal
gives notice to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the
Act, gives an opportunity of being heard to the parties to
the claim petition as also the insurer, holds an inquiry
into the claim and makes an award determining the
amount of compensation which appears to it to be just.
(Vide Section 168 of the Act.)
(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary
procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more
persons possessing special knowledge of and matters
relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.
(Vide Section 169 of the Act.)
(vii) The award of the Tribunal should specify the
person(s) to whom compensation should be paid. It
should also specify the amount which shall be paid by the
insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the
accident or by all or any of them. (Vide Section 168 of the
Act.)
(viii) The Tribunal should deliver copies of the award
to the parties concerned within 15 days from the date of
the award. (Vide Section 168(2) of the Act.)
We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that
an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an
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adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to
a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation
on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in
accordance with the statute.”
21.2 Anita Sharma v New India Assurance (supra):
“21. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the
High Court to be cognizant of the fact that strict
principles of evidence and standards of proof like in a
criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases. The
standard of proof in such like matters is one of
preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond
reasonable doubt. One needs to be mindful that the
approach and role of courts while examining evidence in
accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with
non-examination of some best eyewitnesses, as may
happen in a criminal trial; but, instead should be only to
analyse the material placed on record by the parties to
ascertain whether the claimant’s version is more likely
than not true.”
(emphasis added)
22. Therefore, what remains in situations where there is no eyewitness
that the Tribunal, in its inquiry process, based on the test of
preponderance of probabilities, assesses the facts and circumstances
placed before it. Every accident has its own peculiar circumstances; it
could involve the nature of the vehicles, the location of the accident, and
the extent of the collision.
23. For example, in cases where there might be two vehicles of similar
sizes, say two heavy vehicles, which collide in the middle of the road,
there could arise a situation warranting an assessment of contributory
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negligence. However, if a heavy vehicle collides with a lighter vehicle, in
the middle of the road, the inquiry would lead to the question as to which
of the vehicles was driving on the wrong side of the lane or carriageway.
If that is also not established, an assessment needs to be made considering
the location of the collision, the circumstances in which traffic moves in
that particular area, and whether there was any indication of intoxication
in the post-mortem of the deceased.
24. Other aspects which may arise include the time of the day, whether
the offending vehicle was in a standing position, abandoned without
flashing lights, or whether it suddenly braked. Many of these aspects
would come to the fore if there is testimony of the driver of the offending
vehicle, who, upon cross-examination, may reveal certain aspects relating
to the nature of the accident. The predicament before the Tribunal is that if
no such evidence is available, then what material it should rely upon. In
such circumstances, the only material available is the first statement made
to any authority, which is usually the FIR.
FIR and Investigation
25. In National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Smt. Pushpa Rana &
Ors. (supra), the Court held the filing of the FIR, chargesheet and
accompanying police record constitutes sufficient material to sustain a
finding of negligence in motor accident claim proceedings on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Relevant observations of
this Court are extracted as under:
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“12. The last contention of the appellant insurance
company is that the respondents claimants should have
proved negligence on the part of the driver and in this
regard the counsel has placed reliance on the judgement
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Meena Variyal; 2007 (5) SCALE 269. On perusal
of the award of the Tribunal, it becomes clear that the
wife of the deceased had produced (i) certified copy of the
criminal record of criminal case in FIR No. 955/2004,
pertaining to involvement of the offending vehicle, (ii)
criminal record showing completion of investigation of
police and issue of charge sheet under Section 279/304-
A, IPC against the driver; (iii) certified copy of FIR,
wherein criminal case against the driver was lodged; and
(iv) recovery memo and mechanical inspection report of
offending vehicle and vehicle of the deceased. These
documents are sufficient proofs to reach the conclusion
that the driver was negligent. Proceedings under Motor
Vehicles Act are not akin to proceedings in a civil suit
and hence strict rules of evidence are not required to be
followed in this regard. Hence, this contention of the
counsel for the appellant also falls face down. There is
ample evidence on record to prove negligence on the part
of the driver.”
(emphasis added)
26. Once the FIR comes into play and the investigation proceeds,
thereafter, there may be some material forming of the investigation which
throws light on the nature of the accident and the aspect of the negligence.
27. In this regard, reference may be made to United India Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Deepak Goel and Ors. 2014: DHC:470, wherein this Court,
following Pushpa Rana (supra), reiterated that where an FIR has been
registered and a chargesheet filed against the driver of the offending
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vehicle, such material is sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, particularly in the absence
of rebuttal evidence from the driver or owner. Relevant paragraphs are
extracted as under:
“19. Be that as it may, criminal case bearing FIR
No.603/95 was registered against the respondent No.
3/driver at P.S. Singhani Gate, Ghaziabad. The police
investigated the case and thereafter filed the chargesheet
under Sections 279/304-A IPC against the said driver.
The claimants have proved both the documents noted
above before the learned Tribunal. Acquittal of the
driver/respondent No.3 by the learned Judicial
Magistrate vide its judgment dated 30.07.2003 would not
have any adverse affect on the claim petition for the
reason, he was acquitted only on the ground that eye
witness had not seen the driver of the offending vehicle as
he fled away from the spot. Neither any document had
been placed on record nor any witness had been
examined by the owner or Insurance Company to prove
that the respondent No. 3 was not driving the bus bearing
No.PAB 3325 on 18.08.1995 at about 12.45 pm.
Moreover, respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were proceeded ex
parte before the learned Tribunal, and they did not place
any defence before the learned Tribunal. Thus, the
learned Tribunal while deciding the claim petition had
relied upon the FIR, chargesheet and the statements of
the claimants.
20. In deciding the accident cases, the Tribunals or the
Courts bear in mind the caution struck by the Apex Court
that a claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
is neither a criminal case nor a civil case. In a criminal
case in order to have conviction, the matter is to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and in a civil case the
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evidence, but in a claim petition before the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal, the standard of proof is much
below than what is required in a criminal case as well as
in a civil case. Undoubtedly, the enquiry before the
Tribunal is a summary enquiry and, therefore, does not
require strict proof of liability.
21. Nonetheless, in a case, where FIR is lodged,
chargesheet is filed and specially in a case where driver
after causing the accident had fled away from the spot,
then the documents mentioned above are sufficient to
establish the fact that the driver of the offending vehicle
was negligent in causing the accident particularly when
there was no defence available from his side before the
learned Tribunal. Thus, the claimants have prove
negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.”
(emphasis added)
28. The Supreme Court in Ranjeet v. Abdul Kayam Neb, 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 497 has recently reiterated its position on the said issue, where
it stated as under:
“4. It is settled in law that once a charge sheet has been
filed and the driver has been held negligent, no further
evidence is required to prove that the bus was being
negligently driven by the bus driver. Even if the
eyewitnesses are not examined, that will not be fatal to
prove the death of the deceased due to negligence of the
bus driver.
5. In view of the aforesaid facts, we are of the opinion
that the Tribunal and the High Court both manifestly
erred in law in refusing to grant any compensation to the
claimants.”
(emphasis added)
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29. In Meera Bai v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company
Ltd. & Anr. 2025:INSC:600, the Supreme Court has observed that in
cases where the eyewitness was not examined, reliance on FIR and
charge-sheet was enough for the finding of negligence to be established.
In this regard, the relevant paragraphs are as under:
“2. The claimants before the Tribunal have filed an
appeal from the order of the High Court which allowed
the appeal of the insurance company and dismissed the
claim petition for reason of no eyewitness having been
examined to prove the rash and negligent driving.
3. On facts, it needs to be stated that the accident
occurred on 29.01.2015 when the deceased was
travelling pillion in a motorbike driven and owned by the
second respondent. The FIR was lodged against the
owner driver of the vehicle for the offence of rash and
negligent driving. A charge sheet was filed against the
owner driver. The owner driver filed a written statement
before the Tribunal denying the rash and negligent
driving on his part, however he did not mount the box to
depose that it was not due to his fault that the accident
occurred.
4. As far as examining the eyewitness, such a witness will
not be available in all cases. The FIR having been lodged
and the charge sheet filed against the owner driver of the
offending vehicle, we are of the opinion that there could
be no finding that negligence was not established.”
(emphasis added)
30. In Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025
SCC OnLine SC 636, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“8. The accident occurred on 03.11.1999 upon which a
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Annexure P-4. Annexure P-4 clearly indicates that the
trailer was found to have been driven rashly and
negligently; the owner of which was the 1st respondent
before the Tribunal and the insurer, the 3rd respondent.
The charge sheet has also been filed which is produced as
Annexure P-9. After investigation, the charge sheet
clearly found that the accident was caused due to the
negligence of the driver of the trailer and arrayed him as
the accused. PW 1 who was riding pillion also spoke of
the rash and negligent driving of the trailer.
…
11. In a motor accident claim, there is no adversarial
litigation and it is the preponderance of probabilities
which reign supreme in adjudication of the tortious
liability flowing from it, as has been held
in Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation. Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier
Cruz is a case in which the rider, who also carried a
pillion, died in an accident involving a pick-up van. There
was a contention taken that the claimants who were the
legal heirs of the deceased had not cared to examine the
pillion rider and hence the version of the respondent in
the written statement that the moving scooter had hit the
parked pick-up van, was to be accepted. It was found, as
in the present case, that the Police had charge-sheeted
the driver of the pickup van which prima facie showed
negligence of the charge-sheeted accused. Similarly in
the present case also, the Police after investigation,
charge-sheeted the driver of the trailer finding clear
negligence on him, which led to the accident. This has not
been controverted by the respondents before the Tribunal
by any valid evidence nor even a pleading. In fact, the
Tribunal, on a mere imaginative surmise, found that since
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cautious, which in any event is not a finding of
negligence.
12. Finding that the driver was not cautious is one thing
and finding negligence is quite another thing. Prima
facie, we are satisfied that the negligence was on the
trailer driver as discernible from the evidence recorded
before the Tribunal; standard of proof required being
preponderance of probability as has been reiterated
in Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited“
(emphasis added)
Res ipsa loquitur
31. Res ipsa loquitur means “the things speak for itself”, is a well-
recognised doctrine in the law of negligence. The doctrine enables a court
to draw an inference of negligence from the very nature of the accident,
where the occurrence is such that, in the ordinary course of events, it
would not have happened without negligence. In such circumstances, the
surrounding facts themselves constitute prima facie evidence of
negligence, thereby shifting the evidentiary burden onto the person who
had control over the instrumentality causing the injury to provide an
explanation consistent with due care.
32. As noted in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 28, at p.
77, the doctrine represents an exception to the general rule that the burden
of proving negligence lies upon the claimant; where the facts established
are such that the natural inference arising from them is that the injury was
caused by the defendant’s negligence, the event itself may “tell its own
story”, warranting an inference of negligence in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation.
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33. The origins of the doctrine may be traced to the earlier decision in
Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H & C 722, where the plaintiff was injured
when a barrel of flour fell from the defendant’s premises onto a public
street. The Court held that such an occurrence constituted sufficient prima
facie evidence of negligence, thereby casting upon the defendant the
burden of explaining that the accident had not occurred due to want of
care on his part.
34. The doctrine received its classical formulation in the English
decision of Scott v. London and St Katherine Docks Co. (1865) 3 H & C
596, where it was observed that when the thing causing the accident is
under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those having
such management use proper care, the occurrence itself affords reasonable
evidence of negligence in the absence of explanation by the defendant.
35. The Supreme Court has also recognised the relevance of this
doctrine in accident cases. In Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan, (1974)
1 SCC 690, the Supreme Court observed that negligence may, in
appropriate cases, be inferred from the surrounding circumstances of the
accident itself where the facts reasonably indicate rash or negligent
conduct. For ease of reference, relevant paragraphs are extracted as under:
“9. The main point for consideration in this appeal is,
whether the fact that the truck caught fire is evidence of
negligence on the part of the driver in the course of his
employment. The maxim res ipsa loquitur is resorted to
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cause of the accident is primarily within the knowledge of
the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the
accident is unknown does not prevent the plaintiff from
recovering the damages, if the proper inference to be
drawn from the circumstances which are known is that it
was caused by the negligence of the defendant. The fact
of the accident may, sometimes, constitute evidence of
negligence and then the maxim res ipsa loquitur applies.
10. The maxim is stated in its classic form by Erle, C.J.:
[Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks, (1865) 3 H&C
596, 601]
“… where the thing is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose
from want of care.”
The maxim does not embody any rule of substantive law
nor a rule of evidence. It is perhaps not a rule of any kind
but simply the caption to an argument on the evidence.
Lord Shaw remarked that if the phrase had not been in
Latin, nobody would have called it a principle
[Ballard v. North British Railway Co., 1923 SC (HL) 43].
The maxim is only a convenient label to apply to a set of
circumstances in which the plaintiff proves a case so as to
call for a rebuttal from the defendant, without having to
allege and prove any specific act or omission on the part
of the defendant. The principal function of the maxim is to
prevent injustice which would result if a plaintiff were
invariably compelled to prove the precise cause of the
accident and the defendant responsible for it even when
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the facts bearing on these matters are at the outset
unknown to him and often within the knowledge of the
defendant. But though the parties’ relative access to
evidence is an influential factor, it is not controlling.
Thus, the fact that the defendant is as much at a loss to
explain the accident or himself died in it, does not
preclude an adverse inference against him, if the odds
otherwise point to his negligence (see John G.
Fleming, The Law of Torts, 4th Edn., p. 264). The mere
happening of the accident may be more consistent with
the negligence on the part of the defendant than with
other causes. The maxim is based as commonsense and
its purpose is to do justice when the facts bearing on
causation and on the care exercised by defendant are at
the outset unknown to the plaintiff and are or ought to be
within the knowledge of the defendant (see Barkwayv. S.
Wales Transo [(1950) 1 All ER 392, 399] ).
11. The plaintiff merely proves a result, not any
particular act or omission producing the result. If the
result, in the circumstances in which he proves it, makes
it more probable than not that it was caused by the
negligence of the defendants, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is said to apply, and the plaintiff will be entitled
to succeed unless the defendant by evidence rebuts that
probability.
………
13. It should be noticed that the defendant does not
advance his case by inventing fanciful theories,
unsupported by evidence, of how the event might have
occurred. The whole inquiry is concerned with
probabilities, and facts are required, not mere conjecture
unsupported by facts. As Lord Macmillan said in his
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dissenting judgment in Jones v. Great Western [(1930) 47
PLR 39] :
“The dividing line between conjecture and inference is
often a very difficult one to draw. A conjecture may be
plausible, but it is of no legal value, for its essence is that
it is a mere guess. An inference, in the legal sense, on the
other hand, is a deduction from the evidence, and if it is a
reasonable deduction it may have the validity of legal
proof. The attribution, of an occurrence to a cause is, I
take it, always a matter of inference. The cogency of a
legal inference of causation may vary in degree between
practical certainty and reasonable probability. Where the
coincidence of cause and effect is not a matter of actual
observation there is necessarily a hiatus in the direct
evidence, but this may be legitimately bridged by an
inference from the facts actually observed and proved.”
In other words, an inference is a deduction from
established facts and an assumption or a guess is
something quite different but not necessarily related to
established facts.
14. Alternatively, in those instances where the defendant
is unable to explain the accident, it is incumbent upon
him to advance positive proof that he had taken all
reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.
15.Res ipsa loquitur is an immensely important vehicle
for importing strict liability into negligence cases. In
practice, there are many cases where res ipsa loquitur is
properly invoked in which the defendant is unable to
show affirmatively either that he took all reasonable
precautions to avoid injury or that the particular cause of
the injury was not associated with negligence on his part.
Industrial and traffic accidents and injuries caused by
defective merchandise are so frequently of this type that
the theoretical limitations of the maxim are quite
overshadowed by its practical significance [ Millner:
“Negligence in Modern Law”, 92] .”
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36. Similarly, in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshi v. Ranjit Ginning &
Pressing Co. (P) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 745, the Supreme Court emphasised
that in claims arising out of motor accidents the court must examine the
circumstances in which the accident occurred and determine whether the
manner of the occurrence reasonably points towards negligence. Relevant
paragraphs are extracted as under:
“5. The High Court has not gone into the question as to
whether the car was being driven rashly and negligently
by the owner’s employee as it held that the act was not in
the course of his employment. We feel that the question as
to whether the car was being driven rashly and
negligently would have to be decided on the facts of the
case first for, if the claimants fail to establish rash and
negligent act no other question would arise. We would
therefore proceed to deal with this question first. The
claimants did not lead any direct evidence as to how the
accident occurred. No eyewitness was examined. But PW
1, the younger brother of the deceased Purshottam
Udeshi, who went to the spot soon after the accident was
examined. He stated that he went with one of his relatives
and an employee of his brother’s employer and saw that
the car had dashed against a tree while proceeding from
Nagpur to Pandurna. The tree was on the right hand side
of the road, four feet away from the right hand side of the
main metalled road. The vehicle will have to proceed on
the left hand side of the road. The road was 15 feet wide
and was a straight metalled road. On either side of the
road there were fields. The fields were of lower level. The
tree against which the car dashed was uprooted about 9
to 10 inches from the ground. The car dashed so violently
that it was broken in the front side. A photograph taken at
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vehicle struck so violently that the machine of the car
from its original position went back about a foot. The
steering wheel and the engine of the car receded back on
driver’s side and by the said impact the occupants died
and front seat also moved back. The witness was not
cross-examined on what he saw about the state of the car
and the tree. It was not suggested to him that the car was
not driven in a rash and negligent manner. In fact there is
no cross-examination on the aspect of rash and negligent
driving. The Claims Tribunal on this evidence found that
“it was admittedly a mishap on the right side of the road
wherein the vehicle had dashed against a tree beyond the
pavement so violently as not only to damage the vehicle
badly but also entailing death of its three occupants,
maxim “‘res ipsa loquitur’ applies”
(see Ellor v. Selfridge [(1930) 46 TLR 236] ). The
Tribunal proceeded to discuss the evidence of PW 1 and
found on the evidence that it cannot help concluding that
the dashing of the car against the tree was most violent
and that it was for the respondents to establish that it was
a case of inevitable accident. They have led no evidence.
It may at once be stated that though the opposite parties
had pleaded that this is a case of inevitable accident they
have not led any evidence to establish their plea. The
burden rests on the opposite party to prove the inevitable
accident. To succeed in such a defence the opposite party
will have to establish that the cause of the accident could
not have been avoided by exercise of ordinary care and
caution. “To establish a defence of inevitable accident
the defendant must either show what caused the accident
and that the result was inevitable, or he must show all
possible causes, one or more of which produced the
effect, and with regard to each of such possible causes he
must show that the result could not have been avoided”.
(Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 28, p. 81).
No such attempt was made and before us the plea of
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inevitable accident was not raised. We have therefore to
consider whether the claimants have made out a case of
rash and negligent driving. As found by the Tribunal
there is no eyewitness and therefore the question is
whether from the facts established the case of rash and
negligent act could be inferred. The Tribunal has applied
the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur”. It has to be
considered whether under the circumstances the Tribunal
was justified in applying the doctrine.
6. The normal rule is that it is for the plaintiff to prove
negligence but as in some cases considerable hardship is
caused to the plaintiff as the true cause of the accident is
not known to him but is solely within the knowledge of the
defendant who caused it, the plaintiff can prove the
accident but cannot prove how it happened to establish
negligence on the part of the defendant. This hardship is
sought to be avoided by applying the principle of res ipsa
loquitur. The general purport of the words res ipsa
loquitur is that the accident “speaks for itself’ or tells its
own story. There are cases in which the accident speaks
for itself so that it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove the
accident and nothing more. It will then be for the
defendant to establish that the accident happened due to
some other cause than his own negligence. Salmond on
the Law of Torts (15th Edn.) at p. 306 states: “The
maxim res ipsa loquitur applies whenever it is so
improbable that such an accident would have happened
without the negligence of the defendant that a reasonable
jury could find without further evidence that it was so
caused”. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol.
28, at p. 77, the position is stated thus: “An exception to
the general rule that the burden of proof of the alleged
negligence is in the first instance on the plaintiff occurs
wherever the facts already established are such that the
proper and natural inference arising from them is that the
injury complained of was caused by the defendant’s
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negligence, or where the event charged a; negligence
‘tells it own story’ of negligence on the part of the
defendant, the story so told being clear and
unambiguous”. Where the maxim is applied the burden is
on the defendant to show either that in fact he was not
negligent or that the accident might more probably have
happened in a manner which did not connote negligence
on his part. For the application of the principle it must be
shown that the car was under the management of the
defendant and that the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who had the
management used proper care. Applying the principles
stated above we have to see whether the requirements of
the principle have been satisfied. There can be no dispute
that the car was under the management of the company’s
manager and that from the facts disclosed by PW 1 if the
driver had used proper care in the ordinary course of
things the car could not have gone to the right extreme of
the road, dashed against a tree and moved it a few inches
away. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted
that the road is a very narrow road of the width of about
15 feet on either side of which were fields and that it is
quite probable that cattle might have strayed into the
road suddenly causing the accident. We are unable to
accept the plea for in a country road with a width of
about 15 feet with fields on either side ordinary care
requires that the car should be driven at a speed in which
it could be controlled if some stray cattle happened to
come into the road. From the description of the accident
given by PW 1 which stands unchallenged the car had
proceeded to the right extremity of the road which is the
wrong side and dashed against a tree uprooting it about 9
inches from the ground. The car was broken on the front
side and the vehicle struck the tree so violently that the
engine of the car was displaced from its original position
one foot on the back and the steering wheel and the
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engine of the car had receded back on the driver’s side.
The car could not have gone to the right extremity and
dashed with such violence on the tree if the driver had
exercised reasonable care and caution. On the facts made
out the doctrine is applicable and it is for the opponents
to prove that the incident did not take place due to their
negligence. This they have not even attempted to do. In
the circumstances we find that the Tribunal was justified
in applying the doctrine. It was submitted by the learned
counsel for the respondents that as the High Court did
not consider the question this point may be remitted to the
High Court. We do not think it necessary to do so for the
evidence on record is convincing to prove the case of
rash and negligent driving set up by the claimants.”
(emphasis added)
37. Thus, where direct evidence regarding the manner of the accident
is unavailable, the Tribunal is entitled to examine the surrounding
circumstances and assess whether the occurrence is of such a nature that
negligence can reasonably be inferred. In such cases, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur operates as a rule of evidence enabling the Tribunal, on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, to determine whether the
accident itself provides a reasonable basis to infer negligence.
Summarizing
38. From the above discussion relating to the nature of inquiry before
the Tribunal, the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and the
applicable standard of proof, three aspects emerge clearly.
39. First, that the proceedings before the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal are in nature of an inquiry and are not hemmed in by rules of
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procedure or evidence. The Supreme Court in Shila Datta (supra)
[passages extracted in paragraph 20 (a) above], has elaborated on this
aspect. Essentially, a claim under Section 165 of the MV Act, is neither a
suit nor an adversarial lis.
40. Tribunal holds an inquiry and makes an award to determine
compensation, which ought to be just and reasonable. The procedure to be
followed is summarised in the best discretion of the Tribunal. It has the
power under Section 169 of MV Act to summon persons possessing
special knowledge of the matters relevant to the inquiry.
41. In Anita Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court emphasised that fault
may not be found merely because Tribunals do not examine some of the
best eyewitnesses, as in a criminal trial, but should do their best to analyse
the material placed on record by the parties.
42. Having clearly sketched the contours of the procedure undertaken
by a Tribunal, it brings us to the second issue, which is determination of
negligence. The nature of the accident and the basic facts surrounding the
same are presented before the Tribunal in the form of a DAR (Detailed
Accident Report), or through an FIR, or a recording in a police diary,
along with the claim for compensation. In order to arrive at an assessment
of negligence and, therefore, consequential liability in tort law, the
principle of res ipsa loquitur, particularly in accident cases, is often
brought into play.
43. Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constitutes an exception to the
general rule that the burden of proving negligence lies upon the claimant.
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The facts, “tell its own story” and “speak for itself”. The fact of the
accident itself sometimes constitutes evidence of negligence. The principal
function of the maxim is to prevent injustice, that would be caused to a
plaintiff who would otherwise be compelled to prove the precise cause of
the accident and responsibility of the defendant, when the facts are
unknown to plaintiff but lie only within the knowledge of defendant. The
burden then shifts to the defendant, who can, by leading evidence, rebut
the inference drawn by the Court based on the doctrine.
44. A notable line has been drawn in this inference to be drawn by the
Courts, distinguishing between “mere conjecture” and “inference”.
Conjecture leans more towards a mere guess, though plausible. However,
inference in the legal sense is a reasonable deduction from evidence. A
large part of defendant’s defence would be to explain or provide proof that
he had taken all reasonable steps to avert foreseeable harm.
45. Therefore, for application of the principle, it must be shown that
the offending vehicle was under the management of the defendant and that
the accident was such that, in the ordinary course of things, it would not
have happened if those who were in management had used proper care.
Having reached a reasonable inference based on the facts of the accident
and being presented with a defence raised by defendants that they
exercised care to avert foreseeable harm, the issue before the Tribunal
would be how to balance the two aspects and what parameter is to be
applied in measuring this balance, or in assessing which side the scales
tilt.
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46. This brings us to the third aspect, which is the test to be applied.
It is well settled that the test or the burden of proof which applies is not
that of beyond a reasonable doubt (as in criminal cases), but on the test of
preponderance of probabilities.
47. The principle that negligence in motor accident claim proceedings
is to be assessed on the touchstone of probability rather than strict proof
did not emerge for the first time in Bimla Devi (supra), but rests on earlier
jurisprudence recognising that proceedings before statutory tribunals are
not governed by strict rules of evidence and that negligence in accident
cases may be inferred from surrounding circumstances on a reasonable
evaluation of the material placed on record. Evolution of this approach is
also reflected in a previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of
Mysore v. S.S. Makapur, AIR 1963 SC 375, wherein it was observed that
“they can, unlike courts, obtain all information material for the points
under enquiry from all sources, and through all channels, without being
fettered by rules and procedure, which govern proceedings in court. The
only obligation which the law casts on them is that they should not act on
any information which they may receive unless they put it to the party
against whom it is to be used and give him a fair opportunity to explain
it.”
48. This would effectively mean that the Tribunal is required to weigh
the material placed before it, including the police record, evidence,
testimonies, documentary evidence, to determine which way the balance
tilts, i.e. “what is more probable?”.
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49. Probability is certainly a subjective notion, but draws within its
fold various unquantifiable elements like common sense, judicial
experience, demeanor of witnesses, strength of the police record, location
and manner of accident, nature of vehicles involved, etc. To apply the test
of preponderance of probabilities is not to pick out, in an arbitrary and ad
hoc manner, some fragment from the mass of facts and evidence and reach
a result, but to ultimately balance the whole set.
50. The Supreme Court in Meena Variyal (supra) provides a caution
in the same spirit, for Tribunals to approach a claim for compensation,
albeit in a summary procedure, without ignoring all ‘basic principles of
law’.
51. The ‘basic principles of law’ are those that have been touched
upon above, which can be usefully termed as the ‘three fundamental
pillars’ for assessment of negligence (i.e. proceeding is in nature of
inquiries, application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine and use of
preponderance of probability as the balancing test).
52. These jurisprudential tools are to be used by Tribunals in a
sensible and rational manner, and not cut short the process, merely
because the larger canvas is summary in nature. Any Court assessing
motor accident cases will run that risk, since the jurisprudence provides
considerable scope for applying discretion. There can be no straitjacket
standard beyond what has already been stated and reiterated time and
again by various Courts, and there would be no point paraphrasing it yet
again with more words and explanations.
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53. In the opinion of this Court, the core essence is for a Tribunal to
marshal all facts and evidence before it, assess them on the basis of the
principles stated above, and weigh them with common sense and judicial
experience.
54. What is to be avoided is randomness, irrationality, absurd
reasoning, conjecture, and illogic. Insurance Companies have often, as in
this case, complained about the sketchy nature of Tribunal’s assessment
on the aspect of negligence. While that is a matter of the individual style
of judgment writing of a particular Presiding Officer of Tribunal, essence
of what is stated above cannot be lost.
55. Sometimes, as an Appellate Court, one has to read between the
lines of what has been stated by the Tribunal, the conclusion not being
wrong, but the explanation inadequate or only partly articulated. What,
therefore, needs to be followed by the Tribunals is a simple procedure of
remaining conscious of the three fundamental pillars while assessing
negligence, joining the dots and articulating the analysis in plain and
simple language.
56. The reasons that inform a judge’s mind in reaching conclusion
after meandering through an assessment have to be stated out there, and
not left for guesswork. This does not mean unnecessary extension,
amplification, and elaboration, but simply following a line, of recording
the reasoning, the judicial sense which permits a judge to weigh the
preponderance, and join the dots as it were.
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Conclusion
57. Keeping the above discussion in mind, this Court is not persuaded
by the plea of the appellant/Insurance Company that the accident was not
caused due to the negligence of respondent no.4, driver of the offending
vehicle. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident and, therefore, the
principle of res ipsa loquitur was rightly invoked. As per the post-mortem
report, Sanjar Alam died due to “ante-mortem injuries caused by blunt
force impact”, and the Mechanical Inspection Report reflects damaged
parts on the front of the offending vehicle. Apart from that, an FIR had
been registered against respondent no.4/ driver.
58. Moreover, notice is taken of the possibility that respondent no. 4
was most likely under the influence of liquor, considering the statement of
the owner of the offending vehicle [R2W1], who stated that driver Ashraf
[respondent no.4 herein] had been instructed to not consume liquor on
duty and was warned not to consume liquor on duty or take any drugs. In
the cross-examination, R2W1, he stated that he was aware that the driver
was under the influence of liquor at the time of the accident.
59. Statement of the officer from the Insurance Company by way of
affidavit [Exhibit R3W1/A], also stated that the driver of the vehicle was
under the influence of alcohol as per MLC No. 58261 of Hindu Rao
Hospital, where he was admitted after the accident. The MLC is exhibited
as Exhibit R3W1/6, as per which smell of alcohol was present, which the
Insurance Company relied upon as a defence for violation of policy terms
and conditions. However, R3W1, in his cross examination, stated that he
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had no personal knowledge as to whether the driver was under the
influence of alcohol at the time of the accident.
60. There is no other material which could displace the finding of
negligence on the part of the driver based on preponderance of
probabilities, in the inquiry conducted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal
might have been slim in its reasoning and narrative; however, no other
conclusion which could have been arrived at regarding the finding of
negligence.
61. Deceased persons were traveling on a rickshaw when they were hit
by a truck. It would be difficult to accept that a truck could not have
avoided a slow-moving rickshaw rather than the other way around. Even
on the facts of the accident, principal of res ipsa loquitur applies with full
force.
Compensation
62. Changes in the computation are made to following effect:
i) Since deceased was 22 years of age, future prospects ought
to have been taken at 40% in place of 50%, following the principles
enunciated in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017)
16 SCC 680, as there was no evidence that he was employed in
permanent employment.
ii) Deduction towards personal expenses was taken at ‘1/3rd’
by the Tribunal, whereas appellant/Insurance Company contends
that it ought to have been 50%, on the ground that only the wife was
treated as a dependent. Respondent no.1/wife of deceased, by way
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of affidavit [Exhibit PW2/A], stated that deceased was working as
a rickshaw puller and was contributing towards the household
expenses of the family. In her cross-examination, she reiterated that
deceased used to provide financial support for household
requirements when he visited the native place. Further, as reflected
from memo of parties filed along with the claim petition, the father
had already expired and petitioner nos.2 and 3 [respondent no. 2 &
3 herein] were minor sisters of deceased. In the absence of any
rebuttal evidence led by driver, owner or insurer to show that the
deceased was not contributing towards their maintenance, the
Tribunal cannot be faulted in treating the family structure as
comprising more than one dependent. In these circumstances,
deduction towards personal expenses was rightly taken in the
category applicable to two to three dependents, i.e. ‘1/3rd’ of the
income, consistent with principles laid down in Pranay Sethi
(supra). Though, the Tribunal seemed to grant ‘1/3rd’ as deduction
despite holding that there was no proof that minor sisters were
dependents, in the opinion of this Court while the deduction of
‘1/3rd’ was correct the reasoning was incorrect.
iii) Loss of love and affection shall be ‘Nil’, in view of United
India Insurance Company Limited vs. Satinder Kaur Alias
Satwinder Kaur and Others (2021) 11 SCC 780.
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iv) Funeral expenses and Loss of estate shall be awarded at Rs.
15,000/- each as per the principles enunciated in Pranay Sethi
(supra).
v) Consortium shall be awarded Rs. 40,000/- each to the wife
and the two sisters as per Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Nanu Ram, (2018) 18 SCC 130, which will be Rs. 1,20,000/-
[Rs.40,000/- x 3].
63. Accordingly, compensation is recomputed as under:
S. HEADS AWARDED BY AWARDED BY
NO. THE TRIBUNAL THIS COURT
1. Income of deceased (A) (less Rs.7254/- Rs.7254/-
Income Tax) [unskilled] [unskilled]
2. Add Future Prospects (B) @ 50% 40%
40%
3. Less Personal expenses of the 1/3rd 1/3rd
deceased (C)
4. Monthly loss of dependency Rs.7,254/- Rs.6,770.40/-
[(A +B)-C = D]
5. Annual loss of dependency Rs.87,048/- Rs.81,244.80/-
(Dx12)
6. Multiplier (E) 18 18
7. Total loss of dependency Rs.15,66,864/- Rs.14,62,406/-
(Dx12xE = F) [Round of
Rs.14,62,406.4/-]
8. Medical expenses (G) Nil Nil
9. Compensation for loss of Rs.1,00,000/- Rs.1,20,000/-
consortium (H) [40,000x 3]
10. Compensation for loss of love Rs.1,00,000/- Nil
and affection (I)
11. Compensation for loss of Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/-
estate (J)
12. Compensation towards Rs.25,000/- Rs.15,000/-
funeral expenses (K)
TOTAL COMPENSATION Rs.18,01,864/- Rs.16,12,406/-
[F+G+H+I+J+K]
INTEREST 9% 9%
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64. In view of the above recomputation, total compensation payable to
the claimants stands reduced to Rs.16,12,406/- along with interest @ 9%
per annum as awarded by MACT.
65. Since 100% of the awarded amount had already been directed to
be deposited before the Registry of this Court vide order dated 30th
September 2013, out of which 80% was also directed to be released to
claimants, remaining deposited amount shall be adjusted against the
recomputed compensation. In case any excess amount has been deposited
by the appellant, same shall be refunded to the appellant along with
accrued interest thereon. The claimants shall be entitled to release of the
entire amount in terms of the directions contained in the impugned Award.
66. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed in the aforesaid terms
and disposed of.
67. Pending applications (if any) are rendered infructuous.
68. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to Insurance Company, only
if the order of deposit has been compiled with.
69. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL
(JUDGE)
APRIL 17, 2026/RK/tk
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