Himachal Pradesh High Court
National Highway Authority Of India vs Sunder on 20 July, 2026
2026:HHC:30610
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
OMP(M) No.250 of 2026
Decided on: 20.07.2026
.
National Highway Authority of India .... Applicant.
Versus
Sunder ...Respondent
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? Yes
rt
For the applicant: Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate.
For the respondent: Mr. Varun Rana, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral)
The instant application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act has been filed for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal,
which is barred by 4 years and 77 days.
2. The facts, as emerge in the present case, are that the
land of the respondent was utilized for the construction of four-lane
road in Ner Chowk, Manali Section of NH-21. The applicant-appellant
initiated the acquisition proceedings under the National Highways Act,
1956, from KM 126.500 to KM 188.917, Bilaspur Ner Chowk Section
for the land falling under revenue estate Dayohi, Tehsil Sundernagar,
District Mandi. The Competent Authority passed an award bearing No.
40 dated 17.10.2013 under Section 3-G of the National Highways Act,
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1956 and determined the compensation to the tune of Rs.12,00,000/-
per bigha, irrespective of classification of land. The compensation for
.
the structure was also awarded as per the report of the registered
Valuer duly verified by Executive Engineer, HPPWD.
3. Feeling dis-satisfied by the quantum of compensation,
the respondent/non-applicant filed claim under Section 3-G (5) of the
of
Act, 1956, before the learned Divisional Commissioner, Mandi,
appointed by the Central Government. The learned Arbitrator partly
rt
allowed the claim of the claimant/respondent and enhanced the
compensation amount of the land to the tune of Rs.26,35,000/- per
bigha and also granted statutory benefits vide impugned award dated
26.07.2017, however, the claim of the respondent/landowner for
enhancement of compensation for structure was rejected.
4. Feeling dis-satisfied with the award passed by the
learned Arbitrator, the applicant-appellant preferred petition under
Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the learned
District Judge, Mandi, however, the said petition came to be dismissed
on 18.11.2021.
5. In the application which has been filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act, it has been contended that the impugned
judgment was passed by the learned District Judge on 18.11.2021.
The counsel for the applicant applied for the certified copy on
16.01.2026, and the same was prepared and delivered on the same
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day. It has been stated that the appeals pertaining to Mohal Dayohi
were allotted/assigned to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates. Despite
.
repeated requests, the then counsel for the applicant did not provide
any update regarding the filing of the appeal or its status. Various
requests were made to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates to send the
filing receipts and the orders passed in the appeals. However, the
of
same were never received. It has been further stated in the application
that M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates were directed to file the appeals;
rt
however, no order or update was given by the said law firm in any of
the matters. The applicant finally withdrew the appeals from the said
law firm vide letter dated 23.07.2025. Thereafter, the applicant again
contacted its counsel to procure the complete case file and requested
the counsel to provide the entire record along with the filing numbers.
However, in December 2025, the said M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates
refused to hand over the record to the applicant.
6. It has been stated that after obtaining the entire record,
legal opinion was sought so as to determine the future course of
action. The legal opinion was given by the Regional Office, and the
matter was discussed at various levels for the purpose of filing the
appeal, where it was decided to challenge the judgment of the learned
District Judge. In this process, a delay of 4 years and 77 days has
occurred in filing the appeal. It has been stated that the delay in filing
the appeal is neither intentional nor willful, but the same has occurred
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under unavoidable circumstances. Along with the application, the
applicant has placed on record Annexure A-2, the copy of the
.
communication addressed by the Project Director of the present
applicant to M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, dated 23.09.2022,
whereby the applicant had requested the said law firm to challenge the
impugned order before this Court by filing the appeals under Section
of
37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Annexure A-3 is the copy of
the communication addressed to the learned senior counsel of the
rt
present case dated 23.07.2025, whereby the cases were entrusted to
him. Thereafter, Annexure A-4 is the copy of the email addressed by
the counsel to the applicant for procuring the entire record, as they
were not in possession of the complete set of files.
7. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the
applicant that the delay in filing the appeal is on account of the fact that
the law firm, namely M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, who were
entrusted with the cases, neither filed the appeals in time nor
communicated or responded to the communication addressed by the
applicant. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the present
applicant cannot be penalized for the negligence of the law firm.
Therefore, though the delay is on the higher side, however, keeping in
view the attending facts and circumstances of the case, the same
deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.
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8. On the other hand, the application has been vehemently
opposed by Mr. Varun Rana, learned counsel for the non-applicant, on
.
the ground that the delay in filing the present appeal is intentional,
deliberate, and willful. Since there is a huge delay of more than four
years, therefore, in the absence of any plausible explanation, no relief
can be granted to the present applicant. He further submits that on
of
account of the inaction and negligence of the applicant, the valuable
rights which have accrued to the non-applicant/respondent cannot be
rt
taken away lightly. He further submits that the respondent is a poor
villager and his land was utilized by the NHAI for the construction of the
road way back in the year 2012. He further submits that for more than
the last 13 years, the claimant is running after the present applicant for
the payment of just and fair compensation. He further submits that in
case the present application is allowed, a huge irreparable loss shall
be caused to him, and he shall be dragged in another round of
litigation.
9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
have gone through the case file carefully.
10. In the present case, the thrust of the applicant’s
argument is that the entire delay in filing the present appeal occurred
on account of the fact that the case in hand was entrusted to M/s Mittal
and Mittal Advocates, vide its letter dated 23.09.2022. Though various
averments have been made in the application explaining the reasons
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for not filing the present appeal, admittedly, from 23.09.2022 till
23.07.2025, no material or document has been placed on record to
.
demonstrate what steps were taken by the applicant for filing the
present appeal. Even otherwise, Annexure A-2, the letter which has
been addressed by the Project Director of the NHAI to M/s Mittal and
Mittal Advocates, reveals that the impugned judgment was passed on
of
18.11.2021. However, there is no explanation as to what steps were
taken by the applicant from the said date, i.e., from 18.11.2021 to
rt
23.09.2022. The said gap is missing, and no explanation has been
offered by the present applicant. To the similar extent, after entrusting
the cases to the learned senior counsel who is representing the
applicant before this court since 23.07.2025, the applicant has not
been able to establish and substantiate what steps were taken by them
and what prevented them from filing the instant appeal from
23.07.2025 to 16.01. 2026. The gap of nearly three years between
23.09.2022 and 23.07.2025 is missing and has not been explained, as
a result of which a right has accrued to the respondent/non-applicant,
which cannot be taken away on the basis of the bald assertions made
in the application.
11. This court is conscious of the fact that the land of the
respondent/non-applicant, who is a villager, was utilized for the
construction of the road way back in 2012, and despite passing of
more than 13 years, he is running from pillar to post to get fair
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compensation. No plausible or cogent reasons have been assigned or
have come forward to show what prevented the present applicant from
.
filing the instant appeal within time. Though the applicant has tried to
put the entire blame on M/s Mittal and Mittal Advocates, but when
specifically asked by this Court what action has been taken against the
law firm, the counsel for the applicant failed to answer.
of
12. Generally, the Courts have adopted a very liberal
approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5
rt
of the Limitation Act, in order to condone delay to enable the Courts to
do substantial justice and to apply the law in a meaningful manner that
sub-serves the ends of justice. Notwithstanding the above, no matter
how liberal an approach is adopted in condoning delay, the existence
of sufficient cause for not filing the appeal in time is a condition
precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay.
The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, and ’cause
for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or, as a matter
of fact, dead matters to be revived and reopened by taking aid of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It must always be borne in mind, while
construing sufficient cause in deciding applications under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation
prescribed for filing an appeal, a substantive right accrues in favour of
the decree-holder, and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed.
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13. The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that even
after sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal
.
within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as
a matter of right, as excusing the delay is within the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in the court. The Court, despite the establishment of
sufficient cause, may for various reasons refuse to condone the delay,
of
depending upon the bona fides of the party. The liberal approach in
considering the sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to
rt
override the substantive law of limitation. The concept of a ‘liberal
approach’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation. It is a well-settled principle of law that though limitation may
harshly affect a particular party, it has to be applied with all its rigour
when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. Where a case has been
presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain to
the court what the sufficient cause was which means an adequate and
enough reason that prevented him from approaching the court within
the period of limitation. No court would be justified in condoning such
an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever, as in the
present case where there is a delay of more than 4 years and 77 days
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as Pathapati
Subba Reddy (died) by LRs and others vs. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA), Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, has
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laid down the parameters for condonation of delay in the following
manner:
.
“12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which
is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be
dismissed. The use of the word ‘shall’ in the aforesaidprovision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject
to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and
had to be given effect to even though no objectionof
regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to
in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation uponrtthe court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond
limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The
exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24(inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only
with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers
the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred afterthe prescribed period provided the proposed appellant
gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within
the period prescribed. In other words, the courts areconferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal
even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided theproposed appellant is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’
for not filing it within time. The said power to condone thedelay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of
time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other
factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due
diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that
courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in
dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay
in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to
advance substantial justice.
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14 to 20 xx xx xx xx
.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors.6, where the High Court, despite
unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had
allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this
Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its
discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High
of
Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic
and an informed manner. The liberal approach in
considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be
rt
allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court
observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’,
‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’
cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of
limitation.
22. xx xx xx
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer 8, this Court held that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based
upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The
expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of
the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was
also observed that even though limitation may harshly
affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all
its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts
have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable
grounds.
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the
aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner
in which equilibrium has to be maintained between
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adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute
as it stands, Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
.
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a
statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power
to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
of
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
rt particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce
it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex
sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”
15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant
that, being an instrumentality of the State, a liberal approach should be
adopted while condoning the delay in filing the application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. She submits that since the file went
through different channels and because it is an agency of the State,
the Court should adopt a liberal approach while considering the said
application
16. To the said submission of learned counsel for the
applicant, Mr. Varun Rana, learned counsel for the respondent, has
placed on record the copy of the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble
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Apex Court in Shivamma (dead) by LRs vs. Karnataka Housing
Board & others, Civil Appeal No.11794 of 2025, decided on 12th
.
September, 2025, whereby Hon’ble Apex Court has held that
irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private
person, the provisions of law applicable are the same, and as such
same consideration that is shown by the courts to a private party, when
of
claiming the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, should also
be adopted towards the State. The expression “sufficient cause”
rt
cannot be construed too liberally merely because the party is theGovernment, the courts are bound to accept readily whatever has been
stated on behalf of the state.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court has deprecated the
condonation of delay in filing the appeal therein that was occasioned
not by any unavoidable circumstance, but by the sheer inefficiency and
ineptitude of the Government pleaders concerned, merely because the
party seeking condonation happened to be the State. in doing so, the
Hon’ble Apex Court had observed that the concepts such as liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach, substantial justice cannot be
employed to thwart the substantial law of limitation, particularly in
cases where the court concludes that there is no justification for the
delay. The distinction between the State or any instrumentality, vis-a-
vis the private individual for the purpose of Section 5 of The Limitation
Act should be understood in its proper context and true spirit.
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18. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the State
or any of its instrumentality cannot be put on the same footing as a
.
private party for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court while passing the judgment
has given a clear message to the State and all its instrumentalities that
a leisurely and lethargic approach cannot continue for all times to
of
come. The State and all public authorities to constitute legal cells to
examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved in the
rt
decisions by the courts. If not, then endeavour should be made
towards arriving at a settlement, instead rather than re-agitating the
related causes before the courts. Differential treatment cannot continue
for all times to come.
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court after setting aside the judgment
passed by the High Court, whereby the delay was condoned,
dismissed the application for condonation of delay by imposing cost of
Rs.25,000/- on the respondent in the said case. It has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the
importance of the judicial time, what worries is the plight of the litigant
with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and
its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations
deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold because, say if a party
litigating against the State for whatever reason is unable to contest the
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condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the
lis for another round of litigation and leaves such litigant listless.
.
20. The said exposition of law has been reiterated in various
judgments by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
21. In the present case, the applicant-NHAI has filed the
application to make out a case for the condonation of delay. The entire
of
burden has been shifted on M/s Mittal & Mittal, Advocates, and it has
been averred that on account of their negligence, the present appeal
rt
could not be filed. Interestingly, the applicant has failed to establish or
demonstrate from the record what steps were taken by the applicant
from the date the impugned judgment was passed by the learned
District Judge, Mandi. Not even a single communication has been
placed on record to show that any correspondence was made by the
applicant to the said legal firm prior to 23.09.2022. Even thereafter, for
three years, no steps were taken by the present applicant to inquire
about the pendency or status of the case. From 23.09.2022 till
23.07.2025, no explanation has come forward on behalf of the
applicant to show and establish that the applicant was prompt in
dealing with the present case and that there was no negligence on the
part of the applicant in filing the present appeal.
22. Though, in substance, it has been contended by the
learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant was not aware of
the filing of the appeal, if any, by M/s Mittal & Mittal, Advocates, and
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that they were under the impression that the appeals stood filed by the
said law firm, there is no explanation on behalf of the applicant as to
.
what steps were taken by them except for the letter (Annexure A-2) to
inquire about the pendency/status of the cases.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent has drawn the
attention of this court to the reply, whereby it has been stated that the
of
averments and contents of the application are false, incorrect, and
mischievous. When the non-applicant filed the execution petition, the
rt
counsel for the present applicant put in an appearance before the
learned executing court and also deposited the entire awarded amount
before the said executing court, based upon which the execution was
ordered to be closed. The said fact has been stated by the non-
applicant on affidavit, which also falsifies the case of the present
applicant. Once the learned counsel for the applicant/JD put in an
appearance in the execution proceedings and subsequently accepted
the same by depositing the awarded amount, the allegations and
averments made in the application do not hold good and are found to
be false and incorrect.
24. The stand as has been adopted by the learned counsel
for the applicant that on account of the fault of the legal firm, the delay
of 4 years 77 days has occurred in filing the present appeal, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajneesh Kumar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash,
SLP(Civil) Nos.935-936 of 2021, has held that as noticed over a
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period of time that a tendency on the part of litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings
.
before the court is coming forward. It has been observed that even if, it
is assumed that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this
by itself cannot be a ground to condone the long and inordinate delay,
as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is
of
expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending
in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not
rt
be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the Advocate
and thereby disowns him at any time and seek relief.
25. It is well settled that Advocate is the agent of the party.
His acts and statements, made within the limits of the authority given to
him, are the acts and statements of the principal, i.e. the party who
engages him. It is true that in certain situations the court may, in the
interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree
notwithstanding the negligence or misdemeanour of the Advocate
where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant, but there is no
such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and
seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an
absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment has held as follows:
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“10. It appears that the entire blame has been thrown
on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the
petitioners in the trial court. We have noticed over a period.
of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their
lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the
proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a
moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or
negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone
long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be
of
vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally
vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not
rt
be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the
advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek
relief.
S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS. 935-936 OF 2021
11.In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of
this Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. & M.C. Private
Ltd. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 185, wherein this Court
observed as under:-
“8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and
statements, made within the limits of authority given tohim, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the
party who engage him. It is true that in certain situations,the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a
dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the
negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it
finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no
such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at
any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can
be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the
working of the system extremely difficult. The observations
made in Rafiq [AIR 1981 SC 1400] must not be
understood as an absolute proposition. As we have::: Downloaded on – 24/07/2026 20:37:37 :::CIS
18 2026:HHC:30610mentioned hereinabove, this was an ongoing suit posted
for final hearing after a lapse of seven years of its
institution. It was not a second appeal filed by a villager.
residing away from the city, where the court is located. The
defendant is also not a rustic ignorant villager but a private
limited company with its head office at Calcutta itself andmanaged by educated businessmen who know where their
interest lies. It is evident that when their applications were
not deposed of before taking up the suit for final hearingof
they felt piqued and refused to appear before the court.
May be, it was part of their delaying tactics as alleged by
the plaintiff. May be not. But one thing is clear they chose
rt
to noncooperate with the court. Having adopted such a
stand towards the court, the defendant has no right to askits indulgence. Putting the entire blame upon the advocate
and trying to make it out as if they S.L.P. (CIVIL) NOS.
935-936 OF 2021 were totally unaware of the nature orsignificance of the proceedings is a theory which cannot
be accepted and ought not to have been accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the
decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2
SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to
ensure that actions are commenced within a particular
period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence
documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to
contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to
the principle that law does not assist a person who is
inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when
challenged or disputed to remain dormant without
asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms
the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum::: Downloaded on – 24/07/2026 20:37:37 :::CIS
19 2026:HHC:30610vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura sub- veniunt (the laws
give help to those who are watchful and not to those who
sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is.
to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a
reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale,
fake or fraudulent claims.” (Emphasis supplied)”
26. To the similar effect is the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex
of
Court in Sanjay Singh and another vs. Central Himalayan LandDevelopment Company Ltd., (2019) 12 SCC, 218, wherein the
rt
parameters for condonation of delay have been laid down in thefollowing manner.
“15. But, what is more striking is that the delay to the tune
of 721 days was condoned by the High Court when there
was no satisfactory explanation. In CIVIL APPEAL NO.
1928 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) NO.24690 OF 2018) SANJAY
SINGH AND ANR. VS. CENTRAL HIMALAYAN LANDDEVELOPMENT CO. LTD. our view, there was gross
negligence on part of the respondent and the explanationoffered in support of the prayer for condonation does not
appear to be correct. This is evident from the fact that noeffective steps were taken to pursue the complaint which
was lodged against the then advocate. In the petition for
special leave, it was asserted that the complaint against
the Advocate was not being proceeded with and the
respondent had remained absent on the relevant date.
Said assertion was not answered satisfactorily in the
affidavit in reply filed in this Court. Taking totality of the
circumstances, in our view the delay ought not to have
been condoned by the High Court. We, therefore, accept
the submission of the appellants and set aside the order::: Downloaded on – 24/07/2026 20:37:37 :::CIS
20 2026:HHC:30610condoning delay. Consequently, the First Appeal also
stands dismissed.”
.
27. This court is of the considered view that a poor villager,
whose land was utilized for the construction of the road, has been
deprived of his properties, is running from pillar to post for the last 13
years. In case the present application is allowed, the respondent will be
of
thrown into another round of litigation for years to come. As rightly
pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that since the
rt
delay is inordinate and unexplained and is more than 4 years 77 days,
it cannot be condoned in any eventuality. The applicant has failed to
make out a case for the condonation of delay as no sufficient reasons
have been assigned in the application.
28. Consequently, in view of the observations made
hereinabove, the present application, being devoid of any merit,
deserves to be dismissed. Ordered accordingly.
29. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
( Romesh Verma )
Judge
20th July, 2026
(vt)
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