Himachal Pradesh High Court
Naresh vs State Of H.P. And Anr on 4 August, 2026
2026:HHC:32277
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No: 789 of 2026
.
Reserved on: 28.07.2026
Date of Decision: 04.08.2026
Naresh ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. and Anr. ...Respondents
Coram rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Petitioner : Mr Surinder Saklani, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1/State : Mr Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Nemo
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of private complaint No. 59 of 2023 titled Surender
Kumar versus Naresh pending before the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Court No. 8, Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial
Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
2
2026:HHC:32277
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the respondent no. 2/complainant filed a
.
complaint against the petitioner/accused for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 323 and 341 of the IPC. It was
asserted that the accused was constructing a steel structure on
20.08.2023. The complainant objected to it and requested the
of
accused not to carry out any construction. The complainant and
the accused had purchased the flats from Vishal Chauhan, who
rt
was called to the spot. He clarified that no one was authorised to
construct any stand in front of any flat and if any structure was to
be raised, it was to be raised on the side of the building. He also
earmarked the area for constructing the stand. The accused came
to the spot on 27.08.2023 at about 3-3:30 p.m. with 6-7 persons
and threatened to construct the stand. The complainant objected,
and the accused slapped the complainant. The complainant’s son
intervened, and the accused also caused him injuries. The
complainant tried to go to his home, but the accused restrained
him from proceeding further. The complainant made a complaint
to the police, and the police filed a Kalandra under Section 107/150
of the Cr.P.C. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial
Court for taking action against the accused.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
3
2026:HHC:32277
3. Learned Trial Court recorded the preliminary evidence
and found sufficient reasons to summon the accused vide order
.
dated 19.02.2024. The accused appeared before the Court on
05.10.2024 and furnished the bail bonds.
4. Being aggrieved by the filing of the complaint and
of
summoning order passed by the Court, the accused has filed the
present petition for quashing of the complaint, summoning order
rt
and consequential proceedings. It has been asserted that a
kalandra was prepared and was sent to the Court of the learned
Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Urban), who had issued the notices to
the accused. Civil litigation is going on between the parties. A false
complaint was filed to compel the accused to compromise the
matter. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an
abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the complaint and consequential
proceedings arising out of it be quashed.
5. I have heard Mr Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
4
2026:HHC:32277
6. Mr Surinder Saklani, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the matter was reported to the police and the
.
police filed a kalandra before the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate. The complainant could not have filed a complaint
based on the same facts. The continuation of the proceedings
before the learned Trial Court amounts to double jeopardy. Civil
of
litigations are pending between the parties, and the complainant
had filed a false complaint against the accused to compel him to
rt
settle the matter. The continuation of the proceedings would
amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the summoning
order, complaint and consequential proceedings arising out of it
be quashed.
7. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State submitted that the dispute is
between the private parties and the State has no submissions to
make.
8. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
5
2026:HHC:32277
9. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
.
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,of
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
rt
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and ofthe principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted andreproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of anycourt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearlydefined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustivelist of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
6
2026:HHC:32277
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
of
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
rt contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings,
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause nos. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
7
2026:HHC:32277
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
of
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
rt
quashed.”
10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers areneither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature ofthis authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embeddedwithin Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines
that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal
proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the
Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.
The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
8
2026:HHC:32277legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)
the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are.
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
11. A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that
of
where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any
court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends
of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered
but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent
rt
powers. The provision does not confer any new power on
the High Court but rather saves the power which the HighCourt already possesses, from before the enactment of the
legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its
power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quashany criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the
initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process
of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the
ends of justice.”
12. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13. It was submitted that the complaint was made to the
police and the police filed a kalandara. The complainant could not
have filed a complaint based on the same facts. The continuation
of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court amounts to
double jeopardy. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid
down more than 100 years ago in Muthia Moopan and Ors.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
9
2026:HHC:32277
(09.09.1911- MADHC): MANU/TN/0278/1911 that the security
proceedings contemplate the discharge as opposed to acquittal. No
.
charge is to be framed. Hence, the provision of Section 495 of
Cr.P.C. 1888 (corresponding to Section 300 of 1973) does not apply
to security proceedings. It was observed: –
of
“Section 495 has no application to the case. It applies only
where the proceedings could end in an acquittal or
discharge of the accused. A proceeding under Section 107 of
the Criminal Procedure Code does not terminate in either of
rt
these ways. No doubt Section 117 enacts that the enquiry in
such cases shall be made as nearly as may be practicable inthe manner prescribed for conducting trials and recording
evidence in summons cases. But the final order to be passed
is expressly provided for in Section 119, Criminal Procedure
Code, which lays down that “If, on an enquiry under Section117, it is not proved that it is necessary for keeping the
peace… that the person in respect of whom the enquiry is
made, should execute a bond, the Magistrate shall make anentry on the record to that effect, and, if such person is in
custody only for the enquiry, shall release him or if suchperson is not in custody, shall discharge him.” Section 118,
Criminal Procedure Code, shows that if the finding is
against the accused, no order is to be passed convictinghim. The order should be one directing him to execute a
bond. If, on the other hand, the finding is in his favour,
Section 119 shows an entry is to be made on the record that
it is not necessary that he should execute a bond and if he is
in custody he should be released; if he is not in custody he
should be discharged. In Velu Tayi Ammal v. Chidambaravelu
Pillai I.L.R., (1910) Mad., 85, Miller, J., points out that the
expression discharged in Section 119, Criminal Procedure
Code, means merely discharged from custody and is not
used in the technical sense of discharged (as opposed to
acquitted) from an offence as used in Section 253, Criminal::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
10
2026:HHC:32277Procedure Code. No charge has to be framed against the
accused in security proceedings which commence with the
making of an order under Section 112, Criminal Procedure.
Code, by the Magistrate “setting forth the substance of the
information received, the amount of the bond to be
executed, the term for which it is to be in force, and the
number, character and class of sureties (if any) required.”
We have not here, therefore, a case where the framing of a
charge is contemplated at all or as the result of the
proceedings an order either of discharge or acquittal is to beof
passed against anyone. It may be noted that even the word
“accused” is not used by the legislature with reference to
security proceedings, though the word is a convenient one
and may not inappropriately be made use of for some
rt
purposes, but as pointed out by Miller, J., the use of the
word requires caution. That learned Judge held in Velu TayiAmmal v. Chidambaravelu Pillai, I.L.R., (1910) Mad., 85 that
Section 437, Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers the
High Court or a Sessions Judge to direct a further enquiry to
be made where an accused person has been discharged,does not apply to orders passed under the security sections.
The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in
Queen-Empress v. Iman Mondal, I.L.R., (1900) Calc., 662.”
14. This question was also considered by Emperor vs.
Bhagwat Singh, AIR 1926 All 403 and it was held that a person
bound over under Section 107 is not convicted of any offence and
may be retried. It was observed: –
“The question is whether the appellate court has the power
under section 423 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
order a re-trial. The authority given to an appellate court is
contained in clauses (c) and (d). In an appeal from an order,
the appellate court may alter or reverse such order and may
make any amendment or any consequential or incidental
order that may be just or proper. Under clause (b), in an
appeal from a conviction, the appellate court is specifically::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
11
2026:HHC:32277given the power of ordering a retrial. The distinction exists
for a very obvious reason. Under section 403, a person once
convicted or acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence,.
and in an appeal from a conviction, if the conviction is
reversed, the appellant may claim that he has been
acquitted and he would not be liable to re-trial for the same
offence. To obviate this difficulty, power has to be given tothe appellate court specifically to order a re-trial. This
difficulty will not arise in proceedings taken under section
107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A person bound overof
under the terms of that section is not convicted of any
offence and may be re-tried in pursuance of the same order
passed under section 107. The order for re-trial is, in our
opinion, an incidental order. All that the Sessions Judge has
rt
done is to reverse the order binding over the applicants and
then to direct that proceedings subsequent to the stage ofthe issue of a notice under section 107 be all cancelled and
that the Magistrate do proceed from the stage of the issue
of notice.”
15. A similar view was taken in Narinder Singh v. Shiv
Kumar, 2023 SCC OnLine J&K 791 wherein it was held:
10. From a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that
no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or
even for a different offence, but on the same facts. In the
instant case, even if it is assumed that the facts narrated inthe impugned complaint and the facts narrated in the
proceedings under Sections 107/117 of Cr. P.C. are similar,
still then, in the proceedings under Sections 107/117 of Cr.
P.C., the petitioner is not to be tried and convicted for any
offence. At best, he can be asked by the Magistrate to
execute a bond for keeping peace and good behaviour. It is
only in the proceedings initiated on the basis of a criminal
complaint that the petitioner can be tried and convicted of
some offence. Therefore, the provisions of Section 300 of
Cr. P.C. are not attracted to the facts of the instant case. The
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
12
2026:HHC:32277
argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, as such, is
without any merit.
16. Therefore, the plea taken by the petitioner/accused
.
that the filing of the complaint before the learned Trial Court after
initiation of the criminal proceedings before the learned SDM
amounts to double jeopardy is not acceptable.
of
17. The copies of the order sheets show that the
summoning order was passed on 19.02.2024. The petitioner had
rt
appeared before the learned Trial Court on 05.10.2024 and had
furnished the bail bonds. However, the present petition was filed
before the Court on 21.07.2026 after the lapse of more than 2 years
from the summoning order. The inherent jurisdiction is
discretionary and cannot be exercised in case of inordinate delay.
It was laid down by the Delhi High Court in Ajit Kumar Gola v. State
(NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine Del 1398, that ordinarily a petition
under Section 482 of CrPC should be filed within 90 days and the
delay beyond 90 days should be satisfactorily explained. It was
observed:
“12. In Bata v. Anama Behera, 1989 SCC OnLine Ori 325: 1990
Cri LJ 1110, the learned Single Judge of the Orissa High Court
observed as under:
“Though for filing an application under Section 482 there is
no limitation, the application should be filed within a::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
13
2026:HHC:32277reasonable time, so that the progress of the case is not
disturbed at a belated stage. A revision petition challenging
an order can be filed within 90 days from the date of the.
order. Similarly, a period of 90 days, which is at par with a
revision petition, should be treated as a reasonable time for
filing an application under Section 482, and if it is filed
beyond the period of 90 days, the applicant would have toexplain the cause of the delay.”
13. Similarly in Gopal Chauhan v. Smt Satya, 1978 SCC OnLine
HP 33: 1979 Cri LJ 446, it was observed that a petition under
of
Section 482 CrPC and Article 227 of the Constitution of
India filed after expiry of 3 years from the date of
summoning ought not to be entertained when the case is
fixed for the stage of evidence and that too, when the
rt
petitioner has approached the Revisionist Court.
14. Thus, although the question of inordinate delay and
laches has not been dealt with in many cases but the fact
remains that a party who invokes the jurisdiction of the
High Court for quashing of FIR and the consequent
proceedings by embarking on to show that the ingredients
of Section 409 or 420 IPC are not made out, is not only
required to meet the test of expeditious dispatch of
approaching to the Court but he should also be able to show
that the facts are so glaring that it calls for interference of
the High Court rather than raising the disputed questions of
fact. In the present case, the FIR was admittedly registered
in the year 1999, and a charge sheet had also been filed in
the same year. Therefore, the petitioner was aware of what
the accusations against him were when he appeared before
the Court for the first time in 1999, as a complete set of the
charge sheet must have been supplied to him. If at all, the
petitioner felt that there was a case for quashing of the FIR,
he ought to have approached the Court at the earliest
possible stage. I agree with the observation made by the
Orissa High Court that if a revision against an order of
summoning could be filed within a period of 90 days then
ordinarily a period of 90 days should have been sufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
14
2026:HHC:32277
CrPC Admittedly, this has not been done and if the period is
calculated from 1999, the present petition has been filed
after more than 11 years and, therefore, there was
.
inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner for
which not even an iota of Explanation is forthcoming in the
petition.
15. Even if, the contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner that the cause of action for filing the petition
accrued to the petitioner only after 09.052009 when the
charges against him under Section 409 and 420 IPC were
of
framed, is taken to be correct even then from the date of
framing of the charge, there has been a lapse of almost two
years in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. As I have
observed hereinabove that a revision against an order ought
rt
to be filed within a period of 90 days and the said period has
been held by Orissa High Court Court to be reasonable and
sufficient to invoke the revisionary power of a Court, then
ordinarily the said period can also be said to be reasonable
in normal circumstances while preferring a petition under
Section 482 CrPC while as in the instant case, there is a
lapse of almost two years without there being even an iota
of averment in the petition as to what the petitioner was
doing during these two years.”
18. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to provide
any explanation for the delay, and the inherent jurisdiction cannot
be exercised at his instance.
19. It was submitted that a civil suit is pending between
the parties and a dispute of civil nature is being given a criminal
colour. This submission cannot be accepted. The allegations in the
complaint show that the accused came with 4-5 persons and gave
beatings to the complainant and his son. They also restrained
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
15
2026:HHC:32277
them from proceeding towards their home. These allegations
prima facie show the commission of offences punishable under
.
Sections 323 and 341 of the IPC. Merely because a civil suit is
pending between the parties does not mean that no offence was
committed in the present case. Hence, the pendency of the civil
suit will not help the petitioner.
of
20. It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the
rt
Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC
949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial
Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet isready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of
the view that the appellants should prefer a dischargeapplication before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer
might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If
any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall
look into the materials and take a call whether any
discharge case is made out or not.”
21. No other point was urged.
::: Downloaded on – 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
16
2026:HHC:32277
22. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is
dismissed.
.
23. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
of
(Rakesh Kainthla)
rt Judge
4th August, 2026
(Nikita)
::: Downloaded on - 04/08/2026 21:12:38 :::CIS
