Chattisgarh High Court
Naresh Kumar Patel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 8 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
CGHC010123112022 2026:CGHC:28121-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 645 of 2022
Naresh Kumar Patel S/o Ramayan Prasad Patel Aged About 20 Years R/o
Village Tundra, P.S.- Gidhouri, District - Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara,
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through - S.H.O. Of P.S. - Gidhouri-Tundra, District -
Baloda-Bazar-Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
--- Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Mr. Hemant Gupta, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Addl. A.G.
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
08/07/2026
1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 has been preferred by the appellant assailing the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.03.2022
Digitally
signed by
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC, POCSO
VED
VED PRAKASH
PRAKASH DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:
2026.07.14
20:03:19
+0530Act, Baloda Bazar, in Special Criminal Case (POCSO) No. 25/2019,
2whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced in the
following manner:-
Conviction Sentence
U/s. 377 of the IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs.
500/-, in default of payment of
fine additional R.I. for one year.
U/s. 6 of the Protection of R.I. for 20 years and fine of Rs.
Children from Sexual Offences 500/-, in default of payment of
Act, 2012 (in short 'POCSO Act') fine additional R.I. for one year.
U/s. 12 of the POCSO Act R.I. for 3 years and fine of Rs.
300/-, in default of payment of
fine additional R.I. for 3 months.
All the sentences are directed to run concurrently.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 12.05.2019, PW-1/father of
the victim lodged a written complaint (exhibit P-1) to the police with
the allegation that on 11.05.2019, at about 8:00 p.m. his minor son
was dancing in a marriage ceremony in front of his house, but he
was missing from there. His friend informed him that the appellant
took him towards field and while searching him, he was found near
vicinity and disclosed that the appellant tried to make carnal
intercourse, then he lodged the report. Based on the said complaint,
the FIR (exhibit P-2) was registered against the appellant for the
offence under Sections 377, 511 of the IPC and Section 8 of the
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short
‘POCSO Act‘). The victim boy was sent for his medical examination,
to Primary Health Centre, Barpali, District Baloda Bazar-Bhatapara,
where he was medically examined by the doctor, however no injury
3
has been found on the body of the victim boy. Spot map (exhibit P-3)
was prepared by the police and exhibit P-4 was prepared by the
patwari. The underwear of the victim boy was seized vide seizure
memo (exhibit P-7). With respect to the age of the victim boy, his
birth certificate (exhibit P-12) was seized vide seizure memo (exhibit
P-8) and according to the birth certificate, the date of birth of the
victim boy is 26.05.2012. The birth register has also been seized
from Nagar Panchayat, Tundra vide seizure memo (exhibit P-9). The
appellant was arrested on 12.05.2019, and he too was sent for
medial examination to Primary Health Center, Barpali and on his
medical examination, the doctor found him able to do sexual
intercourse. The underwear of the appellant has also been seized
vide seizure memo (exhibit P-15). The underwear of the victim boy
and the appellant were sent for its query report to the doctor, who
gave their query reports (exhibit P-22 and P-25, respectively) and
referred for its chemical examination from the FSL. Both these
underwear of the victim boy and the appellant were sent to the State
FSL Raipur, from where report (exhibit P-30) was received. As per
the FSL report, no semen or sperm was found on the sent articles.
Statement of the victim boy under Section 164 of CRPC and under
Section 161 of CRPC of the witnesses have been recorded and after
completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the
learned trial Court for the offence under Sections 377 and 511 of the
IPC and Sections 8, 12 and 18 of the POCSO Act.
3. The learned trial Court vide order dated 30.08.2019, framed charge
against the appellant for the offence under Sections 377 and 511 of
4
the IPC and Sections 8, 12 and 18 of the POCSO Act. The charge
against the appellant was amended on 25.03.2022 and in place of
charge under Sections 377/511 of the IPC, the charge of Section 377
of the IPC has been framed. Likewise, in place of charge under
Sections 8, 12 and 18 of the POCSO Act, the charge under Sections
6 and 12 of the POCSO Act has been framed. The appellant denied
the charge and claimed trial.
4. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined 14
witnesses and exhibited documents. Statement of the appellant
under Section 313 CRPC was also recorded, wherein he denied all
incriminating circumstances appearing against him, pleaded
innocence and submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the
offence. No defence evidence was adduced by the appellant.
5. After appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led by the
prosecution, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant and
sentenced him as has been mentioned in the earlier part of this
judgment. Hence this appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that, the prosecution
has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are
material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of prosecution
witnesses and the same cannot made basis to convict the appellant
in the offence in question. He would also submit that initially the case
of the prosecution case was attempt to commit unnatural offence with
the victim boy, however the allegation was subsequently exaggerated
and the offence of commission of unnatural offence with the victim
5
boy was alleged. As per the FIR, the prompt report has been lodged
and the victim boy was immediately medically examined by the
doctor, but there is no external or internal injury found on the body of
the victim boy, which falsified the entire case of the prosecution. He
would also submit that, even in the FSL report, no semen or sperm
were found, which also proved the false implication of the appellant.
The victim boy (PW-2) and his friends i.e. PW-4 and PW-5 were the
tutored witnesses and their evidence cannot be relied for conviction
of the appellant. There are material inconsistencies in the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, and there was sufficient reason for
false implication of the appellant, as there was a dispute between the
father of the victim boy and the appellant on the issue of eating
snacks from the snacks cart of the father of the victim boy. He would
further submit that, the evidence produced by the prosecution is not
of that quality to inspire confidence upon the court on the evidence of
the witnesses, therefore, the appellant is entitled for benefit of doubt
and acquittal from the alleged offence.
7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant
and would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. But for minor omission or contradiction, the
evidence of prosecution witnesses are sufficient to hold the appellant
guilty for the alleged offence. A prompt report has been lodged by the
victim boy. Even if no injury is found on the body of the victim boy,
that itself is not sufficient to disbelieve the evidence of the victim boy
and other witnesses. He would further submit that the absence of
6
injury on the victim are not the determinative factor that the appellant
has been falsely implicated. He would further submit that there is no
reason for false implication of the appellant that too the minor victim
and his friends. A general hot talks during eating of snacks on credit
from the snacks cart of the father of the victim boy are not sufficient
to falsely implicate the appellant. There are sufficient and
overwhelming evidence in the case, which proved the involvement of
the appellant in the offence in question and the learned trial Court
has rightly convicted and sentenced him for the alleged offence and
the appeal does not have any merit and is liable to be dismissed.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein above and also gone through the
records of the trial court with utmost circumspection.
9. PW-2 is the victim boy, aged about 6 years. After making preliminary
inquiry of his IQ, the learned trial Court after satisfying itself recording
the evidence of the victim boy. He stated in his evidence that, at the
time when he was sitting near Nagraj hotel, the appellant took him to
shop on the pretext to purchase the foam for celebrating dance.
Thereafter, he took him towards field and tried to make carnal
intercourse after removing his clothes. When he tried to shout, he
gagged his mouth and pressed his neck. After sometime, he left him
near Guru shop and he went towards his house. On the way, he met
with his father, and then he disclosed the incident to him. His father
has lodged report to the police.
7
******* In cross-examination he stated that, the place where the
appellant took him, was not visible due to its darkness. He received
multiple injuries due to embedding of thorns. He denied his presence
near the marriage place and enjoying the DJ. In para 26 and 27 of
his further cross-examination, he admitted that he was being tutored
by his father, as to what are to be spoken in the court.
10. PW-4 is the friend of the victim boy. He stated in his evidence that at
the time when they were in the marriage function, the appellant
allured the victim boy for giving chocolate and took him towards field
and in the field, he removed his underwear. In cross-examination, he
admitted that at the marriage place, there was a mob of 100-150
persons. He admitted that he did not know what was the
conversations between the appellant and the victim boy and he did
not know, as to whether the appellant gave chocolate to the victim
boy or not. He also admitted that, he had not seen the appellant and
the victim boy together and he has not witnessed anything. He also
admitted that he was being tutored earlier.
11. PW-5 is another friend of the victim boy. He too has stated that at the
time, when they were at the marriage function, the appellant took the
victim boy towards field. However, in his cross-examination, he
resiled from his examination in chief and admitted that he did not
know about conversation between the appellant and the victim boy
and the appellant was present in the marriage place and participated
in warm welcome of the persons. He too has admitted that he was
being tutored by the counsel and accordingly he made his statement.
8
12. From the testimony of all these three witnesses, including the victim,
it is evident that they deposed before the Court in accordance with
what they had been tutored to state. The evidence of child witness is
to be examined carefully, as they easily be tutored by the persons
interested, which are against the accused.
13. In the matter of “State of Karnataka v. Shantappa Madivalappa
Galapuji and Ors.” 2009(12) SCC 731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Para 15 has held as under:-
“15. “6….. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short “the Evidence Act“) does not prescribe any
particular age as a determinative factor to treat a
witness to be a competent one. On the contrary,
Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all
persons shall be competent to testify, unless the
court considers that they are prevented from
understanding the questions put to them or from
giving rational answers to these questions,
because of tender years, extreme old age,
disease — whether of mind, or any other cause of
the same kind. A child of tender age can be
allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to
understand questions and give rational answers
thereto. This position was concisely stated by
Brewer, J. in Wheeler v. United States (159 US
523). The evidence of a child witness is not
required to be rejected per se, but the court as a
rule of prudence considers such evidence with
close scrutiny and only on being convinced about
the quality thereof and reliability can record
conviction, based thereon. [See Suryanarayana v.
State of Karnataka (2001 (9) SCC 129)]
9
7. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of
Maharashtra [(1997) 5 SCC 341] it was held as
follows: (SCC p. 343, para 5):
“5. ….. A child witness if found competent to
depose to the facts and reliable one such
evidence could be the basis of conviction. In
other words even in the absence of oath the
evidence of a child witness can be considered
under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided
that such witness is able to understand the
questions and able to give rational answers
thereof. The evidence of a child witness and
credibility thereof would depend upon the
circumstances of each case. The only precaution
which the court should bear in mind while
assessing the evidence of a child witness is that
the witness must be a reliable one and his/her
demeanour must be like any other competent
witness and there is no likelihood of being
tutored.”
The decision on the question whether the child
witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests
with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and
the said Judge may resort to any examination
which will tend to disclose his capacity and
intelligence as well as his understanding of the
obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial
court may, however, be disturbed by the higher
court if from what is preserved in the records, it is
clear that his conclusion was erroneous. This
precaution is necessary because child witnesses
are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world
of make-believe. Though it is an established
10
principle that child witnesses are dangerous
witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be
influenced easily, shaken and moulded, but it is
also an accepted norm that if after careful
scrutiny of their evidence the court comes to the
conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it,
there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the
evidence of a child witness.
The above position was highlighted in Ratansingh
Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2004(1)
SCC 64).”
14. The law relating to appreciation of the testimony of a child witness is
well settled. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra,
(1997) 5 SCC 341, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a child
witness, if found competent under Section 118 of the Evidence Act
and capable of understanding the questions put to him and giving
rational answers, is a competent witness and conviction can be
based on such testimony, provided it is found reliable. In Panchhi v.
State of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177, it was observed that while the
evidence of a child witness is not to be rejected merely because of
his tender age, the Court must exercise greater circumspection since
a child is susceptible to influence and tutoring. The same principle
was reiterated in Ratansingh Dalsukhbhai Nayak v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 1 SCC 64, wherein it was held that though a child
witness is a competent witness, the Court must be satisfied that the
testimony bears the impress of truth and is free from the possibility of
tutoring. Again, in State of Karnataka v. Shantappa Madivalappa
Galapuji, (2009) 12 SCC 731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed
that the evidence of a child witness must be subjected to close
11
scrutiny and can safely form the basis of conviction only when it
inspires confidence and there is no likelihood of the witness having
been tutored or influenced. Thus, the consistent judicial approach is
that while the testimony of a child witness is not to be discarded
merely on account of age, it must be evaluated with greater caution,
particularly where the record itself discloses circumstances indicating
tutoring or external influence.
15. In the present case, the victim (PW-2) has admitted in his cross-
examination that he was tutored by his father before entering the
witness box. PW-4 and PW-5 have also admitted that they had been
tutored. These admissions strike at the spontaneity and independent
character of their testimony. Consequently, their evidence cannot be
accepted at its face value and requires independent corroboration. In
the absence of such corroboration from the medical and forensic
evidence, it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction solely on their
testimony.
16. PW-1 is the father of the victim boy. He stated in his evidence that the
appellant took his minor son after giving allurement to give him
chocolate, when his friend informed him about the fact of taking his
son by the appellant, he started searching him and found him near
ATM in the village. His son informed him about the incident of carnal
intercourse by the appellant. He also informed about threatening
given by the appellant to the victim boy. When he has gone to the
house of the appellant, he ran away from his house, thereafter, he
lodged the report. He gave a written complaint to the police and the
12
FIR (exhibit P-2) was lodged. The police has seized the birth
certificate of his son.
******* In cross-examination, he admitted that at the place of
marriage function, there was a mob of persons, who were the
invitees. He had not seen the appellant there. The friends of his son
informed about his missing. Though a suggestion was given to this
witness that the appellant has eaten snacks from his snacks cart and
has not paid amount, there was a quarrel on that issue, but he
denied. He admitted that he himself had not seen both of them
together. There was injury on the buttock and both the hands of his
son and 8-10 thorns were embedded. He get the written complaint
typed at 9:00-10:00 a.m. in the next morning. In further cross-
examination, certain discrepancies have come with that of his 161
CRPC statement (exhibit D-1). This witness has also stated that, he
noticed injuries on the body of the victim boy, when met while
searching him.
17. PW-3 is the mother of the victim, who stated in her evidence that her
minor son had gone to the marriage function and about 8:00 p.m. the
son of her brother-in-law informed about his missing and then they
started searching him. When her son was found near ATM, he
disclosed about the incident that the appellant committed unnatural
sexual intercourse with him. He also informed that he dragged him
on the thorns by which number of thorns have embedded on his
body. In cross-examination, she admitted that she herself had not
seen both of them together. There is also various omissions and
13
contradictions admitted by her with that of her 161 CRPC statement
(exhibit D-2).
18. PW-6 is the uncle of the father of the victim boy. He was being
informed by the father of the victim boy about the incident, but he has
turned hostile and not supported the allegation. He admitted in his
cross-examination that, the appellant had given chocolate to the
victim boy, on which his family members got annoyed and they
scolded the appellant. When he protested, they started beating him
and when the appellant about to go for lodging the report to the
police, then they discussed for lodging of the report against the
appellant. Before lodging of the report, they also take advise from
their counsel.
19. PW-7 is the cousin brother of PW-1, he stated in his evidence that on
the place of marriage function, when the victim boy was not seen,
they started searching him and his son informed that the victim boy
was being taken by the appellant. After sometime, he was found near
ATM and informed about the incident of unnatural sexual intercourse
by the appellant with him, thereafter they lodged the report. In cross-
examination he admitted that, he had not seen the appellant on the
spot. He also admitted that, when the victim boy was found, he
written statement not disclosed the name of the appellant and only
informed that, the friend of his father has taken him. He also
contradict his 161 CRPC statement (exhibit D-3).
20. PW-8 has stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, he had
gone to the marriage function in the village. The appellant was in
14
drunken condition and he took the victim boy towards the field after
alluring him to give chocolate. After some time, when he was at the
house of the complainant, the victim came there and informed about
the incident. This witness has declared hostile and while leading
question asked by the prosecution, he stated that the father of the
victim boy informed him about the injuries on the body of the victim
boy. In cross examination, he admitted that he had not seen the
victim boy and the appellant together. He further admitted that he had
not made any statement to the police and if his statement has been
filed by the police, he did not know about the same. He also admitted
that he disclosed the incident first time before the court.
21. PW-9 is the clerk posted at Nagar Panchayat, Tundra, who has taken
the register of the office of the Registrar, Births and Deaths and
proved the birth date of birth of the victim boy. He proved the register
(exhibit P-16) and it is attested to copy is exhibit P-16C. Since the
age of the victim boy is not disputed by the appellant, his evidence,
though much have significant about the age, but would not be
necessary to deal here.
22. PW-10 is the witness of seizures (exhibit P-7 to P-9), however,
considering the fact that he had not supported the prosecution’s
case, leading question was asked by the prosecution and then he
admitted the seizures made vide the documents (exhibit P-7 to P-9
and also P-15). In cross examination, he again diluted his evidence
and stated that on the instance of the police personnel, he signed the
documents and therefore, his evidence is shaky.
15
23. PW-11, PW-12, PW-13 and PW-14 are the procedural witnesses,
who stated about their part of the investigation, which they
participated including the spot map prepared by Patwari.
24. From the overall evidence available in the record, there is missing of
a specific and clinching evidence against the appellant that he had
taken the victim boy and committed unnatural sexual intercourse with
him. The victim boy was immediately medically examined by the
doctor and no injuries have been found on his body. Even in the FSL
report, no semen and sperm were found on the underwear of the
victim or the appellant.
25. It is true that in the prosecutions involving unnatural sexual offenses,
the absence of injuries on the body of the victim, is not by itself
sufficient to discard the prosecution case. However, where the
medical evidence fails to lend any support to the prosecution version
and it is considered along with the material contradictions, omissions
and inherent improbabilities appearing in the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, the absence of injuries assumes considerable
significance. In the present case, he victim was aged about 6 years
and he stated about injuries on his body. His father (PW-1) and other
witnesses have also stated about presence of the injuries on his
body and while he was medically examined immediately, no injuries
have been found on his body. The allegation is of forcible
commission of offence punishable under Section 377 of IPC.
Nevertheless, the medical examination does not disclose any
external or internal injury on the body of the victim including the anal
region nor any sign of suggestive of penetration or use of force. The
16
medical evidence, therefore, does not corroborate the ocular version,
though conviction can undoubtedly be based on sole testimony of the
victim if it inspires complete confidence, where such testimony is not
wholly reliable and remains uncorroborated by the medical evidence,
the Court must seek assurance before recording a conviction. In the
present case, the cumulative effect of the absence of medical
corroboration coupled with the material discrepancies in the
prosecution evidence creates a reasonable doubt regarding the
prosecution story. It is a settled principle of law that if two views are
reasonably possible on the evidence adduced, the one favourable to
the accused must prevail.
26. In the case of Radhu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2007 (12) SCC
57, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that:
“6. It is now well settled that a finding of guilt in a
case of rape, can be based on the
uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix. The
very nature of offence makes it difficult to get
direct corroborating evidence. The evidence of
the prosecutrix should not be rejected on the
basis of minor discrepancies and contradictions.
If the victim of rape states on oath that she was
forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse, her
statement will normally be accepted, even if it is
uncorroborated, unless the material on record
requires drawing of an inference that there was
consent or that the entire incident was improbable
or imaginary. Even if there is consent, the act will
still be a ‘rape’, if the girl is under 16 years of age.
It is also well settled that absence of injuries on
the private parts of the victim will not by itself
17falsify the case of rape, nor construed as
evidence of consent. Similarly, the opinion of a
doctor that there was no evidence of any sexual
intercourse or rape, may not be sufficient to
disbelieve the accusation of rape by the victim.
Bruises, abrasions and scratches on the victim
especially on the forearms, writs, face, breast,
thighs and back are indicative of struggle and will
support the allegation of sexual assault. The
courts should, at the same time, bear in mind that
false charges of rape are not uncommon. There
have also been rare instances where a parent
has persuaded a gullible or obedient daughter to
make a false charge of a rape either to take
revenge or extort money or to get rid of financial
liability. Whether there was rape or not would
depend ultimately on the facts and circumstances
of each case. ”
27. Further, in the case of Raju and others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, 2008 (15) SCC 133, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed that:
“11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the
greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but
at the same time a false allegation of rape can
cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to
the accused as well. The accused must also be
protected against the possibility of false
implication, particularly where a large number of
accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in
mind that the broad principle is that an injured
witness was present at the time when the incident
happened and that ordinarily such a witness
would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but
18there is no presumption or any basis for
assuming that the statement of such a witness is
always correct or without any embellishment or
exaggeration.”
28. After considering the entire evidence on record, we are of the opinion
that the prosecution has not proved the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. It is true that a conviction in a sexual offence case
can be based on the sole testimony of the victim if it is found to be
trustworthy and reliable. However, in the present case, the victim
(PW-2), as well as PW-4 and PW-5, admitted during their cross-
examination that they had been tutored before giving evidence.
Therefore, their testimony requires careful scrutiny and independent
corroboration. The medical examination of the victim, conducted
immediately after the incident, did not reveal any external or internal
injury, including any injury to the anal region. Further, the FSL report
did not detect semen or sperm on the underwear of either the victim
or the appellant. Though the absence of injuries or forensic evidence
is not by itself sufficient to reject the prosecution case, in the present
case these circumstances, read together with the admissions
regarding tutoring and the material contradictions and omissions in
the prosecution evidence, create a reasonable doubt about the
prosecution story.
29. It is a settled principle of criminal law that the prosecution must prove
its case beyond reasonable doubt. If the evidence gives rise to two
possible views, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted.
In the facts of the present case, the evidence led by the prosecution
19
does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of the appellant.
Therefore, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
30. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 26.03.2022 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, FTSC (POCSO), Baloda Bazar, in Special Criminal
Case (POCSO) No. 25/2019 are set aside. The appellant is
acquitted of all the charges by extending the benefit of doubt.
31. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 12.05.2019. He be
released forthwith, if not required in any other case.
32. Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the appellant is directed to furnish
a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one surety in the like
amount before the Court concerned, which shall remain effective for
a period of six months.
33. Registry is directed to transmit the trial Court record along with a
copy of this judgment to the Court concerned forthwith for information
and necessary compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved
