Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Nara Chandra Babu Naidu vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 15 July, 2026
Date of reserved for orders : 17.04.2026
Date of pronouncement : 15.07.2026
Date of uploading : 15.07.2026
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 1762 & 1763 of 2021
Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021
Between:
1. NARA CHANDRA BABU NAIDU, S/O KHARJURA NAIDU, AGED
ABOUT 71 YEARS, R/O KARAKATTA ROAD, UNDAVALLI VILLAGE,
TADEPALLI MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH
STATE.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CID PS, A.P. AMARAVATHI, MANGALAGIRI, REP. BY THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH,
AMARAVATHI.
2. ALLA RAMA KRISHNA REDDY, S/O LATE DASARATHA RAMI REDDY,
MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, MANGALAGIRI ASSEMBLY
CONSTITUENCY, NEAR AUTO NAGAR, GOWTHAMABUDDHA
ROAD, MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT - 522 503, ANDHRA
PRADESH.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021
Between:
1. PONGURU NARAYANA, S/O LATE SUBBARAMAIAH, AGED 63
YEARS, R/O D.NO.16-11-540, HARANADHAPURAM, 1ST LANE,
NELLORE, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CID PS, AP, AMARAVATHI, MANGALAGIRI,
REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
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ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
2. ALLA RAMA KRISHNA REDDY, S/O LATE DASARADHA RAMI REDDY
MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MANGALAGIRI ASSEMBLY
CONSTITUENCY, NEAR, AUTO NAGAR, GOWTHAMBUDHA ROAD,
MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT-522503, AP
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 15.07.2026
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SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
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* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 1762 & 1763 of 2021
% 15.07.2026
#Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021
Between:
1. NARA CHANDRA BABU NAIDU, S/O KHARJURA NAIDU, AGED
ABOUT 71 YEARS, R/O KARAKATTA ROAD, UNDAVALLI VILLAGE,
TADEPALLI MANDAL, GUNTUR DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH
STATE.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, CID PS, A.P. AMARAVATHI, MANGALAGIRI, REP. BY THE
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH,
AMARAVATHI.
2. ALLA RAMA KRISHNA REDDY, S/O LATE DASARATHA RAMI REDDY,
MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, MANGALAGIRI ASSEMBLY
CONSTITUENCY, NEAR AUTO NAGAR, GOWTHAMABUDDHA
ROAD, MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT - 522 503, ANDHRA
PRADESH.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021
Between:
1. PONGURU NARAYANA, S/O LATE SUBBARAMAIAH, AGED 63
YEARS, R/O D.NO.16-11-540, HARANADHAPURAM, 1ST LANE,
NELLORE, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, THROUGH STATION
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CID PS, AP, AMARAVATHI, MANGALAGIRI,
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REPRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
2. ALLA RAMA KRISHNA REDDY, S/O LATE DASARADHA RAMI REDDY
MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MANGALAGIRI ASSEMBLY
CONSTITUENCY, NEAR, AUTO NAGAR, GOWTHAMBUDHA ROAD,
MANGALAGIRI, GUNTUR DISTRICT-522503, AP
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
! Counsel for the Petitioners: 1. Sri Siddharth Luthra appearing on
behalf of Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao
2. Sri Posani Venkateswarlu appearing
on behalf of Sri Y.Koteswara Rao
^Counsel for the Respondents: 1. Sri Siddharth Dave and Sri Ponnavolu
Sudhakar Reddy appearing on behalf of
Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy
2. Sri Chintalapati Panini Somayaji,
Additional Public Prosecutor
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1) (1986) 2 SCC 414
2) (2009) 15 SCC 643
3) (2013) 3 SCC 330
4) (1977) 2 SCC 699
5) (2023) 20 SCC 219
6) (2023) 15 SCC 488
7) (2024) 15 SCC 776
8) (2023) 20 SCC 194
9) 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
6
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10) (2018) 12 SCC 391
11) (2018) 13 SCC 612
12) (2021) 5 SCC 435
13) (2011) 11 SCC 766
14) (2013) 9 SCC 245
15) (2007) 14 SCC 568
16) (2023) 20 SCC 120
17) (2010) 8 SCC 775
18) (2024) 2 SCC 86
19) 1960 SCC OnLine SC 79
20) 2021 SCC OnLine AP 2706
21) (2021) 1 HCC (AP) 686
22) (2022) 20 SCC 574
23) (2004) 4 SCC 705
24) 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726
25) MANU/TL/1219/2023
26) (2020) 10 SCC 710
27) (2003) 12 SCC 738
28) 1965 SCC OnLine SC 36
29) 2019 SCC OnLine AP 54
30) 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 169
31) 2012 SCC OnLine AP 856
32) 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217
33) 2012 SCC OnLine AP 377
34) (2014) 2 SCC 1
35) 2023 SCC OnLine AP 378
36) (2023) 6 SCC 559
37) (2021) 19 SCC 401
38) (2008) 4 SCC 471
7
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39) 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21
40) (2022) 20 SCC 661
41) (2023) 18 SCC 399
42) (1999) 2 SCC 651
43) (2018) 3 SCC 104
44) (2002) 2 SCC 210
45) (1996) 1 SCC 542
46) 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983
47) AIR 1987 AP 160
48) (2020) 3 SCC 317
49) (2000) 5 SCC 630
50) (2003) 4 SCC 739
51) (2001) 2 SCC 330
52) (1979) 2 SCC 491
53) (2020) 2 SCC 153
54) 2022 SCC OnLine AP 942
55) (1971) 2 SCC 564
56) (2000) 8 SCC 655
57) (2011) 9 SCC 1
58) AIR 2001 SC 2512
59) (2020) 18 SCC 763
60) 2006 SCC OnLine AP 1449
61) 2004 SCC OnLine AP 1282
62) (1970) 1 SCC 653
63) 1986 SCC OnLine AP 141
64) (1988) 1 SCC 692
65) (2000) 4 SCC 168
66) (2000) 6 SCC 195
67) (2004) 2 SCC 9
8
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68) (2007) 12 SCC 1
69) (2008) 5 SCC 550
70) (2012) 2 SCC 688
71) (2019) 9 SCC 148
72) (1977) 4 SCC 39
73) (2022) 15 SCC 164
74) (2021) 9 SCC 35
75) (2022) 15 SCC 136
76) (2024) 10 SCC 527
77) (2003) 6 SCC 195
78) (2012) 9 SCC 512
79) (2019) 10 SCC 373
80) 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 2076
81) (2020) 3 SCC 240
82) (2003) 5 SCC 257
83) (2018) 16 SCC 299
84) (2001) 8 SCC 607
85) (2020) 2 SCC 338
86) (2023) 4 SCC 338
87) (2022) 2 SCC 129
88) 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484
89) (1980) 2 SCC 471
90) (1972) 3 SCC 786
91) (2022) 15 SCC 228
92) 2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 474
93) (1988) 2 SCC 142
94) (2021) 5 SCC 795
95) (2021) 8 SCC 583
96) (2022) 4 SCC 549
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97) (2022) 16 SCC 703
98) (2021) 18 SCC 135
99) (2024) 6 SCC 267
100) (2023) 16 SCC 666
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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 1762 & 1763 of 2021
COMMON ORDER:
“नीति परमं धमो, नीति परमं सुखम्, नीति परमं मोक्षः , नीति परमं परम्।”
– Mahabharata, Shanti Parva,
By Veda Vyasa.
Justice is the greatest dharma, justice is the greatest happiness,
justice is the greatest liberation, justice is the highest of all.
1. Justice is not merely a legal concept. It is, at its deepest level, a
moral and civilizational imperative. The role of the courts in a constitutional
democracy is not only to resolve legal disputes but to uphold the values of
truth, fairness, and human dignity that lie at the foundation of the rule of law. In
this case, as in all cases, the ultimate measure of success is not whether one
party prevailed over another, but whether the system of justice served the
cause of truth and the dignity of every person before it.
PREFACE:
2. This case highlights yet another dispute arising from the
acquisition of land under the land pooling scheme introduced by the Andhra
Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority Act, 2014 (for brevity ‘the
APCRDA Act’), enacted to establish a new capital city for the State of Andhra
Pradesh; at its core, the matter underscores the tension between the
government’s vision of urban development and a people representative’s
concerns over voluntariness, adequacy of compensation, and protection of
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Dr.YLR,Jproperty rights, making it a significant test of how public purpose is balanced
against individual constitutional and statutory safeguards.
3. The two Criminal Petitions, viz., Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021 and
Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, are heard together and disposed of by way of this
common order, as they arise out of one and the same FIR registered in Crime
No.5 of 2021 on the file of the CID Police Station, Amaravathi, Mangalagiri,
Guntur District. Both petitions are filed under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) seeking quashment of the
proceedings initiated pursuant to the said FIR, wherein the Petitioners, who
were then holding the constitutional offices of Chief Minister and Minister for
Municipal Administration and Urban Development respectively, have been
arrayed as Accused Nos.1 and 2.
4. Heard Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioner in
Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021 and Sri Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Y.Koteswara Rao, learned Counsel for the
Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021 and Sri Siddharth Dave, learned Senior
Counsel and Sri P.Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 in
Crl.P.Nos.1762 & 1763 of 2021 and Sri Chintalapati Panini Somayaji, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor representing the CID for State.
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Dr.YLR,JARGUMENTS OF THE PETITIONERS:
5. Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of Sri Ginjupalli Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the Petitioner in
Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021, addressed this Court on the maintainability and the
overwhelming merit of these connected petitions filed under Section 482 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing of the
impugned First Information Report registered as Crime No.5 of 2021 on the
file of the CID Police Station, Amaravathi, Mangalagiri, Guntur District. It was
submitted that the Petitioner in Criminal Petition No.1762 of 2021, who held
the office of Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh, and the Petitioner
in Criminal Petition No.1763 of 2021, who held the office of Minister for
Municipal Administration and Urban Development in the said Government,
stand arraigned respectively as Accused Nos.1 and 2. It was submitted that
the impugned First Information Report is not a mere irregularity curable by
trial, but is fundamentally, manifestly and irredeemably unsustainable in law,
inasmuch as it seeks to criminalize the sovereign function of governance and
to convert the machinery of the criminal law into an instrument for the
settlement of political scores.
6. Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel submits that both
petitions, arising as they do from a common First Information Report and
directed at the self-same act of governance, ought to be appreciated against
the political backdrop in which the impugned prosecution came to be
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Dr.YLR,Jlaunched. It was submitted that upon the change of Government, the
instrumentalities of the State, and particularly the Crime Investigation
Department, came to be pressed into service as instruments of targeted action
against functionaries of the then Opposition. It was submitted that,
conventional avenues of harassment having failed to yield results, the
impugned First Information Report represents merely the latest device
resorted to for the said purpose and constitutes one more chapter in what was
described as a sustained campaign of political retribution.
7. Elaborating upon the contents of the impugned First Information
Report, it was submitted that the same came to be registered on 12.03.2021,
founded upon a complaint dated 24.02.2021 lodged by Respondent No.2, a
former Member of the Legislative Assembly and an active functionary of the
party presently in Opposition, purportedly upon information said to have been
received from certain villagers of Nowluru. It was submitted that the First
Information Report invokes Sections 166, 167, 217 and 120-B read with
Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the
I.P.C.,’), Section 3(1)(f) and (g) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for brevity ‘the SCs & STs (POA)
Act.’), and Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of
Transfer) Act, 1977 (for brevity ‘the Assigned Land Prohibition Act.’), and that
both Petitioners are implicated solely by reason of their respective roles in the
formulation and implementation of the Land Pooling Scheme for the new
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Dr.YLR,Jcapital city of Amaravati, and, more particularly, in relation to G.O.Ms.No.41
dated 17.02.2016 issued under ‘the APCRDA Act’.
8. To demonstrate the complete legitimacy of every step taken by
the Petitioners, learned Senior Counsel submits about the constitutional
genesis of the capital city project. It was submitted that upon the bifurcation of
the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh under the Andhra Pradesh
Reorganisation Act, 2014 (for brevity ‘the Re-organisation Act.’), the successor
State was left without a capital, Hyderabad having been allotted to the newly
formed State of Telangana subject only to a transitional arrangement not
exceeding ten years, thereby casting upon the State of Andhra Pradesh the
constitutional necessity of establishing an altogether new capital. It was
submitted that Parliament, mindful of the gravity of this exercise, incorporated
Section 6 in ‘the Re-organisation Act.,’ mandating constitution of an Expert
Committee, pursuant to which the Union Government constituted a Committee
headed by Sri K.Sivaramakrishnan on 28.03.2014. It was submitted that the
said Committee undertook visits to eleven districts, held extensive and well-
publicized consultations, invited and received as many as 4,728 suggestions
from members of the public pursuant to a public notice, and submitted its
report on 28.07.2014, which report expressly records, at paragraph 3.3.2, that
the region between Guntur and Vijayawada had attracted considerable public
support as a potential site by reason of its central location and connectivity. It
was concluded that these facts establish, beyond any doubt, that the choice of
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location was arrived at through a transparent and participatory process in
which no element of secrecy or insider knowledge was involved.
9. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that, founded upon the
said Expert Committee Report, the Cabinet of the State Government, presided
over by the Petitioner in Criminal Petition No.1762 of 2021, resolved on
01.09.2014 to locate the new capital in the area surrounding Vijayawada, and
that this decision was thereafter placed before the Legislative Assembly on
04.09.2014, which body, exercising its plenary democratic authority,
unanimously endorsed the same. It was submitted that a unanimous
resolution of the elected Legislature constitutes the highest form of democratic
ratification that any governmental decision can receive, and that no act
performed in pursuance of such a resolution can, consistently with settled
principle, be branded as malicious, conspiratorial, or criminal in character.
10. Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
thereafter traced the implementation of the Land Pooling Scheme, submitting
that a Group of Ministers, of which the Petitioner in Criminal Petition No.1763
of 2021 was a member, was constituted by G.O.RT.No.3234 dated
24.09.2014, and that both Petitioners personally undertook extensive
consultations across twenty-nine villages of Tullur, Mangalagiri and Tadepalli
mandals, culminating in the announcement of the Land Pooling Policy on
07.12.2014 and the farmers’ package on 08.12.2014. It was submitted that
‘the APCRDA Act.,’ came into force on 30.12.2014, and that within sixty days
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thereafter, more than 25,000 farmers voluntarily entered into land pooling
agreements covering upward of 30,000 acres, a rate of voluntary participation
stated to be unparalleled anywhere in the world, and one which, it was
submitted, constitutes the most complete answer conceivable to any
suggestion of coercion, fraud, or criminal design underlying the Scheme.
11. Addressing what learned Senior Counsel described as the
lynchpin of the entire prosecution, namely G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016, it
was submitted that the said Government Order, issued in exercise of the rule-
making power conferred by Section 18 of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ so as to amend
Rule 5(2) of the Rules of 2015, was preceded by due consideration at the
level of the Principal Secretary concerned and the sanction of the Chief
Minister, is consonant with the assignment policy long prevalent in the State,
applies uniformly without discrimination as to caste or community, and has, to
this date, never been assailed in any writ or other constitutional proceeding,
nor declared invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction. It was submitted
that the said Government Order therefore continues to enjoy the full
presumption of legislative validity attaching to subordinate legislation.
12. Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel submits that as a
matter of first principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers, that
the sovereign power of rule-making reposed in the Executive cannot be made
the subject of criminal investigation or prosecution, and that it is not open to
an investigating officer to sit in judgment upon the motive underlying a piece of
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delegated legislation, this being a function reserved exclusively to the
constitutional Courts. It was further submitted that no motive can, in law, be
attributed to an act of legislation or subordinate legislation, and that so long as
G.O.Ms.No.41 stands unreversed, every act done in pursuance thereof is an
act of lawful compliance and not of criminal disobedience. It was additionally
submitted that the successor enactment repealing ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ had
itself expressly saved actions taken there under, a circumstance said to be
fatal to the prosecution’s own case, since a government does not save that
which it regards as illegal.
13. It was submitted that the impugned First Information Report is
conspicuously silent as to any specific act attributed to either Petitioner in his
individual capacity, both having been arraigned solely by virtue of the offices
held by them at the relevant time, a mode of implication stated to amount to
an impermissible form of vicarious criminal liability unknown to law. It was
submitted that even the preliminary enquiry conducted by the Superintendent
of Police, RO (CID), Vijayawada, prior to registration of the First Information
Report, discloses no material justifying investigation against either Petitioner.
14. Learned Senior Counsel thereafter demonstrated, offence by
offence, the want of essential ingredients. Reliance was placed on Bihar
State Electricity Board v. Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala1 for the proposition
that Section 166 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ requires knowing disobedience of a specific
1
(1986) 2 SCC 414
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direction of law resulting in known injury, a requirement stated to be wholly
absent here. It was submitted that Section 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ fails for identical
reasons, and Section 167 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ fails since no document prepared in
compliance with a subsisting Government Order can be termed “incorrect”.
Reliance was placed on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI 2 , for the ingredients of
criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ namely an agreement,
its relation to an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means, and a meeting of
minds, and it was submitted that none of these ingredients finds any mention
in the complaint, which discloses, at its highest, mere disagreement with a
policy decision. As regards Section 3(1)(f) and (g) of ‘the SCs & STs (POA)
Act.,’ it was submitted that the three cumulative prerequisites, namely a
scheduled-caste or scheduled-tribe victim, a non-scheduled accused, and
wrongful dispossession, are each unsatisfied, no individual victim having been
identified and the lands in question having been validly reconstituted or
transferred under the very Government Order impugned.
15. Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
further pressed two independent and complete statutory bars to the
maintainability of the prosecution: first, Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act’,
which in absolute terms bars any suit, prosecution or proceeding against the
Government, the Authority, or any officer or person for anything done or
purporting to be done under the Act or the Rules made thereunder; and
2
(2009) 15 SCC 643
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second, Section 8 of ‘the Assigned Land Prohibition Act.,’ which similarly bars
proceedings for acts done in good faith in pursuance of that Act. It was
submitted that both bars operate as self-contained and unqualified shields
rendering the prosecution unsustainable ab initio.
16. Learned Senior Counsel concluded by drawing attention to what
was described as the most telling circumstance in the entire matter, namely
the complete absence, even after five years, of a single genuinely aggrieved
landowner before any forum, notwithstanding that the impugned transactions
took place in 2015-16. It was submitted that this circumstance exposes the
complaint as one actuated by political rivalry rather than genuine grievance.
Learned Senior Counsel submitted that all four limbs of the test enunciated in
Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor3, stand satisfied on the material placed
on record, and that the principles laid down in State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy 4 , squarely apply to prevent the criminal process from
degenerating into an instrument of harassment. On this basis, it was urged
that the impugned proceedings in Crime No.5 of 2021 be quashed in their
entirety as against both Petitioners.
17. On the principles of quashing, Sri Siddharth Luthra, learned
Senior Counsel for the Petitioner emphasizes that the extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ exists to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.
3
(2013) 3 SCC 330
4
(1977) 2 SCC 699
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Reliance was placed on the following judgments, which laid down illustrative
categories where quashing is justified:
18. On the issue of malicious or frivolous prosecution, learned Senior
Counsel submitted that criminal law cannot be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment or vendetta by relying on the following judgments, all
of which underscore the duty of Courts to nip vexatious litigation in the bud:
4. W.B. SEB v. Dilip Kumar Ray15
5
(2023) 20 SCC 219
6
(2023) 15 SCC 488
7
(2024) 15 SCC 776
8
(2023) 20 SCC 194
9
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
10
(2018) 12 SCC 391
11
(2018) 13 SCC 612
12
(2021) 5 SCC 435
13
(2011) 11 SCC 766
14
(2013) 9 SCC 245
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19. On the question of delay in lodging FIRs and its bearing under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner
relied on the following judgments, where the Hon’ble Apex Court cautioned
that unexplained delay often betrays mala fide intent and may warrant
dismissal of proceedings:
20. On the issue of defence of the accused being considered at the
stage of quashing, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that
where the complaint itself discloses a complete defence, the Court is
empowered to intervene. For this proposition, reliance was placed on the
following judgments:
1. Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore
Bhartiya18
21. On the issue of public knowledge about the plan for creation of
capital and limits of judicial review in policy matters, reliance was placed on
the following judgments, which held that Courts cannot substitute their
judgment for that of the executive in matters of policy unless fundamental
rights are infringed.
15
(2007) 14 SCC 568
16
(2023) 20 SCC 120
17
(2010) 8 SCC 775
18
(2024) 2 SCC 86
19
1960 SCC OnLine SC 79
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1. Dammalapati Srinivas v. State of A.P.,20
2. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan v. State of A.P.,21
3. State of A.P. v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan22,
22. On the issue of interpretation of statutes and the principle that
language of one Act cannot be read into another, reliance was placed on
Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm v. T.N. Electricity Board23, where the Court
held that pisciculture cannot be equated with agriculture merely by borrowing
definitions from other enactments.
23. On the scope of Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and the nexus test
for sanction, reliance was placed on Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar
Upadhyay 24 , which clarified that protection is available only when the act
bears a reasonable nexus with official duty, and cannot be extended to acts
dehors service functions.
24. On the issue of power to make rules and power to amend rules,
reliance was placed on Sanikommu Venkata Sai Bharath Reddy v. Union
of India25 which consistently held that laying provisions are directory and not
mandatory, and rules become valid upon publication in the Gazette.
25. On the issue of SC/ST offences not being established merely
because the informant belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe,
20
2021 SCC OnLine AP 2706
21
(2021) 1 HCC (AP) 686
22
(2022) 20 SCC 574
23
(2004) 4 SCC 705
24
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3726
25
MANU/TL/1219/2023
23
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Dr.YLR,J
reliance was placed on Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand 26 , which
clarified that intention to humiliate on account of caste is the sine qua non for
prosecution under ‘the SCs/STs (POA) Act’.
26. Finally, on the issue of laying of rules before the Legislature being
directory and not mandatory, reliance was placed on the following judgments,
which affirmed that omission to lay rules before the Legislature does not affect
their validity once notified:
Society27
2. Jan Mohd. Noor Mohd. Bagban v. State of Gujarat28
3. Ester Axene Residential High School v. State of A.P.,29
4. Chidurala Sudakar v. State of Telangana30
27. Sri Venkateswarlu Posani, learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner submits that the mala fide character of the entire prosecution is
further graphically illustrated by the conduct of the Respondent Police
Authorities during the investigation. Armed with the impugned FIR, police
officials have been conducting searches at various premises of the Petitioner
in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, Minister, in a manner that is illegal in character and
motivated not by any genuine investigative necessity, but by the explicit
purpose of tarnishing his image and reputation in the eyes of the public,
26
(2020) 10 SCC 710
27
(2003) 12 SCC 738
28
1965 SCC OnLine SC 36
29
2019 SCC OnLine AP 54
30
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 169
24
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intimidating him personally, and demoralizing his political supporters. It is
submitted that the perusal of the search authorizations would readily
demonstrate the illegal methodology and the high-handed approach that the
Respondents have been employing under the guise of investigation. No crime
requiring investigation has been established, no cognizable offence has been
disclosed and yet, the Minister’s premises are subject to searches that serve
no investigative purpose other than to harass and humiliate him. This is
precisely the form of conduct that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
L.Muniswamy supra, warned against when it held that a court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or
persecution. The searches are not investigation, they are persecution. They
are not law enforcement; they are political warfare conducted under the guise
of law enforcement. This conduct, taken together with the registration of the
FIR, presents the most compelling case for intervention by this Court.
28. Sri Venkateswarlu Posani, learned Senior Counsel for the
Petitioner submits that consequent upon the bifurcation of the erstwhile State
of Andhra Pradesh under ‘the Re-organisation Act.’, the Legislature enacted
‘the APCRDA Act’, wherein Section 18 introduced the innovative concept of a
land pooling scheme as an alternative to compulsory acquisition. Pursuant
thereto, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.1 dated 01.01.2015, prescribing
the policy framework and guidelines. The scheme classified lands into patta
lands and assigned lands and envisaged reconstituted plots in exchange for
25
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lands pooled into the capital region. Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.41 dated
17.02.2016 amended Rule 5 of G.O.Ms.No.1, refining the classification by re-
categorizing assigned lands to regulate their inclusion in the pooling
framework.
29. The gravamen of the complaint, which formed the substratum for
registration of the crime, was that through such reclassification, assigned
lands were allegedly brought within the ambit of the pooling scheme in
violation of ‘the Assigned Land Prohibition Act’, with mala fide intent to confer
benefit upon certain individuals. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that while
assignment of lands is an executive policy subject to change, the prohibition
on transfer is a statutory mandate applicable only to lands deemed
unalienable. Learned Senior Counsel meticulously delineated the categories
of assignment: (i) lands assigned to freedom fighters and political sufferers
under G.O.Ms.No.1745 dated 28.08.1959, permitting alienation after ten
years; (ii) lands assigned to ex-servicemen under G.O.Ms.No.1117 dated
11.11.1993, likewise alienable after ten years; and (iii) general assignments,
further divided into pre-1954/1958 assignments (alienable) and post-
1954/1958 assignments (heritable but non-transferable). This distinction was
judicially recognized in Raavi Satish v. State of Andhra Pradesh31, wherein
the Court held that pre-1954/1958 assignments are registrable
31
2012 SCC OnLine AP 856
26
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notwithstanding prohibitory lists, whereas post-1954/1958 assignments attract
refusal under Section 5(2) of the Prohibition Act.
30. Sri Venkateswarlu Posani, learned Senior Counsel further relied
upon the Full Bench decision in Land Acquisition Officer-cum-R.D.O. v.
Mekala Pandu32, which held that assignees are entitled to compensation on
par with patta holders when lands are acquired for public purpose, and that
prohibitory clauses in assignment pattas do not operate in such
circumstances. Learned Senior Counsel also adverted to Konkala
Amaravathi v. Sub-Registrar33, where it was held that once assigned lands
are sold pursuant to mortgage, the Prohibition Act ceases to apply, and
registering authorities must register such documents. Thus, the alienability of
assigned lands is nuanced and context-dependent, and the impugned
Government Order cannot be said to contravene statutory provisions.
31. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even encroachers
under the A.P. Land Encroachment Act, 1905, were brought under the pooling
scheme to obviate prolonged litigation, given the time-bound requirement for
capital establishment. The inclusion of “Sivaijamadars” and other categories
was similarly justified under prevailing policy. Hence, G.O.Ms.No.41 dated
17.02.2016 is neither contrary to the Prohibition Act nor tainted with mala
fides, and there is no allegation of individual benefit.
32
2004 SCC OnLine AP 217
33
2012 SCC OnLine AP 377
27
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32. On the penal provisions invoked, learned Senior Counsel
submitted that Sections 166 and 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are non-cognizable, and
Section 167 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ though cognizable, historically pertains to
falsification of translations or documents, not policy decisions such as
issuance of a Government Order. The invocation of Sections 3(1)(f) and
3(1)(g) of ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.’ is equally untenable, as the FIR contains
no allegation of wrongful occupation or dispossession of SC/ST lands. It is
emphasized that under Section 7 of ‘the Assigned Land Prohibition Act.,’
punishment for acquiring assigned lands is limited to six months’
imprisonment, and the offence is non-cognizable under the Second Schedule
of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Consequently, police cannot register or investigate without prior
Magistrate’s permission under Sections 154 and 155 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The
registration of crime and initiation of investigation without such sanction is
therefore ultra vires.
33. Finally, citing the celebrated principles in Bhajan Lal supra, Sri
Venkateswarlu Posani, learned Senior Counsel submitted that where
allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence, registration of crime and
investigation must be quashed; even if investigation proceeds, continuation of
proceedings without disclosure of cognizable offence constitutes abuse of
process; none of the FIR allegations satisfy statutory requirements; and the
registration of crime and continuation of investigation are unsustainable in law.
28
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE 1st RESPONDENT:
34. Sri Panini Somayaji, learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits
that the investigative record unmistakably demonstrates the voluntary
character of the land pooling transactions. Nearly seventy‑six witnesses have
been examined in the instant crime, and their depositions, recorded under due
process, consistently affirm that they parted with their assigned lands without
coercion, inducement, or third‑party compulsion. The prosecutorial stance is
that such unanimity of testimony constitutes unimpeachable evidence of
voluntariness, thereby negating the substratum of allegations of fraud or mala
fide intent.
35. It is further contended that in Crime Nos.14 and 15 of 2020 of the
CID Police Station, Mangalagiri, the very same official witnesses were
examined, and their statements were reiterated in the present case. Several
witnesses, common to all three proceedings, have categorically deposed that
they were holders of assigned lands and that their participation in the pooling
scheme was entirely consensual. The learned Prosecutor emphasizes that
consistency across multiple proceedings enhances the probative value of the
evidence and establishes a continuum of voluntariness beyond reasonable
doubt.
36. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor argues that the
investigative process has been conducted in strict conformity with statutory
mandates and standing orders, and that the CID, acting within its lawful
29
Crl.P.Nos.1762 & 1763 of 2021
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Dr.YLR,Jjurisdiction, has scrupulously adhered to procedural safeguards. The
examination of witnesses was neither perfunctory nor selective; rather, it was
comprehensive, encompassing both official and private stakeholders. This
breadth of inquiry, it is submitted, fortifies the legitimacy of the investigation
and rebuts the allegation of political vendetta.
37. The prosecutorial submission underscores that the witnesses,
being direct beneficiaries of the scheme, are competent and credible sources
of evidence. Their declarations that they surrendered lands without external
pressure are not mere formalities but substantive attestations of free will. The
learned Prosecutor contends that such evidence, emanating from primary
stakeholders, cannot be brushed aside as self‑serving, but must be accorded
full evidentiary weight under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for
brevity ‘the Evidence Act.,’).
38. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor further submits that the
voluntariness of the scheme is corroborated by contemporaneous
governmental records, including agreements executed under ‘the APCRDA
Act.’ These records, duly registered and preserved, reflect the conscious and
informed consent of landholders. The Prosecutor argues that when
documentary evidence and oral testimony converge in unison, the
presumption of legality and bona fides under Section 114 of ‘the Evidence
Act.,’ stands reinforced.
30
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39. Finally, it is contended that the allegations of coercion or wrongful
dispossession under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are wholly unsustainable considering the witness
depositions. It is submitted that the statutory prerequisites of victim
identification, wrongful occupation, and caste‑based intent are conspicuously
absent. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates voluntary participation
across communities, thereby rendering the invocation of penal provisions
untenable. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor concludes that the
investigative record, viewed holistically, establishes that the FIR discloses no
cognizable offence, and urged to pass appropriate orders.
SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT No.2 in Crl.P.No.1762
of 2021:
40. Mr. Siddarth Dave, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2 submits
that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is extremely limited and
cannot be invoked to conduct a mini trial at the threshold; the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the primary test for quashing is
whether, on a plain reading of the complaint or FIR, the commission of an
offence is disclosed, and if it is, then investigation must follow, since an FIR
need not be an encyclopaedia but only needs to disclose suspicion of an
offence, which by itself is sufficient to trigger investigation, and once the
investigation is complete, either a closure report or a charge sheet will be filed,
31
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Dr.YLR,Jgiving the accused remedies at that stage. Learned Senior Counsel further
submits that voluminous documents produced by Petitioners in quashing
petitions are generally not looked into, except in rare cases where
unimpeachable evidence such as passport entries conclusively establishes
impossibility of the offence, and that statements under Section 161 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ are not to be relied upon at this stage, particularly when investigation
has been stayed and material has not yet been collected.
41. Referring to Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., 34 learned Senior
Counsel pointed out that in corruption cases, police may conduct a preliminary
inquiry only to ascertain whether allegations reveal a cognizable offence, not
to test veracity, and such inquiry must be conducted by an officer of the rank
of Sub-Divisional Police Officer, raising the question whether CID has
authority to register and investigate a case without prior approval from the
competent Government authority. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted
that a Member of Legislative Assembly can in appropriate cases bypass
constitutional remedies and directly agitate grievances against Government
Orders before the police or Additional DGP, when the individuals of his
legislative constituency alleged that their lands were taken at throwaway
prices by fraudsters.
42. Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
would further submit that the reliance placed upon M. China Hari Babu v.
34
(2014) 2 SCC 1
32
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State of A.P.,35 unequivocally establishes that Standing Order No. 866-1 of
the A.P. Police Manual circumscribes the jurisdictional competence of the
Crime Investigation Department (CID). The CID, being but a specialized
branch of the State Police and not an extra-territorial or autonomous body akin
to the CBI, cannot suo motu embark upon investigation. The Standing Order
mandates that while any Unit Officer, meaning the officer attached to the
concerned police station at the ground level, may requisition the CID, no
enquiry or investigation can be undertaken absent the prior sanction of the
Additional Director General of Police, CID, or the Director General of Police. In
the present case, such authorization was indeed accorded on 25.02.2021,
pursuant to which a preliminary enquiry was ordered, culminating in the
registration of the FIR dated 12.03.2021. It is further submitted that the MLA
has not lodged his complaint before the Station House Officer, Mangalagiri,
nor has any Unit Officer made a request in this matter, thereby underscoring
that the procedural safeguards contemplated under the Manual have been
duly observed.
43. Sri Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
submits that the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Courts under
Article 226 of the Constitution and Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is not designed
to serve as a forum for embarking upon a roving enquiry into the veracity,
reliability, or genuineness of allegations at the very inception of criminal
35
2023 SCC OnLine AP 378
33
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proceedings. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman
Kumar Singh36, has categorically reaffirmed that even an FIR registered on
mere suspicion suffices to set the criminal law in motion, and that an FIR
premised upon “probability” of commission of an offence is of a higher
threshold than one based on suspicion alone. In corruption matters,
particularly under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity ‘the
P.C.Act.,’) the jurisprudential thrust is that considerations applicable to general
penal statutes cannot be transposed, and that the High Courts must adopt a
hands-off approach, eschewing premature interdiction save in the rarest of
rare cases where mala fides alone constitute the substratum of the
investigation. The investigative process must be permitted to unfold, for it is
only through such process that probity in governance can be maintained and
societal pollutants weeded out.
44. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent further submits that
the true mandatory import of Order 866 does not lie in the mere initiation of a
request by a unit officer, but rather in the categorical stipulation that no inquiry
or investigation shall be undertaken by the CID absent prior sanction from the
Additional Director General of Police, CID, or the Director General of Police.
The gravamen of the provision is thus the requirement of prior approval from
the competent authority, which alone constitutes the sine qua non for lawful
initiation of proceedings. Even assuming, arguendo, the contention advanced
36
(2023) 6 SCC 559
34
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Dr.YLR,J
by learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Siddharth Luthra, that the
provision mandates a request from a unit officer as a precondition, and that
any deviation therefrom amounts to a violation, it is submitted that such an
irregularity, even if established, cannot ipso facto furnish a ground for
quashing an FIR. The jurisdictional foundation of the FIR remains unaffected,
and the alleged procedural lapse, at best, may be a matter for departmental
scrutiny but does not vitiate the criminal process at its inception.
45. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that certain procedural
irregularities have crept into the initiation of investigation, such as the absence
of a formal request from a unit officer under the A.P. Police Manual or lapses
in routing through the proper channel, such defects do not ipso facto vitiate
the investigation or render the resultant police report void in law. The settled
principle is that a defective investigation, unless it occasions a miscarriage of
justice, cannot nullify the cognizance validly taken by a competent court. It is
submitted that no prejudice has been caused to the petitioners; the allegations
pertain to large-scale irregularities in public land dealings, and suspicion alone
is sufficient to warrant investigation. To quash the FIR at this nascent stage
would amount to conducting a mini trial under the guise of jurisdiction
conferred under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which is impermissible. The only
legitimate ground for quashing is where a plain reading of the FIR discloses
no cognizable offence whatsoever. In the present case, the allegations,
whether raised by an MLA or any other complainant, clearly disclose
35
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cognizable offences, and therefore, the invocation of the inherent jurisdiction
of this Court is wholly unwarranted.
46. Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent
would further submit that subsequent to the registration of the FIR,
investigation proceeded with expedition, ten witnesses having been examined
prior to the grant of stay on 19.03.2021, and thereafter, despite the stay being
confined only to the petitioners herein, the investigation continued and
witnesses up to LW.76 were examined. It is emphasized that the stay was not
an omnibus interdiction of the investigation but was specific to the petitioners
alone. Moreover, in respect of Crime Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of 2020, the petitions
for quashment having been dismissed, the investigations were carried to their
logical conclusion, and the cases were referred as “mistake of fact,” which
orders were duly approved by the jurisdictional Special Judges. Hence, at this
juncture, the attempt to quash the proceedings is wholly premature, for the
investigative process is yet ongoing and the petitioners retain their remedy
should the police ultimately close the matter as a mistake of fact. The
gravamen of the complaint pertains to policy decisions involving monetary
implications, wherein gullible persons were allegedly induced to part with
lands at undervalued rates. No such gullible person has lodged a complaint
before any police station or SHO, and therefore, the present petition seeking
quashment is devoid of merit and liable to be rejected, permitting the
investigation to proceed unhindered.
36
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SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT No.2 in Crl.P.No.1763
of 2021:
47. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy, learned Counsel for
Respondent No.2 submits that the Respondent No.2/De‑Facto Complainant
had lodged a criminal complaint against the Petitioners in Crime No.5 of 2021
dated 12.03.2021 for offences under Sections 166, 167, 217, 120‑B read with
Sections 34 to 37 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Section 3(1)(f), (g) of ‘the SCs/STs (POA) Act’,
and Section 7 of ‘the Assigned Lands Act’. The Petitioners have approached
this Court seeking quash of the FIR. It is submitted that the present petitions
are misconceived, premature, and devoid of merit. A perusal of the FIR and
the investigation materials filed along with the Counter and Additional Counter
clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences, including conspiracy,
cheating, and criminal misconduct.
48. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel further
submits that the complaint specifically alleges manipulation of capital city
limits, alignment of the Inner Ring Road, and formulation of Land Pooling
Schemes to benefit the Petitioners and their associates. The Counter Affidavit
filed by the State substantiates these allegations, thereby establishing a prima
facie case. In such circumstances, the quash petitions are not maintainable.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal supra and Neeharika
37
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Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra37 has categorically held that
the inherent powers under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be exercised
sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases. Since a prima facie case exists,
the present petitions do not fall within that category.
49. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel further
submits that allegations of corruption demand even greater caution in
exercising inherent powers. Reliance is placed on CBI v. K.M. Sharan38, and
Aman Kumar Singh supra, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized
that corruption cases must be allowed to proceed to trial rather than being
stifled at the threshold.
50. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel further
submits that the Petitioners’ grounds essentially seek a mini‑trial under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ requiring an enquiry into the reliability and
truthfulness of allegations at the FIR stage. Such a course is impermissible.
The sufficiency of evidence is within the domain of the Trial Court. Reliance is
placed on R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab39, Neeharika Infrastructure (P)
Ltd. supra, Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi) 40, and CBI
v. Aryan Singh41.
37
(2021) 19 SCC 401
38
(2008) 4 SCC 471
39
1960 SCC OnLine SC 21
40
(2022) 20 SCC 661
41
(2023) 18 SCC 399
38
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51. It is submitted that at the FIR stage, the Court cannot sift or weigh
evidence. Reliance is placed on State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan 42 , and
Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat43. Each transaction in a
large‑scale fraud must be treated as a distinct offence, as held in Narinderjit
Singh Sahni v. Union of India44.
52. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel further
submits that the FIR discloses genuine offences established in preliminary
investigation. As held in Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri45 mala fides of
the complainant are irrelevant if the complaint discloses an offence.
53. On the issue of delay, it is submitted that in complex
socio‑economic offences and conspiracies involving manipulation of financial
trails and bureaucratic records, delay is inevitable. Economic offences are a
class apart, and mere delay cannot justify quashing. Reliance is placed on
Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi)46.
54. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
furthermore submits that registration of FIR by the CID at the instance of a
third party is permissible. This Court in M. China Hari Babu supra dismissed
a similar contention. The Government Order on land pooling was designed to
ratify illegal alienation of assigned lands and encroached government lands,
42
(1999) 2 SCC 651
43
(2018) 3 SCC 104
44
(2002) 2 SCC 210
45
(1996) 1 SCC 542
46
2025 SCC OnLine SC 983
39
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manipulated through revenue records by the Petitioners in their official
capacities.
55. Sri Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
eventually submits that policy decisions embodied in Government Orders are
subject to public scrutiny. If criminal conspiracy is evident behind such orders,
citizens are entitled to initiate criminal proceedings. There is no estoppel
against prosecution. Investigations into policy decisions, such as the Delhi
liquor policy case and Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, demonstrate that criminal
liability can arise from governmental orders. Considering the above
submissions, it is urged that this Court may dismiss the Criminal Petitions filed
by the Petitioners in the facts and circumstances of the case.
56. Having attentively considered the arguments canvassed by
learned Senior Counsel on both sides, the Court proceeds to evaluate the
same with circumspection and legal propriety. This Court has undertaken a
thorough and circumspect examination of the whole of the material available
on record before proceeding to its determination.
POINT FOR CONSIDERATION:
57. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of
the learned Senior Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration
is:
“Whether the proceedings in Crime No.5 of 2021 of CID Police
Station, Amaravathi, Mangalagiri, Guntur District are liable to be
quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’/Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’?”
40
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58. Indeed, this Court has heard learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the Petitioners at considerable length, has perused the impugned First
Information Report, the preliminary enquiry report, the Expert Committee
Report dated 28.07.2014, the Cabinet decision dated 01.09.2014, the
resolution of the Legislative Assembly dated 04.09.2014, G.O.Ms.No.41 dated
17.02.2016, and the other material placed on record, and has given its
anxious consideration to the rival contentions.
FIRST INFORMATION REPORT AND BACKGROUND AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF REGISTRATION OF THE FIR:
59. The FIR was registered pursuant to an English typed report
submitted by Sri Alla Rama Krishna Reddy, Member of Legislative Assembly
(M.L.A), Mangalagiri Constituency, Guntur District, to the Addl. Director
General of Police, CID, AP, Mangalagiri, on 24.02.2021 at 11:00 hours. In that
report, the MLA alleged that some of the influential persons of the then
Government had cheated innocent peasants, many of them belonging to
SC/ST and other weaker sections, by taking away their lands illegally and
fraudulently, keeping them under confusion and fear of insecurity about their
lands through false representations.
ALLEGATIONS IN BRIEF OF THE WRITTEN COMPLAINT LODGED BY
THE DE-FACTO COMPLAINANT:
60. The de-facto complainant, Sri Alla Ramakrishna Reddy, MLA of
Mangalagiri, has alleged that large-scale irregularities and conspiracies were
committed in the implementation of the Land Pooling Scheme (LPS) by the
41
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then Government of Andhra Pradesh during the formation of Amaravati Capital
City. He states that confidential information regarding the location of the
capital and modalities of land procurement was misused by influential persons
to deprive gullible peasants, particularly SC/ST and weaker sections, of their
lawful benefits. According to him, middlemen intimidated and deceived
farmers into executing sale agreements for paltry sums, and subsequently
G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 was crafted to legitimize such transactions
by introducing the undefined concept of “Sivaijamadars,” thereby enabling
purchasers of assigned and encroached lands to claim returnable plots under
LPS. He further alleges that fictitious meetings were recorded to justify
amendments, revenue records were tampered with or shown as missing,
objectionable lands including poramboke and riverbed (lanka) lands were
fraudulently categorized as eligible, and undue benefits were extended to
people close to the then ruling dispensation. He asserts that these acts were
in violation of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ and the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act, 2013 (for brevity ‘the RFCTLARR
Act.,’) amounting to criminal breach of trust and conspiracy to enrich select
individuals at the cost of the State exchequer. He therefore seeks a thorough
investigation into the misuse of government orders, manipulation of records,
and collusion of officials and political leaders in illegally alienating government
lands worth crores.
42
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61. Upon receipt of the said report, the ADGP, CID, AP, issued
instructions vide Memorandum No. C.No.17/ADG/CID/2021, Dt. 25-02-2021,
directing Sri S. Surya Bhaskar Rao, DSP, RO, CID, Vijayawada, to conduct a
Preliminary Enquiry and submit a report.
FINDINGS IN BRIEF OF THE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY REPORT
SUBMITTED BY THE DSP, RO, CID:
62. The preliminary enquiry conducted by the DSP, CID, establishes
that ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ and the Land Pooling Scheme Rules, 2015
(G.O.Ms.No.1 dated 01.01.2015) were originally framed to consolidate patta
lands for capital city development, without extending benefits to assignees,
purchasers of assigned lands, or encroachers of Government lands. However,
by G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016, the Government introduced amendments
that classified four categories of assigned lands and two categories of
encroachers, thereby extending eligibility for reconstituted plots even to those
in possession of Government lands under assignment or encroachment. The
enquiry notes that this amendment was processed despite objections from the
Revenue Department, without placing the matter before the Legislature as
required under Section 18(4) of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ and in contravention of
‘the Assigned Lands Act.’ The DSP observed that the amendment effectively
converted illegal acts into legal entitlements, legitimizing possession of
objectionable Government lands and undermining statutory safeguards. The
note files reveal that the Commissioner, APCRDA, in his remarks dated
13.01.2016, recommended treating certain assigned lands as patta lands and
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extending packages to encroachers, which was inconsistent with statutory
prohibitions and judicial precedents such as Dharma Reddy v. Sub-
Collector47.
63. The enquiry further highlights that the Commissioner omitted
critical legal aspects, relied on irrelevant references, and recommended
packages for encroachers and assignees despite clear statutory bars. The
report points out that G.O.Ms.No.41 was issued to benefit select individuals by
legitimizing possession of Government lands, including objectionable
encroachments, thereby undermining revenue laws and assignment policies.
The DSP concluded that the process of issuing G.O.Ms.No.41 was marked by
anomalies, malfeasance, and deviation from established legal principles, as it
sought to regularize encroachments and alienations prohibited under law. The
crux of the findings is that the amendment was contrary to ‘the APCRDA Act.,’
and ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ and revenue policies, and was brought into
existence to confer undue benefits upon certain categories of people, thereby
warranting further investigation into its legality and propriety.
64. Upon completion of the preliminary enquiry, a report dated
12.03.2021 was submitted. Based on these findings, the ADGP, CID, ordered
the registration of the case, and the FIR was registered on 12.03.2021 at
19:00 hours vide Crime No.05/2021.
47
AIR 1987 AP 160
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AVERMENTS IN BREIF OF THE COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT OF THE 1ST
RESPONDENT:
65. In his counter-affidavit filed by Sri A.Lakshmi Narayana, Deputy
Superintendent of Police, CID Cyber Crimes, Mangalagiri, it was submitted
that during investigation, it was disclosed a deep-rooted, premeditated, and
meticulously orchestrated criminal conspiracy of extraordinary magnitude. The
Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, Ponguru Narayana/Accused No.2, who
held the esteemed constitutional office of Minister for Municipal Administration
and Urban Development and was also the former Vice-Chairman of APCRDA,
is alleged to have conspired together with Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021
and other official and non-official accused persons to procure assigned lands,
lands belonging predominantly to persons from Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe communities, for illegal pecuniary gain, exploiting his position
of power and public trust. It is submitted that such conduct, if established,
represents not merely a criminal act but a fundamental betrayal of
constitutional office and public duty.
66. It is further submitted that the investigation has unearthed a
calculated and sinister modus operandi adopted by the accused persons. The
henchmen, followers, and benamis of the Petitioners systematically
approached the poor assignee farmers, predominantly belonging to SC/ST
communities, and spread deliberate misinformation and propaganda to the
effect that the Government would resume their assigned lands without
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Dr.YLR,Jpayment of any compensation whatsoever. These gullible and unsuspecting
peasants, having no other means of livelihood, were thereby placed in a state
of immense fear and anxiety. Taking ruthless advantage of this manufactured
fear, the agents of the accused induced and compelled the said assignees to
part with their lands at nominal prices, far below their true value. This Court
must take judicial notice of the fact that such manipulation of vulnerable
communities for private gain constitutes the most reprehensible species of
criminality, striking at the very heart of social justice.
67. It is further submitted that the investigation has conclusively
established that the accused persons, acting in furtherance of their criminal
conspiracy, channelled funds amounting to Rs.18.1 Crores through the
company of Accused No.3, K.V.P. Anjani Kumar @ Bobby, and through his
employees (Accused Nos.7 to 10), to make payments to the assignee
farmers. Significantly, the actual purchasers of these lands, the benamis and
relatives of the Petitioners, paid no consideration directly to the vendor-
assignees. The money flowed through a chain of intermediaries, designed
deliberately to conceal the identity of the beneficial owner and to sanitize the
proceeds of this illegal enterprise. Lands to the extent of Ac.148.21 Cents
were thus illegally secured in the names of relatives and associates of
Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021 alone. Such elaborate financial
engineering is not the conduct of innocent people but is the hallmark of a
carefully pre-planned criminal conspiracy.
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68. It is further submitted that specific instances of binami
transactions have been identified and documented during investigation. In one
such instance, Puli Sudhakar, s/o late Yesobu, an SC-Madiga assignee of
Uddandarayuni Palem village, Thullur Mandal, sold his assigned land to
Lakshmisetti Sujatha, the mother of the daughter-in-law of DVS Panakalarao,
who is related to Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, without receiving a single
paisa directly from the said purchaser. The consideration was routed through
Narayana Institutions to KVP Anjani Kumar @ Bobby (A3), thence to Aluri
Venkata Rao, and finally through Kolli Sivaram, an employee of Accused No.3,
who issued the cheque to the vendor-assignee. In another transaction,
Chikkala Vijaya Saradhi, nephew of Ganta Srinivasa Rao, the co-father-in-law
of Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, similarly purchased land from Komera
Rajya Lakshmi (SC), with consideration again routed through Kolli Sivaram,
employee of Accused No.3. These transactions, which are submitted, speak
for themselves.
69. It is further submitted that the investigation has established
beyond reasonable doubt that G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016, which
facilitated the transfer of assigned lands, was issued in flagrant disregard of
legal and procedural requirements, at the behest of the Petitioners, who used
their dominant positions in the Government to override all institutional
safeguards. The then District Collector, Kanthi Lal Dande, IAS, the then Joint
Collector, Cherukuri Sridhar, IAS, and the then Principal Secretary, Ajay Jain,
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IAS, have all voluntarily and categorically deposed that they had appraised
Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021 of the serious legal hurdles likely to arise
from the issuance of the said GO, but the Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021
responded with the imperious declaration, “Whatever I say is Law, you should
follow my instructions.” Furthermore, the Legal Department had not granted
clearance, the then Advocate General had not given concurrence, and the
mandatory requirement of placing the matter before the Council of Ministers or
the State Legislature, as mandated by ‘the APCRDA Act’, was deliberately and
consciously bypassed. This is a textbook case of wilful abuse of public office.
70. It is further submitted that in the course of investigation, the
Investigating Officer secured a highly incriminating telephonic conversation
between Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021 Sri P.Narayana and his daughter
Dr. P.Sindhura, extracted from a hard disc seized during search proceedings
at the office and residential premises of Dr. Ponguru Sindhura, Managing
Director of Narayana Educational Institutions, in the course of investigation in
Cr.No.16/2022. In the said recorded conversation, Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763
of 2021 himself admitted that he had purchased assigned lands, albeit not in
his own name. He further acknowledged that if those lands were registered in
their names, the previous Government might put them in jail. It is submitted
that this voluntary admission by the Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021
constitutes the most compelling evidence of his guilt and renders the present
petition for quashing utterly untenable.
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71. It is further submitted that the Petitioners have sought to take
refuge under the immunity provisions of Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act’. It is
submitted that this contention is entirely misconceived and must be rejected.
The protection afforded by Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act’ extends only to
acts done in pursuance of and within the scope of ‘the APCRDA Act’ and
provides no shield whatsoever against the commission of cognizable offences
under ‘the I.P.C.,’ ‘the SCs/STs (POA) Act’, or the AP Assigned Land
(Prohibition of Transfer) Act, 1977. The offences alleged in this case are
entirely distinct from the legitimate exercise of discretionary powers under ‘the
APCRDA Act’. The accused are charged with criminal conspiracy, abuse of
official position for personal pecuniary gain, and atrocities against SC/ST
assignees, conduct that no statute of limited immunity can protect.
72. It is further submitted that the contention of the Petitioners, if any,
that sanction under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is a mandatory prerequisite for
their prosecution, must be rejected as wholly without merit. It is well-settled
law that the protection under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is available only
when the act complained of is an act done, or purported to be done, in the
discharge of official duty. The acts attributed to the Petitioners herein, namely,
hatching a criminal conspiracy with private individuals, routing funds through
benamis, inducing SC/ST farmers to sell their assigned lands under duress,
and issuing a Government Order with the deliberate intent of conferring illegal
benefits upon themselves and their associates, bear no reasonable nexus to
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Dr.YLR,J
the discharge of any official duty. The acts are purely of a private and criminal
character, clothed in official garb for the purpose of concealment.
73. It is further submitted that it is a well-settled proposition of law,
affirmed repeatedly by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that the power to quash an
FIR under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be exercised with great
circumspection and sparingly. The jurisdiction is not to be invoked merely
because the accused are people of influence or because the investigation is
politically inconvenient to them. The sole question before this Court at this
stage is whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose the
commission of cognizable offences. It is submitted that the FIR and the
material gathered during investigation, including statements of IAS officers,
victim-assignees, and documentary evidence, disclose not merely a prima
facie case but a robust and substantial case of criminal conspiracy, abuse of
official position, fraud upon the State, and atrocities upon SC/ST persons. As
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited at the Bar, an FIR
cannot be quashed without giving reasonable time to the investigating agency
to complete its investigation, and interference at a nascent stage of
investigation would cause grave prejudice to the cause of justice.
74. It is further submitted that from 2014 to 2016, as many as 932.72
Acres of assigned land witnessed a change in the names of enjoyers, with
new people, most of whom are relatives, associates, and benamis of the
accused, appearing in the revenue records. The assignees who have lost their
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lands belong overwhelmingly to the SC and ST communities and weaker
sections of society. They have been reduced from landholders to agricultural
labourers in their own fields. The estimated illegal gain to the accused,
through the exploitation of the Amaravathi Capital City project, is assessed at
not less than Rs.600 Crores. It is the solemn duty of this Court, as the sentinel
of constitutional values, to allow the investigation to proceed unhindered so
that the truth may be fully unravelled and justice may be delivered to the most
marginalized sections of society who have been grievously wronged. In the
light of the foregoing submissions, it is urged that this Court may be pleased to
dismiss the Criminal Petitions filed by the Petitioners and decline to quash the
proceedings in Crime No.05/2021.
ORIGIN OF CRIMINAL PETITIONS:
75. Two Criminal Petitions came up for first hearing after their
registration before a learned Single Judge of this Court on 19.03.2021. It is
profitable and relevant to refer that the learned Single Judge of this Court,
Hon’ble Sri Justice Cheekati Manavendranath Roy, on 19.03.2021 granted
interim order holding as under:
"... ... ...
... ... ...
The petitioners in both the above Criminal Petitions are Al and A2
in Crime No.5 of 2021 of C.I.D. Police Station, A.P., Amravati,
Mangalagiri. They have filed the Criminal Petitions under Section 482
Cr.P.C. seeking quash of the said F.I.R. registered against them and
other accused for the offences punishable under Sections 166, 167,
217, 120-B r/w. Secs.34, 35, 36 and 37 of IPC; Section 3(1)(f), (g) of
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989; and Section 7 of the A.P. Assigned Lands
(Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977.
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Dr.YLR,JThis is yet another case pertaining to the land dispute arising out
of acquisition of lands under land pooling scheme introduced under
the A.P. Capital Regional Development Authority Act, 2014, (for
short, the “A.P. CRDA Act”) for establishing a capital city for the
present State of Andhra Pradesh.
The 2nd respondent, who is the de facto complainant, is the sitting
Member of Legislative Assembly of Mangalagiri Assembly
Constituency. He belongs to the present ruling party. He lodged a
report with the Additional General of Police, Crime Investigation
Department, Mangalagiri of Andhra Pradesh, on 24.02.2021, stating
that the erstwhile combined State of Andhra Pradesh, which
originally constituted under the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, was
bifurcated into two States i.e. the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh under the A.P. Reorganisation Act, 2014 and the
present State of Andhra Pradesh was formed with effect from
02.06.2014 and in the General Assembly Elections held in the month
of April, 2014 for the residuary State of Andhra Pradesh, Telugu
Desam Party came into Rule and as there was no capital city for the
residuary State of Andhra Pradesh that the said State Government
has taken steps to establish a capital city and for that purpose, the
A.P. CRDA Act was brought into existence after approval of the
Cabinet and after the Bill was passed to that effect in the State
Legislative Assembly in the month of September, 2014. It is stated
that concept of land pooling was also introduced under the said Act
to acquire lands from the peasants and others for the said purpose
and accordingly, the lands were acquired.
It is stated that recently some farmers, who are named in his
report, approached him stating that the lands assigned to them have
also been illegally acquired for the said purpose by making false
representations that they can manage to get compensation from the
Government and thereby acquired the lands without paying any
compensation and that loss was caused to them in this regard.
It is also stated in the said report that the then Chief Minister of
the State Sri N.Chandrababu Naidu, brought G.O.Ms.No.41, dated
17.02.2016 incorporating guidelines for acquiring the assigned lands
and this G.O.Ms.No.41 was illegally brought into existence in
contravention of the prevailing procedure to benefit the close
associates of the then Chief Minister and consequently, the
assignees were put to loss.
Therefore, he requested to conduct in-depth investigation into the
matter by the police.
The Additional Director General of Police, Crime Investigation
Department, after considering the contents of the said report lodged
by the M.L.A., entrusted the matter to the Deputy Superintendent of
Police, C.I.D., Vijayawada, for preliminary investigation. Accordingly,
the said Officer has conducted a preliminary investigation and he has
submitted his report. Based on the said report, the present F.I.R.
came to be registered against the petitioners on 12.03.2021.
Now the petitioners, who are (1) the then Chief Minister and the
present Opposition Leader and (2) the Minister for Municipal
Administration for the erstwhile Government of Andhra Pradesh,
seek quash of the said F.I.R. on the ground that the facts of the case
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Dr.YLR,J
do not constitute any offences against them for which the F.I.R. was
registered and the case has been foisted, out of political rivalry by
the present State Government and the de facto complainant, who is
the M.L.A., who also belongs to the present Ruling Party and as
such, the sought quash of the F.I.R. also mainly on the ground that
since the prosecution pertains to the acts purported to have been
done by the petitioners in pursuance of the A.P. CRDA Act for the
purpose of establishing a capital city and to acquire lands for the said
purpose, protection is provided to them from prosecution under
Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act and specific bar is imposed under
the said Act to prosecute any Authority, officer, or person in respect
of any act done or purported to have been done by them under the
said Act or in pursuance of the said Act or the Rules or Standing
Orders made under the said Act. Therefore, the present prosecution
is not maintainable against them under law.
Learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra, appearing for A-1,
would submit that the facts of the case and the allegations set out in
the F.I.R. do not at all constitute any offences punishable under
Sections 166, 167, 217, 120-B r/w. Secs.34, 35, 36 and 37 of IPC;
Section 3(1)(f).(g) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; and Section 7 of the A.P.
Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, for which the
F.I.R. is registered and even in the preliminary investigation report
also no role was attributed to the petitioners in both the Criminal
Petitions regarding any such offences said to have been committed
by them. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra
would submit that the launching of criminal proceedings against the
petitioners is an abuse of process of law besides being malicious in
nature.
He then would vehemently contend that in view of the express bar
engrafted under Section 146 of the AP CRDA Act, as the main
allegation is that the petitioners have brought G.O.Ms.No.41 to
acquire lands for the purpose of establishing capital city in
contravention of the Business Rules, the said acts are clearly
protected under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act and they cannot
be prosecuted for any such acts done or purported to have been
done under the said Act. So, he would contend that the present
prosecution is not at all maintainable under law.
Learned Senior Counsel Sri Dammalapati Srinivas appearing for
A-2 would submit that a reading of the contents of the F.I.R. shows
that, as per the Note File, the proposal for bringing out the said
G.O.Ms.No.41 was initiated by Sri Kantilal Dande, I.A.S., who is the
Collector, and thereafter, on completion of the entire process at
various levels that the matter was finally placed before the then Chief
Minister and the Minister for Municipal Administration Department for
approval which clearly indicates that both the petitioners are not the
persons responsible for initiating the process of bringing out the said
G.O. He would submit that the G.O. was placed before the
petitioners only at the final stage for approval. Therefore, he would
submit that no offence is made out against these petitioners even
from the contents of the F.I.R. He would also reiterate that in view of
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Dr.YLR,J
the bar contained in Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act that the
present prosecution against the petitioners is not maintainable.
Learned Additional Advocate General Sri Jasthi Nagabhushan
appearing for the 1st respondent State would submit that although
the specific role of these two petitioners in violating the Business
Rules relating to drafting and bringing into existence the
G.O.Ms.No.41, is not mentioned either in the F.I.R. or in the
preliminary investigation report, the fact remains established is that
they are at the helm of affairs at the relevant time and as such they
cannot shun their responsibility. So, the matter requires investigation
to find out the specific role played by them in bringing out the said
G.O. and at this stage it cannot be held that they have no role to play
in bringing out the said G.O. Learned Additional Advocate General
would further contend that the material which is now placed before
this Court would prima facie show that the Business Rules relating to
drafting a G.O. has been grossly violated and it clearly indicates that
the G.O. was issued in contravention of the procedure only to benefit
the close associates of the petitioners herein which ultimately
resulted into causing loss to the assignees of the land, who are
landless poor people. Therefore, he would submit with all
vehemence that in view of the seriousness of the allegations, the
prosecution is to be allowed to proceed with the investigation to find
out truth or otherwise of the allegations set out in the F.I.R. He would
further submit that as the assignees, who sustained loss in the said
process, expressed their grievance before the de facto complainant,
who is the sitting M.L.A. that he has lodged the report with the Police
to cause enquiry into the matter and to take appropriate legal action
in this regard. Therefore, learned Additional Advocate General
opposed for grant of stay of investigation in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
As regards the bar contained under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA
Act, which is mainly relied on by the learned Senior Counsel in both
the Criminal Petitions, learned Additional Advocate General would
submit that the bar applies only when the acts are done by both the
petitioners in good faith and as the present acts, are done by both
the petitioners to do favour to their close associates, it cannot be said
that they are protected under Section 146 of the Act. Therefore, the
bar engrafted under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act is not
applicable to the facts of the case. He would also rely on Section 23
of the A.P. CRDA Act which relates to protection of acts done in good
faith. So, according to him, Section 146 has to be read along with
Section 23 and when it is shown that the acts are not done in good
faith that the protection under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act is
not available to them.
In reply to the said argument, learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth
Luthra would submit that it is not stated in Section 146 of the A.P.
CRDA Act that the bar of prosecution applies only to the acts done in
good faith. He would contend that as per the language employed in
Section 146, since the protection is given to all acts, the present
prosecution is clearly barred under law. He would submit that Section
23 cannot be read along with Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act and
Section 23 is an independent provision and applies in a different
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Dr.YLR,J
context. He would submit that all acts are done by the petitioners in
good faith in the larger interest of the public.
I have considered the above elaborate submissions made by both
the learned Senior Counsel for both the petitioners and also the
learned Additional Advocate General for the 1st respondent-State.
The substance of the allegations as set out in the F.I.R. primarily
show that some persons who are claiming to be assignees of the
assigned lands expressed their grievance before the de facto
complainant, who is the M.L.A., that the lands assigned to them were
acquired for the purpose of establishing a capital city by making false
representation compensation to from them would that they
Government the get and no compensation was paid to them and they
sustained loss in the said process and also that G.O.Ms.No.41 to
acquire said lands was brought into existence by the authorities at
the helm of affairs at that time to benefit some of the close
associates of the then Chief Minister in contravention of the
prevailing procedure.
So, the allegations primarily pertain to the alleged contravention
of the procedure in the Business Rules meant for issuing
G.O.Ms.No.41. Whether it amounts to any offence as alleged is a
matter which is required to be decided in the main Criminal Petitions.
In this context, it is relevant to note that G.O.Ms.No.41 was issued
long back in the year 2016. Till now the assignees or any person did
not raise any demur whatsoever in this regard. They did not question
the said G.O. in any Court of law. They also did not lodge any report
with the Police for all this length of five years time alleging that they
have been cheated in acquiring the lands assigned to them for the
purpose of establishing a capital city by making any false
representation either by the petitioners or by any person. Now, after
lapse of about five years, according to the prosecution version, they
approached the de facto complainant, who is an M.L.A. in the
present ruling party, expressing grievance in this regard and he
lodged the present report with the police on the basis of alleged
grievance said to have been expressed before him by the assignees.
The genuineness of the said F.I.R. which is now lodged by the M.L.A.
is mainly questioned by the petitioners on the ground that he lodged
the said report with the police against the petitioners, who are the
former Chief Minister and present Leader of Opposition and the
former Minister of Municipal Administration, to wreak their political
vengeance out of malice against the petitioners. The Court finds
considerable force in the above contention raised by the petitioners.
When the assignees did not lodge any report with the police for all
this length of five years period and even till today and when the
report came to be lodged at the instance of the de facto complainant,
who is an M.L.A. of the present rulingparty, and when the validity of
the said criminal proceedings launched on the basis of the said
report is primarily questioned on the ground of malice and political
vendetta, the matter requires examination in the main Criminal
Petitions to ascertain whether the present case is the outcome of
malice and political vendetta or not.
In this context, it is relevant to note the very recent and latest
judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Arnab
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Dr.YLR,J
Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 2 SCC 427.
The Apex Court held, while considering human liberty vis-à-vis public
interest, that no doubt public interest requires that there should be a
fair and due investigation of crime and that the inherent power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. r/w. Article 226 of the Constitution of India should
be sparingly and cautiously used to quash criminal proceedings.
However, at the other end of the spectrum, it is also the duty of the
Court to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for
harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the
spectrum. Further held that, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter
which the High Courts and lower Courts must be alive to.
Therefore, in the light of the law enunciated by the Apex Court
explaining the duty of the Court while considering a quash petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, that the Court must make an endeavour to ensure that criminal
law does not become a weapon of harassment of citizens and the
same is not misused, the aforesaid defence taken by the petitioners
that they have been falsely implicated in this case on account of the
political vendetta is required to be examined in detail in the main
Criminal Petitions. Certainly, it is a fact to be considered in the
present facts and circumstances of the case.
Further, as can be seen from the contents of the F.I.R. and also
the preliminary investigation report, prima facie no specific role is
attributed to the petitioners herein in contravening the said procedure
or in committing any such offences for which the F.I.R. is registered.
Apart from it, it is significant to note that Section 146 of the A.P.
CRDA Act imposes a specific bar to prosecute any officer, authority
or a person for the acts done or acts purported to have been done
under the said Act are in pursuance of the said Act. For better
appreciation, Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act is reproduced
hereunder:
“S.146. Bar of Legal proceeding:- No suit, prosecution or the
proceeding shall lie against the Government or Authority or officer or
person for any act done or purporting to be done under or in
pursuance of the Act or the rules or standing orders made
thereunder.”
Therefore, a bare perusal of the aforesaid Section makes it
manifest that no prosecution shall lie against the Government or
authority or officer or even any person for any act done or purported
to have been done under the Act or in pursuance of the said Act or
the Rules or the Standing Orders made thereunder.
Now it is relevant to consider the authoritative judgment rendered
by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp.(1)
SCC 335. About 7 grounds have been enumerated in the said
judgment by the Supreme Court which justifies exercise of the power
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for the purpose of quashing the F.I.R.
Ground No.6 is relevant in the context to consider. It says that when
there is specific bar under the Act to initiate prosecution, it would be
a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. It reads thus:
“6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
56
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Dr.YLR,Jproceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.”
Thus, the Apex Court clearly held that when there is an express
legal bar engrafted in the concerned Act to prosecute a person for
any such offence, it affords a strong ground for quashing the F.I.R.
Obvious reason is, when the accused got immunity from any
prosecution in a case where there is express legal bar under the Act,
to prosecute them, the very prosecution launched against them
would not be maintainable under law.
The facts of the case clearly show that the alleged acts
complained against the petitioners pertain to the acts done in
pursuance of the A.P. CRDA Act. The entire dispute revolves round
and pertains to the lands acquired under the A.P. CRDA Act.
Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that prima facie the
aforesaid bar under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act clearly applies
to the present facts of the case. Although the learned Additional
Advocate General made his best efforts to convince the Court that
the said bar applies only when the acts are done in good faith and
not otherwise, the learned Senior Counsel Sri Sidharth Luthra would
contend that there is nothing in the said Section to indicate that the
said protection from the prosecution is applicable only to the acts
done in good faith. Even otherwise, he would submit that there is
nothing to indicate that the petitioners have not done the said acts in
good faith. So, in view of the said rival contentions, the matter
requires deep examination in the main Criminal Petitions whether the
bar contained under Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act applies to the
present facts of the case and whether the present prosecution is
barred or not. This has to be finally adjudicated after the 1st
respondent State files its detailed counter-affidavit explaining the
same and also after the 2nd respondent, who is the de facto
complainant, makes his appearance.
Therefore, prima facie, in view of the express bar engrafted under
Section 146 of the A.P. CRDA Act, ultimately, if it is found that the bar
applies to the present facts of the case, it goes to the very root of the
matter and strikes at its bottom regarding the very maintainability of
the prosecution against the petitioners.
As the State seeks to prosecute the petitioners mainly on the
ground of alleged violation of Business Rules in issuing
G.O.Ms.No.41, another important aspect which needs examination
is, whether mere violation of Business Rules in issuing a particular
G.O. would constitute any offence without there being any requisite
mens rea or guilty intention on the part of the concerned, which is the
basic principle of our criminal jurisprudence. At this stage, there is no
reliable material on record to hold that the said acts in violating the
Business Rules, even if any, in issuing the said G.O., would
constitute an offence.
In view of the above, the petitioners could make out a strong
prima facie case warranting interference of this Court in exercise of
its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the main Criminal
Petitions to examine whether the criminal prosecution launched
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against the petitioners herein in the above crime amounts to abuse of
process of law or not.
Therefore, in the said facts and circumstances of the case, this
Court is of the considered view that till the said question is decided
after hearing both the parties, that there shall be an order of stay of
investigation and other proceedings against the petitioners, who are
Al and A2, till the next date of hearing.
Therefore, there shall be stay of investigation and all further
proceedings pursuant to the registration of F.I.R. in Crime No.5 of
2021 of C.I.D. Police Station, A.P., Amaravati, Mangalagiri, against
the petitioners, who are Al and A2, till the next date of hearing.”
76. It is not out of place to mention that during proceedings, a learned
Single Judge of this Court, Hon’ble Sri Justice Rao Raghunandan Rao, by
order dated 16.04.2021, extended the stay earlier granted for a further period
of three weeks. Subsequently, another learned Single Judge, Hon’ble Sri
Justice Donadi Ramesh, by order dated 12.11.2021, extended the subsisting
interim order for a period of eight weeks. Again, on 05.01.2022, Hon’ble Sri
Justice Rao Raghunandan Rao, extended the interim order for a further period
of six weeks. Thereafter, on 23.02.2022, Hon’ble Sri Justice Donadi Ramesh,
learned Single Judge, extended the interim order until further orders.
77. Indeed, as per the roster, when these two Criminal Petitions were
listed together before another learned Single Judge, Hon’ble Sri Justice
Konakanti Sreenivasa Reddy, on 24.01.2023, a direction was issued to the
Registry to obtain necessary orders from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for
posting the matters before an appropriate Bench. Pursuant thereto, the
Registry placed a note before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, who was pleased
to direct that the matters be posted before the Hon’ble Judge having roster
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provision to hear Criminal Petitions including those seeking quashment of
charge sheets and FIRs pertaining to the period 2018 to 2021.
78. Thereafter, another learned Single Judge, Hon’ble Dr. Justice
V.R.K.Krupa Sagar, by order dated 30.08.2023, reserved the matters for
judgment. However, on 14.12.2023, the matters were relisted under the
caption “part‑heard,” and they have since remained pending adjudication
before the said Bench.
79. Subsequently, as per the roster dated 11.07.2025, the cases
pertaining to former and sitting MLAs and Members of Parliament (MPs) were
assigned to this Court. From thenceforth, the present matters have been
heard in part from time to time and from 17.11.2025 onwards the matters have
been continuously posted under the caption “part‑heard.”
80. It is also pertinent to note that, as per roster dated 19.01.2026
note No.3, all matters on change of roster shall stand released and shall be
posted before the Bench or Benches as per the roster, while part‑heard and
reserved matters under the caption “CAV” shall, unless released, remain with
the concerned Benches. In view of the said roster note direction, the present
two matters continued to remain with this Bench and are further adjudicated
from time to time. Later these two Criminal Petitions were reserved for orders
on 17.04.2026 and are presently under consideration. In addition to that, on
the date of pronouncement of this common order this Court has the roster to
hear and dispose of the cases relating to former and sitting MLAs and MPs.
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PRINCIPLES OF QUASHING – EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 482 OF ‘THE
Cr.P.C.’
81. The extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
and Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ serves as a vital safeguard in the justice
system, empowering High Courts to intervene whenever legal processes are
misused or manipulated. These provisions are designed not merely to correct
technical errors but to uphold the broader principles of fairness, equity, and
justice. By granting courts the authority to quash proceedings that amount to
harassment or abuse, they ensure that judicial machinery is not exploited for
ulterior motives and that individuals are protected from unjust prosecution.
82. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Wajid supra at paragraph
Nos.36, 37 & 38 held that when an accused approaches the Court under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing
of an FIR or criminal proceedings on the ground of frivolity, vexatiousness, or
ulterior motive, the Court has a duty to scrutinize the matter with greater care.
The Court cautioned that complainants driven by personal vengeance often
draft FIRs meticulously to disclose all ingredients of an offence, and hence the
Court must not confine itself to the averments alone but also examine
attending circumstances, materials collected during investigation and even
read between the lines to detect abuse of process. It emphasized that multiple
FIRs or patterns of litigation may reveal vendetta or grudge, and in such
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cases, the Court is empowered to intervene to prevent harassment and
misuse of criminal law.
83. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahmood Ali supra at paragraph
Nos.11, 12 & 13 held that when an accused seeks quashing of an FIR or
criminal proceedings under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Article 226 of the
Constitution on the ground that they are frivolous, vexatious, or instituted with
ulterior motives, the Court must scrutinize the matter with heightened care.
The Court observed that complainants driven by personal vengeance often
draft FIRs meticulously to disclose all ingredients of an offence, and therefore
it is not sufficient to examine the averments alone. Instead, the Court must
also consider attending circumstances, materials collected during
investigation, and, if necessary, read between the lines to detect abuse of
process. It emphasized that multiple FIRs or patterns of litigation may reveal
vendetta or grudge, and in such cases, judicial intervention is warranted to
prevent harassment and misuse of criminal law.
84. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Haji Iqbal supra at paragraph No.14
held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing criminal proceedings, the Court is
not required to confine its scrutiny solely to the averments in the FIR or
complaint. Where allegations of mala fides, personal vendetta, or abuse of
process are raised, the Court must examine the attendant circumstances, the
background leading to the initiation of proceedings, and the material collected
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during investigation to determine whether the criminal process has been
misused. The Court further observed that factors such as the registration of
multiple FIRs may be relevant in assessing whether the proceedings are
motivated by personal vengeance or ulterior motives.
85. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Salib supra at paragraph No.26 held
that while considering a plea for quashing under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
or Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court must not restrict its examination to
the averments in the FIR alone. Where allegations of mala fide prosecution,
personal vendetta, or abuse of process are raised, the Court is empowered to
consider the attendant circumstances, antecedent events, and materials
collected during investigation to ascertain the true nature of the proceedings.
The Court observed that a complaint motivated by ulterior motives may be
carefully drafted to disclose the ingredients of an offence, and therefore a
deeper scrutiny of the overall factual matrix is warranted to determine whether
the criminal process has been misused.
86. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal supra, at paragraph
Nos.102 & 103 laid down illustrative categories of cases where the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ may be exercised to prevent abuse
of process or to secure the ends of justice. These include (1) where
allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value, do not
constitute any offence, (2) where allegations do not disclose a cognizable
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offence, (3) where uncontroverted allegations and evidence do not disclose
commission of any offence, (4) where allegations disclose only a non-
cognizable offence, (5) where allegations are absurd or inherently improbable,
(6) where there exists an express legal bar to proceedings, and (7) where
proceedings are manifestly mala fide or maliciously instituted with ulterior
motives. The Court, however, cautioned that the power of quashing must be
exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases,
as courts are not to embark upon inquiries into the reliability or genuineness of
allegations at the threshold.
87. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Lovely Salhotra supra, at paragraph
No.3 held that where no cognizable offence is made out against certain
accused, the FIR can indeed be quashed in part, and the High Court erred in
holding otherwise. The Court observed that the appellants could not be made
to suffer merely because investigation against co-accused was still pending,
particularly when the Magistrate had already opined that no offence was prima
facie made out against them. It further noted that the FIR filed against the
appellants was an afterthought, intended solely to pressurize them in relation
to their own criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. Thus, the Court underscored that continuation of such
proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.
88. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ishwar Pratap Singh supra at
paragraph No.9 held that the High Court, while exercising its inherent
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jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is empowered to quash a
charge-sheet even in part, if such intervention is necessary to prevent abuse
of process or to secure the ends of justice. The Court clarified that there is no
prohibition in law against partial quashing, since an accused may be
aggrieved only with respect to certain charges among several offences
alleged. It emphasized that a charge-sheet filed at the dictate of an external
authority, rather than by the police in exercise of its lawful powers, amounts to
abuse of process. Accordingly, the Court quashed the supplementary report
filed at the direction of the Commission, reiterating that the High Court ought
to have exercised its inherent powers to the extent of the abuse, without being
constrained to quash the entire charge-sheet.
89. In Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab 48 , the Supreme Court at
paragraph Nos.8 & 10 reiterated that the High Court’s power under Section
482 of ‘the CrPC.,’ to quash criminal proceedings is limited to cases where the
FIR or charge-sheet fails to disclose the essential ingredients of the alleged
offence or where interference is necessary to prevent abuse of process or
secure the ends of justice. The Court emphasized that, at the initial stage, the
High Court cannot assess the merits of the evidence or consider the
accused’s defence, except in exceptional circumstances. If the allegations
prima facie constitute an offence, criminal proceedings cannot be quashed.
The Court further held that statements recorded under Section 161 of ‘the
48
(2020) 3 SCC 317
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Cr.P.C.,’ are inadmissible as evidence and cannot be relied upon while
deciding a petition under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ for quashing
proceedings.
MALICIOUS OR FRIVOLOUS PROSECUTION:
90. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishna Lal Chawla supra at
paragraph Nos.20, 21, 22, 23 & 26 held that trial Judges and Magistrates bear
a constitutional and statutory duty to identify and dispose of frivolous litigation
at the earliest stage, thereby safeguarding both judicial time and the
fundamental right to liberty under Article 21. Recognising that every trial is a
voyage in search of truth, the Court emphasised the wide powers conferred
under Section 165 of ‘the Evidence Act.,’ which enable Judges to order
production of material and ask questions to stem vexatious proceedings.
Stressing the pivotal role of Trial Courts as the “kingpin” of the justice system,
the Court warned against misuse of criminal procedure for personal vendetta,
noting the severe hardship and stigma suffered by falsely accused persons. It
reiterated that frivolous complaints must be nipped in the bud, and that Courts
have inherent powers to prevent abuse of process, denying relief to litigants
who attempt to pollute the stream of justice with vexatious claims. Thus, the
ruling reinforced the responsibility of Trial Courts to act as the first line of
defence against harassment and misuse of judicial machinery.
91. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Gosu Jayarami Reddy supra
observed at paragraph No.1 that political rivalry often degenerates into
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personal vendetta, where principles and policies are sidelined and personal
ambition for power drives individuals to commit grave offences to avenge
defeat or settle scores. The Court noted that the appeals before it presented a
similar picture, assailing the conviction and sentence passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Anantapur at Gooty, and affirmed by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, the judgment underscored the dangers of
political enmity transforming into criminal acts, highlighting the judiciary’s role
in scrutinising such prosecutions with care.
92. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ravinder Singh supra at paragraph
Nos.21 to 25 & 33 held that legitimate indignation does not amount to malice,
as malice in law requires intentional wrongful conduct without just cause or
excuse, actuated by ill will or improper motive. The Court clarified that in
cases of malicious prosecution, mere malice is insufficient if reasonable and
probable cause existed for launching proceedings, and the burden lies on the
plaintiff to prove both malice and want of reasonable cause. It further
explained that “vexatious” proceedings signify harassment through law without
justification, aimed only at annoying or burdening the adversary, thereby
amounting to abuse of process. The Court also discussed the principle of
issue estoppel, distinct from double jeopardy, which prevents re-litigation of
facts already determined in a prior trial between the same parties. Ultimately,
the Court stressed that criminal prosecution cannot be used as an instrument
of vendetta or needless harassment, and that Courts, exercising their inherent
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powers ex debito justitiae, have a paramount duty to protect innocent persons
from untenable complaints and to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial
process.
93. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Dilip Kumar Ray supra at paragraph
Nos.15 held, the concept of malice in law is not a mere rhetorical flourish but a
substantive doctrine of jurisprudence. The Court delineated the distinction
between malice in fact, which connotes spite, ill will, or indirect and improper
motive actuating an action, and malice in law, which signifies the intentional
commission of a wrongful act without lawful excuse, just cause, or probable
cause, irrespective of personal animus. It was emphasised that while in
common parlance malice is equated with hostility or indignation, in legal
contemplation it extends to any deliberate act in conscious disregard of
another’s rights, a wilful perversion of lawful authority, or an abuse of process
for collateral ends. The Court further observed that mere general allegations
or indignation cannot suffice; cogent evidence must be available on record to
establish mala fides. In this context, reliance was placed upon Prabodh
Sagar v. Punjab SEB 49 , State of A.P. v. Goverdhanlal Pitti 50 , State of
Punjab v. V.K. Khanna 51 , and S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India 52 ,
wherein it was consistently held that ignorance of law cannot absolve one
from malice in law, for the law presumes knowledge of its commands. Thus,
49
(2000) 5 SCC 630
50
(2003) 4 SCC 739
51
(2001) 2 SCC 330
52
(1979) 2 SCC 491
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malice imports a corrupt state of mind, a wrongful intent, or an indirect motive,
and in the specific context of malicious prosecution, liability arises only where
proceedings are instituted without reasonable or probable cause and with an
ulterior or illegitimate purpose, thereby converting the machinery of justice into
an instrument of oppression. The Court, therefore, crystallised the principle
that malice, whether in fact or in law, signifies a conscious violation of law to
the prejudice of another, and that the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse constitutes the very essence of legal malice.
DELAY IN LODGING FIR:
94. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently cautioned that
unexplained or inordinate delay in initiating or pursuing criminal proceedings
often signals mala fide intent, reflecting an attempt to misuse the process of
law rather than to genuinely seek justice. Such delay undermines the
credibility of prosecution and places an unfair burden on the accused, who is
left to face prolonged uncertainty and harassment. Recognizing this, the Court
has emphasized that when delay appears unjustified and motivated, it may
warrant dismissal of proceedings altogether, thereby ensuring that the criminal
justice system is not exploited for ulterior purposes and that fairness remains
the guiding principle of adjudication.
95. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chanchalpati Das supra at paragraph
Nos.21, 22 & 25 held that unexplained inordinate delay in filing a criminal
complaint, though not by itself an absolute ground for quashing, must be
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of process to settle personal scores. In the case at hand, the complaint filed
after eight years was found to be malicious prosecution, with allegations so
absurd and improbable that no prudent person could conclude there was
sufficient ground to proceed. The Court emphasised that frivolous and
vexatious litigation clogs the judicial system, driving genuine cases to the
background, and therefore parties indulging in such abuse must be saddled
with exemplary costs to deter repetition. It further cautioned that when
individuals projecting themselves as spiritual leaders engage in such
irresponsible litigation, it amounts to misuse of court proceedings for ego or
vendetta, which must be curbed in the larger interest of justice.
96. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kishan Singh supra at paragraph
No.22 held that delay in lodging an FIR must be accompanied by a plausible
explanation, failing which such delay may prove fatal to the prosecution. The
Court cautioned that frustrated litigants, unsuccessful in civil proceedings,
often resort to criminal complaints with mala fide intent to harass adversaries
or wreak vengeance, and such misuse of criminal jurisdiction cannot be
permitted. It emphasized that courts must scrutinize delayed complaints to
ensure that criminal process does not degenerate into a weapon of
harassment and persecution. Where an FIR is lodged purely out of personal
grudge or vendetta, with the sole aim of entangling the other party in
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warrant quashing.
DEFENCE OF THE ACCUSED AT THE STAGE OF QUASHING:
97. It is trite law that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not
powerless to consider the defence of the accused if the complaint itself
discloses a complete and unimpeachable defence. In such circumstances,
where the allegations on their face negate the possibility of guilt or reveal that
the prosecution is inherently flawed, the Court is empowered to intervene to
prevent unnecessary trial. This principle ensures that the judicial process is
not reduced to a mere formality when continuation of proceedings would serve
no purpose other than harassment, thereby safeguarding the rights of the
accused and upholding the ends of justice.
98. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik
GMBH supra at paragraph Nos.21, 22, 33, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60,
61, 62 & 64 held that while considering a private complaint of defamation, the
Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the allegations, statements, and
supporting materials under Sections 200 and 202 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ to determine
whether sufficient ground exists for proceeding, though not for conviction. The
Court clarified that although ordinarily the benefit of Exceptions to Section 499
of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is to be tested at trial, there is no legal bar preventing the
Magistrate from considering them at the stage of issuance of process if the
complaint itself discloses a complete defence. It emphasised that initiation of
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to prevent abuse of judicial time. The Court harmonised divergent precedents,
observing that while some decisions restrict consideration of Exceptions to
trial, others permit their application even at the pre-trial or quashing stage
under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ depending on the facts. Ultimately, it was
held that the Magistrate’s duty is to form a prima facie opinion on whether an
offence is made out, and if the allegations themselves fall within an Exception,
dismissal of the complaint at the threshold would be justified.
99. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vadilal Panchal supra at paragraph
Nos.5 to 7, 14 & 15 held that a Magistrate, while dealing with a complaint
under Sections 200, 202 and 203 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is not bound as a matter of
law to issue process merely because the accused pleads an exception such
as the right of private defence. The Court clarified that if the complaint itself or
the materials placed before the Magistrate disclose a complete defence under
any exception, the Magistrate would be justified in dismissing the complaint at
the threshold for want of sufficient ground to proceed. It rejected the High
Court’s view that the Magistrate could not consider the plea of self-defence at
the pre-trial stage, observing that the Presidency Magistrate had rightly
concluded, on the basis of witness statements and inquiry reports, that no
offence was made out and there was no sufficient ground for proceeding.
Thus, the Court affirmed that the Magistrate has the discretion to apply judicial
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mind to the materials before him and dismiss frivolous complaints where a
complete defence is apparent.
LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN POLICY MATTERS:
100. On the issue of public knowledge regarding the plan for creation
of a capital and the limits of judicial review in policy matters, it has been held
that Courts must exercise restraint and cannot substitute their own judgment
for that of the executive in such decisions. Matters of policy fall within the
domain of the government, and judicial interference is warranted only when
such policies infringe upon fundamental rights or violate constitutional
provisions. This principle ensures that governance remains within the sphere
of the executive, while the judiciary acts as a constitutional safeguard,
stepping in only when individual rights or constitutional mandates are at risk.
101. In Dammalapati Srinivas supra a learned Single Judge of this
Court categorically held at paragraph Nos.52, 54 to 56, 59, 60, 68 & 72 that
the mere purchase of lands by A-1 and his relatives in the proposed capital
region, without any proof of his participation in the decision-making process or
possession of exclusive official knowledge, cannot amount to criminal
misconduct under Section 13(1)(d)(ii) of ‘the P.C.Act’. The Court observed that
the location of the capital was already a matter of public speculation and
widely reported in newspapers, thereby negating any allegation of misuse of
confidential information. Consequently, the attempt to criminalize valid
property transactions executed under registered sale deeds for lawful
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provisions was declared untenable.
102. In Chekka Guru Murali Mohan v. State of A.P., supra a learned
Judge of this Court decisively held at paragraph Nos.24, 38, 43, 44, 84, 87,
88, 102 to 104, 107, 119 & 120 that the prosecution’s attempt to criminalize
bona fide land transactions was wholly untenable. It observed that locus
standi to lodge a criminal complaint is alien to criminal law, since every
offence is against society, and thus any person may set the law in motion.
However, the Court rejected the State’s reliance on the concept of insider
trading, clarifying that it is confined to securities under the SEBI Act and
cannot be imported into ‘the I.P.C.,’ to criminalize private sales of immovable
property. Importantly, the Court reiterated that the right to property is not only
a constitutional and statutory right but also a human right, and that buyers
have no legal obligation to disclose speculative information about future
capital location to sellers. Since the alleged information was already in the
public domain through widespread newspaper reports, non-disclosure could
not amount to “dishonest concealment” under Section 415 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The
Court warned that criminalizing such transactions would open floodgates of
speculative prosecutions whenever land values rise, which the law does not
permit. Consequently, it held that no offence under Sections 420, 406, 409, or
120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ was made out, branding the prosecution as an abuse of
process and quashing the FIR.
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103. In State of A.P. v. Chekka Guru Murali Mohan supra, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed at paragraph Nos.6, 15, 18 the High Court’s
reasoning that the alleged information regarding the location of the new capital
city was already in the public domain at the time of the land transactions,
thereby negating any claim of concealment or misuse of official knowledge. It
upheld the finding that offences under Sections 406 and 409 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
were inapplicable as no breach of trust was involved, and Section 120-B of
‘the I.P.C.,’ was equally inapplicable in the absence of any criminal conspiracy.
The Court further observed that since the transactions concerned private
individuals and private lands, the Prevention of Corruption Act could not be
invoked, and reiterated that courts must necessarily examine the factual
substratum of an FIR to determine whether it discloses any cognizable
offence. Concluding that the High Court’s quashing of the FIRs was neither
perverse nor illegal, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution amounted to
an abuse of process and rightly stood quashed.
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
104. On the issue of statutory interpretation, it is a well-settled principle
that the language of one statute cannot be mechanically imported into
another, as each statute is a self-contained code with its own purpose,
context, and legislative intent. Courts are required to interpret provisions
strictly within the framework of the statute in question, giving effect to the
words used by the legislature without borrowing meanings from unrelated
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enactments. This ensures that the distinct objectives of different laws are
preserved, prevents distortion of legislative intent, and maintains the integrity
of statutory interpretation as a discipline rooted in precision and contextual
fidelity.
105. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Maheshwari Fish Seed Farm supra
at paragraph Nos.6 to 9, 11, 16 held that words not defined in a statute must
be construed in their ordinary and popular sense, as legislation is addressed
to common understanding. While “agriculture” in its wider sense may include
cultivation, horticulture, forestry, and livestock rearing, the Court emphasized
that the productive use of land is essential for an activity to qualify as
agriculture. Pisciculture, being the artificial breeding and rearing of fish
independent of land’s productive capacity, cannot be equated with agriculture.
The Court rejected reliance on definitions in other statutes that artificially
included pisciculture, noting that such enactments were not pari materia and
that definitions in one statute cannot control interpretation in another.
Consequently, pisciculture was held not to fall within the ambit of “agriculture”
in the context of the case.
SCOPE OF SECTION 197 OF THE CR.P.C.
106. Protection under law for acts done by public officials is not
absolute; it is available only when the act in question bears a reasonable
nexus with the discharge of official duty. The rationale is that immunity exists
to enable officials to perform their functions fearlessly and effectively, not to
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shield them from accountability for actions that are wholly unrelated to their
service obligations. Therefore, when an act is dehors or outside the scope of
official functions, such protection cannot be extended, ensuring that the
doctrine of immunity is not misused and that public servants remain
answerable for conduct beyond their lawful duties.
107. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Om Prakash Yadav supra held at
paragraph Nos.18, 19, 49 to 74, that the protection under Section 197 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ is not absolute and cannot be invoked for every act of a public
servant merely because it was done during service. Rather, the true test lies in
whether the act bears a direct and reasonable nexus with the discharge of
official duty, such that it can reasonably be claimed to have been performed
by virtue of the office. The Court reiterated that while excess in the
performance of duty may still attract protection if reasonably connected to
official functions, acts of criminal conspiracy, misappropriation, fabrication, or
misuse of authority fall dehors official duty and cannot be shielded under
Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C‘. Emphasizing the “quality of the act” as the
determinative factor, the Court clarified that sanction is intended to safeguard
honest officers from frivolous prosecution but cannot be used as a cloak for
illegality or misconduct. Thus, the applicability of Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
must be assessed case by case, balancing the need to protect bona fide
discharge of duty with the imperative of ensuring accountability for acts
unconnected with official functions.
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108. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in CBI v. B.A. Srinivasan 53 , at
paragraph No.15 held that the protection contemplated under Section 197 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is available only when the act complained of bears a reasonable
and direct nexus with the discharge of official duties, such that the impugned
act is inseparably connected with the performance of the public servant’s
official functions. The Court observed that an official act may be performed
either in faithful discharge of duty or even in dereliction thereof; however, for
the statutory protection to apply, it must be demonstrated that the act in
question was so integrally connected with official responsibilities that it cannot
be divorced from the performance of such duties. Where the alleged
misconduct lacks a reasonable connection with the discharge of official
functions and the official status of the accused merely furnished the occasion
or opportunity for the commission of the act, the requirement of prior sanction
would not arise. The Hon’ble Court further emphasized that the question of
whether the offending act was committed while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of official duty is often a mixed question of law and fact, which
may crystallize only after evidence is adduced during trial. Consequently, the
plea regarding sanction under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is not confined to
the threshold stage and may be legitimately raised at any stage of the
proceedings, including after cognizance, at the stage of framing of charge,
during trial, or even subsequent to conviction. In cases where the
53
(2020) 2 SCC 153
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determination of such issue necessitates appreciation of factual material and
examination of the defence of the accused, the Court may appropriately leave
the question of sanction open to be adjudicated upon in the final judgment
after the evidentiary record is fully developed. Thus, the Hon’ble Court
reiterated that the applicability of Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ depends upon
the existence of a real, reasonable, and inseparable nexus between the
impugned act and the official duties of the public servant, and not merely upon
the official position held by the accused.
109. A learned Judge of this Court in Kothuri Laxmi Narayana v.
State of Andhra Pradesh 54 , at paragraph No.13 held that the protective
sanction contemplated under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is attracted only
when the acts complained of are reasonably connected with and performed
while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of, official duties. The Court
observed that merely because the accused was a public servant holding a
statutory office at the relevant point of time would not ipso facto entitle him to
the immunity envisaged under Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’. The true test is
whether the impugned act formed an integral part of the official functions
entrusted to the public servant. Where the allegations pertain to the issuance,
creation, or facilitation of false or fabricated official records, certificates, or
documents, such conduct cannot, by any stretch of legal imagination, be
regarded as an act in the discharge of official duty. This Court emphasized
54
2022 SCC OnLine AP 942
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that acts involving forgery, fabrication, or abuse of official position stand wholly
outside the scope of legitimate official functions and constitute a clear
departure from, rather than an exercise of, statutory duties. Consequently, in
the absence of any reasonable nexus between the alleged misconduct and
the discharge of official responsibilities, the protection under Section 197 of
‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is unavailable, and criminal proceedings cannot be interdicted on
the ground of want of sanction. This Court therefore held that where the
allegations disclose acts ex facie beyond the ambit of official duty, no ground
is made out for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ to quash the proceedings at the threshold.
RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY AND DIRECTORY NATURE OF LAYING
PROVISIONS:
110. On the issue of the power to make and amend rules, it is trite law
that the laying provisions are directory in nature and not mandatory. The Court
clarified that rules framed under statutory authority attain validity upon their
publication in the Official Gazette, and the act of laying them before the
legislature is not a condition precedent to their enforceability. This principle
underscores the distinction between legislative oversight and the operative
force of delegated legislation, ensuring that administrative rule-making
remains effective without being stalled by procedural formalities.
111. In Sanikommu Venkata Sai Bharath Reddy supra at paragraph
Nos.23 & 25 the Court held that the Telangana Educational Institutions
(Regulation of Admission and Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1983 was
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that Sections 3 and 15 of the Act empower the State Government to regulate
admissions and frame rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The
Telangana Educational Institutions (Regulation of Admissions into
Undergraduate Professional Courses through Common Entrance Test) Rules,
2017 were framed in exercise of these statutory powers. The Court further
observed that Section 15 of the Telangana General Clauses Act, 1308 Fasli
provides that the power to make rules includes the power to add, vary, amend,
or rescind them; therefore, the State Government is competent to amend the
2017 Rules. Since the validity of Sections 3 and 15 of the 1983 Act was not
challenged by the petitioners, the State’s authority to amend the Rules
remained unquestionable.
112. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Toddy Tappers Coop. Society supra
at paragraph Nos.18, 21 to 29, 32 & 33 held that the requirement of laying
subordinate legislation before both Houses of the Legislature is directory and
not mandatory, and therefore non-compliance with such laying provisions
does not render the rules or notifications void. The Court, relying on Atlas
Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana55, and Quarry Owners’ Assn. v.
State of Bihar56, clarified that laying clauses serve as a legislative check on
executive action but do not constitute a condition precedent to validity. It
distinguished between “approval” and “permission,” noting that approval
55
(1971) 2 SCC 564
56
(2000) 8 SCC 655
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validates an act already done unless disapproved, whereas permission must
precede the act. The Court further observed that in the instant case, the
Respondents had incurred only civil liability under the licence conditions and
the Excise Act, and not criminal liability, and hence strict adherence to Rule 24
was unnecessary. Even if retrospective effect of the rule was questioned, the
provision was directory, and non-compliance would not vitiate proceedings for
suspension of licence, as Respondents could still defend themselves by
testing samples independently.
113. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jan Mohd. Noor Mohd. Bagban
supra, at paragraph No.18 held that the rules framed under the Bombay Act
22 of 1939 were valid from the date they were made under Section 26(1), and
their validity was not dependent upon being placed before the Houses of
Legislature as required under Section 26(5). The Court observed that although
the provision mandated laying the rules before the Legislature, failure to do so
did not affect their legality, since Section 26(5) was directory and not
mandatory in nature. The rules, having been in operation since 1941,
continued to remain valid by virtue of Section 64 of the Gujarat Act 20 of 1964,
and the contention that they lacked legal force due to delayed placement
before the Legislature was rejected.
114. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Ester Axene Residential
High School supra at paragraph Nos.35 to 41 held that under Section 99(3)
of the A.P. Education Act, the requirement of laying rules before the State
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Legislature is directory and not mandatory, and therefore non-compliance with
this procedure does not render the rules void. The Court observed that the
2018 Rules, notified in G.O.Ms.No.43 dated 09.08.2018, became valid and
enforceable upon publication in the State Gazette, and omission to lay them
before the Legislature until its next session does not affect their legality.
Referring to precedents such as Jan Mohd. Noor Mohd. Bagban supra,
Atlas Cycle Industries supra and K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka 57 , the Court emphasized that laying provisions are intended to
ensure legislative oversight but are not conditions precedent to the validity of
delegated legislation. Consequently, the deviation from Section 99(3) did not
annul the rules, and the Petitioners’ contention was rejected, affirming that
G.O.Ms.No.43 amending Rule 12 and omitting Rule 13 remained valid.
115. The High Court of Telangana in Chidurala Sudakar supra, at
paragraph Nos.83 to 90 held that the requirement under Section 99(3) of the
A.P. Education Act for rules to be laid before the State Legislature is directory
and not mandatory, and therefore omission to comply with it does not affect
the validity of the rules or their coming into force. The Court explained that
rules become effective upon publication in the State Gazette, and any
subsequent annulment or modification by the Legislature (once notified) would
operate prospectively without invalidating prior actions. It distinguished
between different types of laying clauses, noting that Section 99(3) falls under
57
(2011) 9 SCC 1
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the “negative resolution” category, meaning rules remain valid unless annulled
or modified. The Court rejected the contention that legislative approval was a
precondition, clarifying that the 2018 Rules came into force immediately upon
notification in the Gazette and remained valid until annulled or modified.
Reliance on Union of India v. National Hydroelectric Power Corporation
Ltd., 58 was found misplaced, as that case involved a statutory requirement of
approval, unlike Section 99(3).
JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS INTERPRETING SCs/STs (POA) ACT:
116. It has been firmly held that for prosecution under ‘the SCs/STs
(POA) Act.,’ the intention to humiliate a person on account of their caste is the
sine qua non. Mere occurrence of an incident or use of offensive language,
without the specific element of caste-based humiliation, does not attract the
provisions of the Act. This requirement ensures that the law is applied strictly
to cases where the abuse is rooted in caste discrimination, thereby preserving
its purpose of protecting vulnerable communities while preventing misuse in
situations where caste is not the motivating factor.
117. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hitesh Verma supra at paragraph
Nos.9, 15 to 18, 22 & 23 held that mere existence of a property dispute
between parties, where one happens to belong to a Scheduled Caste, does
not by itself attract offences under ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ unless the
abuse, intimidation, or harassment is specifically on account of the victim’s
58
AIR 2001 SC 2512
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SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ is the intention to humiliate a person because they
belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, and not merely because of a
civil dispute over possession of land. Referring to Khuman Singh v. State of
M.P.,59 and Ishwar Pratap Singh supra the Court reiterated that enhanced
punishment or prosecution under ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ cannot be
sustained unless the offence is committed solely on the ground of caste
identity, and further recognized that charge-sheets can be quashed in part
under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ to prevent abuse of process. Consequently,
the charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 3(1)(r) was quashed.
118. In Budapap v. State of A.P.60, this Court at paragraph No.9 held
that mere use of abusive words referring to a person’s caste does not by itself
constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.’ To
attract the provision, there must be a clear intention to insult, intimidate, or
humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on account of
their caste and within public view. Where the alleged caste-based remarks
arise incidentally during a personal dispute or quarrel and the complaint does
not disclose any specific intention to humiliate the victim because of their
caste, the essential ingredients of the offence are not satisfied. This Court
further observed that vague and omnibus allegations against all accused,
without specifying who uttered the offending words, are insufficient to sustain
59
(2020) 18 SCC 763
60
2006 SCC OnLine AP 1449
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prosecution under Section 3(1)(x). Accordingly, finding that the dispute was
personal in nature and not motivated by caste-based humiliation, the Court
quashed the proceedings, while leaving the complainant at liberty to pursue
remedies for any other offences disclosed.
119. In Gara Yesobu v. State of A.P. 61 , the Andhra Pradesh High
Court at paragraph Nos.4 & 8 held that an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act’ can be committed only by a person who is not a
member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe against a victim belonging
to an SC/ST community; therefore, if both the accused and the victim belong
to SC/ST communities, the provision is not attracted. The Court further
emphasized that Rule 7 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995
mandates that offences under the Act must be investigated by a police officer
not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, and since the term
“shall” is mandatory, any investigation conducted by a lower-ranking officer is
vitiated. Accordingly, where the investigation was carried out by an Inspector
of Police rather than a Deputy Superintendent of Police, the charge-sheet
under Section 3(1)(x) was held invalid and was quashed.
INVESTIGATION, FRAMING OF CHARGE, AND QUASHING:
120. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the judgments of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari62, at paragraph
Nos.5 to 7 and 10 held that under the scheme of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the power of the
61
2004 SCC OnLine AP 1282
62
(1970) 1 SCC 653
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police to investigate cognizable offences is independent and uncontrolled by
the Magistrate, and the Magistrate cannot interfere with or stop such
investigation; rather, Section 159 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ confers only a limited power
on the Magistrate to ensure that the police do not abuse the proviso to Section
157(1) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by refusing to investigate, and in such cases, if he
thinks fit, the Magistrate may either direct an investigation or himself proceed
or depute a subordinate Magistrate to hold a preliminary enquiry, but this
power is strictly an alternative to the first clause and not an unqualified
authority to intervene in ongoing police investigations.
121. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala supra,
at paragraph No.6 held that the Bihar State Electricity Board could not be
treated as a licensee for the purpose of initiating prosecution under Section
42(b) of the Electricity Act, and further observed that the complaint disclosed
no specific acts of omission or commission attributable to the Board or the
accused persons, nor did it clearly establish the duty cast upon any particular
individual who allegedly failed to discharge it; the Court also noted that the
matter appeared to have suffered from a long lapse of time, with the
complainant seemingly losing interest, as evidenced by the absence of
representation on behalf of the respondent-complainant.
122. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Dharama Reddy v. Sub-
Collector Bodhan Nizamabad District 63 , at paragraph No.11 held that
63
1986 SCC OnLine AP 141
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Section 3(1) of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ not only prospectively prohibits
transfers of assigned lands after the commencement of the Act, but also
retrospectively declares that all transfers made prior to its coming into force
are null and void, non est in law, and incapable of vesting any right or title in
the transferee; while affirming this interpretation, the Court clarified that it
remains open to a Petitioner to establish, on the facts of a particular case, that
Section 3(1) does not apply or that the case falls within the exemption under
Section 3(5), and directed that the Writ Petitions be placed before a single
Judge for disposal without avoidable delay.
123. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre 64 , at paragraph No.7 held that while
considering a prayer for quashing a prosecution at the initial stage, the test to
be applied is whether the uncontroverted allegations prima facie establish the
offence, and the court must also examine any special features of the case to
determine whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to allow the
prosecution to continue. Further, recognising that the judicial process cannot
be used for oblique purposes, the Court observed that where the chances of
ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful purpose would be served by
permitting the prosecution to proceed, the court may quash the proceedings
even at a preliminary stage.
64
(1988) 1 SCC 692
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124. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v.
State of Bihar65, at paragraph No.16 held that the essential ingredients of the
offence of cheating under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and allied offences under
Sections 418 and 423 were not made out and further observed that even the
basic allegations necessary to constitute offences under Sections 469, 504
and 120-B were absent in the complaint. Noting that the allegations did not
disclose any intentional deception or dishonest intention at the inception of the
transaction, the Court concluded that the case fell within the first category of
instances laid down in Bhajan Lal supra and that continuation of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, thereby
quashing the complaint and setting aside the High Court’s refusal to do so.
125. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.K. Patel v. State of Gujarat66,
at paragraph Nos.16 & 17 held that the offences alleged squarely fell within
the ambit of “acts done under the colour or in excess of any duty or authority”
of a police officer, since the very ingredients of the offences required that they
be committed in the cloak of a public servant or at least under the colour of
office. Specifically, Section 166 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ mandates that the offender must
be a public servant disobeying a legal direction with intent to cause injury, and
similarly, the pivotal ingredient for offences under Sections 167 and 219 of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ is the public servant’s misuse of authority, while the remaining offences
alleged were ancillary and part of the same transaction, all of which could not
65
(2000) 4 SCC 168
66
(2000) 6 SCC 195
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office.
126. The Hon’ble Apex Court in R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha67, at
paragraph Nos.46 to 50 held that the offence under Section 169 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
which prohibits a public servant from unlawfully buying or bidding for property,
is incomplete unless supported by a specific statutory enactment imposing
such prohibition. Mere executive instructions or codes of conduct, such as the
Code of Conduct for Ministers issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu, do
not have statutory force and cannot be elevated to the level of law to
constitute a legal prohibition enforceable in a court of law. The Court clarified
that while such codes carry ethical and moral weight, they remain guidelines
without legal sanction, and therefore any breach thereof cannot amount to an
offence under Section 169 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ or even be treated as unlawful within
the meaning of Section 43 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ ultimately concluding that the
prosecution had failed to establish the offence alleged.
127. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State
of Uttaranchal 68, at paragraph Nos.23, 24, 27 & 46 held that the inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ are wide and exist
to secure the ends of justice, prevent abuse of the process of the court, and
give effect to orders under the Code. However, such powers must be
exercised sparingly, carefully, and with great caution, ensuring that legitimate
67
(2004) 2 SCC 9
68
(2007) 12 SCC 1
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prosecutions are not stifled prematurely, especially when facts are incomplete
or evidence is yet to be collected. The Court emphasized that criminal
prosecution should not be permitted as an instrument of harassment, private
vendetta, or ulterior motive, and while no rigid rule can be laid down, the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction must always be guided by the statutory tests
and sound judicial principles, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment.
128. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Chaudhari Ran Beer
Singh69, at paragraph Nos.10 & 13 held that in matters of policy decisions
such as the creation of a district or State, the scope of judicial interference is
extremely limited, and courts should not substitute their own judgment for that
of the executive unless infringement of fundamental rights is clearly shown.
The Court emphasized that policy decisions must be left to the Government,
which alone is competent to weigh all relevant aspects, and even if a second
view is possible, the judiciary cannot interfere merely on that ground, thereby
finding the High Court’s interference on irrelevant considerations to be
erroneous.
129. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of U.P.,70
at paragraph Nos.55 & 56 held that while the High Courts possess
unquestionable authority to grant stay of investigation or trial in deserving
cases, such extraordinary power under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be
exercised sparingly, with due caution and circumspection, only to prevent
69
(2008) 5 SCC 550
70
(2012) 2 SCC 688
90
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abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. Once exercised, the High
Court must ensure expeditious disposal of the proceedings, preferably within
six months, so that the stay does not result in undue delay or erosion of faith
in the justice delivery system. The Court further emphasized that although the
Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts, it can
issue guidelines in public interest to improve the administration of justice,
thereby underscoring that criminal prosecution should not be misused as an
instrument of harassment or vendetta.
130. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajiv Thapar supra at paragraph
Nos.28 to 30 held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ the High Court must act with caution and circumspection, as this
stage is not meant for evaluating the truthfulness of allegations or the weight
of defences raised by the accused. The Court clarified that quashing of
proceedings before trial can only be justified if the material produced by the
accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, sufficient to rule out and
displace the prosecution’s assertions, and incapable of being justifiably
refuted. It laid down a four-step test: (i) whether the defence material is sound
and indubitable, (ii) whether it rules out the factual assertions in the complaint,
(iii) whether it remains unrefuted or irrefutable, and (iv) whether continuing the
trial would amount to abuse of process and not serve the ends of justice. If all
these conditions are satisfied, the judicial conscience of the High Court should
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persuade it to quash the proceedings, thereby saving valuable court time and
preventing misuse of criminal prosecution.
131. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah v.
State of Gujarat71, at paragraph Nos.9 & 10 held that at the stage of framing
of charges, the Trial Court must apply its judicial mind to the material placed
before it and determine whether a prima facie case exists, keeping in mind
that such an order substantially affects the liberty of the accused and must not
cause irreparable harm. The Court further clarified that quashing of charges
by the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is permissible only in
exceptional circumstances, and at this preliminary stage the enquiry is
confined to a prima facie examination of the material rather than an
assessment of the quality or quantity of evidence, reiterating the principle laid
down in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh72.
LIMITS ON THE QUASHING JURISDICTION:
132. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of
T.N.,73 stressed at paragraph No.27 that while quashing of criminal complaints
must indeed be reserved for the “rarest of rare” cases, the High Court has a
duty to examine each matter in detail to prevent miscarriage of justice. The
Court criticized the High Court for failing to consider the facts and
circumstances properly, reiterating that law is a sacrosanct entity meant to
71
(2019) 9 SCC 148
72
(1977) 4 SCC 39
73
(2022) 15 SCC 164
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serve justice, and frivolous cases should not be allowed to pervert its nature.
Thus, the ruling reinforced the responsibility of Courts to ensure that baseless
prosecutions do not undermine the integrity of justice.
133. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Kaptan Singh v. State of U.P., 74
clarified at paragraph No.9.1 that the scope of the High Court’s powers under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ when quashing criminal proceedings. It held that
once investigation is complete, statements are recorded, evidence is
collected, and a charge-sheet has been filed, the matter stands on a different
footing compared to the stage of FIR. At this stage, the High Court must
consider the material collected during investigation, but it cannot act like an
investigating agency or an appellate court by appreciating evidence or
drawing inferences. The Court emphasised that the High Court’s role is limited
to examining whether the FIR and prima facie material disclose a cognizable
offence, not to adjudicate on merits. In this case, the High Court erred by
quashing proceedings without considering the evidence collected and the
charge-sheet filed, thereby exceeding its jurisdiction.
134. The Hon’ble Apex Court in P. Dharamaraj v. Shanmugam75, at
paragraph Nos.51 to 53 held that Courts must exercise great caution while
quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Article
226 of the Constitution on the basis of compromise, especially when the
offences have wider societal impact beyond the complainant and accused. In
74
(2021) 9 SCC 35
75
(2022) 15 SCC 136
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this case, corruption in securing employment in the Transport Corporation was
involved, with two categories of persons, those who paid money and got
appointments, and those who paid but failed. The Court reasoned that
allowing compromise for the second category (refund of money) would
indirectly validate the illegal appointments of the first category. It emphasized
that corruption by public servants is an offence against the State and society
at large, and cannot be treated like a private dispute capable of settlement.
Therefore, the High Court erred in quashing the criminal complaint on the
basis of compromise, as such action would undermine the fight against
corruption and abuse of official position.
135. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Somjeet Mallick v. State of
Jharkhand 76 , clarified at paragraph Nos.15, 17 to 20 that the principles
governing quashing of FIRs or criminal proceedings at the threshold. It held
that at this stage, the allegations in the FIR, complaint, or police report, along
with materials collected during investigation, must be taken at face value to
determine whether a prima facie case exists. The Court emphasised that
correctness of allegations is not to be tested at this stage, since an FIR is not
an encyclopaedia of all imputations, what matters is the gravamen of
accusations disclosing a cognizable offence. It further explained that only after
investigation, at the stage of framing charges, the Court can assess which
specific offence is made out, or discharge the accused if warranted.
76
(2024) 10 SCC 527
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Importantly, once a police report under Section 173(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ has
been submitted, the Court must apply its mind to the materials collected
before deciding on quashing. In the case at hand, allegations of dishonest
conduct in failing to pay rent for a hired truck required investigation, as they
could amount to criminal breach of trust, and hence quashing the FIR at the
threshold was unjustified.
136. A learned Single Judge of this Court in M. China Hari Babu
supra at paragraph Nos.9 & 10 it has examined the scope of investigation by
the Crime Investigation Department (CID) under Standing Order No. 866-1 of
the A.P. Police Manual. The Court noted that the CID is ordinarily tasked with
investigating serious and specialized categories of crimes such as counterfeit
currency, professional poisoning, theft of government arms, terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, organized crime, financial frauds, inter-State
conspiracies, and politically motivated offences. Importantly, the Court
emphasized that no enquiry or investigation can be taken up by the CID
without prior orders of the Additional DGP CID or the DGP. Thus, the ruling
clarified that CID’s jurisdiction is limited to specific classes of crimes and
requires proper authorization before commencing investigation, ensuring that
its specialized role is not misused or extended beyond mandate.
137. In Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja77, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court at paragraph Nos.9, 10, 13, 20 & 21 held that investigation is the
77
(2003) 6 SCC 195
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exclusive domain of the police from the lodging of the FIR until submission of
the final report under Section 173(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and Courts cannot
interfere during this stage. Further, even serious defects or irregularities in
investigation do not vitiate cognizance or trial unless they cause miscarriage
of justice, since cognizance taken on a defective police report is not a nullity
under Section 190 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ thereby affirming that errors in investigation
cannot by themselves invalidate subsequent proceedings.
138. In Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Supra the Hon’ble Supreme
Court at paragraph No.33 laid down comprehensive principles on the scope of
High Court powers under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and Article 226 in
quashing petitions, particularly regarding interim orders like “no coercive
steps” or stay of investigation. It held that police have a statutory duty to
investigate cognizable offences and Courts should not thwart investigations
except in rare cases where no offence is disclosed. Quashing must be
exercised sparingly, not routinely, and Courts cannot test the reliability of
allegations at the FIR stage. FIRs are not encyclopaedias, and investigation
must be allowed to proceed unless continuation would cause miscarriage of
justice. The Court cautioned that interim orders restraining arrest or
investigation should not be passed casually, and ordinarily the accused should
seek anticipatory bail under Section 438 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ Even in exceptional
cases, reasons must be recorded to justify such interim relief, ensuring judicial
restraint and respect for the distinct spheres of police and judiciary.
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139. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd.,
supra at paragraph Nos.13 to 15 authoritatively held that the power of
investigation into cognizable offences is a statutory prerogative and obligation
vested in the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and ordinarily the
Courts ought not to impede, obstruct, or stifle such investigation at its
inception. The Court observed that the extraordinary and inherent jurisdiction
under Section 482 of ‘the CrPC.,’ is to be exercised with utmost
circumspection and judicial restraint, and only in exceptional cases where the
allegations contained in the FIR, even if taken at face value and accepted in
their entirety, fail to disclose the commission of any cognizable offence or
clearly demonstrate an abuse of the process of law. The Hon’ble Court
emphasized that while considering a prayer for quashing, the judicial inquiry is
confined to examining whether the FIR prima facie discloses the ingredients of
a cognizable offence, and the Court is not permitted to undertake an
assessment of the reliability, genuineness, truthfulness, or evidentiary worth of
the allegations, as such matters fall exclusively within the province of
investigation and trial. It was further held that criminal proceedings should not
ordinarily be scuttled at the threshold, quashing being an exception rather
than the rule, since the functions of the judiciary and the investigating agency
are complementary but distinct, each operating within its own constitutionally
and statutorily demarcated sphere. The Hon’ble Court reiterated that the
inherent powers of the High Court, though wide in amplitude, do not confer an
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unfettered or arbitrary jurisdiction and must be exercised only to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent manifest abuse of process in accordance with the
parameters laid down in R.P. Kapur supra and Bhajan Lal supra. The Court
further held that during the pendency of proceedings seeking quashing of an
FIR, interim orders staying investigation ought not to be granted routinely, and
before passing any such order, the High Court must apply the very same
stringent principles that govern the exercise of its jurisdiction to quash criminal
proceedings. Thus, the Hon’ble Court underscored that save in exceptional
situations where non-interference would occasion a manifest miscarriage of
justice, the investigating agency must be permitted to complete the
investigation unhindered, and the Courts must refrain from prematurely
pronouncing upon the merits of the allegations on the basis of incomplete or
undeveloped facts.
140. In R.P. Kapur supra the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph
No.6 identified three illustrative categories where the inherent powers under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ can and should be exercised to quash
proceedings: (i) where there is a clear legal bar against institution or
continuance of proceedings, such as absence of sanction, (ii) where the
allegations in the FIR or complaint, even if taken at face value, do not
constitute the alleged offence, and (iii) where the allegations may constitute an
offence but there is no legal evidence, or the evidence adduced manifestly
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fails to prove the charge, thus laying the foundation for later jurisprudence on
quashing criminal proceedings.
141. In Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan supra the Hon’ble Apex Court at
paragraph Nos.17 to 20 held that Courts must be slow to quash complaints at
the pre-trial stage, especially when factual controversies remain possible and
legal presumptions operate, as in cheque dishonour cases. It emphasised that
quashing proceedings prematurely could cause grave and irreparable
consequences by ousting the Trial Court’s role in weighing evidence, thereby
giving the accused an unmerited advantage. The Court clarified that factual
defences must be of unimpeachable quality to disprove allegations outright,
and since the cheque and signature were not disputed, the presumption
favoured the complainant. Thus, the High Court rightly refused to quash the
complaint, ensuring the accused would still have the opportunity to rebut the
presumption during trial before an impartial judge.
142. In Aryan Singh supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph
Nos.6 to 8 held that at the stage of discharge or quashing under Section 482
of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the High Court has very limited jurisdiction and must not
conduct a “mini trial” by evaluating whether charges are proved, since proof of
charges is a matter for trial based on evidence led by the prosecution. The
Court clarified that at this stage, the only question is whether sufficient
material exists to proceed against the accused, not whether the allegations
are ultimately true or malicious. It further observed that the High Court erred in
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declaring the proceedings malicious, as such issues can only be determined
after trial, and reiterated that the proper test is whether a prima facie case is
disclosed by the material collected during investigation.
143. In K.M.Sharan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph
Nos.30 to 32 & 37 held that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR and
charge-sheet under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by going beyond its limited
jurisdiction at the pre-trial stage. The Court reiterated that, following the
principles in Bhajan Lal supra, the High Court must only examine whether the
allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet, taken at face value, prima facie
constitute an offence, and not embark upon an inquiry into the truthfulness or
reliability of those allegations. It emphasised that questions of veracity and
malicious intent are matters for trial, and quashing at the threshold to stifle a
legitimate prosecution is impermissible.
144. In Aman Kumar Singh supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court at
paragraph Nos.62, 63, 65, 80 & 81 reiterated the caution from Bhajan Lal
supra that quashing of criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, in
the rarest of rare cases, and courts should not examine the reliability or
genuineness of allegations at the FIR stage. It held that since an FIR can be
registered even on suspicion, the High Court erred in quashing one based on
“probabilities” of crime, particularly in corruption cases under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, where a hands-off approach is desirable to maintain probity in
governance. The Court emphasised that corruption cases should ordinarily be
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allowed to proceed to investigation and trial, and interference is justified only
in exceptional circumstances where records reveal absolutely no material to
support even a reasonable suspicion of illicit enrichment, and mala fides alone
drive the prosecution.
145. In O.C. Kuttan supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph
No.6 reaffirmed that while the High Court may quash an FIR if it does not
disclose a cognizable offence, such power under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
or Article 226 must be exercised sparingly, with great caution, and only in the
rarest of rare cases. The Court criticised the High Court for exceeding its
jurisdiction by sifting evidence, commenting on the victim’s character, and
concluding that no offence of rape was made out, even though the FIR alleged
serious offences under ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Immoral Traffic Act. It reiterated that an
FIR is merely the initiation of the investigative process, and Courts at the
threshold cannot weigh or test the reliability of allegations. Accordingly, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and directed the
investigating agency to proceed with the investigation, underscoring that
premature quashing undermines justice and social order.
146. In Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel supra the Hon’ble Apex Court
at paragraph Nos.29 to 33 held that while examining the legality of an FIR, the
High Court cannot act like an investigating agency or exercise appellate
powers. Its role is limited to determining whether the FIR discloses prima facie
commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, the Court cannot
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appreciate evidence or draw inferences, especially when the material is
disputed, as that is the domain of the investigating authority and later the Trial
Court. Once the FIR discloses a cognizable offence, the High Court must
allow investigation to proceed, and any deeper scrutiny amounts to
jurisdictional error.
147. In Narinderjit Singh Sahni supra the Hon’ble Supreme Court at
paragraph No.60 rejected the argument that multiple deposit agreements with
financial companies should be treated as a single offence, holding instead that
each deposit constituted a separate and independent transaction since the
parties, amounts, and periods of deposit were all different. The Court
emphasised that these agreements bore all the characteristics of distinct
transactions brought about by the companies’ allurements, and therefore there
was no compelling reason to merge them into one offence.
SCOPE OF INQUIRY – CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY:
148. The Hon’ble Apex Court in CBI v. K. Narayana Rao 78 , at
paragraph Nos.15 & 24 held that at the stage of consideration of charge or
commitment, the Court is not expected to conduct a meticulous evaluation of
the evidentiary material as though adjudicating upon guilt after a full-fledged
trial. The jurisdiction exercised at such preliminary stage is confined to
ascertaining whether the material placed on record discloses a strong and
grave suspicion giving rise to a presumptive inference of the accused’s
78
(2012) 9 SCC 512
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involvement in the alleged offence, thereby warranting further prosecution.
While the Court is vested with the authority to sift and scrutinize the material
for the limited purpose of determining the existence of a prima facie case, it
must refrain from embarking upon a roving, speculative, or exhaustive inquiry
into the merits of the prosecution case. Conversely, where the material is
wholly lacking in probative value or is manifestly incapable of establishing
even a prima facie nexus between the accused and the offence alleged, the
Court is duty-bound to discharge the accused and prevent unwarranted
prosecution. The Hon’ble Court further expounded that the gravamen of the
offence of criminal conspiracy lies in the existence of a consensual agreement
between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or to achieve a lawful
object through unlawful means. Such agreement may be established by direct
or circumstantial evidence; however, the prosecution must demonstrate a
clear and unambiguous meeting of minds, and the acts relied upon must be
shown to have been performed in furtherance of the common design. Mere
suspicion, conjecture, surmise, or tenuous inference, howsoever strong,
cannot substitute for cogent, credible, and legally admissible evidence. An
inference of conspiracy can be legitimately drawn only when the proved
circumstances form an unbroken chain leading irresistibly to the conclusion of
guilt and are incompatible with any other reasonable hypothesis consistent
with innocence.
QUASHING WHERE ALLEGATIONS DO NOT DISCLOSE THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF AN OFFENCE:
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149. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana79,
at paragraph No.17 held that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash criminal proceedings may be legitimately invoked where the allegations
contained in the First Information Report or complaint, even if accepted in their
entirety and taken at face value, fail to disclose the essential ingredients of
any cognizable offence or do not prima facie establish the involvement of the
accused. The Court observed that the continuance of criminal prosecution in
the absence of foundational facts constituting an offence would amount to an
abuse of the process of law and result in unwarranted harassment of the
accused. It was further held that where the uncontroverted allegations forming
part of the prosecution case, together with the material and evidence collected
during investigation, do not disclose the commission of any offence or make
out a legally sustainable case against the accused, the High Court would be
fully justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to interdict such proceedings
at the threshold. The Hon’ble Court thus underscored that criminal law cannot
be permitted to be set in motion on the basis of allegations which, even if left
unrebutted, do not satisfy the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence, and
that judicial intervention is warranted to prevent misuse of the criminal process
and to secure the ends of justice.
SCs/STs (POA) ACT – REQUIREMENT OF CASTE-BASED MOTIVATION:
79
(2019) 10 SCC 373
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150. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khuman Singh supra at
paragraph No.14 held that for attracting the penal consequences
contemplated under Section 3(2)(v) of ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ the
prosecution is required to establish not merely that the victim belonged to a
Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, but also that the offence was
perpetrated on account of and because of such caste or tribal identity. The
Court elucidated that the victim’s membership of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe, by itself, is insufficient to sustain a conviction under the
aforesaid provision unless there exists cogent and credible evidence
demonstrating that the caste status of the victim constituted the motivating
factor or foundational cause for the commission of the offence. In the absence
of material establishing a direct nexus between the criminal act and the
victim’s caste identity, the essential ingredients of the statutory offence remain
unfulfilled. The Hon’ble Court, therefore, emphasized that a conviction under
Section 3(2)(v) cannot rest upon mere proof of the victim’s caste status, but
must be founded upon clear evidence showing that the offence was
committed solely on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe; failing which, such conviction would be legally
unsustainable.
151. In Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat80, at paragraph
Nos.23 & 24, the Gujarat High Court held that an offence under Section
80
2016 SCC OnLine Guj 2076
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Dr.YLR,J3(1)(x) of ‘the SCs & STs Act’ is made out when a non-SC/ST person
intentionally insults or intimidates a member of a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe with the intention of humiliating them, and the accused knows
or is aware of the victim’s caste status. The Court further clarified that the
incident must occur in a place “within public view,” which can include a private
place if members of the public are present and able to see or hear the
incident. The expression “public view” is to be understood in contrast to
“private view,” referring to situations where the act is visible or audible to the
public.
CHEATING AND CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY – REQUIREMENT OF
FRADULUENT INTENT AT INCEPTION:
152. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sushil Sethi v. State of
Arunachal Pradesh81, while reiterating the principles enunciated in Hira Lal
Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI82, at paragraph No.7.3 held that the sine qua non
for constituting an offence of cheating under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is the
existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention on the part of the accused at
the very inception of the transaction, namely, at the time when the promise,
representation, or inducement was made. The Court emphatically observed
that the mere subsequent failure to fulfil a promise or perform a contractual
obligation does not, by itself, give rise to an inference of dishonest intention
existing from the outset. In the absence of specific allegations or material
81
(2020) 3 SCC 240
82
(2003) 5 SCC 257
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Dr.YLR,Jdemonstrating intentional deception, fraudulent inducement, or mens rea at
the inception of the transaction, the essential ingredients of the offence of
cheating remain conspicuously absent and criminal liability cannot be fastened
upon the accused. The Hon’ble Court further held that criminal proceedings
founded upon purely civil disputes, bereft of the requisite criminal intent,
amount to a misuse of the criminal justice process and their continuance
would constitute an abuse of the process of law. The Court also reiterated that
to bring home a charge of criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ the prosecution must establish the existence of a prior agreement or
meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators for the commission of an
unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. While such agreement may be
proved through direct or circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must
nevertheless adduce cogent material demonstrating the existence of the
conspiratorial arrangement; mere suspicion, conjecture, or association
between parties cannot substitute proof of the foundational agreement
necessary to sustain a charge of conspiracy.
INHERENT JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 — NON-OUSTER BY
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT:
153. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing of Road
Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI 83 , at paragraph No.54 held that the inherent
jurisdiction of the High Courts is a constitutional power inhering in them by
83
(2018) 16 SCC 299
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Dr.YLR,Jvirtue of their status as superior courts of record under Article 215 of the
Constitution of India and is not a power merely conferred or circumscribed by
the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court observed that,
apart from their constitutional obligation to safeguard fundamental rights under
Article 226, the High Courts are duty-bound to protect the liberty of citizens, a
mandate which finds resonance in Article 21 of the Constitution. In view of this
constitutional scheme, the Hon’ble Court held that the bar contained in
Section 19(3)(c) of ‘the P.C.Act.,’ cannot be construed as ousting or prohibiting
the maintainability of a petition under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ before the
High Court, since the non obstante clause contained therein operates only in
relation to the provisions of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and not against the constitutional
powers vested in the High Courts. The Court further clarified that while the
power to interfere with criminal proceedings, including the grant of stay in
exceptional cases, must be exercised with circumspection and judicial
restraint, it nevertheless remains available where the ends of justice so
require. Consequently, the Hon’ble Court authoritatively declared that any
interpretation suggesting a blanket prohibition on the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction by the High Courts, or an absolute embargo on the grant of stay of
criminal trials, is contrary to the constitutional framework and settled principles
of law, and to that extent the contrary view expressed in Satya Narayan
Sharma v. State of Rajasthan84, stood expressly overruled.
84
(2001) 8 SCC 607
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SECTION 17-A OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT —
MANDATORY PRIOR APPROVAL:
154. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Yashwant Sinha v. CBI 85 , at
paragraph No.117 held that Section 17-A of ‘the P.C.Act.,’ engrafts a
mandatory statutory safeguard in favour of public servants by prohibiting the
conduct of any enquiry, inquiry, or investigation into offences alleged to have
been committed by a public servant in respect of any recommendation made
or decision taken by him in the discharge of his official functions, unless prior
approval is obtained from the competent authority empowered to remove such
public servant from office. The Court categorically observed that the legislative
mandate embodied in Section 17-A creates a jurisdictional precondition, and
in the absence of such previous approval, neither an inquiry nor an
investigation can lawfully be initiated. Emphasizing the mandatory nature of
the provision, the Hon’ble Court noted that where allegations pertain to official
decisions or recommendations rendered in the course of public duties, the
investigating agency is statutorily restrained from proceeding further without
first securing the requisite sanction from the competent authority. The Court
thus underscored that Section 17-A is intended to afford protection against
unwarranted or vexatious investigations arising out of bona fide official acts
and that compliance with the requirement of prior approval constitutes an
indispensable prerequisite for the valid commencement of investigative
proceedings in such cases.
85
(2020) 2 SCC 338
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LIMITED SCOPE OF SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C – NO MINI-TRIAL OR
APPRECIATION OF EVIDENCE:
155. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State v. M. Maridoss86, at paragraph
Nos.8 & 11 held that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the High Court is not expected to undertake a meticulous
examination of disputed facts or embark upon a mini trial to assess the
veracity, sufficiency, or probative value of the evidence. The Court observed
that, at the threshold stage, the judicial inquiry is confined to examining the
nature of the allegations contained in the First Information Report and
determining whether, on a plain and meaningful reading thereof, the
averments prima facie disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence. The
Hon’ble Court further emphasized that investigation into alleged criminal
offences falls within the exclusive domain of the investigating agency, and
such agency must ordinarily be afforded a reasonable and unhindered
opportunity to carry out its statutory functions in accordance with law.
Interference by the High Court at the nascent stage of investigation is
warranted only in exceptional circumstances, such as where the allegations,
even if accepted in their entirety, fail to disclose the commission of any
cognizable offence or where the prosecution is clearly barred by law. The
Court thus reaffirmed that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of
cases, so as to prevent abuse of the process of law while simultaneously
86
(2023) 4 SCC 338
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ensuring that legitimate investigations are not prematurely thwarted by judicial
intervention.
156. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaptan Singh supra, at
paragraph Nos.9.1 & 9.2 held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is to be exercised with great caution,
restraint, and only in exceptional circumstances, as quashing of criminal
proceedings is an exception and not the rule. The Court observed that once
investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge-sheet and cognizance
has been taken by the competent court, the matter stands on a different
footing from a case where the challenge is directed merely against the
registration of an FIR. In such circumstances, the High Court is obliged to
consider the material collected during investigation, including witness
statements and other evidence gathered by the investigating agency, while
examining whether the continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse
of the process of law. However, the Hon’ble Court emphatically reiterated that
even at this stage the High Court cannot assume the role of either the
investigating agency or a trial court by undertaking an appreciation of
evidence, assessing its probative value, adjudicating upon disputed questions
of fact, or drawing its own conclusions regarding the truthfulness of the
allegations. The Court underscored that the assessment of evidentiary worth
and determination of guilt or innocence falls exclusively within the domain of
trial. It was further held that the expansive power under Section 482 of ‘the
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Cr.P.C.,’ though wide in amplitude, must be exercised sparingly and only in
furtherance of the statutory objectives of securing the ends of justice and
preventing abuse of the process of court. Reaffirming the principles laid down
in Bhajan Lal supra, Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel supra and other
precedents, the Hon’ble Court held that appreciation of evidence is wholly
impermissible at the stage of quashing and that where the material collected
during investigation prima facie discloses the commission of offences, the
criminal proceedings ought to be permitted to continue in accordance with law.
Consequently, the Court held that interference by the High Court in such
circumstances amounts to an impermissible transgression of jurisdiction and
an unwarranted intrusion into matters falling within the province of
investigation and trial.
157. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka87, at paragraph Nos.27 & 28 held that while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the High Court is required to
confine its scrutiny to the limited question as to whether the allegations
contained in the First Information Report or complaint, if taken at their face
value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of an
offence and make out a case for proceeding against the accused. The Court
observed that the jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ does not
permit a detailed examination of the truthfulness, reliability, or evidentiary
87
(2022) 2 SCC 129
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worth of the allegations, nor does it authorize the Court to substitute its own
assessment of the facts in place of a lawful investigation or trial. The Hon’ble
Court emphasized that unless the allegations are so inherently absurd,
patently improbable, or manifestly mala fide that no prudent person could
reasonably conclude that an offence has been disclosed, criminal proceedings
ought not to be interdicted at the threshold. It was further held that the High
Court exceeds the bounds of its jurisdiction when it embarks upon an
appreciation of evidence, indulges in conjectures and surmises, or evaluates
disputed factual issues as though exercising appellate or trial jurisdiction.
Reaffirming the settled parameters governing the exercise of inherent powers,
the Hon’ble Court underscored that where the allegations in the FIR,
complaint, and accompanying material disclose a prima facie case, the
criminal process must be allowed to proceed in accordance with law, and
premature judicial interference founded upon speculative reasoning or an
assessment of merits is wholly impermissible. Consequently, the Court held
that an inquiry into the veracity of allegations and the sufficiency of evidence
lies beyond the permissible ambit of proceedings under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ and falls within the exclusive domain of investigation and trial.
POLITICAL MOTIVATION NOT A GROUND FOR QUASHING:
158. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of
Uttar Pradesh88, at paragraph No.39 held that criminal proceedings cannot be
88
2022 SCC OnLine SC 484
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Dr.YLR,Jinterdicted at their very inception in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ merely on the premise that the complaint has
been instituted by a political adversary or is alleged to be politically motivated.
The Court observed that although the possibility of a complaint being actuated
by political rivalry or personal animosity cannot be entirely ruled out, such
circumstance by itself does not furnish a valid ground for quashing criminal
proceedings where the allegations, on their face, disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence. The Hon’ble Court emphasized that the truthfulness,
reliability, or otherwise of the allegations falls within the province of
investigation and trial and cannot ordinarily be adjudicated in proceedings
under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ It was further held that while exercising its
inherent powers, the Court is not concerned with evaluating the correctness or
evidentiary worth of the allegations except in the rarest of rare cases where
the complaint is manifestly frivolous, inherently absurd, mala fide on its face,
or fails to disclose the essential ingredients of any offence known to law.
Reaffirming the settled principles governing the exercise of quashing
jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Court underscored that where the allegations prima
facie constitute an offence, the criminal process must be permitted to run its
course and judicial interference at the threshold would be wholly unwarranted.
Consequently, the Court held that disputed questions relating to motive, falsity,
or political vendetta are matters to be tested upon evidence during trial and
not grounds for prematurely stifling a legitimate prosecution.
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MALA FIDE EXERCISE OF STATUTORY POWER – JUDICIAL REVIEW:
159. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh89,
at paragraph No.11 held that findings on questions of fact arrived at by the
High Court are ordinarily entitled to great judicial deference and are not liable
to be disturbed by the appellate court unless such findings suffer from
perversity, are based on no evidence, or are otherwise vitiated by a manifest
error of appreciation. The Court observed that where the exercise of statutory
power is challenged on the ground of mala fides and the factual
circumstances unmistakably reveal a colourable or improper exercise of
authority, the Court is empowered to pierce the veil of ostensible legality and
examine the real purpose underlying the impugned action. The Hon’ble Court
emphasized that the mere existence of statutory authority does not legitimize
the arbitrary, collateral, or mala fide exercise of power, for every public power
is coupled with a duty to act bona fide, fairly, and for the purpose for which
such power has been conferred. It was further underscored that when
statutory power is employed as a cloak to achieve extraneous objectives or is
exercised for oblique, political, or collateral considerations, such action
constitutes fraud on power and is liable to be invalidated by judicial review.
The Court thus reiterated that the rule of law demands not merely the
existence of legal authority but also its faithful and bona fide exercise, and
where power is shown to have “run haywire under statutory cover”, the Courts
89
(1980) 2 SCC 471
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are duty-bound to scrutinize the surrounding circumstances to ascertain
whether the action is genuinely referable to the statutory purpose or is vitiated
by mala fides and colourable exercise of power.
LIMITATION/SANCTION PROTECTION – AVAILABLE ONLY FOR BONA
FIDE OFFICIAL ACTS:
160. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of
Maharashtra90, at paragraph No.12 held that statutory protection provisions
prescribing limitation for institution of prosecutions against public servants are
available only in respect of acts performed bona fide and in the purported
discharge of duties under the relevant enactment. The Court observed that
where a public servant acts dishonestly, prepares false records,
misappropriates public funds, commits criminal breach of trust, or otherwise
engages in criminal misconduct, such acts cannot be regarded as acts done
“under the Act” so as to attract the protective umbrella of limitation or immunity
provisions. The Hon’ble Court emphasized that the decisive test is not the
official status of the accused but the nature and character of the impugned
act. If the act complained of constitutes a flagrant violation of official duties
rather than their execution, the statutory protection ceases to operate. It was
therefore held that acts involving fabrication of documents, misappropriation of
entrusted funds, and abuse of official position are not acts performed in
pursuance of statutory functions but are acts committed in clear derogation of
and contrary to those functions. Consequently, limitation provisions governing
90
(1972) 3 SCC 786
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Dr.YLR,Jprosecutions for acts done under the statute have no application to such
criminal conduct, and a prosecution in respect thereof cannot be defeated on
the ground that it was instituted beyond the period prescribed for bona fide
official acts performed under the authority of the statute.
DELAY AND SANCTION – MATTERS FOR TRIAL, NOT THRESHOLD
QUASHING:
161. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shantaben Bhurabhai Bhuriya
v. Anand Athabhai Chaudhari91, at paragraph Nos.34 & 35 held that mere
delay in the lodging of an FIR or complaint cannot, by itself, constitute a valid
ground for quashing criminal proceedings in exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’. The Court observed that the
issue of delay is essentially a matter of evidence and appreciation of facts,
which must be examined during trial after affording the complainant an
opportunity to explain the circumstances leading to such delay. The Hon’ble
Court further held that the plea regarding absence of sanction under Section
197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ also does not, in every case, justify the quashing of
proceedings at the threshold, particularly where serious allegations disclose
misuse or abuse of official power. It was emphasized that the applicability of
Section 197 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ depends upon whether the acts complained of
were reasonably connected with the discharge of official duties, a question
which is often debatable and requires a proper factual foundation.
Consequently, where the allegations prima facie suggests acts that may fall
91
(2022) 15 SCC 228
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outside the ambit of lawful official functions, the criminal proceedings ought
not to be stifled prematurely by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court. The Hon’ble Court underscored that even assuming sanctions be
necessary, the appropriate course would ordinarily be to leave the issue open
for determination at the appropriate stage or direct the competent authority to
consider the question of sanction, rather than altogether terminating the
prosecution. Thus, the Court reaffirmed that disputed issues relating to delay
or sanction are generally matters for adjudication on evidence and cannot
ordinarily furnish a foundation for quashing criminal proceedings at their
inception.
162. This Court in State of A.P. v. Estate Abolition Tribunal 92 , at
paragraph Nos.20 & 25 held that while the law of limitation and the principles
governing delay and laches apply equally to the Government and private
litigants, a distinct and weighty consideration arises where public interest
stands compromised on account of fraud, bad faith, negligence, or deliberate
inaction on the part of Government officials. This Court observed that
governmental decisions are institutional and collective in character and, unlike
disputes between private individuals, the consequences of dismissing
proceedings instituted by the State on technical grounds of delay may
ultimately prejudice the larger public interest rather than any individual
functionary. Relying upon the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme
92
2018 SCC OnLine Hyd 474
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Court in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer 93 , the Court
emphasized that where public interest has suffered owing to acts of mala
fides, collusion, fraud, or conduct of government officers acting at cross-
purposes with the State, the issue of delay must be viewed in a broader and
more pragmatic perspective. The Court further underscored that there exists a
vital distinction between the Government as a legal entity and the individual
officials entrusted with its administration. Where governmental rights are
jeopardized not because the State consciously abandoned its claim but
because its officers either negligently slept over their duties or deliberately
failed to act, refusal to entertain the matter on the ground of delay would
effectively punish the public exchequer and public interest rather than the
defaulting officials. The Court therefore held that in cases involving substantial
public interest, fraud, or dereliction of duty by public servants, the doctrine of
delay and laches cannot be applied in a rigid or mechanical manner, and
courts must adopt an approach that prevents public interest from being
sacrificed at the altar of technicalities, particularly where such sacrifice would
indirectly reward unlawful conduct and confer undue advantage upon private
parties.
INVESTIGATION IS THE EXCLUSIVE DOMAIN OF THE POLICE –
RESTRAINT ON JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE:
93
(1988) 2 SCC 142
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163. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India)
(P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh94, at paragraph No.40 to 42 reiterated the
settled principle that the power of investigation into cognizable offences lies
primarily within the exclusive domain of the investigating agency, and Courts
should be slow to interfere with or obstruct the investigatory process at its
nascent stage. The Court observed that judicial intervention to quash criminal
proceedings or arrest an investigation is warranted only in exceptional cases
where, upon a plain reading of the First Information Report or complaint, no
cognizable offence or offence of any nature is disclosed. Emphasizing the
limitations on the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Court held that
the power of quashing under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ must be exercised
sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases to
prevent manifest abuse of the process of law. It was further underscored that,
while examining a prayer for quashing, the Court is not entitled to embark
upon an inquiry into the truthfulness, reliability, genuineness, or evidentiary
value of the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint, as such matters fall
within the province of investigation and trial. The Hon’ble Court also reaffirmed
that criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold and that
quashing should remain an exception rather than the rule. Where the
allegations, even broadly construed, disclose the commission of an offence,
the Courts must refrain from usurping the statutory functions of the
94
(2021) 5 SCC 795
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Dr.YLR,Jinvestigating agency, since investigation and adjudication occupy distinct and
separate spheres within the criminal justice system. The Court thus held that
so long as the allegations prima facie disclose the ingredients of an offence,
the investigative machinery must be permitted to function unhindered and
judicial interference at inception would be wholly unwarranted.
164. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Saranya v. Bharathi 95 , at
paragraph No.13 held that where the investigation has yielded substantial
material prima facie indicating the involvement of the accused in the
commission of the alleged offences, the High Court would transgress the
settled limitations of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ by
quashing the charge-sheet or criminal proceedings at the threshold. The Court
observed that material collected during investigation, including circumstantial
evidence such as call detail records and other incriminating circumstances
having a proximate nexus with the occurrence, constitutes relevant
consideration for determining whether a prima facie case is made out against
the accused. The Hon’ble Court emphasised that while exercising inherent
jurisdiction, the High Court is not expected to undertake an appreciation of
evidence, evaluate its probative worth, or speculate upon the likelihood of
conviction or acquittal, as such an exercise falls squarely within the domain of
the trial court. It was further held that the High Court does not function as a
court of appeal while considering a petition under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’
95
(2021) 8 SCC 583
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and, therefore, cannot adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact or assess
the sufficiency of evidence as if conducting a trial. Reaffirming the well-settled
principles governing the exercise of quashing jurisdiction, the Hon’ble Court
held that where the material collected during investigation discloses a prima
facie case against the accused, criminal proceedings ought to be permitted to
proceed in accordance with law, and any interference based upon a
premature evaluation of evidence would amount to a serious jurisdictional
error and an unwarranted encroachment upon the functions of the trial court.
RESTRAINT IN EXERCISE OF QUASHING JURISDICTION – RAREST OF
RARE CASES:
165. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shafiya Khan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 96 , at paragraph No.16 held that the extraordinary and inherent
jurisdiction vested in the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings is
required to be exercised with utmost restraint, circumspection, and only in the
rarest of rare cases where the continuance of the proceedings would amount
to a manifest abuse of the process of law. The Court observed that, while
considering a petition for quashing, the High Court is not expected to
undertake an inquiry into the truthfulness, reliability, genuineness, or probative
value of the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint, as such an exercise
falls squarely within the domain of investigation and trial. The Hon’ble Court
further emphasized that the inherent powers of the High Court, though wide in
amplitude, do not confer an unfettered or arbitrary jurisdiction to act according
96
(2022) 4 SCC 549
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Dr.YLR,Jto subjective notions, whims, or predilections. The exercise of such power
must remain firmly guided by settled legal principles and judicially recognized
parameters. Consequently, where the allegations prima facie disclose the
commission of an offence, the criminal process ought not to be interdicted at
the threshold merely on the basis of disputed factual contentions, and the
Court must refrain from substituting its own assessment of the merits for that
of the competent investigating or adjudicatory forum.
DOCTRINE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY:
166. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Odisha v. Pratima
Mohanty97, at paragraph Nos.8.2, 10.1 & 11 held that the jurisdiction to quash
criminal proceedings under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is required to be
exercised sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in exceptional cases
where the continuation of the prosecution would amount to a manifest abuse
of the process of law. The Court reiterated that while considering a challenge
to an FIR, complaint, or charge-sheet, the High Court cannot embark upon an
inquiry into the reliability, genuineness, or evidentiary worth of the allegations,
nor can it undertake a meticulous examination of the material on record as if
conducting a mini-trial. It was emphasized that once a thorough investigation
has culminated in the filing of a charge-sheet, the criminal proceedings ought
not to be quashed except in rare and compelling circumstances. The Hon’ble
Court further underscored the doctrine of public accountability, observing that
97
(2022) 16 SCC 703
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Dr.YLR,Jevery holder of a public office occupies a position of trust and is duty-bound to
exercise statutory powers with transparency, fairness, rectitude, and in
furtherance of public interest. Public servants who abuse their office, whether
by acts of commission or omission, resulting in loss to the public exchequer or
injury to the public interest, are amenable to criminal action and cannot claim
immunity from legal scrutiny. The Court stressed that the higher the office
held, the greater the obligation of probity, accountability, and fidelity to public
duty. It was further held that where allegations disclose prima facie misuse of
official position causing wrongful gain to private individuals and corresponding
loss to public resources, a full-fledged investigation and trial are warranted.
The Hon’ble Court therefore deprecated the approach of the High Court in
evaluating the sufficiency and credibility of the evidence collected during
investigation and held that such an exercise amounts to an impermissible
usurpation of the functions of the trial court. Reaffirming the settled limits of
the quashing jurisdiction, the Court concluded that disputed factual issues and
matters relating to appreciation of evidence must be left for adjudication during
trial and cannot form the basis for premature termination of criminal
proceedings.
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ARTICLE 226 WRIT JURISDICTION – PRINCIPLES UNDER SECTION 482
CR.P.C:
167. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi98, at paragraph No.56 held that the principles governing the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
equally apply to the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution when a prayer is made for quashing an FIR. The Court
emphatically observed that at the stage of considering the validity of an FIR or
criminal proceedings, the High Court is not permitted to embark upon a
detailed examination of disputed facts, appreciate evidence, assess the
sufficiency of the material collected, or adjudicate upon the probable defence
of the accused, as such an exercise would amount to conducting an
impermissible mini-trial. Reiterating the settled position of law, the Hon’ble
Court held that even at the stage of framing of charges, courts are restrained
from undertaking a meticulous evaluation of the evidentiary record, and
therefore a fortiori such an exercise is wholly impermissible while considering
a petition seeking quashing of an FIR under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or
Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court underscored that the scope of
judicial scrutiny at the threshold stage is limited to ascertaining whether the
allegations, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence warranting investigation. Where the
allegations prima facie constitutes an offence, the investigating agency must
98
(2021) 18 SCC 135
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Dr.YLR,Jbe permitted to perform its statutory functions unhindered, and the criminal
process should not be prematurely interdicted through judicial intervention.
The Hon’ble Court therefore reaffirmed that the quashing jurisdiction cannot
be employed as a substitute for trial and that any assessment requiring
appreciation of evidence or determination of disputed factual issues falls
exclusively within the domain of investigation and trial.
ANALYSIS:
168. The FIR in Crime No.05 of 2021 was registered by the CID Police
Station, Amaravathi, Guntur District, on 12.03.2021. It was based on a
complaint submitted by Sri Alla Rama Krishna Reddy, the then MLA of
Mangalagiri Constituency. The complaint alleged irregularities in the Land
Pooling Scheme (LPS) of the Capital Region Development Authority (CRDA)
during the formation of Amaravathi capital city.
169. The complaint stated that villagers from Nowluru and other areas
approached the MLA, expressing grievances that influential persons from the
then Government had cheated them. Farmers belonging largely to SC, ST,
and weaker sections were allegedly misled into believing that their assigned
lands would be taken away without compensation. Middlemen, acting as part
of a conspiracy, exploited this fear, lured the farmers with small payments, and
obtained agreements or sale deeds, often unregistered, thereby depriving
them of lawful benefits under the Land Pooling Scheme. The complaint
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Dr.YLR,Jemphasized that this was done through deception and manipulation of
government orders.
170. The FIR specifically named Sri Nara Chandrababu Naidu,
(former) present Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh, and Sri Ponguru
Narayana, (former) present Minister for Municipal Administration and Urban
Development, along with other officials, as accused. It alleged that they
manipulated capital city limits, alignment of the Inner Ring Road, and the land
pooling modalities to benefit themselves and their associates. The complaint
pointed to G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 as a key instrument used to
extend undue benefits to certain individuals by introducing the concept of
“Sivaijamadars” and by legitimizing encroachers of government lands. This,
according to the complainant, was contrary to ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ and
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Act,
2013 (for brevity ‘the RFCTLARR Act.,’).
171. The FIR records that a preliminary enquiry was conducted by
S.Surya Bhaskar Rao, DSP, CID, Vijayawada, who submitted a report on
12.03.2021 confirming that cognizable offences were made out. Based on
this, the Additional DGP, CID, ordered registration of the case. The FIR was
then forwarded to the learned VI Additional Junior Civil Judge Court, Guntur,
and investigation was entrusted to A.Lakshmi Narayana, DSP, Cyber Crime,
CID, Mangalagiri.
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172. The complaint alleges on the modus operandi adopted by the
accused. It alleged misuse of confidential information about the capital city
location to acquire assigned and government lands from gullible peasants. It
contends how panic was created among SC/ST and weaker sections, followed
by coercion and deception to obtain sale deeds. It pointed to the issuance of
G.O.Ms.No.41 to legitimize such transactions, despite the absence of legal
definitions for “Sivaijamadars.” It further alleged fabrication of records,
including fictitious meetings with village committees, to justify amendments to
the Land Pooling Scheme. It also highlighted irregularities in Nowluru
Revenue Village, where excess assigned land beyond what was recorded in
revenue documents was illegally accepted for land pooling, thereby enriching
certain individuals. In conclusion, the complainant alleges that the then
Government leadership and officials orchestrated a deliberate scheme to
manipulate land pooling policies, exploit vulnerable farmers, and unlawfully
benefit themselves and their associates. These acts, according to the
complaint, amounted to criminal conspiracy, cheating, and corruption, causing
irreparable loss to marginalized communities and wrongful gain to the
accused.
173. It is axiomatic that pursuant to ‘the Re‑organisation Act.,’ which
came into effect on 01.03.2014, the Central Government, in exercise of its
statutory mandate under Section 6 of ‘the Re-organisation Act.,’ constituted on
28.03.2014 an Expert Committee under the Chairmanship of Sri
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Dr.YLR,JSivaramakrishnan. The Committee thereafter undertook an elaborate exercise
by visiting various regions of the State, holding extensive consultations with
stakeholders, and inviting suggestions and feedback from the public regarding
the location of the new capital. Upon culmination of these deliberations, the
Committee submitted its report on 28.07.2014, setting forth the details of its
consultations, the nature of public opinion received, and the outcome of its
assessment. Therefore, no information as to the location of the Capital City
can be said to be privileged.
174. Following the submission of the Expert Committee’s report, the
Cabinet, on 01.09.2014, resolved to establish the Capital in the area around
Vijayawada, and this decision was formally placed before the Legislative
Assembly by the then Chief Minister on 04.09.2014, whereupon a unanimous
resolution was passed endorsing the said decision. Consequent thereto, on
24.09.2014, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.O.RT.No.3234
constituting a “Group of Ministers” to devise and implement the “Land Pooling
System” for the Capital City. In pursuance of this constitution, it is self-evident
that the Ministers along with senior Government Officers visited the villages
identified for the proposed Capital, engaged in extensive consultations with
the inhabitants, and particularly apprised the landowners of the modalities of
the Land Pooling System, thereby enabling them to participate in and
contribute to the Capital City Project.
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175. After consultations and considering the requirements of the
people, a Land Pooling Scheme was duly formulated and incorporated in the
Andhra Pradesh Capital Region Development Authority Bill, 2014, which was
introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 22.12.2014. The said Bill
culminated in the enactment of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ which came into force on
30.12.2014. On the same day, the Capital City area was notified and the
APCRDA was directed to proceed with Land Pooling for procurement of land.
In furtherance thereof, the rules governing the Land Pooling Scheme were
notified on 01.01.2015 vide G.O.Ms.No.1 of 2015, issued in exercise of
powers under Section 18(2)(f) of the Act. Subsequently, G.O.Ms.No.41 dated
17.02.2016 was promulgated under Section 18 of the Act, amending Rule 5(2)
of the 2015 Rules. Prior to the approval and sanction of the Chief Minister,
G.O.Ms.No.41 received due consideration by the Principal Secretary and was
passed after following the prescribed procedure and due process of law.
INGREDIENTS OF THE PENAL PROVISIONS – ESTABLISMENT OF
PRIMA FACIE CASE:
176. Section 166 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals with a public servant who
knowingly disobeys a direction of law which he is bound to obey, thereby
causing injury to any person. The essential ingredients of the offence are that
the accused must be a public servant, there must be a conscious and knowing
disobedience of a specific legal direction binding upon him, and such
disobedience must be accompanied by the knowledge or intention that it
would cause injury to a person. As authoritatively held by the Hon’ble
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Dr.YLR,JSupreme Court in Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala supra, the prosecution must
specifically allege and demonstrate the existence of a particular direction of
law, its knowing disobedience by the public servant, and the resultant injury
within his knowledge. In the present case, the Petitioners acted in compliance
with G.O.Ms.No.41, a valid and subsisting Government Order that has never
been declared invalid. A public servant acting under and in accordance with a
legally operative Government Order is, in law, obeying the law and not
disobeying it. Furthermore, there is no allegation of injury caused to any
specific individual because of the Petitioners’ actions. Therefore, not only
there is a complete absence of the essential ingredients of Section 166 of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ but there exists a fundamental legal impossibility of establishing the
offence against the Petitioners, who acted in compliance with a legally valid
and subsisting Government Order.
177. Section 167 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ punishes a public servant who frames,
prepares, or translates an incorrect document with the intent to cause injury.
The essential ingredients of the offence are that the accused must be a public
servant, must prepare or frame a document, the document must be incorrect,
and such act must be accompanied by the intention of causing injury to
another person. In the present case, the documents in question were
prepared in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016, a subsisting
Government Order that has never been declared invalid by any competent
Court. Consequently, any document prepared in compliance with such
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Government Order cannot, in law, be characterized as “incorrect” or unlawful.
The act of framing policy or issuing statutory instruments pursuant to a valid
Government Order does not attract the provisions of Section 167 of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ Even if any person considers the Government Order to be contrary to
law or individual rights, the proper remedy is to challenge it before a
competent Court; until it is set aside, the presumption of legality and validity
attached to it must prevail. Furthermore, there is no allegation, much less any
material, to suggest that the Petitioners prepared any document with the
intention of causing injury to any person. Therefore, the essential ingredients
of Section 167 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are wholly absent, and the provision is manifestly
inapplicable to the acts of the Petitioners, who merely acted in compliance
with a legally valid and subsisting Government Order.
178. Section 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ applies only where a public servant
knowingly disobeys a direction of law with the specific intention of saving any
person from legal punishment or of saving any property from forfeiture or any
other legal charge. Thus, the essential ingredients of the offence are: (i)
conscious and wilful disobedience of a legal direction, and (ii) an intention to
shield a person from punishment or a property from forfeiture. In the present
case, the Petitioners issued G.O.Ms.No.41 in the exercise of their statutory
powers under the relevant legal framework, and there is no allegation, much
less any material, suggesting that they acted with the intent to save any
person from punishment or to protect any property from forfeiture or legal
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liability. The allegations in the complaint do not disclose the existence of either
of the indispensable elements required to attract Section 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’
Consequently, it is evident that the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 cannot, in any
manner, be brought within the scope of Section 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and the said
provision is manifestly inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the
present case.
179. Therefore, on a careful evaluation of the accusations under
Sections 166, 167, and 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ it is evident that the statutory
essentials are wholly absent. The essence of Sections 166 and 217 lies in a
deliberate disobedience of law by a public servant with knowledge of resultant
injury, as clarified in Nand Kishore Tamakhuwala supra. Compliance with
G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 is in fact obedience to law, thereby excluding
the mischief of these provisions. As regards Section 167 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ it’s
invocation presupposes the preparation of an “incorrect document”; the mere
allegation that the Government Order itself is invalid cannot suffice, for until
duly struck down, the presumption of legality attaches to such enactments. A
subjective belief of illegality does not ipso facto render documents prepared
thereunder incorrect. Hence, the accusations under Sections 166, 167, and
217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioners are devoid of substance and
unsustainable.
180. Section 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ which deals with criminal conspiracy,
is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case, as the essential and
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indispensable ingredients of the offence are conspicuously absent. It is well
settled, as authoritatively explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mir
Nagvi Askari supra, that to constitute a criminal conspiracy there must be: (i)
an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) such agreement must be
directed towards the commission of an illegal act or the commission of a legal
act by illegal means; and (iii) a clear meeting of minds for the accomplishment
of the unlawful object. In cases where the conspiracy is not itself punishable,
there must also be an overt act in furtherance of the agreement. The sine qua
non for attracting Section 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is therefore the existence of a
demonstrable agreement and a shared unlawful intention. In the present
matter, a bare reading of the complaint and the FIR reveals the complete
absence of any allegation disclosing an agreement inter se the accused
persons, any meeting of minds directed towards an unlawful objective, or any
overt act undertaken in pursuance of such an agreement.
181. Most significantly, the complaint fails to identify any illegal act
whatsoever or any legal act allegedly carried out by illegal means. At its
highest, the allegations merely reflect a disagreement with, or challenge to, a
policy decision taken by the Government in the exercise of its lawful rule-
making and executive powers. Such disagreement may constitute a matter of
political or administrative debate, but it cannot, by any stretch of legal
reasoning, be elevated into an accusation of criminal conspiracy. In the
absence of the cardinal prerequisites of agreement, unlawful object, meeting
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of minds, and overt acts in furtherance thereof, the invocation of Section 120-
B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ the gravest of all charges in the present case, is entirely
unsustainable, legally indefensible, and devoid of any factual or legal
foundation. To permit the continuation of such an allegation on the basis of the
averments contained in the complaint would amount to converting a challenge
to governmental policy into a criminal prosecution, thereby reducing Section
120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ into a political instrument, a consequence wholly alien to
its purpose and scope in criminal jurisprudence.
182. Further, the FIR does not disclose any agreement, overt act, or
illegal object. At most, it reflects disagreement with a policy decision. Policy-
making cannot be equated with conspiracy. Therefore, Section 120-B of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ is unsustainable. Underlying this prosecution is a dangerous theory –
that governance equals conspiracy, the Bhagavath Gita affirms, “यद्यदाचरति
श्रेष्ठस्तत्तदे वेिरो जनः ” (“Yad yad ācarati śreṣṭhas tat tad evetaro janaḥ”), which
means “Whatever a leader does, others follow”. Leaders act for the people,
their acts cannot be criminalized. To criminalize governance is to criminalize
dharma itself. Thomas Paine also declared, “When men yield up the privilege
of thinking, the last shadow of liberty quits the horizon.” This Court must
ensure liberty does not quit the horizon of Andhra Pradesh. The invocation of
Section 120‑B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ is unsustainable. The Bhagavath Gita teaches,
“अनातश्रिः कममफलं कायं कमम करोति यः ” (“Anāśritaḥ karma‑phalaṁ kāryaṁ karma
karoti yaḥ”) which means, “He who performs duty without attachment is a true
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yogi”. No meeting of minds to commit illegality exists. Only collective
responsibility in governance. Criminal conspiracy cannot be inferred from
policy decisions. As John Locke observed, “Genuine liberty is freedom from
arbitrary power,” meaning individuals are protected from the personal whims
of others or the state. The FIR seeks to impose arbitrary power upon
legitimate governance.
183. Sections 34 to 37 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deal with acts done by several
persons in furtherance of common intention, cooperation, or aiding. Section 34
of ‘the I.P.C.,’ requires common intention and participation, Section 35 of ‘the
I.P.C.,’ requires shared criminal knowledge, Section 36 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals
with cooperation in acts, and Section 37 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals with cooperation
in illegal acts. In this case, the acts were collective ministerial decisions
endorsed by the Legislature. They were lawful, transparent, and democratic.
No illegal common intention or cooperation is alleged. Hence, these provisions
do not apply.
184. The invocation of Sections 3(1)(f) and 3(1)(g) of ‘the SCs & STs
(POA) Act.,’ is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable. These
provisions are attracted only when the essential ingredients are cumulatively
satisfied, namely: (i) the victim must belong to a Scheduled Caste or
Scheduled Tribe; (ii) the accused must belong to a non-Scheduled Caste or
non-Scheduled Tribe community; and (iii) there must be wrongful occupation
of, or wrongful dispossession from, property belonging to such victim. In the
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present case, none of these foundational requirements is disclosed in the FIR.
The FIR neither identifies any specific victim belonging to a Scheduled Caste
or Scheduled Tribe nor describes any particular instance of wrongful
occupation or dispossession. On the contrary, the admitted factual position is
that the lands in question were either voluntarily pooled, transferred through
valid transactions, or reconstituted under G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 in
exercise of powers traceable to the statutory framework under ‘the APCRDA
Act.’ Unless such land reconstitution, assignment, or alienation is set aside by
a competent judicial or adjudicatory authority, the element of “wrongfulness,”
which constitutes the very foundation of Sections 3(1)(f) and (g), cannot be
imputed.
185. The assignment and reconstitution process under the applicable
Rules is uniform, non-discriminatory, and applicable across all categories
without singling out members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Any
grievance against such executive action is amenable to challenge before the
appropriate constitutional forum and cannot be converted into a criminal
prosecution through collateral attack. Further, as held in Hitesh Verma supra,
the provisions of ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ are attracted only where the acts
complained of are intrinsically connected with the victim’s caste identity, and a
mere land dispute or property-related grievance does not, by itself, constitute
an offence under the Act. Therefore, in the absence of identified SC/ST
victims, specific allegations of wrongful dispossession, or any legally
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of ‘the SCs & STs (POA) Act.,’ against the Petitioners is manifestly untenable
and amounts to an impermissible misuse of a protective social legislation
enacted for the benefit of vulnerable communities.
186. A full bench judgment of this Court in Mekala Pandu supra, at
paragraph Nos.19, 48, 49, 53, 55, 56, 71, 110 and 111, it is held that ‘the
Assigned Lands Act.,’ is a beneficial and protective legislation intended to
safeguard assigned lands granted to landless poor persons and prevent their
alienation to economically stronger sections. The Court observed that
although restrictions are imposed on the transfer of assigned lands, such
restrictions are not intended to curtail the assignee’s ownership rights but
rather to protect them and ensure that the benefits of the land continue to the
assignee and his legal heirs from generation to generation. Alienations in
violation of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ are void, and the law provides for
restoration of the land to the original assignee or legal heirs. This Court further
held that assignees possess rights akin to full ownership, and the restrictions
on alienation do not diminish their title or interest in the land. Consequently,
any condition in the assignment patta denying or restricting compensation was
declared unconstitutional, and this Court ruled that assignees are entitled to
full market-value compensation and all consequential benefits on par with
absolute owners whenever assigned lands are resumed or acquired for a
public purpose.
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187. Section 7 of ‘the Assigned Land Act.,’ prohibits transfer of
assigned lands and penalizes violations. The ingredients are that the land
must be “assigned land” and there must be a transfer in violation of
prohibition. In this case, the Government Order was issued under statutory
authority. No evidence of illegal transfer of assigned land is alleged against
the Petitioners personally. Moreover, Section 8 of ‘the Assigned Land Act.,’
provides immunity for acts done in good faith under the Act, shielding the
Petitioners.
188. Hence, the invocation of Section 7 of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ is
wholly misconceived, for the statutory language penalises acquisition of
assigned land by “any person,” whereas the gravamen of the de‑facto
complainant’s assertion is confined to the promulgation of a rule, without any
specific allegation of acquisition by any identified individual. Furthermore, at
the cost of repetion, Section 8 of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ expressly provides
immunity by stipulating that no prosecution or legal proceeding shall lie
against any person, officer, or authority for acts done or intended to be done in
good faith in pursuance of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Thus, the
very substratum of the allegation collapses, as the impugned act falls squarely
within the protective ambit of Section 8, rendering the allegation under Section
7 unsustainable in law.
189. Finally, Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act’ and Section 8 of ‘the
Assigned Land Act’ provide statutory bars against prosecution. Section 146 of
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done under or in pursuance of ‘the APCRDA Act’. Section 8 of ‘the Assigned
Land Act’ bars prosecution for acts done in good faith under ‘the Assigned
Land Act’. Both provisions independently shield the Petitioners, as their
actions were taken under statutory authority and in good faith. The Bhagavath
Gita assures, “न ति कल्याणकृत्कतिद् दु र्मतिं िाि र्च्छति” (“Na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaścid
durgatiṁ tāta gacchati”), which means, “One who does good never comes to
grief”. Acts done in good faith under statutory authority cannot be criminalized.
The statutory shield embodies the truth. Milton, in Paradise Lost, declared,
“License they mean when they cry liberty.” Here, liberty is preserved by
shielding lawful acts from malicious prosecution.
190. Therefore, the offences alleged under ‘the I.P.C.,’ ‘the SCs & STs
(POA) Act.,’ and ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ are, on the face of it, not made out.
There is no assertion of direct or indirect acquisition of assigned land by the
Petitioners, and the FIR merely contains a sweeping allegation that
“influenced persons of the then Government cheated farmers,” without
attributing any specific act to them. Such vague and omnibus accusations
cannot form the basis of criminal prosecution. Considering the inordinate
delay, absence of complaints from victims, demonstrable procedural
compliance, and evident mala fides, this Court holds that it is the bounden
duty of this court to invoke its inherent powers under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.,’ to quash the FIR and prevent abuse of the judicial process. Every
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section invoked in the FIR fails to meet its essential ingredients. The
Petitioners acted under statutory authority, through democratic processes, and
with legislative endorsement. No wrongful act, intent, or victim has been
identified. The FIR, therefore, represents political persecution rather than a
genuine criminal case.
191. Indeed, the interim order dated 19.03.2021, passed under
Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was a rightful exercise of inherent jurisdiction.
Significantly, the order was neither challenged nor vacated, and the
Investigating Agency continued its inquiry against other accused persons,
examining witnesses up to LW.76. The argument that investigation was
obstructed stands contradicted by the State’s own counter affidavits and
reopening applications. Jurisprudence laid down in Allahabad High Court
Bar Assn. v. State of U.P.,99 affirms that interim relief is granted to safeguard
the efficacy of final relief, and the Petitioners’ case squarely falls within those
parameters.
192. This Court at the outset adverted to the well-settled legal position
governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of ‘the
Cr.P.C.’ The inherent powers of the High Court are wide and unfettered in their
amplitude, and they exist to secure the ends of justice, to prevent abuse of the
process of the Court, and to give effect to any order under ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The
locus classicus on this subject is the landmark decision of the Hon’ble
99
(2024) 6 SCC 267
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Supreme Court in L.Muniswamy supra, wherein it was authoritatively held
that the High Court’s inherent power is designed to achieve the salutary public
purpose that a Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into
a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Hon’ble Apex Court further
recognized in that case that in a criminal proceeding, the veiled object behind
a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of
the prosecution rests, and analogous circumstances, would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice, for the ends of
justice are higher than the ends of mere law. This Court in the instant case
finds that the present case answered every criterion laid down in that
judgment.
193. This Court applied with meticulous care the four-step test
authoritatively prescribed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajiv Thapar supra
which remains the definitive judicial standard for the exercise of the power of
quashing at the pre-trial stage upon the production of defence material. The
four steps of that test are: first, whether the material relied upon by the
accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, being of sterling and
impeccable quality; Second, whether such material would rule out and
displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused;
Third, whether the said material has not been, and cannot justifiably be,
refuted by the prosecution or the complainant; and Fourth, whether
proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of the process of the Court
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and would not serve the ends of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv
Thapar supra further held that if the answer to all four steps is in the
affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to
quash the criminal proceedings, for such exercise of power, besides doing
justice to the accused, would save precious Court time that would otherwise
be wasted in holding a trial, especially when it is clear that the same would not
conclude in the conviction of the accused. This Court on meticulous
examination of the entire material on the record holds that every step of this
four-fold test was answered emphatically and conclusively in favour of both
Petitioners on the facts of the present case.
194. A foundational reason for quashing the FIR is that the acts of both
Petitioners, for which they were sought to be prosecuted, were acts done in
direct and faithful execution of a constitutionally mandated, publicly
deliberated, democratically endorsed, and legislatively sanctioned decision of
the highest order. The bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh
under ‘the Re-organisation Act.’ necessitated the establishment of a new
capital city, as the historic capital of Hyderabad was allocated to the newly
formed State of Telangana. Parliament itself, in Section 6 of ‘the Re-
organisation Act.’, mandated the Central Government to constitute an Expert
Committee to study alternatives regarding the location of the new capital. The
Expert Committee, constituted under the Chairmanship of Sri
Sivaramakrishnan, conducted wide-ranging public consultations in eleven
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districts, received 4,728 written suggestions from the public, interacted with
Ministers, non-governmental organizations, and stakeholders of every
description, and submitted its comprehensive report on 28.07.2014, which
specifically identified the area between Guntur and Vijayawada as a
geographically central and well-connected location that had received much
public attention. No information pertaining to the capital’s location was
therefore secret, privileged, or restricted to insiders. Therefore, this Court
holds that these incontrovertible facts established beyond shadow of doubt the
entirely open and democratically legitimate character of the decision.
195. The allegations sought to be fastened upon the Petitioners are
confined exclusively to G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016. Undeniably,
issuance of Government Orders, framing of Rules, and enactment of
legislation are matters falling within the executive and legislative domain of the
State, undertaken for the purposes of good governance, societal welfare, and
advancement of the economic and social status of its citizens. A plain reading
of the letter of the de‑facto complainant reveals that the gravamen of his
contention rests upon the procedure adopted by the Government in issuing
G.O.Ms.No.41 and the manner of its implementation. The assertion of the
informant that the said Government Order introduced provisions allegedly
inconsistent with ‘the RFCTLARR Act.,’ cannot, by any stretch, constitute a
criminal offence, for such matters pertain to policy formulation and legislative
competence rather than penal liability.
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196. All allegations revolve around G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016,
which was issued in exercise of delegated legislative power under Section 18
of ‘the APCRDA Act.’ Incontrovertibly, no villager or landowner has ever
approached any forum challenging the acquisition or compensation, thereby
rendering the complainant’s professed concern doubtful and politically
motivated. The claim that the Government Order was intended to benefit
encroachers is unfounded, as G.O.Ms.No.41 is consistent with the
long‑standing assignment policy, remains in force, and does not contravene
any statute or regulation. Legislative or subordinate legislative acts cannot be
imputed with mala fides, nor can their validity be adjudged by a police officer
under the guise of investigation. The essence of the matter is that the
accusations do not disclose any criminal offence but only assail a lawful policy
decision.
197. A plain reading of the FIR and complaint demonstrates that the
attempt of the de‑facto complainant is to criminalize the exercise of
rule‑making power vested in the executive. The FIR discloses no criminal act
attributable to the Petitioners but instead seeks to convert a solemn act of
governance into a penal offence. The complaint itself was lodged five years
after the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016, thereby revealing mala
fide intent to prosecute members of the previous government on concocted
charges. Having failed to challenge the vires of G.O.Ms.No.41 before any
competent forum, the complainant now seeks to misuse criminal process to
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foist false consequences upon a lawful exercise of delegated legislation.
There is an inexplainable delay of nearly five years in lodging the FIR.
198. The allegations advanced by the de‑facto complainant seek to
punish the Petitioners for a solemn act performed by the executive in the
exercise of its rule‑making power, against which no prosecution is
maintainable. Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ expressly provides a bar of
legal proceedings, stipulating that no suit, prosecution, or proceeding shall lie
against the Government, the Authority, or any officer or person for any act
done or purported to be done under or in pursuance of the Act, the rules, or
standing orders made thereunder. In light of this statutory protection, the
attempt to criminalize the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 is
wholly misconceived, devoid of criminal ingredients, and impermissible in law.
199. Even if the complaint is taken at face value, it only questions the
validity of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 and the rules framed thereunder
and does not disclose any cognizable offence attributable to the Petitioners,
who were then the Chief Minister and the Cabinet Minister. The allegations
merely assail a policy decision and exercise of rule‑making power, which fall
within the realm of governance and cannot be criminalized. The essence of
the matter is that the accusations are politically motivated, devoid of criminal
ingredients, and directed only at undermining the legitimate rule‑making
functions of the executive.
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200. The FIR is nothing but an instrument of political vendetta. In this
regard, the Bhagavad Gita reminds us “Satyam eva jayate nānṛtam” – Truth
alone triumphs, not falsehood. (Mundaka Upanishad, echoed in Gita’s spirit).
When governance decisions are criminalized, democracy itself is imperilled.
To punish leaders for decisions endorsed by the Legislature is to punish the
people themselves. Lord Denning once cautioned “Law should not be seen as
a weapon in the hands of the powerful, but as a shield for the weak.” The
present FIR, far from shielding, wields law as a weapon of revenge.
201. The FIR conspicuously lacks any genuinely aggrieved person.
The Bhagavath Gita proclaims, “उद्धरे दात्मनात्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेि्”, (“Uddhared
ātmanātmānaṁ nātmānam avasādayet”) which means, “Let a man lift himself
by his own self, let him not degrade himself”. No villager has come forward to
lift his grievance. Instead, a political adversary seeks to degrade governance.
Justice demands that only genuine victims speak, not political proxies.
Shakespeare too warned in Hamlet “For ’tis the sport to have the engineer
hoist with his own petard.” Here, the complainant hoists law for sport, not
justice.
202. Permitting police to adjudicate motives behind delegated
legislation strikes at the root of separation of powers. The Bhagavath Gita
counsels, “स्वधमे तनधनं श्रेयः , परधमो भयाविः ” (“Swadharme nidhanam śreyaḥ,
paradharmo bhayāvahaḥ”), which means “Better to die in one’s own duty than
to follow another’s”. The executive must perform its dharma of governance.
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The judiciary alone may review legality. As Vedanta Desika wrote, “धमो रक्षति
रतक्षिः ” (“Dharmo rakṣati rakṣitaḥ”), which means, “Dharma protects those who
protect it”. To criminalize rule‑making is to abandon dharma. Edmund Burke
echoed, “The law touches us all, but it must not strangle the constitution.”
Specifically, the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016 under the
APCRDA Act was an executive action taken in line with the prescribed
Business Rules. Such Government Orders cannot be subjected to criminal
scrutiny under the IPC, as that would undermine the sanctity of executive
decision-making. The Petitioners, being public servants, did not disobey any
law or fabricate documents with intent to cause harm, making the application
of Sections 166, 167, 217 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and related provisions wholly
misplaced.
203. The sequence of events clearly reflects strict adherence to
statutory procedure. Beginning with the Collector’s communication dated
14.12.2015 and culminating in the issuance of G.O.No.41 on 17.02.2016, the
Note File moved through the established hierarchy, with observations from the
Revenue Department, Law Department, and the CRDA Commissioner duly
recorded. The Chief Minister’s approval was accorded subsequently, on
22.03.2016, after the G.O. had already been issued, thereby dispelling any
suggestion of criminal liability. Further, under Rule 58 of the Business Rules,
the Secretary to Government, CRDA, bore the statutory responsibility to
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ensure compliance, and the record demonstrates that such compliance was
meticulously observed throughout the process.
204. Proceeding from the Expert Committee’s report and the public
mandate, the Cabinet of the Andhra Pradesh Government took a formal
decision on 01.09.2014 to locate the new capital in the area around
Vijayawada. This Cabinet decision was placed before the Legislative
Assembly of Andhra Pradesh on 04.09.2014 by the Chief Minister himself, and
the Legislature passed a unanimous resolution endorsing the Cabinet’s
decision. Indeed, a unanimous resolution of the State Legislature constitutes
the highest democratic imprimatur that any governmental decision can
receive, being a solemn and definitive expression of the will of the people of
the State as represented by their elected representatives. No act of the
Petitioners taken in pursuance of this unanimously endorsed decision could
therefore be characterized as malicious, conspiratorial, or criminal in any
legally cognizable sense. To criminalize acts done in faithful execution of a
unanimous legislative resolution would be tantamount to criminalizing the
democratic will of the Legislature itself.
205. The fulcrum of the accusation against the applicant rests upon
the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41 dated 17.02.2016; however, the very premise
of injury cannot arise unless the said Government Order is first declared
unconstitutional and shown to have been promulgated with malice or for
personal gain. So long as G.O.Ms.No.41 retains its legal efficacy, any act
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performed in pursuance thereof, unless demonstrated to be in contravention
of its mandate, cannot be construed as disobedience of law or preparation of
an incorrect document. Significantly, the subsequent Repeal Act itself
preserves actions taken under ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ thereby undermining the
contention that such actions were inherently illegal. Until G.O.Ms.No.41 is
invalidated by a competent forum, documents prepared pursuant thereto
cannot be branded as void, and even if invalidity is later declared, culpability
under penal provisions would require proof that the preparation was
undertaken with the singular intent to inflict public harm – an allegation that
remains wholly unsubstantiated in the present matter.
206. The lynchpin of the entire FIR was G.O.Ms.No.41 dated
17.02.2016, issued in exercise of the rule-making power conferred by Section
18 of ‘the APCRDA Act’, amending Rule 5(2) of the 2015 Rules. This Court
holds that the Government Order is unquestionably an act of delegated or
subordinate legislation, issued by the State Government in the exercise of
statutory rule-making powers expressly conferred upon it by an Act of the
Legislature. Prior to its issuance, G.O.Ms.No.41 received due consideration at
the level of the Principal Secretary of the concerned department and was
issued only after following due process of law and obtaining formal sanction. It
is in full conformity with the assignment policy that has been in force in Andhra
Pradesh for decades. It has never been declared invalid, unconstitutional, or
illegal by any Court of competent jurisdiction. It stands upon the statute book
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to this day as a valid, subsisting piece of delegated legislation carrying the full
constitutional presumption of validity. This Court emphasizes that as long as
G.O.Ms.No.41 remains unreversed, any act done in furtherance thereof is an
act of compliance with the law, not an act of criminal disobedience.
207. One of the most significant constitutional reasons for quashing
the FIR was the foundational principle that no criminal motive can lawfully be
attributed to an act of rule-making or delegated legislation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional and administrative law that no motive shall be
attributed to any act done by either the legislature or a sub-ordinate
legislature, including any Government Order issued in the exercise of
delegated legislative power. It is not open to any Court, much less to a Police
Officer conducting an investigation in a criminal case, to enquire into the
motives behind a legislative act. This Court categorically holds that to permit a
Police Officer, acting under the guise of criminal investigation, to adjudicate
upon whether a particular piece of delegated legislation was enacted with an
ulterior motive or to confer undue benefits would be to strike at the very root of
the doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution of India, and
would vest in the executive police machinery a power that belongs exclusively
to the judiciary. The appropriate remedy for challenging a Government Order,
even if alleged to be wrong on merits, is its challenge before a competent
constitutional court, and not a criminal prosecution.
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208. It is an axiomatic principle of constitutional law, flowing from the
doctrine of separation of powers and from the legislative privileges recognized
by the Constitution, that the sovereign power of rule-making vested in the
executive government cannot be made the subject-matter of criminal
prosecution. The Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021, as the Chief Minister,
and the Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, as the Minister of Municipal
Administration, exercised precisely this sovereign rule-making power in
bringing G.O.Ms.No.41 into existence. A legislative act or a quasi-legislative
act, which is what a Government Order issued under a statute constitutes,
cannot be impugned as a criminal act. To hold otherwise would create a
constitutionally catastrophic and wholly unacceptable regime in which every
official of every outgoing government would face criminal prosecution by the
incoming government for every policy decision taken in office, a consequence
that would be devastating for the rule of law and representative democracy.
STATUTORY BARS:
209. It is careful to note of a particularly telling and self-defeating
feature of the prosecution’s case. The then incumbent Government that
registered the FIR had itself, through the legislation repealing ‘the APCRDA
Act’, specifically saved all acts done under ‘the APCRDA Act’, thereby
internally and irrefutably conceding that those acts were legally valid and
could not simply be undone by legislative or executive fiat. It must be pointed
out that when a government, having itself denounced certain acts as unlawful,
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nevertheless proceed to preserve them, it fatally compromises and dismantles
the integrity of its own case. The very argument of the prosecution is thus
eroded from within by the conduct of the very Government that initiated the
prosecution. A government cannot, on one hand, save the acts done under a
statute through a saving clause in a repeal enactment and, on the other hand,
prosecute persons criminally for having performed those self-same acts.
210. A powerful and independent ground for quashing the FIR was the
absolute statutory bar against prosecution contained in Section 146 of ‘the
APCRDA Act’, which provides in the most explicit terms that no suit,
prosecution, or other proceeding shall lie against the Government, the
Authority, or any officer or person for any act done or purporting to be done
under or in pursuance of ‘the APCRDA Act’ or the rules or standing orders
made thereunder. This Court holds that this bar is absolute and admits of no
exception. The acts of both Petitioners, the formulation and implementation of
the Land Pooling Scheme, the issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41, and all acts done in
pursuance thereof, being acts done under and in pursuance of ‘the APCRDA
Act’ and the rules made thereunder, are completely and unqualifiedly shielded
by this statutory immunity. The prosecution of the Petitioners for such acts is
thus not merely erroneous but is directly contrary to a statutory prohibition
enacted by the Legislature, rendering the FIR fundamentally untenable ab
initio.
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211. Independently and additionally, it is found that Section 8 of ‘the
Assigned Lands Prohibition Act’, which provides that no prosecution or other
legal proceeding shall lie against a person, officer, or authority for any act
done or intended to be done in good faith in pursuance of ‘the Assigned Lands
Prohibition Act’ or Rules made thereunder, constitutes a separate, self-
sufficient, and unambiguous legislative shield against the present prosecution.
The acts of the Petitioners being acts done in good faith in the exercise of
statutory authority, the bar under Section 8 ‘the Assigned Lands Prohibition
Act’ operates independently and conclusively to preclude criminal prosecution.
Both statutory bars, operating cumulatively and independently, render the
present FIR a nullity ab initio, and that the violation of these provisions by the
Respondents further underscores the mala fide character of the impugned
proceeding.
212. The learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent submits that
G.O.Ms.No.41 was issued in clear violation of the Business Rules, and
therefore the Petitioners, who were at the helm of affairs at the relevant time,
cannot shirk their responsibility. It was submitted that those in authority had a
duty to ensure compliance with statutory safeguards, and having failed to do
so, they must now face the consequences. The learned Senior Counsel
stressed that the investigation must proceed further to uncover the true facts
surrounding the issuance of the impugned Government Order. He further
contended that the protection sought under Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’
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is wholly inapplicable, since that provision does not extend to acts tainted with
mala fides or undertaken in breach of established rules. Instead, reliance was
placed on Section 23 of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ which shields only acts done in
good faith. According to the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent, the
issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41, being contrary to the Business Rules, cannot be
said to have been done in good faith, and thus the Petitioners are not entitled
to statutory immunity.
213. In interpreting the interplay between Section 146 and Section 23
of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ this Court is of the benign view that while Section 23
expressly protects only acts done in good faith, Section 146 provides a
broader statutory bar against prosecution for acts carried out under the
authority of the Act. Of course, these provisions must be read harmoniously,
with Section 146 serving as a shield against vexatious litigation and Section
23 reinforcing the principle that bona fide acts are immune from challenge.
Importantly, one should understand that the official acts are presumed to be
done in good faith unless mala fides are clearly established, and mere
allegations of irregularity or procedural lapses cannot, by themselves, displace
this presumption.
214. On this basis, it is hereby held that the Petitioners, being in
positions of authority and acting under statutory mandate, were entitled to the
protection of Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act.’ The issuance of
G.O.Ms.No.41, even if questioned for procedural compliance, was
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nonetheless an act performed in the course of governance and under the
framework of ‘the APCRDA Act.’ Therefore, the bar under Section 146 of ‘the
APCRDA Act.,’ applied, insulating the Petitioners from prosecution. Eventually,
since no compelling evidence of mala fides is demonstrated, statutory
immunity cannot be denied, and the Petitioners’ actions must be treated as
falling within the protective ambit of Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act.’
215. The impugned FIR does not contain any specific allegation of the
commission of a cognizable offence against either Petitioner in his individual
capacity. Both Petitioners have been arraigned as accused in a purely
mechanical and high-handed manner solely based on the offices they held at
the time of issuance of G.O.Ms.No.41, without any specific act, conduct, or
omission being attributed to either of them individually. Such vicarious criminal
attribution is wholly unknown to law and is constitutionally impermissible.
Criminal liability is personal and cannot be imposed merely by virtue of a
person’s official position. The preliminary inquiry report, which preceded the
registration of the FIR, itself does not establish that either Petitioner committed
any act warranting criminal investigation. It is further emphasized that the FIR,
which is the foundation of the criminal proceeding, is wholly devoid of the
specificity and particularity that the law demands before a citizen is subjected
to the coercive machinery of criminal prosecution.
INORDINATE DELAY IN FIR:
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216. The complaint in question was lodged on 24.02.2021, concerning
transactions that had occurred as far back as 2015 and 2016 – reflecting a
delay of five full years. This unexplained lapse, coupled with the absence of
any grievance from farmers or landowners during the intervening period,
strongly indicates that the present FIR is vitiated by political mala fides of the
most transparent variety. Significantly, not a single villager or landowner who
is alleged to have been deprived of land has approached any Court, tribunal,
grievance forum, or authority to complain of wrongdoing. Instead, the
complaint was filed by the then MLA of Mangalagiri Constituency, an active
functionary of the ruling party and political adversary of the Petitioners. The
enthusiasm of the de-facto complainant was not that of a public-spirited citizen
but the calculated enterprise of a political rival, redolent of mala fides.
Reliance is properly placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners
on Mahmood Ali supra and Abhishek v. State of M.P., 100 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court cautioned that in cases tainted with mala fides, Courts
must look beyond the FIR and read between the lines to prevent abuse of
process. The selective prosecution of the Petitioners, while similar schemes
such as G.O.No.72 of 2020 were implemented without challenge, further
underscores the discriminatory and vindictive nature of the present
proceedings.
100
(2023) 16 SCC 666
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217. The inordinate and unexplained delay of approximately five years
between the transactions complained of (2015-2016) and the filing of the
complaint (February 2021) is itself a significant indicator of mala fide intent
and ulterior motive. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kishan Singh and
Chanchalpati Das supra has cautioned that frustrated litigants, unsuccessful
in other proceedings, often resort to criminal complaints with mala fide intent
to harass adversaries or wreak vengeance, and that Courts must carefully
scrutinize delayed complaints to ensure that criminal process does not
degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. It is found that the
timing of the FIR, registered only after a change of government and in the
immediate aftermath of the assumption of office by the political rivals of the
Petitioners, lent irresistible credence to the inference that this prosecution was
politically motivated. The proximity of the FIR registration to the political
transition, taken together with the absence of any aggrieved victim, pointed
unmistakably to the mala fide character of the entire proceeding.
PROPRIETY OF ADGP, CID TO ENTERTAIN COMPLAINT, ORDER
ENQUIRY AND TO DIRECT REGISTRATION OF FIR:
218. Classes of crimes to be investigated by the CID and the
procedure prescribed is enumerated under Standing Order No.866-1 and it is
appropriate to extract the same for better appreciation of the case:
“Standing Order No.866-1. The Crime Investigation
Department, will ordinarily, deal with crimes of the following
classes. Request for taking up of investigation by C.I.D can
be made by any Unit Officer, but without the orders of Addl.
DGP C.I.D or DGP no enquiry or investigation shall be taken
up by C.I.D.
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notes.
B. Counterfeit coining when the counterfeits are struck from
dies, and other cognate offences in respect of coining by
dies.
C. Professional poisoning
D. Theft of Government arms and ammunition
E. Illicit manufacture, transport, sale, possession of firearms,
ammunition, explosives and explosive substances
F. Important cases in which foreigners are concerned
(including cases of international criminals and trafficking in
women by foreigners).
G. Frauds by means of advertisements, bogus funds and
companies/societies, impersonation of public servants, and
swindling.
H. Specially important cases of murder, all important and
inter State dacoities, robbery and housebreaking.
I. Frauds, thefts or cheating of a peculiar nature affecting
more than one district.
J. Stock Market and Bank frauds.
K. Important terrorist cases and cases of bio terrorism
L. Important defalcations of public money and theft of public
property.
M. Smuggling of narcotics and psychotropic substances,
drug trafficking and serious offences under NDPS Act.
N. Financial and Economic crimes i.e., money laundering,
bank frauds, forgeries, misappropriations, cheating, breach
of trust.
O. Organized crime (Mafia type) and gag cases
P. Important conspiracy cases whose ramifications extend to
several districts.
Q. Organised offences relating to environment, flora and
fauna
R. Trafficking in women, girls and children
S. Important cases of rape and dowry deaths
T. Pornography
U. Any serious crime, which appears to have a political
motive, including all offences, connected with arms and
explosives, which are suspected to be of a political nature.
V. Organised thefts of motor vehicles
W. Other cases of Inter-State or International nature requiring
specialized investigation and co-ordination.
X. Organised cases of atrocities against Scheduled Castes
or Scheduled Tribes and important communal or caste riots
accompanied by murders and arson
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Dr.YLR,JY. Cases of such a nature as, in the opinion of DGP, the
Addl. DGP C.I.D or district authorities, call for investigation by
an officer of the C.I.D.
Z. Cases of bringing fraudulent civil suits.”
219. Standing Order No.866-1 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Manual
provides that the Crime Investigation Department will ordinarily deal with
crimes of the above-mentioned classes. On a plain reading of the above
Standing Order, it can be easily understood that the requests for taking up of
investigation by CID can be made by any Unit Officer, but without the orders
of the Additional DGP, CID or the DGP, no enquiry or investigation shall be
taken up by CID. The expression “Unit Officer” is not separately defined in
Standing Order No.866-1 by a single universal provision. In police
administrative practice under the AP Police Manual, it refers to the head of the
police unit concerned from which the request originates. Its meaning depends
on the context and the particular police wing or establishment. Generally, it
refers to the head of the police unit who exercises administrative control over
that unit. That is to say: (a) in a Police District, the Superintendent of Police
(SP) is the Unit Officer; (b) in a Police Commissionerate, the Commissioner of
Police (CP) is the Unit Officer; (c) in an APSP Battalion, the Commandant is
the Unit Officer; and (d) in specialized units (such as CID, Intelligence, PTO,
etc.), the officer designated as the head of that specialized unit functions as
the Unit Officer. Sometimes, the term ‘Unit Officer’ is also used in Government
guidelines. For instance, in the guidelines relating to provision of personal
security officers, the Superintendent of Police of a district or the Commissioner
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of Police of a city is expressly described as the “Unit Officer” at the district/city
level.
220. Thus, as per Standing Order No.866 of the Andhra Pradesh
Police Manual, it is evident that the Standing Order primarily enumerates the
categories of cases that may be investigated by the Crime Investigation
Department (CID) and delineates the jurisdiction and scope of the CID. It does
not confer an unrestricted or general power upon the CID to investigate every
cognizable offence. The jurisdiction of the CID is confined to the classes of
offences specifically mentioned in the Standing Order or such cases as are
entrusted to it by the competent authority in accordance with law. As per the
Andhra Pradesh Police Manual, the prescribed administrative procedure is: (i)
A request for CID investigation is to be made by the “Unit Officer”; (ii) CID
shall not take up any enquiry or investigation without the orders of the
Additional DGP (CID) or the DGP. Thus, the Manual contemplates two distinct
steps: (a) Initiation by the Unit Officer; and (b) Approval by the Additional DGP
(CID) or the DGP before CID assumes investigation.
221. In this context it is profitable to refer the judgment of this court in
Mekala Madhusudhan Reddy v. Director General of Police101, wherein it is
held that the CID headed by Additional Director General of Police, CID., A.P is
a separate independent investigating agency of the state; the Additional
Director General of Police, CID, A.P., is incompetent to address letter to the
101
2020 SCC OnLine AP 964
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Director General of Police, CID, A.P., for transfer of Investigation, suo moto to
take up further investigation; though the Additional Director General of Police,
CID., A.P, is an ‘officer in-charge of the police station’ for the entire state, he is
not a superior officer of the Law & Order Police to conduct investigation or
supervise investigation in terms of Section 36 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’
222. Of course, a Member of Parliament, Member of the Legislative
Assembly, or any other people’s representative is not a “Unit Officer” under
the Police Manual. Therefore, a request made directly by a people’s
representative does not satisfy the procedure prescribed in Standing Order
No.866. Indeed, there is an important distinction, i.e., a people’s
representative is free to submit a representation or complaint to the Additional
DGP (CID) or the DGP. The question is whether that representation alone can
validly trigger a CID investigation, bypassing the request of the Unit Officer
contemplated by Standing Order No.866. On a plain reading of the language
employed in Standing Order No.866, the answer is ‘No’, because the Standing
Order specifically requires the request to emanate from the Unit Officer. A
direct request from a people’s representative is not a substitute for a request
by the Unit Officer. If the Additional DGP (CID) orders a CID investigation
solely on such representation, there is no legality of the order as it is not
traceable to independent statutory power, and it is not even solely on the
strength of Standing Order No.866. Hence, it can be safely concluded that the
prescribed procedure has not been followed.
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223. The investigative conduct of the Respondent Police Authorities,
marked by procedural irregularities and disregard for statutory safeguards,
further underscores the mala fide nature of the proceedings. Their approach,
instead of reflecting neutrality and adherence to law, revealed a predisposition
to sustain a baseless prosecution, thereby reinforcing the Petitioner’s
contention that the investigation itself is tainted and unsustainable. Police
officials had been conducting searches at various premises of the Petitioner in
Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021 in a manner that was found to be illegal in character
and motivated not by any genuine investigative necessity but by the explicit
purpose of tarnishing his image and reputation in the eyes of the public,
intimidating him personally, and demoralizing his political supporters. Such
searches constituted persecution and not investigation, political warfare
conducted under the guise of law enforcement, and not genuine law
enforcement. This pattern of conduct, taken together with the registration of
the FIR, presented a compelling case of the abuse of the criminal process
which it was the Court’s constitutional duty to arrest.
224. The prosecution in the present matter rests upon a
constitutionally untenable premise, namely, that the legitimate exercise of
governmental policy-making authority, and the issuance of Government
Orders in furtherance thereof, can be construed as constituting a criminal
conspiracy between Ministers and officials. Such a theory, if accepted, would
strike at the very root of democratic governance, for it would criminalize the
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discharge of executive functions vested in the State by law. The Court,
therefore, emphatically rejected this dangerous proposition, holding that policy
decisions taken during governance cannot, by their very nature, be equated
with conspiratorial acts under the penal law. It is held that this theory is
constitutionally impermissible, legally incoherent, and profoundly dangerous to
democratic governance. The Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1762 of 2021, as the then
Chief Minister, exercised functions at the very heart of executive governance.
The Petitioner in Crl.P.No.1763 of 2021, as the then Cabinet Minister,
exercised functions integral to collective ministerial responsibility. Both
Petitioners participated in decisions made openly, transparently, through
democratic deliberation, with the endorsement of the Legislative Assembly,
and in pursuance of a statutory mandate. It is held that to permit a prosecution
founded upon such a theory would be to strike at the foundations of
representative democracy and constitutional governance.
225. The Petitioners exercised sovereign rule-making power in issuing
G.O.Ms.No.41. The Bhagavath Gita teaches, “कममण्येवातधकारस्ते मा फलेषु
कदाचन” (“Karmanye vadhikaraste mā phaleṣu kadācana”) which means, “You
have the right to perform your duty, but not to the fruits thereof”. Acts of
governance are duties performed without attachment to personal gain. To
attribute mala fide intent to such acts is constitutionally impermissible. As
Kalidasa wrote in Raghuvamsha, “प्रजा सु खे सु खं राज्ञः , प्रजानां च तििे तििम्” (“Praja
sukhe sukham rājñah, prajānām ca hite hitam”) which means, “The king’s
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happiness lies in the happiness of his subjects”. Governance decisions, even
if disputed, cannot be reduced to criminal conspiracies.
226. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law, affirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chaudhari Ran Beer Singh supra that in matters
of policy decisions, such as the creation of a new capital city or the location
thereof, the scope of judicial interference is extremely limited, and Courts
should not substitute their own judgment for that of the executive unless the
infringement of fundamental rights is clearly demonstrated. Policy decisions
must be left to the Government, which alone is competent to weigh all relevant
considerations. Even if a second view is possible on a matter of governance,
the judiciary cannot interfere merely on that ground. The present FIR, in
attempting to criminalize a policy decision that was made through the most
open and democratic process conceivable and endorsed by the Legislature
unanimously, transgresses this foundational principle to a degree that renders
it constitutionally intolerable.
227. The defence of the Petitioners is not merely arguable but is
complete and unanswerable on the face of the record itself, bringing the case
within the principle recognized in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH
supra and Vadilal Panchal supra that where the complaint itself discloses a
complete and unanswerable defence, the Court is empowered and indeed
duty-bound to intervene and quash the proceedings at the threshold. The
material produced by both Petitioners, including the Expert Committee report,
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the APCRDA publications, the chronology of farmer consultations, the
unanimous legislative resolution, the text of ‘the APCRDA Act.,’ and
G.O.Ms.No.41, is of sterling and impeccable quality. It utterly and completely
displaces the assertions in the FIR and cannot justifiably be refuted by the
prosecution.
228. Sri P. Sudhakar Reddy, learned Counsel for Respondent No.2,
has vehemently canvassed the proposition that in the realm of complex
socio‑economic offences, where financial trails are deliberately obscured and
bureaucratic records are manipulated, delay in investigation and trial is but an
inevitable concomitant, and therefore cannot furnish a valid ground for
quashment. It is trite that economic offences constitute a distinct class,
demanding a nuanced approach, and mere lapse of time cannot ipso facto
vitiate the proceedings. Reliance has rightly been placed upon the
pronouncement in Punit Beriwala supra to buttress this submission.
However, in the case at hand, the factual substratum is materially different,
inasmuch as there is no financial trial or intricate economic conspiracy
involved. The delay of nearly five years, unconnected with any complex
financial investigation, cannot be accorded with the same latitude as in
economic offences. Hence, the contention predicated upon Punit Beriwala
supra is devoid of merit and cannot be sustained.
229. Placing reliance upon the dictum in M. China Hari Babu supra,
Sri Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Counsel for Respondent No.2, has
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strenuously contended that initiation of criminal law by way of registration of
FIR at the behest of a third party is legally permissible. However, the factual
matrix obtaining in M. China Hari Babu supra is wholly distinguishable and
cannot be pressed into service in the present controversy. In contradistinction
to that case, in the matter at hand, none of the farmers whose assigned lands
are alleged to have been encroached or unlawfully appropriated have
themselves approached the law enforcement authorities with a grievance or
complaint. In the absence of any direct victim lodging a report, the invocation
of criminal process at the instance of a stranger to the transaction is
manifestly untenable. Consequently, the submission advanced by the learned
Senior Counsel, predicated upon the aforesaid precedent, does not commend
acceptance and stands rejected.
230. The salutary and paramount constitutional duty of the High Court,
in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, to prevent the criminal process from
degenerating into an instrument of political persecution and personal vendetta.
It drew sustenance from the line of authority established in Gosu Jayarami
Reddy supra, Krishna Lal Chawla supra, Ravinder Singh supra, and
Chanchalpati Das supra, all of which underscore the duty of Courts to nip
vexatious and politically motivated litigation in the bud and to sternly refuse to
allow the machinery of criminal law to be deployed as a weapon of
harassment or vendetta. It is held that the present case is a textbook example
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of the very type of abuse that this venerable line of authority was designed to
prevent and arrest.
231. This Court holds that the present case falls squarely within at
least three of the illustrative categories of cases identified by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal supra in which the extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482
of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is required to exercise to quash proceedings. (i) The FIR, on
its own averments, does not disclose any cognizable offence against the
Petitioners. (ii) The allegations are inherently improbable and constitutionally
absurd, insofar as they seek to characterize the sovereign act of governance
as criminal conspiracy. (iii) There exists an express and absolute legal bar to
the prosecution under Section 146 of ‘the APCRDA Act’ and Section 8 of ‘the
Assigned Land Act’. Additionally, the proceedings are manifestly and
demonstrably mala fide, having been instituted with the transparent ulterior
motive of political persecution and delegitimization of the acts of the previous
Government. Furthermore, there is an enormous unexplainable delay in
lodging the complaint.
232. It is not out of place to mention that two more FIRs were
registered against the petitioners. The gravamen of the allegations in both
complaints is that certain assigned lands belonging to poor and marginal
farmers situated within the Amaravati Capital Region were purchased by
Accused Nos. 5 to 7, 12 to 37, 39, 41 and 53 to 55 (approximately 34 persons)
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by allegedly deceiving and coercing the assignee farmers. It is alleged that the
above-mentioned accused projected themselves as influential persons having
access to high-ranking Government officials and falsely represented to the
assignee farmers that the Government would acquire their assigned lands
without paying any compensation. Acting on such alleged misrepresentations
and under the pressure exerted by the accused therein, about 166 assignee
farmers are stated to have executed registered sale deeds in favour of the
accused.
233. On the basis of the said allegations, FIRs in Crime Nos. 14 and
15 of 2020 came to be registered for the offences punishable under Sections
420, 409, 109, 166, 167, 192, 193, 196, 217 and 506 read with Sections 120-
B, 34, 35, 36 and 37 of ‘the IPC.,’ Sections 3(1)(g) and 3(2)(v)(a) of ‘the SCs &
STs (POA) Act.,’; Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) and (d) of ‘the PC
Act.,’ Section 82 of the Registration Act, 1908; and Section 7 of ‘the Assigned
Lands Act’. However, after thorough investigation the DSP, CID, Mangalagiri
filed final report on 03/11/2025 referring the two cases as mistakes of fact.
Later the learned Judge, ACB Court, Vijayawada after serving notice on the
De-facto complainant and on conducting elaborate enquiry accepted the final
report and closed the two FIRs by issuing RCS proceedings No. 14/2025, vide
order dated 25/11/2025. It must be pointed out that the allegations levelled in
Crime Nos. 14 and 15 of 2020 are akin to the allegations levelled in the instant
case.
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CONCLUSION:
234. In its final analysis, this Court held that the case for quashing the
impugned FIR as against both Petitioners is not merely made out but is
overwhelming, irresistible, and constitutionally compelling. The FIR is the
product of deliberate political malice and represents a calculated campaign to
delegitimize the acts of the previous Government. It was registered on the
complaint of a political opponent, in the absence of any genuinely aggrieved
person. It does not disclose any cognizable offence against either Petitioner in
their individual capacities. It seeks to criminalize the sovereign exercise of
rule-making power and delegated legislative authority. It invokes penal
provisions, namely Sections 166, 167, 217, and 120-B of ‘the I.P.C.,’ read with
Sections 34, 35, 36 and 37 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and Section 3(1)(f) ‘the SCs & STs
(POA) Act’, and Section 7 of ‘the Assigned Lands Act.,’ none of which are
attracted on the facts alleged. It is expressly barred by Section 146 of ‘the
APCRDA Act’ and Section 8 of ‘the Assigned Land Act’. It is vitiated by the
complete absence of any specific allegation against either Petitioner
individually. It has resulted in illegal and harassment-oriented searches. The
preliminary inquiry itself does not establish any act of either Petitioner
warranting criminal investigation. Every step of the four-fold test in Rajiv
Thapar supra is answered in the affirmative in favour of both Petitioners.
Every principle enunciated in L. Muniswamy supra calls for the quashment of
this proceeding.
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235. Therefore, the FIR in Crime No.05 of 2021 does not stand on firm
legal ground because the allegations essentially try to treat official acts,
carried out under constitutional and statutory authority, as criminal offences.
The FIR in Crime No.05 of 2021 stands vitiated by mala fides and political
vendetta.
RESULT:
236. Accordingly, the Criminal Petitions are allowed and
consequently, the proceedings in Crime No.5/2021 registered on the file
of the CID Police Station, Amaravathi, Mangalagiri, Guntur District, are
quashed in their entirety as against both Petitioners.
REFLECTIONS:
237. The case of Crime No. 5 of 2021 raises profound questions about
the boundaries of governmental power and the limits of criminal accountability
for policy decisions. In a democracy, elected governments must be free to
make policy decisions, including decisions that are innovative, controversial,
or even incorrect, without the fear of criminal prosecution every time a
subsequent government disagrees with those policies.
238. This Court, in allowing the Quash Petitions, drew a principled
distinction between a governmental decision that is wrong or irregular (which
is subject to legal challenge in civil or constitutional proceedings) and a
governmental decision that is criminal (which is subject to criminal
prosecution). This Court found that the materials disclosed the former but not
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the latter. As mentioned in Bhagavad Gita, “उद्धरे दात्मनात्मानं , नात्मानमवसादयेि्;
आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो बन्ुः , आत्मै व ररपुरात्मनः ” (“Uddhared atmanam atmanam, na
atmanam avasadayet; atmaiva hy atmano bandhur, atmaiva ripur atmanah”),
which means, “Let a man elevate himself by his own mind, let him not degrade
himself; for the mind can be the friend of the conditioned soul, and his enemy
as well.” One of the most critical aspects of this case is the alleged political
motivation behind the FIR. The registration of criminal cases against
opposition leaders by ruling party governments, and vice versa, has become a
disturbing feature of Indian politics. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has
repeatedly expressed concern about the weaponization of criminal law for
political purposes. In the present case, the pattern is clear: the complaint was
filed by an MLA of the ruling party, it targeted the former (present) Chief
Minister and a former (present) Cabinet Minister of the Government of Andhra
Pradesh, it was registered two years after the change of Government, and it
was being investigated by the CID, which functions directly under the State
Government.
239. The case of Crime No. 5 of 2021, registered at CID PS, A.P.,
Mangalagiri, is a microcosm of the larger tensions that define Indian
governance, politics, and law. At its heart, it is a case about power: the power
of the State to formulate and implement policy; the power of the criminal law to
hold public servants accountable; the power of the courts to protect individuals
from the abuse of that criminal law; and the power of the Constitution to
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protect the most vulnerable members of society from exploitation.
Thiruvalluvar, a Tamil Scholar, in his Thirukkural, mentioned like this, “नीति
शास्त्र सार इति नै कदातप – राजधमो ति रतक्षिुं सवमम्”, which means, “The essence of
political science is to protect all; statecraft without ethics leads to ruin.”
240. This Court, in allowing the Quash Petitions, exercised its
jurisdiction in a principled manner. It is found that the allegations in the FIR,
even taken at face value, do not constitute the criminal offences alleged, and
that the materials available do not disclose the criminal intent necessary to
sustain the charges. The Court’s reasoning was shaped not only by the legal
issues but also by the prevailing political context, which cast doubt on the
bona fides of the prosecution and raised serious concerns about whether the
proceedings were driven by genuine legal grounds or influenced by political
motivations. The most fundamental of Vedic prayers from Brihadaranyaka
Upanishad, “िमसो मा ज्योतिर्ममय” (“Tamaso ma jyotirgamaya”) which means,
“Lead us from darkness to light,” is applicable to all seekers of justice and
truth.
241. Before concluding, this Court deems it a matter of judicial
conscience to record its deep appreciation to the learned Senior Counsel viz.,
Sri Siddharth Luthra, Sri Venkateswarlu Posani, Sri Siddharth Dave and Sri
Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy, for their adroit and thorough assistance in
disposal of these two petitions.
173
Crl.P.Nos.1762 & 1763 of 2021
15.07.2026
Dr.YLR,J
242. In a lighter vein, the Court wryly observed the irony of political
rivals accusing each other of criminality only after losing office, likening the
change of Government to the change of seasons – each ushering in a fresh
crop of FIRs against the outgoing dispensation. With restrained judicial
humour, this Court notes that Government Orders transform from routine
administrative acts into alleged instruments of villainy, and back again with
every election – much like Cinderella’s carriage turning into a pumpkin at
midnight.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
“यिो धममस्तिो जयः ”
“Where there is dharma, there is victory. Justice, when upheld, triumphs overall.”
_______________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
Dated: 15.07.2026
VTS
Whether the order is :
Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No
Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No
