Telangana High Court
Muthyamgiri Sathaiah vs Boddu Rajanna on 10 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
CRP Nos.2887 AND 2888 OF 2019
DATE: 10.07.2026
Between:
Muthyamgiri Sathaiah & others
...Petitioners
AND
Boddu Rajanna
...Respondent
COMMON ORDER:
CRP No.2887 of 2019 is filed under Section 227 of Constitution of
India against the common order dated 05.01.2019 passed in C.M.A No.11
of 2018 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC),
at Mancherial upholding the order dated 18.7.2018 in IA No.135 of 2018
in O.S No.36 of 2018 on the file of Junior Civil Judge at Chennur.
2. CRP No.2888 of 2019 is filed under Section 227 of Constitution of
India against the common order dated 05.01.2019 passed in C.M.A No.13
of 2018 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge (FTC),
at Mancherial upholding the order dated 10.9.2018 in IA No.209 of 2018
in O.S No.36 of 2018 on the file of Junior Civil Judge at Chennur.
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3. Since, the issue in both the Civil Revision Petitions is common,
hence they are heard and ordered by this Common order.
4. Heard Sri Sandeep Kumar Bodla, the counsel appearing for the
petitioners and Sri M.R.S.Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondent.
5. For the sake of convenience, both the parties shall be arrayed as
arrayed in the suit as plaintiff and defendant.
6. The brief facts leading to the filing of the Civil Revision Petitions are
that the original suit, being O.S. No. 36 of 2018, was instituted by the
plaintiff/respondent herein, Sri Boddu Rajanna, seeking a decree of
perpetual injunction in respect of the agricultural land admeasuring
Ac.2-35 guntas in Survey No. 27, situated at Jangama Village, Kotapally
Mandal (hereinafter referred to as the “suit schedule property”). The
specific case of the plaintiff is that the suit schedule property originally
belonged to his maternal grandfather, Sri Muthyamgiri Erra Mallaiah.
Upon the demise of Sri Muthyamgiri Erra Mallaiah, the property devolved
upon the plaintiff’s mother, and thereafter upon the plaintiff by
succession. It is further the case of the plaintiff that his name has been
duly mutated in the revenue records and he has been in continuous,
peaceful, and lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
property. Alleging interference with his possession by the defendants, the
plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit seeking the relief of perpetual
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injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
7. Per contra, the defendants, namely, Muthyamgiri Sathaiah, son of
Poshiah, Muthyamgiri Mahesh, and Muthyamgiri Naresh, who are the
legal heirs of late Muthyamgiri Poshiah, have set up a rival claim
contending that the suit schedule property originally belong to late
Muthyamgiri Poshiah, who remained in continuous possession and
enjoyment thereof until his demise in the year 2010. It is their specific
case that, upon his death, they succeeded to the suit schedule property as
his legal heirs and have continued to remain in peaceful possession and
enjoyment thereof ever since. The defendants have also disputed the
mutation entries relied upon by the plaintiff, contending that the same
neither confer title nor establish lawful possession over the suit schedule
property.
8. In view of the rival claims regarding possession of the suit schedule
property and the allegations of interference made by each side, the
plaintiff filed the suit along with I.A. No. 135 of 2018 seeking an order of
temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his
alleged peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
The defendants, in turn, filed I.A. No. 209 of 2018 seeking a temporary
injunction against the plaintiff.
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9. Upon consideration of the material on record, the learned trial
Court allowed I.A. No. 135 of 2018 filed by the plaintiff and dismissed I.A.
No. 209 of 2018 filed by the defendants. Aggrieved by the said common
order, the defendants preferred C.M.A.Nos.11 and 13 of 2018 before the
Appellate Court. The Appellate Court, by a common judgment, dismissed
both the appeals, confirming the order passed by the trial Court.
10. Challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below, the
defendants have filed the present Civil Revision Petitions Learned counsel
for the petitioners/defendants contend that the orders passed by both the
Courts below are illegal, arbitrary, and contrary to the material available
on record. It is contended that the Courts below failed to properly
appreciate the evidence and erroneously held that the
respondent/plaintiff, Boddu Rajanna, is in possession of the suit schedule
property.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that late Muthyamgiri
Poshiah was in possession of the suit schedule property till his death i.e,
upto 2009, and upon his demise, the petitioners being his legal heirs
succeeded to and continued in possession of the property. It is submitted
that this vital aspect has not been considered by either of the Courts
below. It is further contended that the respondent/plaintiff has failed to
explain the basis for the mutation of his name in the revenue records and
that such revenue entries by themselves neither confer title nor establish
lawful possession.
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12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the
Courts below failed to consider the material documentary evidence
produced by the petitioners, particularly Exs. R1 to R23 and erroneously
recorded a finding that no evidence had been adduced on behalf of the
defendants, such a finding is contrary to the record.
13. Learned counsel further argued that both the Courts below erred in
granting an order of temporary injunction in favour of the
respondent/plaintiff without properly appreciating the oral and
documentary evidence available on record. It is contended that the
respondent failed to establish his possession over the suit schedule
property and that the Courts below placed undue reliance on the revenue
records neither confer title nor conclusively establish possession.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners
have placed sufficient material on record to demonstrate their possession
over the suit schedule property, but the same has not been duly
appreciated by the Courts below, resulting in findings that are perverse
and unsustainable in law. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned
orders be set aside.
15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff
submitted that both the Courts below, upon a proper appreciation of the
oral and documentary evidence, have recorded concurrent findings of fact
holding that the respondent is in possession of the suit schedule property.
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It is contended that such concurrent findings do not warrant interference
in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227
of the Constitution of India.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the respondent
has successfully established his possession through cogent documentary
evidence, whereas the petitioners have failed to rebut the same and that
the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality, jurisdictional error,
or perversity warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
17. The points that can be considered before this Court are:
1. “Whether the concurrent findings of the Courts
below suffer from perversity?
2. Whether the Courts below failed to properly
appreciate the evidence?
3. Whether the impugned orders warrant interference
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?”
18. The main grievances of both the parties are that, the plaintiffs claim
that he is the owner and possessor of the suit schedule property having
succeeded to the same from his maternal grandfather, that his name has
been mutated in the revenue records has been in continuous possession
and cultivation of the land, the defendants are attempting to interfere with
his possession without any lawful right. Per contra, defendants denying
the claim of the plaintiff and contended that the plaintiff was never in
possession of the suit schedule property and their specific case that the
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property belonged to their predecessor i.e., Sri Poshiah and after his
death, they have been in possession.
19. The trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and
documentary evidence marked as Ex.P1 to P12 examined whether the
plaintiff has established the essential ingredients for the grant of a
temporary injunction. The Court found that the revenue records stand in
the name of the plaintiff and prima facie indicate his possession over the
suit schedule property. The Court further observed that the balance of
convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff would suffer
irreparable loss if an injunction is not granted. Accordingly, the trial Court
held that the plaintiff is entitled to an ad-interim injunction and allowed
I.A. No. 135 of 2018. In I.A. No. 209 of 2018 which was filed by the
Defendants (i.e., Muthyamgiri Poshaiah & others) under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 and 2 CPC, seeking a temporary injunction restraining the
plaintiff, Boddu Rajanna from interfering with their alleged possession
and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. The Trial Court, upon
consideration of the pleadings and documents filed by the defendants
including Ex.R1 to R23, held that the defendants failed to establish their
possession as on the date of filing of the suit. The Court further observed
that in view of the findings recorded in I.A. No. 135 of 2018, wherein it
was held that the plaintiff is in possession. Hence, the defendants are not
entitled to grant of injunction. Accordingly, the trial Court dismissed I.A.
No. 209 of 2018. Subsequently, C.M.A. Nos.11 of 2018 and 13 of 2018
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were filed by the defendants before the II Addl. District Judge (FTC),
Mancherial and the Appellate Court, after hearing the submissions of both
parties has observed that the trial Court has passed orders on the basis of
such material and therefore the Appellate Court held that there are no
justifiable grounds to interfere with the orders under challenge and
dismissed C.M.A. Nos. 11 and 13 of 2018, confirming the orders of the
trial Court.
20. Before examining whether the learned trial Court and the First
Appellate Court have committed any error apparent on the face of the
record, or whether the order granting temporary injunction as confirmed
by the First Appellate Court warrants interference by this Court in
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, it is necessary to consider the scope of such
jurisdiction.
21. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that both the Civil Revision
Petitions are filed against the concurrent findings recorded by the trial
Court and the First Appellate Court. The scope of interference with such
concurrent findings in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well settled and is extremely
limited. Therefore, before adverting to the merits of the case, it is
necessary to examine the settled principles governing the exercise of such
jurisdiction.
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22. Therefore, the principal question that falls for consideration before
this Court is whether the Courts below were justified, on the basis of the
material placed before them, in recording a prima facie finding regarding
possession in favour of the plaintiff and consequently granting an order of
temporary injunction, warranting interference in the supervisory
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
23. In Radhey Shyam and another 1, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while distinguishing the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has categorically held
that the power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and
not that of an appellate or revisional Court. The supervisory jurisdiction is
intended to ensure that subordinate Courts and Tribunals Court comes
within the bounds of their authority and follow the procedure established
by law and such jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in
appropriate cases involving patent perversity, gross miscarriage of justice,
jurisdictional error, or a manifest failure of justice. It is not open to the
High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, to
reappreciate the evidence or substitute its own conclusions merely
because another view is possible. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further
observed that, particularly after the amendment to Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
cannot be invoked as a substitute for a revision or an appeal. Interference
1
(2015) 5 SCC 423
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is warranted only where the findings recorded by the courts below are
shown to be patently perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from
manifest illegality resulting in grave injustice. The relevant paragraphs
Nos.25 to 27 are hereunder extracted:
“25. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities
associated with the prerogative writs in England have no role
to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no parallel
system of King’s Court in India and of all other courts having
limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of King’s Court.
Courts are set up under the Constitution or the laws. All courts
in the jurisdiction of a High Court are subordinate to it and
subject to its control and supervision under Article 227. Writ
jurisdiction is constitutionally conferred on all High Courts.
Broad principles of writ jurisdiction followed in England are
applicable to India and a writ of certiorari lies against patently
erroneous or without jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or
authorities or courts other than judicial courts. There are no
precedents in India for High Courts to issue writs to
subordinate courts. Control of working of subordinate courts in
dealing with their judicial orders is exercised by way of
appellate or revisional powers or power of superintendence
under Article 227. Orders of civil court stand on different
footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts
other than judicial/civil courts. While appellate or revisional
jurisdiction is regulated by statutes, power of superintendence
under Article 227 is constitutional. The expression “inferior
court” is not referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in
the referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above.
26. The Bench in Surya Dev Rai also observed in para 25 of its
judgment that distinction between Articles 226 and 227stood
almost obliterated. In para 24 of the said judgment distinction
in the two articles has been noted. In view thereof, observation
that scope of Article 226 and 227 was obliterated was not
correct as rightly observed by the referring Bench in Para 32
quoted above. We make it clear that though despite the
curtailment of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC by
Act 46 of 1999, jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227
remains unaffected, it has been wrongly assumed in certain
quarters that the said jurisdiction has been expanded. Scope of
Article 227 has been explained in several decisions including
Waryam Singh and another vs. Amarnath and Another,
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CRP Nos.2887 & 2888 OF 2019Ouseph Mathai vs. M. Abdul Khadir, Shalini Shyam Shetty vs.
Rajendra Shankar Patil and Sameer Suresh Gupta vs. Rahul
Kumar Agarwal. In Shalini Shyam Shetty, this Court observed :
“64. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that of
late there is a growing trend amongst several High
Courts to entertain writ petition in cases of pure property
disputes. Disputes relating to partition suits, matters
relating to execution of a decree, in cases of dispute
between landlord and tenant and also in a case of
money decree and in various other cases where disputed
questions of property are involved, writ courts are
entertaining such disputes. In some cases the High
Courts, in a routine manner, entertain petitions under
Article 227 over such disputes and such petitions are
treated as writ petitions.
65. We would like to make it clear that in view of the law
referred to above in cases of property rights and in
disputes between private individuals writ court should
not interfere unless there is any infraction of statute or it
can be shown that a private individual is acting in
collusion with a statutory authority.
66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there
is a tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227
of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions.
This is sought to be justified on an erroneous
appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev and in view of the
recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure
Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act,
1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment,
scope of Section 115 CPC has been curtailed. In our
view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed
that has not resulted in expanding the High Court’s
power of superintendence. It is too well known to be
reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court
must act strictly in accordance with law.
67. As a result of frequent interference by the Hon’ble
High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the
Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal
cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal
courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious
problems in the administration of justice. This Court
hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under
Article 226 or 227, the Hon’ble High Court will follow the
time honoured principles discussed above. Those
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CRP Nos.2887 & 2888 OF 2019principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of
justice and the High Courts as the highest courts of
justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them
strictly.”
27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts
are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226. We
are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench that
a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person not
discharging any public duty. The Scope of Article 227 is
different from that of Article 226.”
24. In Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and
others2, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the
scope of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and the grant of temporary
injunctions, reiterated the well-settled principles governing the exercise of
such jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the grant of
an injunction is a discretionary relief and that such discretion can be
exercised only when the Court is satisfied that a serious triable issue
arises for consideration and when there is a probability of the plaintiff
ultimately being entitled to the relief sought, then it is necessary to
protect the party from irreparable injury, loss, or damage. The Court must
also consider the comparative hardship, mischief, or inconvenience likely
to be caused to the parties if the injunction is either granted or refused.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that the burden lies upon the
plaintiff to place sufficient material before the Court to establish a prima
facie case in his favour and to demonstrate an infringement of his right or
enjoyment of the property. The existence of a prima facie case is a
2
(1992) 1 SCC 719
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condition precedent for the grant of an injunction. In addition thereto, the
Court must also be satisfied that the balance of convenience lies in favour
of the plaintiff and that refusal of the injunction would result in
irreparable loss or injury incapable of being adequately compensated in
terms of money. The relevant observations contained in paragraph No.4
and 5 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder.
“4. Order 39, Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may
be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or
otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the
plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to
any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order
grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such
other order for the purpose of staying and preventing… or
dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the
plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the
court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further
orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law
Commission clause(c) was brought on statute by Section
88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from
February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power
except the inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. to grant ad
interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily
concerns with the preservation of the property in dispute till
legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by
which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any
particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant
to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in
exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to
preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the
time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a
discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court
satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be
tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court,
there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for
by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court’s interference is
necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In
other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before
the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the
comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is
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than that would be likely to arise from granting it.
5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde
by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his
favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of
the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his
property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary
injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima
facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial.
Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona
fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits.
Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not
sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy
that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable
injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other
remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction
and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended
injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not
mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the
injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one,
namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of
damages. The third condition also is that “the balance of
convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The
Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should
exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of
substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the
parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is
likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted.
If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of
likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the
suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an
injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its
sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad
interim injunction pending the suit.”
25. In Wander Limited v. Antox India Private Limited 3,
particularly paragraph Nos.8 and 9 thereof, wherein the principles
governing the grant of temporary injunctions were once again reiterated
and explained, which reads as under:
3
1990 (SUPP) SCC 727
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CRP Nos.2887 & 2888 OF 2019“8.The point for consideration is whether there is a prima facie
case on which Antox could be held entitled to restrain Wander
Ltd. and Alfred Berg from manufacturing and marketing goods
under the Trade name Cal-De-Ce and whether on
considerations of balance of convenience and comparative
hardship a temporary injunction should issue. The corollary is
that even if the injunction sought by Antox is refused, that does
not, ipso-facto, entitled Wander Ltd. and Alfred Berg to
manufacture and market the goods if they are not otherwise
entitled to do so under the relevant laws regulating the matter.
9.. Usually, the prayer for grant of an interlocutory injunction is
at a stage when the existence of the legal right asserted by the
plaintiff and its alleged violation are both contested and
uncertain and remain uncertain till they are established at the
trial on evidence. The court, at this stage, acts on certain well
settled principles of administration of this form of interlocutory
remedy which is both temporary and discretionary.”
26. In Garment Craft v. Prakash Cand Goel4, particularly
paragraph Nos. 15 to 17, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborately
explained the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While doing so, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in Estralla Rubber v. Dass
Estate (P) Ltd., reported in (2001) 8 SCC 97, and reiterated the well-settled
principle that, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227, the High
Court cannot act as an appellate court or substitute its own view for that
of the subordinate court merely to correct an error which is not apparent
on the face of the record. It was further held that interference with
findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or tribunal is warranted
only where such findings are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or
4
(2022) 4 SCC 181
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are so perverse that no reasonable person could have arrived at such
conclusions and the said paragraphs are extracted hereunder:
“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of
the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot
be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation
from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court
exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of
first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon
which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory
jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal
flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The
High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and
conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The
jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction
to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation
of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power
under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases,
like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is
so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to
such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is
axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to
ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article 227, this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd (2001) 8 SCC 97“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction
by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
examined and explained in a number of decisions of this Court.
The exercise of power under this article involves a duty on the
High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and to see that they do the duty
expected or required of them in a legal manner. The High Court
is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds
of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of
this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or
tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and
flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice,
where if the High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice
remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court
while acting under this article cannot exercise its power as an
appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that
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CRP Nos.2887 & 2888 OF 2019of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not
apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set
aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior court or
tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is
so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to
such a conclusion, which the court or tribunal has come to.”
17. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had applied
for the certified copy would show that the counsel for the
appellant was aware that the ex-parte decree had been passed
on the account of failure to lead defence evidence. This would
not, however, be a good ground and reason to set aside and
substitute the opinion formed by the trial court that the
appellant being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and
another chance should be given to the appellant to lead defence
evidence. The discretion exercised by the trial court in granting
relief, did not suffer from an error apparent on the face of the
record or was not a finding so perverse that it was
unsupported by evidence to justify it. There could be some
justification for the respondent to argue that the appellant was
possibly aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the
submission that the appellant came to know of the ex-parte
decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017 is incorrect,
but this would not affect the factually correct explanation of the
appellant that he was incarcerated and could not attend the
civil suit proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017.
If it was felt that the application for setting aside the ex-parte
decree was filed belatedly, the court could have given an
opportunity to the appellant to file an application for
condonation of delay and costs could have been imposed. The
facts as known, equally apply as grounds for condonation of
delay. It is always important to take a holistic and overall view
and not get influenced by aspects which can be explained.
Thus, the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate
consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant interference
in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution.”
27. Having regard to the aforesaid settled principles of law governing
the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
and the grant of temporary injunction, this Court now proceeds to
examine the facts of the present case in the light of the material available
on record.
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28. The case of the plaintiffs is that they are the absolute owners and
possessors of the agricultural land admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas in Survey
No.27, situated at Janagama Village, Kottapalli Mandal. It is their specific
case that the suit schedule property originally belonged to their maternal
grandfather, Muttyamgari Erra Mallaiah, from whom it devolved upon
their mother by way of inheritance. Thereafter, upon the demise of their
mother, the petitioners succeeded to the property as her legal heirs.
According to them, the revenue records were accordingly mutated in their
favour, and ever since then they have been in peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property.
29. Per contra, the respondents have relied upon Exhibits R-1 to R-23.
Exhibit R-1 is the death certificate of one M.Pochamma. Exhibits R-2 to R-
21 are certified copies of the pahanis pertaining to the period from 1981 to
2008-2009. On perusal of the said revenue records discloses that, while
the name of M.Erra Mallaiah continues to be shown as the pattadar, the
name of M.Pochamma is reflected as the person in possession of the suit
schedule property.
30. A careful reading of the counter filed by the respondents would
further reveal that the respondents have not disputed the fact that the
suit schedule property originally belonged to M.Erra Mallaiah. Their
principal defence is that, after the demise of M.Erra Mallaiah, his wife,
M.Pochamma, continued in possession and enjoyment of the suit
schedule property and that the revenue records consistently reflected her
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possession. Thus, the dispute between the parties is essentially with
regard to the question of possession, the respondents asserting that the
petitioners were never in possession of the suit schedule property.
31. The suit schedule property claimed by the plaintiffs is agricultural
land admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas in Survey No. 27, situated at Jangaon
Village, Kothapalli Revenue Mandal. According to the plaintiffs, Defendant
No. 1 is the father of Defendant Nos. 2 and 3. It is further their case that
Defendant No. 1 is an agnate of the plaintiffs’ grandfather, late Eram
Mallaiah. The plaintiffs’ claim is confined only to the agricultural land
admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas in Survey No. 27. The defendants, however,
dispute the said claim.
32. It is pertinent to note that the defendants have also set up a counter
claim in the suit, specifically contending that Defendant No.2 is in
possession and cultivation of the suit schedule land admeasuring Ac. 2.35
guntas in Survey No. 27. It is an admitted fact that the father of
Defendant No. 1 and one Muttengari Yerra Mallaiah were real brothers
and constituted a joint Hindu family during their lifetime. It is also not in
dispute that Muttengari Yerra Mallaiah and Muttengari Pochaiah were the
owners and possessors of the agricultural lands bearing Survey No. 25,
admeasuring Ac. 3.25 guntas, and Survey No. 27, admeasuring Ac. 2.37
guntas, situated at Jangaon Shivar. It is further an admitted fact that the
plaintiff is in cultivation and possession of the agricultural land
admeasuring Ac. 3.25 guntas in Survey No. 25, situated at Jangaon
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Shivar. Thus, while the plaintiff claims possession over the land in Survey
No. 25, the defendants assert possession and cultivation over the land in
Survey No. 27 by way of their counter claim.
33. It is also evident that the defendants are claiming the very same
land, namely, agricultural land admeasuring Ac. 2.35 guntas in Survey
No. 27, and have specifically asserted that they are in possession and
cultivation of the said land and they are in lawful possession of the very
same suit schedule property and that the plaintiff-respondents are
making illegal attempts to interfere with their peaceful possession and
enjoyment thereof. Consequently, the defendants have also set up a
counterclaim in the suit seeking the relief of perpetual injunction
restraining the plaintiffs from interfering with their possession and
enjoyment of the suit schedule property and the defendants are relying
upon a panchanama alleged to have been prepared by the Village Revenue
Officer and the Mandal Surveyor in the presence of panch witnesses. The
said panchanama records that, upon local enquiry, it was found that the
land bearing Survey No.27, situated on the outskirts of Jangaon Village
and admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas, had been under the cultivation of late
Muthamgari Pochaiah, son of Pullaiah, for nearly sixty years till his
demise on 30.09.2010. It is further recorded that, thereafter, his legal
successor, Muthamgari Sathaiah, S/o. Pochaiah, has been cultivating the
said land and has continued in peaceful possession and enjoyment
thereof by raising agricultural crops.
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34. The material placed on record further discloses that an appeal
under Section 5-B of the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar
Pass Books Act, 1971, has also been preferred before the Revenue
Divisional Officer seeking to set aside the mutation proceedings effected in
favour of the respondents/plaintiffs in the year 2010 in respect of the land
admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas in Survey No.27 of Jangaon Village. Thus,
the defendants are also placing reliance upon revenue records, namely,
the Adangal, Pahani and Pattadar Pass Books, in support of their claim.
35. On perusal of the Pattadar Pass Book, however, reveals that the
lands in Survey No.25 admeasuring Ac.3.25 guntas and Survey No.27
admeasuring Ac.2.35 guntas stand recorded in the name of Sri Boddu
Rajanna, the plaintiff. Prima facie, the revenue records support the case of
the plaintiffs with regard to their possession over the suit schedule
property.
36. It is no doubt true that, while considering an application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is
competent to incidentally examine the question of title for the limited
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists. In the present
case, the learned Trial Court has meticulously considered the entire
documentary material relied upon by both parties and, upon such
consideration, recorded a finding that the plaintiffs had established a
prima facie case, that the balance of convenience lay in their favour, and
that they would suffer irreparable injury in the event of refusal of
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temporary injunction. Consequently, the learned Trial Court allowed I.A.
No.135 of 2018 filed by the plaintiffs and granted temporary injunction in
their favour, while dismissing I.A. No.209 of 2018 filed by the defendants
seeking similar relief by way of counter-claim.
37. The learned Appellate Court, on an independent re-appreciation of
the entire material available on record, concurred with the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court, the Appellate Court observed that the
name of the plaintiff had been continuously reflected in the revenue
records as pattadar and possessor of the suit schedule property for
several years prior to the institution of the suit and that the plaintiffs had
successfully established a prima facie case as regards their title and
possession. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned trial Court was
confirmed.
38. Having carefully examined the impugned orders and the material
available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that both the
Courts below have appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in its
proper perspective and have concurrently recorded a finding that the
plaintiffs are in prima facie possession of the suit schedule property.
39. The concurrent findings recorded by the both the trial Court and
appellate Court are based on a proper appreciation of the material
available on record and cannot be said to suffer from any patent illegality,
perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in
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exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. This Court, therefore, finds no justification to
interfere with the well reasoned orders passed by the learned trial Court
which were affirmed by the learned Appellate Court.
40. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petitions are devoid of merit and
therefore both the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
Consequently, all pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall
stand closed.
________________________
NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA,J
Date: 10.07.2026
SHA
