Bombay High Court
Murlidhar Sukhdeo Paliwal And Another vs Shri Padamprabhu Maharaj Jain Sansthan … on 13 July, 2026
2026:BHC-NAG:9073
1 WP 3230.19
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.3230 OF 2019
1. Shri Murlidhar Sukhdeo Paliwal,
Aged about 71 years,
Occupation-Cultivator.
2. Shri Sunil Mohan Paliwal (Dead)
Aged about 46 years,
Occupation-Cultivator,
Both R/o. Belkhed, Tq. Telhara,
Distt. Akola.
Through L.Rs.
2-a) Smt. Maya wd/o Sunil Paliwal,
Aged about 53 years,
Occupation-Housewife.
2-b) Barkha d/o Sunil Paliwal,
Aged about 30 years.
2-c) Deep s/o Sunil Paliwal,
Aged about 29 years,
Occupation-Business,
All R/o. Shivaji Nagar,
Tq. Telhara, Distt. Akola. .. Petitioners
.. Versus ..
1. Shri Padamprabhu Maharaj Jain
Sansthan Telhara, through its Trustee
Shri Rajendra Keshavlal Shaha,
Aged about 60 years,
Occupation-Agriculturist,
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R/o. Tower 4, Flat No.405, Capitol
Heights, Baidhyanath Chowk,
Nagpur.
2. Sub-Divisional Officer, Akot.
Distt. Akola.
3. The Member, Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal, Civil Lines, Nagpur. .. Respondents
..........
Shri V.K. Paliwal, Advocate for Petitioners.
Shri S.S. Sitani, Advocate for Respondent No.1.
Shri H.D. Marathe, AGP for Respondent Nos.2 and 3.
..............
CORAM : PRAVIN S. PATIL, J.
DATED : 13.07.2026.
JUDGMENT
1. The challenge by way of present petition is to the
judgment and order passed by the Member, Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur in Revision No.REV/TNC/AKO-
29/2018, decided on 28.3.2019.
2. In the present matter the facts of the present petition
are summarized as under :
The Respondent No.1-Trust is the owner of land
ad-measuring 4.80 HR of Survey No.206 of Mouza Belkhed,
Tahsil-Telhara, District-Akola. The said land was in cultivating
3 WP 3230.19
possession of one Sukhdeo Khushalidas Paliwal. The said
Sukhdeo was expired on 24.8.1985.
The present Respondent No.1-Trust, on the strength of
Exemption Certificate obtained under Section 129(b) of the
Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural land (Vidarbha Region)
Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1958), filed the
application under Section 120 of the Act of 1958 for possession
against the present petitioners.
3. It is the submission of Respondent No.1-Trust that after
the death of original tenant, the legal heirs has no right to
continue the tenancy and they are in illegal possession. Hence,
on the strength of the certificate obtained under Section 129 (b)
of the Act of 1958, the proceeding of summarily eviction and
possession was filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Akot in
the month of March-2014.
4. The said application was strongly opposed by the
present petitioners. It is the submission of the petitioners
before the Sub-Divisional Officer that the father of Respondent
No.1 namely, Manilal Shaha filed R.C. No.133/59/(10-F)
(Belkhed) /1960-61 under Section 19 read with Section 36 of
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the Act of 1958 against Sukhdeo Khusalidas Paliwal (deceased)
for termination of tenancy and possession. The said application
was rejected by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer by his order
dated 22.12.1961. The revision filed against the said order by
the said Manilal Shaha was also dismissed. As such, the said
proceeding has attended the finality. Therefore, the application
filed by the Respondent No.1-Trust for summarily eviction
under Section 120 of the Act is itself not tenable.
5. The learned Sub-Divisional Officer, by his order dated
27.2.2018 has considered the rival submission and recorded the
fact that the original tenant Sukhdeo expired on 24.8.1985.
After his death, the present petitioners were in possession in the
capacity of legal heirs of deceased Sukhdeo. It is further
observed that by the provisions of the Act of 1958 the deceased
Sukhdeo was declared as protected tenant of the land and,
therefore, as per Section 46 of the Act of 1958, the deceased
Sukhdeo was become the owner of the land. So also it is held
by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer that one Manilal Shaha
has filed the proceeding in the year 1961 for recovery of the
possession and that proceedings were dismissed and confirmed
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by the Revisional Court and, therefore, the proceedings filed by
the Respondent No.1-Trust are not tenable and accordingly
though the Respondent No.1-Trust has obtained the certificate
under Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958, the possession of the
land in question being in possession of the petitioners since year
1958, the application filed by the Respondent No.1-Trust was
rejected.
6. The Respondent No.1-Trust against the order of Sub-
Divisional Officer preferred the statutory revision before the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur. The Respondent No.1-
Trust has raised various grounds before the Tribunal and
thereby pointed out the impugned order passed by the learned
Sub-Divisional Officer is liable to be quashed and set aside.
7. The petitioners, who appeared before the Revenue
Tribunal, have raised ground of res judicata. According to
petitioners, earlier proceeding filed by one Manilal Shaha
against deceased Sukhdeo was rejected and said proceeding
attended finality, therefore, application of trust is not tenable.
It is further stated that the application filed by the respondent is
barred by limitation and, therefore, the revision deserves to be
6 WP 3230.19
dismissed, along with this major ground supported the order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer in the matter.
8. The learned Tribunal, after considering the submission
of both the parties, has recorded the findings that the
respondent no.1-Trust, at the time of hearing, has produced the
original certificate obtained under Section 129(b) of the Act of
1958 and the property in dispute is mentioned in the said
certificate. It is held that in view of certificate obtained under
Section 129(b) of the Act of 1958, the provisions of Section 54
of the Act of 1958 are not applicable in the matter, as held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shriram
Mandir Sansthan alias Shri Shri Ram Sansthan Pusda .vs.
Vatsalabai and others. In respect of res judicata, it is recorded
that the proceedings which were filed by earlier occasion in the
year 1960-61 was for termination of tenancy, whereas the
proceedings which are filed by the respondent no.1-trust are
under Section 120 of the Act of 1958 for the eviction of illegal
possession of the deceased over the suit property. As such, by
recording all these reasons, the revision application was
allowed.
7 WP 3230.19
9. In this background, the petitioners approached before
this court stating that learned Tribunal failed to consider the
applicability of principle of res-judicata while deciding revision.
Petitioners, in support of their submission, today handed over
the pursis along with copy of order-sheet in R.C.
No.133/59/(10-F)/60-61 of Belkhed. Petitioners from said
proceeding pointed out that the application for possession was
filed by Manilal Shaha in the capacity of a Manager of the Trust
and said proceedings were dismissed on the ground that the
application for possession of the field for personal cultivation is
not permissible in view of the judgment of this court in the case
of Buvasaheb Tatyasaheb Mathakari ,vs, Yesu Krishna Kadam,
reported in 1959 SCC Online Bom 148 . As such, issue of
possession attended finality in the matter, therefore, same
cannot be agitated again by applying the principle of
res-judicata.
10. The minute perusal of the application shows that the
proceedings were filed before the Revenue Court under Section
19 read with Section 36 of the Act of 1958. Section 19 provides
the termination of tenancy on the ground enumerated under
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said provision and Section 36 provides for procedure of taking
possession. The perusal of these provision shows grounds
under which the proceeding can be filed for termination of
tenancy. So also Section 120 of the Act of 1958 states under
which circumstances, proceeding can be filed for recovery of
possession. It would be relevant to refer Section 19 of the Act
of 1958 which reads as under :
Section 19 : Termination of Tenancy :
(1) Notwithstanding any agreement, usage,
decree or order of a court of law, the tenancy of
any land held by a tenant shall not be
terminated-
(1) unless such tenant –
(a)(i) has failed to pay in any year, before
the 31st day of March of that year, the rent of
such land for that year, or
(ii) if an application for the determination
of reasonable rent is pending before the Tahsildar
under section 12, has failed to deposit within
thirty days from the aforesaid date with the
Tahsildar, a sum equal to the amount of rent
which he would have been liable to pay for that
year if no such application had been made, or
(iii) in case the reasonable rent determined
under section 12 is higher than the sum
deposited by him has failed to pay the balance
due from him within two months from the date
of decision of the Tahsildar.
9 WP 3230.19
(b) has done any act which is destructive or
permanently injurious to the land ;
(c) has sub-divided the land in contravention
of Section 33;
(d) has sub-let [for assigned] the land or failed
to cultivate it personally; or
(e) has used such land for a purpose other
than agriculture [or allied pursuits]; and
(II) unless the landlord has given three month’s
notice in writing informing the tenant of his
decision to terminate the tenancy and the
particulars of the ground for such termination
and within that period the tenant has failed to,
remedy the breach for which the tenancy is liable
to be terminated.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), the tenancy of any land held by a
tenant who is a widow or a minor or who is
subject to physical or mental disability or who is
a serving member of the armed force shall not be
liable to be terminated under the said sub-section
only on the ground that such land has been sub-
let on behalf of the said tenant.
Section 120 of the Act of 1958 is provided to claim the
possession from the person who is having unauthorised
occupation or wrongful possession of Trust land. Section 120
reads as under :
120. Any person unauthorizedly occupying or
wrongfully in possession of any land.
10 WP 3230.19
(a) the transfer of which either by the act of parties or
by the operation of law is invalid under the provisions
of this Act,
(b) the management of which has been assumed under
the said provisions, or
(c) to the use and occupation of which he is not
entitled under the said provisions and the said
provisions do not provide for the eviction of such
person,
may be summarily evicted by the Collector after such
inquiry as he deems fit.
From the perusal of both these provisions, it is clear that there
are two different provisions are provided under the statute for
termination of tenancy and seeking possession of a person who
is having an unauthorized occupation.
11. In the present case, the admitted fact is that the trust
has obtained exemption certificate on 15.4.1967. As such, in
absence of said certificate, the proceedings in the year 1960-61
were filed by the Manager of the trust in a personal capacity
under Section 19 of the Act of 1958, whereas the proceedings
which were filed under Section 120 of the Act of 1958 were in
the month of March-2014 on the basis of the exemption
certificate which was received on 15.4.1967. Therefore, in my
11 WP 3230.19
opinion, both these proceedings were initiated on different
cause of action. The proceeding under Section 120 of the Act of
1958 is filed on behalf of trust for eviction of tenants whose
possession is unauthorized immediately after the death of
original tenant, whereas the proceedings under Section 19 of
the Act of 1958 which were filed in personal capacity for
termination of tenancy in the capacity of Manager of the Trust
for cultivation purpose, therefore, the principle of res judicata
or constructive res judicata is not applicable in the matter. It is
further pertinent to note that there is no such bar to file
proceeding under Section 120 of the Act of 1958, once the
proceeding under Section 19 of the Act of 1958 are filed or
decided. The bare perusal of both the provisions which
reproduced above show the different cause of action to the trust
for termination of tenancy and for seeking possession from the
person who is unauthorizedly occupying the land. Therefore,
prima facie, it is clear that the principle of res judicata is not
applicable in the matter.
12. It is further pertinent to note that admittedly the
present petitioners are the legal heirs of deceased Sukhdeo.
12 WP 3230.19
The said Sukhdeo expired on 24.8.1985. The proceedings
which were filed in the year 1960-61 were against deceased
Sukhdeo and same was dismissed, by holding that the person,
who has filed the proceeding, has no right to file the
proceeding. As such, the said proceedings are not decided on
merits and on the technical reasons, the proceedings were
rightly rejected, on this count also principle of res-judicata is
not applicable in the matter.
13. Respondent No.1 further specifically states that the
proceedings, which are filed against the present petitioners in
the year 2014 was on relying upon the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Shriram Mandir Sansthan
alias Shri Ram Sansthan Pusda .vs. Vatsalabai and others,
reported in (1999) 1 SCC 657 , whereby it is held that after the
death of the tenant, the tenancy of the land is not inherited in
favour of the legal heirs. The tenancy came to an end
immediately after the death of the petitioner tenant. Hence,
from the death of original tenant, the possession of the legal
heirs becomes illegal. The Hon’ble Supreme in this judgment in
Para 13 and 14 observed as under :
13 WP 3230.19
13. The High Court was, therefore, not right
when it held that although Section 54 is
excluded, the ordinary law of succession and
inheritance is not. And, therefore, the tenancy of
lands belonging to the institutions covered by
Section 129(b) would be heritable under the
ordinary law if not under Section 54. In fact, the
Bombay High Court from 1958 to 1980 had
consistently held the view that the tenancy of a
public trust was not heritable. But in 1980, the
High Court held that Section 40 of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act was not the
only source of inheritance and as such the
tenancy of a public trust was heritable under that
Act. The present Section 54 is the relevant
section as far as lands in the Vidarbha Region are
concerned. The Full Bench upheld the view taken
in 1980. In our view, the exclusion of Section 54
by necessary implication also excludes the
provisions of the ordinary law of succession and
inheritance from the tenancy of agricultural lands
of institutions falling under Section 129(b)
14. Section 129 clearly seeks to protect certain
lands from the provisions of the Tenancy Act of
1958. The section thus protects lands held or
leased by a local authority or a university, lands
which are the property of a trust for an
educational purpose, hospital, panjrapole,
gaushala or an institution for public religious
worship, provided the entire income of such land
is appropriated for the purposes of such trust. It
also protects lands assigned or donated by any
person before the commencement of the said Act
for the purpose of rendering services useful to the
community, namely, maintenance of waterworks,
lighting or filling of water-troughs for cattle. It
also protects any land taken under management
by a civil, revenue or criminal court as set out
therein. There is a further safeguard ensuring
14 WP 3230.19
that the income from such lands is appropriated
for the purposes of a trust covered by Section
129(b). The explanation provides for the grant of
a certificate by the Collector after holding an
inquiry. Thus, the clear intention of Section 129
is to protect certain lands from tenancy
legislation where the lands or income from such
lands is being utilised for public purposes set out
there. In this context, if the tenancy of such lands
is not made heritable, this would clearly be in
furtherance of the purpose of exempting such
lands under Section 129.
14. In view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
it is clear that since 24.8.1985 the possession of the petitioners
on the land owned by the trust was illegal. It is not the case of
the petitioners that immediately after the tillers’ day or till the
filing of the proceeding by the present respondent no.1, they
have taken the positive steps to confirm their ownership by any
provision of the Act of 1958. As such, till the filing of the
proceedings, the petitioners were found to be illegal in
possession of the land, therefore, the proceedings which were
filed under Section 120 of the Act of 1958 are independent in
nature and by no stretch of imagination, the principle of res
judicata is not applicable in the matter.
15 WP 3230.19
15. The other issue which is raised by the petitioners is that
while issuing the certificate under Section 129 (b) of the act of
1958, the notice which is mandatory to be issued to the tenant
was not served on them and, therefore, the certificate which is
obtained by the petitioners is not tenable in the eyes of law.
In this regard, it would be pertinent to note that the certificate
which is relied by the respondent no.1 is of dated 15.4.1967.
The respondent no.1 has pointed out that as per the prevailing
law, at the relevant time, the notice was not mandatory to be
served on the tenant as the certification proceeding is between
the trust and the Collector and no role is to be played by the
tenant while issuing such notice. In support of this submission
relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Single Bench of this court
in the case of Shrimant Jagdeorao Anandrao Pawar .vs. Kisan
Namdeo Pawar and others, reported in 1979 Mh,L,J, 687.
16. The respondent no.1 has pointed out that the said legal
position first time in the year 1990 by the judgment of Division
Bench of this court in the case of Keraba Dattu Borachate and
others .vs. Shri Sheshashai and Vishnu Trust, reported in 1990
Mh.L.J. 1183 was reversed by holding that the law laid down in
16 WP 3230.19
the case of Shrimant Jagdeorao Anandrao Pawar .vs. Kisan
Namdeo Pawar and others (supra) is not a good law and
thereby the judgment of the Hon’ble Single Judge was
overruled. Hence, it is the submission of the respondent that
while issuing the certificate in the year 1967, as per the
prevailing law, the notice was not necessary to be served on the
petitioner-tenant and, therefore, on this count the certificate
issued in favour of trust cannot be held illegal. In my opinion,
considering then legal position, notice was not necessary to
issue to tenant, subsequent change in legal position would not
made proceeding void.
17. The third ground which the petitioners have raised
before this court about the limitation of filing of such
proceeding at the instance of the respondent-trust. According
to the petitioners, the proceedings are not filed within a
reasonable time after obtaining the certificate. The certificate
was obtained in the year 1967 and the proceedings were filed in
the year 2014 i.e. almost after period of 40 to 45 years. Hence,
such proceeding cannot be held to be tenable in the eyes of law.
In this regard, the respondent has pointed out that for filing the
17 WP 3230.19
proceeding under Section 120 of the Act of 1958, there is no
limitation is prescribed. According to the respondent no.1-trust,
the day on which the petitioners were found to be
unauthorizedly occupying the land, from that date the cause of
action was recurring one. There is no provision under the Act,
by efflux of time, they became the owner of the land which was
unauthorizedly occupied by them. In support of this submission,
the petitioner has relied upon the two judgments of this court in
the case of Kalidas alias Madhaorao Pande .vs. Wamanrao
Narayan Pande, reported in 1979 Mh.L.J. 887 and Janrao
Ganpatrao Ohe and others .vs. Bhimrao Madhavrao Aware,
reported in 1986 Mh.L.J. 516, wherein this issue was
considered elaborately and held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings filed under
Section 120 of the Act of 1958. It would be relevant to refer
Paras 10 and 11 of the judgment in the case of Janrao
Ganpatrao Ohe and others .vs. Bhimrao Madhavrao Aware
(supra) reads thus :
10. The real question however, to be considered
in my view is whether such a wider concept of
the ‘Court’ is contemplated under the provisions
of the Limitation Act. of the various judgments of
the Supreme Court would show that a ‘Court’
18 WP 3230.19
contemplated under the provisions of the
Limitation Act is an ordinary civil or criminal
Court as is generally understood. I may for
instance refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Nityanand M. Joshi and
another v. The Life Insurance Corporation of
India and others (AIR 1970 S.C. 209) in which it
is held that the Limitation Act is applicable to the
ordinary Courts. Even in the judgment in the
case of The Kerala State Electricity Board
Trivandrum v. T. P. Kunhatiumuna (AIR 1977 SC
282) on which heavy reliance is placed on behalf
of the petitioners to support their contention that
Art. 137 of the that the Limitation Act is
applicable to the applicants under any Act and
not necessarily to the applications under the
Code of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court has
taken the view that the Limitation Act would
apply to any petitions, applications filed under
the Act before a ‘Civil Court’ (see para 22 of the
report). It may be seen that although the
application in the said case was under the
Telegraph Act, it lay before the District Judge
who as found in the said case was an ordinary
Court of civil jurisdiction.
11. I may also observe that in the latest decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of Sakuru v.
Tanaji (cited supra) the view taken by the
Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in the case of K Venkaiah y. K. Venkateshwara
Rao (AIR 1978 Andhra Pradesh 1661 is affirmed.
The view taken by the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the said case is that the Limitation Act
applies to any proceedings before the Civil or
Criminal Courts and not to the proceedings
before the Collector, who is not a Civil or a
Criminal Court. It is therefore clear that for the
application of the provisions of the Limitation Act
is not enough that an authority of a tribunal
19 WP 3230.19
should be a ‘Court’ as is legally understood, but it
must be an ordinary civil or criminal Court of the
Land as the said expression is normally
understood. The authorities under the Rent
Control Order or under the Tenancy Act are not
Civil or Criminal Court as they are generally
understood. Hence, the provisions of the
Limitation Act are not directly attracted to the
proceedings under the said enactments. In this
view of the matter, the contention raised on
behalf of the petitioners that Art. 137 of the
Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings
under section 120(c) of the Tenancy Act deserves
to be rejected.
In view of the law laid down by this court, the issue of
limitation remains no more res integra and, therefore, it cannot
be said that the proceedings which were filed by the petitioners
are barred by limitation.
18. The another ground which the petitioner has raised
that he has filed the proceeding under Section 43 of the Act of
1958 for determination the purchase price of the land and the
proceeding has attended the finality and, therefore, the
application filed under Section 20 of the Act of 1958 is not
tenable. The perusal of the record shows that the proceedings
under Section 43 of the Act of 1958 were filed by the petitioner
after the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated 27.2.2018.
It is pertinent to note that the respondent no.1 immediately
20 WP 3230.19
after the decision of the Sub-Divisional Officer, dated 27.2.2018
preferred the statutory revision before the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur. During the pendency of such
proceeding, the application was filed and same was decided
during pendency of proceeding. In this regard, it would be
relevant to refer the judgment of Hon’ble Single Bench of this
court in the case of Vidarbha Maharogi Seva Mandal, Tapovan,
Amravati .vs. Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Nagpur
and others, reported in 2016 (4) Mh.L.J. 645 . In Paras 40, 41
and 42 of the judgment, the coordinate bench by recording the
various provisions of the Act of 1958 and the judgment
delivered by various benches has summed up the position of
law which reads as under :
40. The position of law can be summed up as
under:
(1) In order to claim exemption under section
129(b) of the said Act, what is essential is that
(i) the land in question is the property of a Trust
for an educational purpose, hospital, panjarpole,
Gaushala or an institution for public religious
worship; and (ii) the entire income of the land is
appropriated for the purposes of such Trust.
(2) It is the factum of existence of Public Trust
on or before 1-4-1961 and utilisation of the
income from the land for the purposes of the
Trust, which is required to be established, and it
21 WP 3230.19
is not necessary that such Public Trust should
have been actually registered as such on or
before the tillers’ day. Such requirement cannot
be read in the Statute.
(3) The grant of certificate of registration of
Public Trust under section 20 of the Maharashtra
Public Trusts Act, 1950 relates back to the date
of formation or constitution of the Trust, as it is
merely a recognition of the existing Trust.
(4) The certificate of exemption issued under
section 129(b) of the said Act operates on the
facts which were in existence on the date of its
issuance and it cannot be construed that the
Trust became entitled to exemption only from
the date of its issuance, i.e. prospectively.
“(5) Once the certificate of exemption is granted
under section 129(b), section 54 under Chapter
III of the said Act ceases to apply and the legal
heirs of the tenant shall not be entitled to inherit
the tenancy, as the applicability of the ordinary
law of inheritance is excluded”.
41. The grant of exemption under section 129(b)
of the said Act is the conclusive evidence of the
fact that the land in question is the property of
the Public Trust and the entire income therefrom
is appropriated for the purposes of such Trust. In
the absence of such certificate, the factum of
existence of the Trust on or before the tillers’
day, ie. 1-4-1961, and its utilisation of income
from the land for the purposes of the Trust, will
have to be established. There conditions are sine
qua non to claim exemption from the
applicability of Chapter III of the said Act.
42. Though the tenant satisfies the requirement
of sub-section (1) of section 46 or sub-section
22 WP 3230.19
(1) of section 49-A under Chapter III of the said
Act, the exemption under section 129(b) of the
said Act can be claimed only after coming into
force of the said Act. Once it is held that the
Trust is entitled to exemption under section
129(b) of the said Act, the provisions of Chapter
III therein shall cease to apply to such land with
effect from the tillers’ day, i.e. 1-4-1961 and
[neither the legal heirs of the tenant shall be
entitled to inherit the tenancy rights under
section 54, nor shall be entitled to protection
under section 120 of the said Act]. The Question
No. (1) is, therefore, answered accordingly.
In view of this legal position, proceeding filed by petitioners are
nothing but non-est in the eyes of law.
19. The last attempt made by the petitioners before this
court by stating that the certificate which is obtained by the
respondent no.1-trust found to be false and bogus. According
to the petitioners, they have specifically moved application
before the Collector, Akola to get the record of the proceeding
under which the exemption certificate was obtained by the
respondent no.1-trust. It is pointed out that the said application
was made on 30.8.2018 before the Collector, Akola and it was
informed by the Collector Office, Akola that on demand of the
record from the concerned office, it was informed that as per
23 WP 3230.19
the report that the record is not available and, therefore, the
details of the same cannot be supplied to him. On the strength
of this application, it is their submission that the certificate
obtained by the respondent no.1-trust found to be false and
fabricated.
20. The respondent no.1-trust has produced before the
Revenue Tribunal as well as before this court the original copy
of the certificate. The same was also objected by the petitioners
stating that the seal and the signature of the officer seems to be
doubtful. According to them, the respondent no.1 should
produce the certified copy to demonstrate its validity before this
court. The respondent no.1 from his docket has produced the
certified copy of the exemption certificate before this court. The
perusal of the said certified copy matched with Annexure-E
(Page 26 and 27) filed by the petitioner himself with the
petition. The perusal of certified copy shows same was
obtained on 28.2.2016 and same is an authenticate copy
obtained from the Sub-Divisional Officer, Akot. As such, there is
no force in the submission of the petitioners that the certificate
obtained by the petitioners is false and bogus.
24 WP 3230.19
21. In the light of above discussion, in my considered
opinion, the judgment delivered by the Maharashtra Revenue
Tribunal do not find any illegality or perversity on the face of
the record. Moreover, the observations recorded in the
judgment shows that by applying the judicial mind, the Tribunal
has decided the proceeding. In the circumstances, it is not a fit
case of any interference in the matter. Accordingly, the writ
petition stands dismissed.
(Pravin S. Patil, J.)
Gulande
Signed by: A.S. GULANDE
Designation: Senior Pvt. Secretary
Date: 17/07/2026 20:01:40
