― Advertisement ―

HomeUncategorizedMunna Lal Toppo vs Chhattisgarh Election Commission on 17 April, 2026

Munna Lal Toppo vs Chhattisgarh Election Commission on 17 April, 2026

ADVERTISEMENT

Chattisgarh High Court

Munna Lal Toppo vs Chhattisgarh Election Commission on 17 April, 2026

Author: Sanjay K. Agrawal

Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal

                                               Page 1 of 42

                                              (EP No.1/2024)




           Digitally                                                       2026:CGHC:17589
           signed by
           SISTA                                                                     AFR
SISTA      SOMAYAJULU
SOMAYAJULU Date:
           2026.04.17
           17:20:28     HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
           +0530

                                    Election Petition No.1 of 2024

                                    Order reserved on: 17/03/2026

                                    Order delivered on: 17/04/2026

                                Order (Full) uploaded on: 17/04/2026

                   Munna Lal Toppo, S/o Late Heera Sai, aged about 44 years, R/o
                   Village Bishunpur, P.O. Poksarai, P.S. Sitapur, Tehsil Batauli, District
                   Surguja (C.G.)
                                                                             ... Petitioner

                                                versus

               1. Chhattisgarh Election Commission through the Chief Electoral Officer
                  of Chhattisgarh, Shastri Chowk, Old Mantralaya Premises, Raipur,
                  District Raipur (C.G.)

               2. District Election Officer cum Collector, Surguja, P.O. Ambikapur,
                  District Surguja (C.G.)

               3. Ravi Rahi, Returning Officer, Legislative Assembly Circle-11, Sitapur
                  Constituency, Sitapur, District Surguja (C.G.)

               4. Poorv Sainik Ramkumar Toppo, S/o Ganesh Ram, aged about 31
                  years, R/o Gotchhal, Post Jamkani, Tehsil Mainpath, District Surguja
                  (C.G.)
                  Bharatiya Janata Party
                                                                      ... Respondents

For Petitioner : Dr. Jitendra Kishor Mehta and Mr. Anand Kumar
Kujur, Advocates.

For Respondents No.1 to 3 : Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, Advocate.
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Sharad Mishra, Advocate.
Page 2 of 42

SPONSORED

(EP No.1/2024)

Single Bench: –

Hon’ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal

C.A.V. Order

For sake of exposition, this Order is divided in following parts:-

S.No.                              Particulars                         Page Nos.

 1.     Challenge in the Election Petition                                2

 2.     Election Petition and Ground for declaring Election Void          3

 3.     Return by the Returned Candidate                                  4

 4.     Issues and Findings on the Issues                                 5

 5.     Submissions on behalf of the Petitioner                           7

 6.     Submissions on behalf of the Returned Candidate                   9

 7.     Submission on behalf of the Election Commission                   12

 8.     Grounds for declaring Election to be Void                         12

 9.     Scrutiny of Nomination Paper                                      14

 10.    Relevant provision regarding Disqualification to Contest the      16
        Election

 11.    Nature of Election Petition/Proceeding                            19

 12.    Burden of Proof                                                   20

 13.    Evidentiary Value of Admission                                    21

 14.    Discussion and Analysis                                           23

 15.    Relief and Cost                                                   41


1. Challenge in the Election Petition

The Election Petitioner herein has called in question the election of

Respondent No.4/Returned Candidate from Legislative Assembly

Constituency No.11, Sitapur (ST), District Surguja under Sections 80A

& 81 read with Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People

Act, 1951 (for short, ‘the Act of 1951’) that his nomination papers
Page 3 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

have been improperly rejected by the Returning Officer by its order

dated 31.10.2023 vide Ex.-P/19.

2. Election Petition and Ground for declaring Election Void:-

2.1) The election petitioner herein has filed this election petition

stating inter alia that he intended to contest the Chhattisgarh

Legislative Assembly Election, 2023. In order to contest election from

Constituency No.11, Sitapur (ST), District Surguja, he submitted 3 sets

of nomination papers on 27.10.2023 and 30.10.2023 before the

Returning Officer, Legislative Constituency No.11, Sitapur (ST),

District Surguja, vide Exs.-P/11, P/12 & P/13. On the date of scrutiny

of nomination papers i.e. on 31.10.2023, one independent candidate

namely, Ram Kumar Kindo filed an objection before the Returning

Officer stating that the election petitioner is a Government contractor,

as he is registered with the Public Health Engineering Department, and

at present he holds the office of profit and, therefore, under Section 9A

of the Act of 1951, the petitioner is disqualified to contest the election.

2.2) The election petitioner herein submitted his reply to the objection

raised by candidate Ram Kumar Kindo on 31.10.2023, vide Ex.-P/16.

Thereafter on the same day i.e. 31.10.2023, the Returning Officer,

Legislative Assembly Constituency No.11, Sitapur (ST) sought a

factual report vide Ex.-P/17 from the Executive Engineer, Public

Health Engineering Department on two points namely, (1) whether

election petitioner Munna Lal Toppo was having contract with
Page 4 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

appropriate Government in relation to his own trade or business or for

execution of any work undertaken by the said Government, and (2) if

yes, then whether such contract still subsists? The Executive Engineer,

Public Health Engineering Department submitted his report on the

same day i.e. 31.10.2023 vide Ex.-P/18 answering both the queries in

affirmative along with supporting documents. Thereafter, on

31.10.2023, the Returning Officer, Legislative Assembly Constituency

No.11 Sitapur passed the impugned order vide Ex.-P/19 rejecting his

nomination papers holding that the election petitioner is disqualified

for contesting the election and being elected as member of Legislative

Assembly of Chhattisgarh under Section 9A of the Act of 1951.

2.3) Thereafter, respondent No.4 was declared elected from the

Legislative Assembly Constituency No.11 Sitapur (ST), District

Surguja on 5.12.2023. Feeling aggrieved, the election petitioner has

filed the present Election Petition questioning the improper rejection of

nomination papers on the grounds enumerated under Section 9A of the

Act of 1951 that he was qualified to contest the election.

3. Return by the Returned Candidate

3.1) Respondent No.4/Returned Candidate, has filed return stating that

the Returning Officer was absolutely justified in rejecting the

nomination papers of the election petitioner, as the District Water &

Sanitation Mission (DWSM) was constituted by order of the Collector

under the Government scheme and powers for implementation of Jal
Page 5 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Jeevan Mission were delegated by the PHE Department as per the

recommendation of the Cabinet and as such, DWSM would fall within

the definition of ‘appropriate Government’ under Sections 7(a) and 9A

of the Act of 1951.

3.2) It was further pleaded that the Returning Officer was absolutely

justified in rejecting the nomination papers of the election petitioner, as

the election petitioner was having contract with the appropriate

Government, which is apparent from the report submitted by the

Executive Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department.

Therefore, in view of Sections 7(a) and 9A of the Act of 1951, the

Election Petition deserves to be dismissed.

4. Issues and Findings on the Issues:-

On the basis of pleadings made by the parties, following issues were

framed and corresponding answers/findings are noted against each one

of them :-

S.No. Issues Findings

1. Whether the returning officer is justified in
rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner
by order dated 31.10.2023 holding that the
petitioner is disqualified to contest the election of “Yes”

Sitapur Assembly Constituency No.11, District
Surguja, in view of the provisions contained in
Section 9A of the Act of 1951?

2. Whether the District Water and Sanitation
Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation
Committee would fall within the definition of
“Not proved”

“appropriate Government” under Section 7(a)
read with Section 9A of the Act of 1951?

3. Relief and cost(s)? “As per para 49”

Page 6 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

5. In order to prove his case that his nomination papers were improperly

rejected by the Returning Officer, the election petitioner has examined

himself as PW-1 and he has proved the documents (Ex.-P/1 to P/25);

(PW-2) Ravi Rahi – Returning Officer, who has proved the contents of

Exs.-P/15, P/16, P/17 & P/19; (PW-3) Shankar Prasad Mandavi,

Executive Engineer, PHE Department, Bilaspur, who has proved his

reply/enquiry report (Ex.-P/18); (PW-4) Ram Kumar Kindo, who has

proved the complaint (Ex.-P/15) and (PW-5) Ram Kumar Toppo. An

affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 of the CPC has been filed by the

election petitioner as also by Ram Kumar Kindo (complainant).

Similarly, respondent No.4 has examined himself.

6. On 2.2.2026, learned counsel for the election petitioner submitted that

his nomination papers were rejected on 31.10.2023, whereas Dr.

Sarweshwar Narendra Bhure (proposed Government Witness) was

posted as MD, Jal Jivan Mission from 11 th September, 2024 to 21st

April, 2025 and, therefore, he does not want to examine him as the

petitioner’s witness. Considering the submission made by learned

counsel for the election petitioner, Dr. Sarweshwar Narendra Bhure

(proposed Government Witness) present before the Court through

Video Conferencing, was discharged without his examination
Page 7 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

7. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner

Dr. Jitendra Kishor Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

election petitioner, would submit as under:-

(i) The Returning Officer was absolutely unjustified in rejecting the

nomination papers on the ground enumerated under Section 9A of the

Act of 1951, as the District Water and Sanitation Mission and Village

Water and Sanitation Committee would not fall within the definition of

appropriate Government under Section 7(a) read with Section 9A of

the Act of 1951.

(ii) Section 9A of the Act of 1951 requires strict proof of a subsisting

contract with the appropriate Government for execution of works

undertaken by that Government and all the ingredients must co-exist

on the date of scrutiny. Appropriate Government has been defined

under Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951 which means the State

Government in relation to Assembly elections.

(iii) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the

State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor. Article 299 of

the Constitution of India mandates that a valid Government contract

must be expressed in the name of Governor and the same be executed

on behalf of the Governor. Non-compliance of Article 299 is fatal to

claim that the contract is with the Government/appropriate

Government. In the instant case, the agreement with the District Water
Page 8 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

and Sanitation Mission and Village Water and Sanitation Committee is

not expressed in the name of Governor of Chhattisgarh, rather it is

executed by the Executive Engineer, PHE Department for District

Water and Sanitation Mission and Village Water and Sanitation

Committee. A tripartite agreement has been entered into between the

Executive Engineer, PHE Department; the petitioner as contractor and

Ex-officio Secretary of the District Water and Sanitation Mission and

Sarpanch for Village Water and Sanitation Committee. As such, there

is no contract/agreement executed with the Executive Engineer, PHE

Department and other bodies and, therefore, the nomination papers of

the petitioner have been wrongly rejected.

(iv) Learned counsel for the election petitioner would place reliance on

the judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Shrikant v.

Vasantrao & Ors1, Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh2, K.P.

Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others3, Bhikraj

Jaipuria v. Union of India4, Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda v.

Vishwanath Reddy and Another5. Learned counsel for the election

petitioner would further place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme

Court in the matter of Shibu Soren v. Dayanand Sahay and Others6

to submit that disqualification of a person must be proved strictly in

1 (2006) 2 SCC 682
2 1968 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1968 SC 1218
3 AIR 1967 SC 203
4 AIR 1962 SC 113
5 1968 SCC OnLine SC 407
6 (2001) 7 SCC 425
Page 9 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

conformity with the object of the Act. Reliance is also placed in the

matter of Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others 7. Relying on the

decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Kanta Kathuria v.

Manak Chand Surana8, it was argued that mere admission of the

Election Petitioner in the nomination paper would not create any

disqualification. Lastly, learned counsel for the election petitioner

would rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of

Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead) through his

LRs9. As such, it was prayed that the election petition be allowed and

the election of Respondent No.4 be set aside.

8. Submissions on behalf of respondent No.4 – Returned Candidate:-

Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Returned Candidate/respondent No.4 herein, would oppose the

submissions made on behalf of the election petitioner and would

submit as under:-

(i) The burden is on the election petitioner to prove his averments/

pleadings before the Election Tribunal (this Court), which in the

instant case, has not been discharged by the election petitioner.

(ii) Since the proceedings before the Election Tribunal (this Court) are

original proceedings, it was open to the election petitioner to place

additional material on record during election trial to show that he was

7 (1954) 1 SCC 57
8 (1969) 3 SCC 268
9 (1990) 1 SCC 193
Page 10 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

not disqualified from contesting the election and his nomination papers

were improperly rejected, but the election petitioner has not filed any

document except the documents which were filed before the Returning

Officer to demonstrate the said fact. Therefore, in order to prove his

candidature/qualification to contest the election, no additional

document/material has been brought before this Court and as such, the

election petitioner has failed to discharge his duty cast upon him.

Learned counsel for respondent No.4 would place reliance on the

judgments of the Supreme Court in the matters of Vashist Narain

Sharma v. Dev Chandra & Others10, Harikrishna Lal v. Babu Lal

Marandi11 and Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit12. Reliance is

further placed in the matters of NT Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja

Nainar & Others13 and Mohd. Yasin Shah v. Ali Akbar Khan 14

(para-38).

(iii) The proceeding of scrutiny of nomination paper(s) as provided

under Section 36 of the Act of 1951 is summary in nature where the

Returning Officer is obligated to scrutinize the nomination papers and

the objection received thereof by giving opportunity of hearing to the

concerned parties. During such scrutiny, the Returning Officer can

conduct a summary enquiry, if he thinks necessary in the given facts

and circumstances of the case. In the instant case, the Returning

10 (1954) 2 SCC 32
11 (2003) 8 SCC 613
12 1988 (Supp) SCC 604
13 AIR 1959 SC 422
14 (1977) 2 SCC 23
Page 11 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Officer has duly followed the procedure prescribed under the Act of

1951, which is evident from the fact that after receiving the complaint

(Ex.-P/15) filed by Ram Kumar Kindo, the Returning Officer

forwarded the same and called for the report from the Executive

Engineer (PW-3), pursuant to which enquiry report (Ex.-P/18) was

submitted by the Executive Engineer, PHED. Thereafter, reply was

also sought from the election petitioner and after giving due

opportunity of hearing and after conducting a summary enquiry, the

order dated 31.10.2023 (Ex.-P/19) was passed. Reliance is also placed

in the matter of Mathura Prasad v. Ajeem Khan15.

(iv) The election petitioner has categorically admitted in his

nomination papers as well as affidavit (Exs.-P/11 to P/14) that he has

subsisting contract with the appropriate Government, which he

admitted during trial as well in his cross-examination. Therefore,

admission is the best evidence and admitted facts need not be proved

unless the same is rebutted during trial, as per Sections 17, 21 and 58

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Learned counsel for respondent

No.4 would place reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in

the matter of Bishwanath Prasad and Others v. Dwaraka Prasad

and Others16 (para-4).

(v) Lastly, it was submitted that since the election petitioner himself

admitted in his nomination papers (Exs.-P/11 to P/13) and affidavit

15 (1990) 3 SCC 659
16 (1974) 1 SCC 78
Page 12 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

(Ex.-P/14) that he was having subsisting contracts under the Jal Jeevan

Mission, he cannot be allowed firstly to make admission before the

Returning Officer to mislead and thereafter revert back and say that the

District Water and Sanitation Mission and Village Water and Sanitation

Committee are not appropriate Government under Section 7(a) read

with Section 9A of the Act of 1951. Admission made and duly proved

by the petitioner is binding on him and, therefore, he cannot resile

from his version. As such, the Election Petition deserves to be

dismissed.

9. Submission on behalf of the Election Commission

Mr. Rakesh Kumar Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

Chhattisgarh Election Commission/respondents No.1 to 3 herein, would

support the stand taken by learned counsel for respondent No.4.

10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival

submissions made herein-above and also gone through the record with

utmost circumspection.

Grounds for declaring election to be void: –

11. The petitioner has taken a ground that his nomination papers have

improperly been rejected by the Returning Officer. At this stage, it

would be appropriate to notice Section 100(1)(c) of the Act of 1951

which states as under: –

Page 13 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

“100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.–(1) Subject
to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of
opinion–

(a) and (b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or

(d) xxx xxx xxx

the High Court shall declare the election of the returned
candidate to be void.”

12. A careful perusal of Section 100(1)(c) of the Act of 1951 would show

that this Court would declare the election of the returned candidate to

be void, if the nomination paper of any candidate has been improperly

rejected.

13. Improper rejection of nomination paper by itself and without anything

more is good ground to declare election of returned candidate, void

(see Somnath Rath v. Bikram K. Arukh and others 17). Similarly, in

the matter of Surendra Nath Kosla and another v. S. Dalip Singh

and others18, the Supreme Court has made distinction between two

classes of cases namely improper acceptance and improper rejection of

nomination paper. There is presumption in case of improper rejection

of nomination paper that it has materially affected result of election.

Fact that one of several candidates for election had been kept out of

arena is by itself very material consideration. On the other hand, in

case of improper acceptance of nomination paper, proof may easily be

forthcoming to demonstrate that coming into arena of additional
17 AIR 1999 SC 3417
18 AIR 1957 SC 242
Page 14 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

candidate has not had any effect on election of best candidate in field.

Similarly, in the matter of Nandiesha Reddy v. Kavita Mahesh19, the

Supreme Court has held that if election is challenged on ground of

improper rejection of nomination paper, petition should set out reasons

given by Returning Officer for rejection and facts necessary to show

that rejection was improper; in absence of such averments it cannot be

said election petition contains material facts to make out a cause of

action to put the election petition in trial.

Scrutiny of nomination paper: –

14. Section 36 of the Act of 1951 deals with Scrutiny of nomination. By

virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 36, the Returning Officer shall

examine the nomination papers and shall decide all objections which

may be made to any nomination and may, either on such objection or

on his own motion, after such summary inquiry, if any, as he thinks fit,

reject any nomination on any of the following grounds:–

(a) that on the date fixed for the scrutiny of nominations the

candidate either is not qualified or is disqualified for being

chosen to fill the seat under any of the following provisions that

may be applicable, namely:–

Articles 84, 102, 173 and 191.

Part II of this Act, and sections 4 and 14 of the Government of

Union Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or

19 AIR 2011 SC 2639
Page 15 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

(b) that there has been a failure to comply with any of the provisions

of section 33 or section 34; or

(c) that the signature of the candidate or the proposer on the

nomination paper is not genuine.

15. Similarly, sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the Act of 1951 provides

rejection on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial

character.

16. Under sub-section (2) of Section 36, the Returning Officer has to

examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be

made thereto. This power is undoubtedly judicial in character. But in

exercising this power he is authorised to come to a decision “after such

summary enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary”. In other words, the

function of the Returning Officer acting under Section 36 of the Act of

1951 is judicial in character but he is not to act judicially in

discharging it. (See Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of

Punjab20.)

17. In the matter of N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar and

others21, the Supreme Court has again held that the enquiry which a

Returning Officer has to make under Section 36 of the Act of 1951 is

summary in character. He may make such summary enquiry, if any, as

he thinks necessary; he can act suo motu.

20 AIR 1956 SC 153
21 AIR 1959 SC 422
Page 16 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

18. Similarly, in the matter of Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit22, the

Supreme Court has held that Returning Officer must satisfy himself

that candidate possesses necessary qualifications, as enquiry under

Section 36 of the Act of 1951 is summary in nature.

Relevant provision regarding Disqualification to Contest the
Election

19. This would bring me back to the disqualifying provision under which

the election petitioner has been disqualified. Section 9A of the Act of

1951, which is the disqualifying provision, states as under: –

“9A. Disqualification for Government contracts, etc.–A
person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a
contract entered into by him in the course of his trade or
business with the appropriate Government for the supply of
goods to, or for the executions of any works, undertaken by that
Government.

Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, where a
contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has
been entered into with the appropriate Government, the contract
shall be deemed not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the
Government has not performed its part of the contract either
wholly or in part.”

20. Section 7 of the Act of 1951 is Definitions clause. Section 7(a) defines

the term “appropriate Government” and Section 7(b) defines the word

“disqualified”. Both the clauses state as under: –

“(a) “appropriate Government” means in relation to any
disqualification for being chosen as or for being a member of
either House of Parliament, the Central Government, and in
relation to any disqualification for being chosen as or for being a

22 AIR 1988 SC 1796
Page 17 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a
State, the State Government;

(b) “disqualified” means disqualified for being chosen as, and
for being, a member of either House of Parliament or of the
Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State under the
provisions of this chapter, and on no other ground.”

21. As this Court is dealing with disqualification for being chosen as a

Member of the Legislative Assembly, the term “appropriate

Government” in Section 9A of the Act of 1951 refers to and means the

“State Government”. The term “State Government” is not defined

either in the Constitution or in the Act of 1951. Clause (a) of sub-

section (1) of Section 2 of the Act of 1951 provides that unless the

context otherwise requires, each of the expressions defined in Section

2 or sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Representation of the People

Act, 1950, but not defined in the Act of 1951, shall have the same

meaning as in the Act. Section 2(60) of the General Clauses Act,

1897, provides that the term “State Government”, as respects anything

done or to be done, shall mean in a State, the Governor.

22. The Supreme Court in Shrikant (supra) considered the meaning of

“State Government” with reference to Section 9A of the Act of 1951

and held that the term “State Government” in Section 9A (read with

Section 7 of the Act) should, therefore, be understood in its ordinary

and normal sense, and not with reference to the extended meaning

under Article 12 of the Constitution.

Page 18 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

23. In the matter of Ranjeet Singh v. Harmohinder Singh Pradhan23, the

Supreme Court has held that Section 9A is a statutory provision which

imposes a disqualification on a citizen. Their Lordships further held

that it would, therefore, be unreasonable to take a general or broad

view, ignoring the essentials of the section and the intention of the

legislature. Purposive interpretation is necessary.

24. Further, in the matter of Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari Singh

Nalwa24, the Supreme court has clearly held that the provisions of

Section 9A disqualify a citizen from contesting an election; a citizen

may, therefore, be disqualified only if the facts of his case squarely fall

within the conditions prescribed by Section 9A. Their Lordships

considering Ranjeet Singh (supra) and Kartar Singh Bhadana

(supra) held in Shrikant (supra) that in order to invoke Section 9A a

candidate has to have a subsisting contract with the appropriate

Government and such contract must be entered into by him in the

course of his trade or business, the contract should relate to the works

undertaken by the appropriate Government, and it should be for

execution of such works. It has been observed in Shrikant (supra) as

under: –

“20. The object and intent of Section 9-A of the Act is to
maintain the purity of the legislature and to avoid conflicts
between duty and interest of Members of the Legislative
Assembly and the Legislative Council. The said object is sought
to be achieved by ensuring that a person who has entered into a

23 (1999) 4 SCC 517
24 (2001) 4 SCC 661
Page 19 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

contract with the State Government and therefore liable to
perform certain obligations towards the State Government, is not
elected as a Member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative
Council, lest he should use his influence as an elected member
of the legislature to dilute the obligations or to seek and secure
undue advantages and benefits in respect of the subsisting
contracts. It seeks to ensure that personal interests will not
override his duties and obligations as a member of the legislature
or Legislative Council. For the purpose of Section 9-A, what is
relevant is whether the candidate has a subsisting contract with
the appropriate Government (in this case, the State Government)
either for supply of goods to the State Government or for
execution of any work undertaken by the State Government.
The six requirements for application of disqualification under
Section 9-A of the Act where a candidate holds a contract for
execution of works undertaken by the appropriate Government
have been listed by this Court in Kartar Singh Bhadana v. Hari
Singh Nalwa
[(2001) 4 SCC 661] as follows: (SCC p. 665, para

8)

(i) There should be a contract entered into by the candidate;

(ii) such contract should be entered into by him in the course
of his trade or business;

(iii) the contract should be entered into with the appropriate
Government;

(iv) the contract should subsist;

(v) the contract should relate to the works undertaken by the
appropriate Government; and

(vi) the contract should be for execution of such works.”

Nature of Election Petition/Proceeding: –

25. It is well settled that the election petition before this Court is an

original proceeding and the proceedings in an election petition are not

in the nature of appeal against the order of the Returning Officer. It is

open to an election petitioner to place material before this Court to
Page 20 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

show that the election petitioner was qualified to contest the election.

It has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Birad Mal

Singhvi (supra) as under: –

“10. … In the absence of any material before the returning
officer, the returning officer was not wrong in taking the entries
in the electoral roll into consideration and acting on them. But
his decision is not final. In an election petition it is open to an
election petitioner to place cogent evidence before the High
Court to show that the candidate whose nomination paper was
rejected had in fact attained the age of 25 years on the relevant
date. It is open to the High Court to take a final decision in the
matter notwithstanding the order of the returning officer
rejecting the nomination paper. If on the basis of the material
placed before the High Court it is proved that the candidate
whose nomination paper had been rejected was qualified to
contest the election it is open to the High Court to set aside the
election. Enquiry during scrutiny is summary in nature as there
is no scope for any elaborate enquiry at that stage. Therefore it
is open to a party to place fresh or additional material before the
High Court to show that the returning officer’s order rejecting the
nomination paper was improper. It should be borne in mind that
the proceedings in an election petition are not in the nature of
appeal against the order of the returning officer. It is an original
proceeding. In the instant case it was open to the respondent
election petitioner to place material before the High Court to
show that the two candidates were qualified and their
nomination paper was improperly rejected.”

Burden of Proof

26. It is well settled legal position that burden is on the election petitioner

to prove the pleadings averred in the election petition. The Supreme

Court in Vashist Narain Sharma (supra) held that the petitioner must

discharge the burden of proving that fact and on his failure to do so,

the election must be allowed to stand. Their Lordships further held

that the question is one of fact and has to be proved by positive
Page 21 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

evidence. If the petitioner is unable to adduce evidence, the only

inescapable conclusion to which the Tribunal can come is that the

burden is not discharged and that the election must stand.

27. In Harikrishna Lal (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court

have held that the election petitioner has to demonstrate that the

Returning Officer was not right in arriving at the satisfaction which he

did and as such, the High Court has not erred in not setting aside the

election of the returned candidate.

Evidentiary Value of Admission

28. Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872/corresponding new

provision is Section 15 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023,

defines Admission. It states about the admission which constitutes a

substantive piece of evidence, which can be relied upon for proving

the veracity of the facts incorporated therein. When once the

admission as noted in a statement either oral or documentary is found,

then the whole onus would shift to the party who made such an

admission and it will become an imperative duty on such party to

explain it. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, it will have

to be presumed to be true. (See Vathsala Manickavasagam and

others v. N. Ganesan and another25.)

29. The Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India v. Moksh

Builders and Financiers Ltd.26 relying upon Bharat Singh v.
25 (2013) 9 SCC 152
26 (1977) 1 SCC 60
Page 22 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Bhagirathi27 has held that an admission is substantive evidence of the

fact admitted, and that admissions duly proved are admissible evidence

irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness

box or not, and observed as under: –

“21. … It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh v.
Bhagirath [AIR 1966 SC 405 : (1966) 1 SCR 606] that an
admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted, and that
admissions duly proved are

‘admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party
making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether
that party when appearing as witness was confronted with
those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those
admissions.” (AIR p. 410, para 19)

In taking this view this Court has noticed the decision in
Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava [AIR
1957 All 1] also.”

30. In the matter of Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v.

Ram Pal Singh Bisen28, it has been held by their Lordships of the

Supreme Court that admission must be proved in accordance with law.

Their Lordships observed as under: –

“31. Under the law of evidence also, it is necessary that
contents of documents are required to be proved either by
primary or by secondary evidence. At the most, admission of
documents may amount to admission of contents but not its
truth. Documents having not been produced and marked as
required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the
court. Contents of the document cannot be proved by merely
filing in a court.”

27 AIR 1966 SC 405
28 (2010) 4 SCC 491
Page 23 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Discussion and Analysis: –

31. Since both the issues are interlinked with each other, they are

considered and decided together.

32. In this case, the election petitioner herein has filed his nomination

papers to contest the election from Legislative Assembly Constituency

No.11, Sitapur (ST), District Surguja. He has filed three sets of

nomination papers before the Returning Officer vide Exs.P-11, P-12 &

P-13 and on the date of scrutiny of nomination papers on 31.10.2023,

one independent candidate namely, Ram Kumar Kindo (PW-4) made

an objection before the Returning Officer stating that the election

petitioner is a Government contractor with the PHE Department and,

therefore, he is disqualified under Section 9A of the Act of 1951 to

contest the election to which the election petitioner has filed reply on

31.10.2023 itself vide Ex.P-16. On the same day i.e. on 31.10.2023,

the Returning Officer sought factual report from the Executive

Engineer, PHE Department on two points namely, (1) whether election

petitioner Munna Lal Toppo was having contract with appropriate

Government in relation to his own trade or business or for execution of

any work undertaken by the said Government, and (2) if yes, then

whether such contract still subsists, which was replied by the

Executive Engineer vide Ex.P-18 in affirmative and thereafter, the

Returning Officer on 31.10.2023, after making summary enquiry,

passed the order Ex.P-19 rejecting his nomination papers holding that
Page 24 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

the election petitioner is disqualified from contesting election by virtue

of Section 9A of the Act of 1951.

33. All the three sets of nomination papers Exs.P-11 to P-13 contain a

clause whether the candidate has any subsisting contract(s) with the

Government. The said clause states as under: –

“(1) to (6) xxx xxx xxx

(7) Whether the candidate has any subsisting contract(s) with the
Government either in individual capacity or by trust or
partnership in which the candidate has a share for supply of any
goods to that Government or for execution of works undertaken
by that Government?. …YES…(Yes/No)

-If Yes, with which Government and details of subsisting
contract ………..

                   SUB- JALJIVAN                 MISSION,   LICENCE   No-
                   CGeR12718

                   1.         KAMLESHWARPUR 2021-22
                   2.         AMGAON 2021-22
                   3.         BISHUNPUR 2022-23
                   4.         LAIGU 2022-23
                   5.         KAMLESHWARPUR/SAPNADAR 2022-23"

34. Not only this, the election petitioner has also filed an affidavit vide

Ex.P-14 before the Returning Officer in support of nomination papers

declaring in clause (9B) that he has contracts with appropriate

Government and the details are as stated herein: –

“(9B) Contracts with appropriate Government and any public
company or companies

(a) details of contracts entered by the candidate…

                   SUB- JALJIVAN                 MISSION,   LICENCE   No-
                   CGeR12718
                             Page 25 of 42

                           (EP No.1/2024)

            1.         KAMLESHWARPUR 2021-22
            2.         AMGAON 2021-22
            3.         BISHUNPUR 2022-23
            4.         LAIGU 2022-23
            5.         KAMLESHWARPUR/SAPNADAR 2022-23

(b) details of contracts entered into by spouse …….NIL…….

(c) details of contracts entered into by dependents
…….NIL…….

(d) details of contracts entered into by Hindu Undivided Family
or trust in which the candidate or souse or dependents have
interest …….NIL…….

(e) details of contracts, entered into by Partnerhsip Firms in
which candidate or spouse or dependents are partners
…….NIL…….

(f) details of contracts, entered into by private companies in
which candidate or spouse or dependents have share
…….NIL…….

xxx   xxx        xxx

xxx   xxx        xxx

xxx   xxx        xxx

                            VERIFICATION

I, the deponent, above named, do hereby verify and
declare that the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to
the best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is false and
nothing material has been concealed there from. I further
declare that: –

(a) there is no case of conviction or pending case against me
other than those mentioned in items 5 and 6 of Part A and B
above;

(b) I, my spouse, or my dependents do not have any asset or
liability, other than those mentioned in items 7 and 8 of Part A
and items 8, 9 and 10 of Part B above.

Page 26 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Verified at …………………..this the …………….day
of……………………..

Sd/-

DEPONENT”

35. Thereafter, Ram Kumar Kindo raised objection vide Ex.P-15 before

the Returning Officer that the election petitioner is a Government

contractor and, therefore, he is disqualified under Section 9A of the

Act of 1951 upon which the Returning Officer noticed the election

petitioner also and the election petitioner filed his reply denying the

allegations made in the objection. The Returning Officer also noticed

the Executive Engineer, PHE Department vide Ex.P-17 on the

following two queries: –

vr,o mijksDr fcanqvksa ds laca/k esa tkap djrs gq, rRdky bl
dk;kZy; dks ;g izfrosnu e; nLrkost miyC/k djkuk lqfuf’pr djsa fd
D;k eqUuk ykyk VksIiks vk0 Lo0 ghjklk; orZeku esa leqfpr ljdkj ds
lkFk vius dkjksckj ;k O;kikj ds vuqØe esa ;k leqfpr ljdkj }kjk
miØkar fdUgha ladekZsa ds fu”iknu gsrq lafonk esa gS\ ;fn gka rks D;k og
lafonk vHkh Hkh thfor gS] bl rF; dk tokc ¼e; nLrkost½ vkt gh
lk;a 5 cts rd fo’ks”k okgd ds gLrs fHktokuk lqfuf’pr djsaA

36. The Executive Engineer, PHE Department submitted reply on the same

day vide Ex.P-18 as under: –

dk;kZy; dk;Zikyu vfHk;Urk] yksd LokLF; ;kaf=dh foHkkx
[k.M&vfEcdkiqj] ftyk&ljxqtk ¼N-x-½

i= Ø- 6330@r-‘kk-@dk-v-@yks-Lok-;ka-[k.M@2023@vfEcdkiqj] fnukad 31@10@2023

izfr]

fjVfuZax vkWfQlj
dk;kZy; fjVfuZax vkWfQlj
fo/kkulHkk fuokZpu {ks=&11 lhrkiqj
ftyk& ljxqtk ¼N-x-½
Page 27 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

fo”k;& fuokZpu {ks= Øa-&11 ls vke vkneh ikVhZ ds vH;FkhZ Jh eqUuk yky VksIiks ds
laca/k esa tkap izfrosnu izLrqr djus ds laca/k esaA

lanHkZ& vkidk i= Øa-&47@fo-lk-fuokZ-&11@2023] lhrkiqj] fnukad 31@10@2023

&0&
mijksDr fo”k;karxZr ys[k gS fd vkids }kjk pkgh xbZ tkudkjh fuEukuqlkj gS&

Øa- fooj.k fVIi.kh
1 D;k eqUuk yky VksIiks vk- Lo- ghjklk; orZeku esa gka
leqfpr ljdkj ds lkFk vius dkjksckj ;k O;kikj ds
vuqØe esa leqfpr ljdkj }kjk miØkar fdUgha ladeksZa
ds fu”iknu gsrq lafonk esa gS\
2 ;fn gka rks D;k og lafonk vHkh Hkh thfor gS\ gka

Jh eqUuk yky VksIiks] Bsdsnkj] bZ&iath;u Øekad CGeR12718 ds }kjk yksd
LokLF; ;kaf=dh [k.M vfEcdkiqj esa fuEufyf[kr vuqca/kksa ds rgr~ dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gS&
Øa- vuqca/k Øekad ,oa o”kZ dk;kZns’k Øa- o fnukad dk;Z dh fLFkfr
1 11/DL/2021-22 1165/05.05.2021 dk;Z izxfr ij gSA
2 12/DL/2021-22 1167/08.05.2021 dk;Z izxfr ij gSA
3 48/DL/2022-23 7840/12.11.2022 dk;Z izxfr ij gSA
4 189/DL/2022-23 584/25.01.2023 dk;Z izxfr ij gSA
5 392/DL/2022-23 1474/03.03.2023 dk;Z izxfr ij gSA

mijksDr lHkh vuqca/kksa esa orZeku esa dk;Z izxfrjr gSA vr% tkudkjh vkidh vksj
vko’;d dk;Zokgh gsrq izsf”kr gSA

layXu& ¼1½ vuqca/k dh Nk;kizfr&05 ux

lgh@&
dk;Zikyu vfHk;Urk
yksd LokLF; ;kaf=dh [k.M
vfEcdkiqj

37. Thereafter, the Returning Officer by its impugned order Ex.P-19

rejected the nomination papers of the election petitioner by recording

following findings: –

mijksDr izkIr vkifRr] tokc ,oa dk;kZy; dk;Zikyu
vfHk;ark yksd LokLF; ;kaf=dh laHkkx vfEcdkiqj ds izfrosnu e;
nLrkost ds ijh{k.k ls eSa bl fu”d”kZ ij igqaprk gwa fd vH;FkhZ Jh eqUuk
yky VksIiksa vk0 Lo0 ghjklk; tks fd orZeku esa yksd LokLF; ;kaf=dh
Page 28 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

[k.M vfEcdkiqj ds lkFk ty thou fe’ku ds dk;ksZa gsrq lafonk esa
gSa ,oa ;g lafonk vHkh thfor gS rFkk muds }kjk foHkkx ls fy;s x;s
vuqca/kksa ij orZeku esa dk;Z izxfr ij gSA tks fd leqfpr ljdkj ds
lkFk fdUgha ladekZsa ds fu”iknu ds fy;s lafonk gSA vH;FkhZ Jh eqUuk
yky VksIiksa us Lo;a vius tokc esa bl rF; dks Lohdkj fd;k gSA blds
vfrfjDr mUgksaus vius uke funsZ’ku i= ,oa ‘kiFk i= esa Hkh bl ckcr~
tkudkjh nh gS fd mudk ty thou fe’ku ds dk;Z gsrq leqfpr ljdkj
ds lkFk vuqca/k@lafonk gSA ftldk fooj.k mUgksaus fuEukuqlkj fn;k gS&

SUB- ty thou fe’ku] yk;lsal uacj & CGeR12718
01& deys’ojiqj 2021&22
02& vkexkao 2021&22
03& fc’kquiqj 2022&23
04& ySxw 2022&23
05& deys’ojiqj@liuknj & 2022&23

mijksDr rF;ksa ds vkyksd esa yksd izfrfuf/kRo vf/kfu;e
1951 dh /kkjk 09 d ij /;ku nsuk vko’;d gSA tks ;g izko/kku djrh
gS fd ^^dksbZ Hkh O;fDr fujfgZr gksxk ;fn vkSj tc rd dksbZ ,slh lafonk
fo|eku gS tks mlus leqfpr ljdkj ds lkFk vius O;kikj ;k dkjckj ds
vuqØe esa ml ljdkj dks eky dk iznk; djus ds fy;s ;k ml
ljdkj }kjk miØkar fdUgha ladeksZa ds fu”iknu ds fy;s dh gSA^^

vr% vH;FkhZ Jh eqUuk yky VksIiks vk0 Lo0 ghjk lk; dks
eSa yksd izfrfuf/kRo dh /kkjk 09 d ds varxZr fo/kkulHkk dk lnL; pqus
tkus ds fy, fujfgZr ikrk gwaA vr% vkifRrdrkZ }kjk izLrqr vkifRr
Lohdkj dh tkrh gS ,oa Jh eqUuk yky VksIiks vk0 Lo0 ghjk lk; }kjk
fo/kkulHkk {ks= 11 lhrkiqj ¼v-t-tk-½ esa nkf[ky ukekadu i= Ø0
04/AC11/2023/RO, 20/AC11/2023/RO ,oa 21/AC11/2023/RO dks
vfof/kekU; ikrs gq;s vLohdkj vFkkZr izfr{ksfr djrk gwaA

mijksDrkuqlkj vkns’k ikfjr fd;k x;k ,oa Ik<+dj lquk;k
x;kA

38. From the aforesaid narration of facts, following facts are quite

evident:-

38.1) The election petitioner while filing nomination papers clearly

asserted that he has a subsisting contract with the appropriate

Government for the supply of goods to that Government or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government, and that the

contract is subsisting contract. Thereafter, he has also filed an affidavit
Page 29 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

vide Ex.P-14 in support of his nomination papers and in paragraph

9(B) of the affidavit (Ex.P-14) also, he has reasserted that he has

subsisting contract with the appropriate Government for the supply of

goods or for the executions of any works undertaken by that

Government.

38.2) On objection being made by Ram Kumar Kindo, the Returning

Officer noticed the petitioner also, upon which the petitioner did not

assert that he had no subsisting contract with the appropriate

Government for the supply of goods to that Government or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government in the course

of his trade or business, rather he remained vague only stating that he

did not hold the office of profit and he is neither Government servant

nor he is suffering any kind of disqualification.

38.3) On the pointed enquiry raised by the Returning Officer before

the Executing Engineer, PHE Department that whether the petitioner

has undertaken the contract with the appropriate Government in the

course of his trade or business for the supply of goods or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government and if yes,

whether such contract still subsists, vide Ex.P-17, the Executive

Engineer submitted his report in affirmative to both the queries. The

Returning Officer relying upon the statement made by the petitioner in

the nomination papers (Exs.P-11 to P-13) at clause (7) read with the

affidavit Ex.P-14 at clause (9B) and further relying upon the statement
Page 30 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

of the Executive Engineer, PHE Department, came to the conclusion

that the election petitioner has subsisting contract entered by him in the

course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the

supply of goods or for the executions of any works undertaken by that

Government, and proceeded to reject the nomination papers.

39. Now, the question for consideration would be, whether the facts as

mentioned in paragraphs 37.1 to 37.3 are duly proved before this Court

for which the election petitioner has examined himself as PW-1 and

three other witnesses. He has proved that he has filed nomination

papers for contesting the election for Sitapur Vidhan Sabha

Constituency. However, in his cross-examination paragraph 18, he has

clearly admitted that he has filled the nomination papers vide Exs.P-11

to P-13 on own volition and he has further admitted that the

information contained in paragraph 7 of Exs.P-11 to P-13 with regard

to subsisting contract with the Government, is correct and he has also

candidly admitted the information given by him in shape of clause

(9B) of the affidavit (Ex.P-14) filed by him before the Returning

Officer with regard to subsisting contract with the appropriate

Government, is correct. Similarly, he has also stated about Jaljivan

Mission, but neither there is mention of registration of the said Mission

nor he has filed registration certificate of the said Mission. As such, it

is quite vivid that so far as the information furnished by the election

petitioner in the nomination papers Exs.P-11 to P-13 regarding the fact
Page 31 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

he has subsisting contract with the appropriate Government in which

he has share for supply of goods to the Government or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government is correct.

Not only this, thereafter, the petitioner has also given the names of the

subsisting contracts with the appropriate Government.

40. The Supreme Court in Moksh Builders and Financiers Ltd.‘s case

(supra) relying upon Bharat Singh (supra) has clearly held that an

admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted and admissions

duly proved are admissible evidence. Further, in Ram Pal Singh

Bisen‘s case (supra), it has been held that admission of documents may

amount to admission of contents but not its truth.

41. In the instant case, the election petitioner himself has filed nomination

papers vide Exs.P-11 to P-13 and proved those documents and in

clause (7) of Exs.P-11 to P-13, he has made admission that he has

subsisting contract with the appropriate Government and he has a

share for supply of any goods to that Government or for execution of

works undertaken by that Government and proved the same by making

admission in paragraph 18 of his statement before the Court. As such,

this would constitute the substantive evidence to hold that the

petitioner had a subsisting contract with the appropriate Government

for the supply of goods or for the executions of any works undertaken

by that Government and this was subsisting on the date of filing

nomination papers. Not only this, the petitioner has filed affidavit
Page 32 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

before the Returning Officer in shape of Ex.P-14 sworn-in before the

Notary Public in which in clause (9B), which was extracted herein-

above in paragraph 33, he has clearly admitted that he has contract

with the appropriate Government giving details of contracts and at the

end of the affidavit, while verifying the contents, he has clearly stated

and declared that “the contents of this affidavit are true and correct to

the best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is false and

nothing material has been concealed there from”. Thus, affidavit has

been duly sworn-in by the petitioner making admission of subsisting

contract with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods or

for the executions of any works undertaken by that Government and

that was the subsisting contract. There was no reason for the

Returning Officer not to accept the statement made by the election

petitioner duly sworn-in before the Notary Public to hold that he has

valid and subsisting contract with the appropriate Government for the

supply of goods or for the executions of any works undertaken by that

Government.

42. Apart from that the objection raised by Ram Kumar Kindo – objector,

was duly served to the petitioner which he replied, but did not take the

stand that contract with the District Water and Sanitation Mission and

the Village Water and Sanitation Committee would not fall within the

meaning of appropriate Government under Section 9A read with

Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951 and, therefore, he is not disqualified
Page 33 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

from contesting the election and Section 9A of the Act of 1951 would

not attract to disqualify him and his reply was totally vague which he

has also proved vide Ex.P-16.

43. Lastly, before passing the order, the Returning Officer also sought

pointed query from the Executive Engineer, PHE Department that

whether the election petitioner has subsisting contract with the

appropriate Government for the supply of goods or for the executions

of any works undertaken by that Government, which the Executive

Engineer replied vide Ex.P-18 that he has subsisting contract with the

appropriate Government which has been proved by Executive

Engineer Shankar Prasad Mandavi (PW-3) examined on behalf of the

petitioner. Thus, ultimately, Returning Officer Ravi Rahi who has

been examined as PW-2 before this Court taking into consideration the

admission made in clause (7) of Exs.P-11 to 13, reply filed by the

election petitioner and also considering the objection made by Ram

Kumar Kindo and reply to the pointed queries submitted by the

Executive Engineer, PHE Department, proceeded to reject the

nomination papers. The Returning Officer has been examined by the

election petitioner as witness No.2 and he has also admitted that the

election petitioner himself has admitted in the nomination papers as

well as in the affidavit that he has subsisting contract with the

appropriate Government for the supply of goods or for the executions
Page 34 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

of any works undertaken by that Government and that was the main

reason for rejecting the nomination papers.

44. As such, the facts mentioned in paragraphs 37.1 to 37.3 are clearly

established by the evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses from

which it is quite apparent that the election petitioner has admitted that

on the date of filing nomination papers, he has valid and subsisting

contract with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods or

for the executions of any works undertaken by that Government. The

documents filed by the election petitioner vide Exs.P-11 to P-14 and

the admission made by him which is duly proved by him are clearly

binding on him on the basis of which the Returning Officer has passed

the order impugned rejecting his nomination papers. Not only this, the

petitioner had two opportunities to explain that the subsisting contract,

if any, is not with the appropriate Government within the meaning of

Section 9A read with Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951 and first

opportunity was available to him when the Returning Officer noticed

him on the objection of the objector, but he did not avail the

opportunity and did not explain, though filed reply vide Ex.P-16,

however, did not take firm stand that the contract was with the District

Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation

Committee, which is not “appropriate Government” within the

meaning of Section 9A read with Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951 and,

therefore, he is qualified to contest the election from Sitapur (ST)
Page 35 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

Assembly Constituency, however, though the petitioner before this

Court took stand that the District Water and Sanitation Mission is a

separate body/local unit which does not come under the definition of

“appropriate Government”, but led no evidence in that regard.

45. In this fact-situation, since the election petition before this Court under

Section 100(1)(c) of the Act of 1951 is an original proceeding, it was

open to the election petitioner to file additional documents

demonstrating that he was not disqualified under Section 9A read with

Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951, as he was not having any subsisting

contract in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate

Government and the contract was with the District Water and

Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation Committee,

which would not fall within the meaning of “appropriate Government”

under Section 9A read with Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951. However,

in shape of additional material before the Court, since the burden of

proof was on the petitioner to prove that he was not disqualified from

contesting the election under Section 9A read with Section 7(a) of the

Act of 1951, the petitioner has only filed copy of the order Ex.P-1 by

which the District Water and Sanitation Mission has been constituted

and further filed document Ex.P-2 by which certain directions have

been given by the State Government to the Collectors and Executive

Engineers & Member Secretaries, District Water and Sanitation

Mission/PHE Department and similarly, Ex.P-3 has also been filed by
Page 36 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

which financial power has been conferred by the State Government

upon the District Water and Sanitation Mission up to ₹ 5 crores and

thereafter, copy of the contract has been filed vide Exs.P-4 to P-10

which are contract documents demonstrating that the petitioner has

entered into contract with the Executive Engineer & Member

Secretary, District Water and Sanitation Mission. Similarly, Exs.P-20

& 21 are documents relating to Operational Guidelines for the

Implementation of Jal Jeevan Mission Har Ghar Jal and Ex.P-25 is the

Guidelines issued by the Election Commission of India for the

Returning Officers for consideration of complaints for rejection of

nomination papers on grounds of disqualification under Section 9A of

the Act of 1951.

46. As such, no additional documents except the aforesaid one have been

filed by the petitioner to establish the fact that the District Water and

Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation Committee is

a separate body or society or trust which do not come under the

purview of “appropriate Government” within the meaning of Section

9A read with Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951, as it was the burden upon

him to establish the said fact being the election petitioner, which he

failed to discharge in satisfaction of this Court.

47. Thus, from the aforesaid analysis, it is quite evident that the election

petitioner has filed his nomination papers vide Exs.P-11 to P-13 in

which in clause (7) he has admitted that he has subsisting contract in
Page 37 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

the course of his trade or business with the appropriate Government

for the supply of goods or for the executions of any works undertaken

by that Government and proved the same by his own evidence, as he

has been examined as PW-1 and in paragraph 18 admitted that the

facts mentioned in clause (7) of the nomination papers (Exs.P-11 to P-

13) are correct. He has also admitted that the contents of the affidavit

(Ex.P-14) filed before the Returning Officer regarding subsisting

contract in the course of his trade or business with the appropriate

Government for the supply of goods or for the executions of any works

undertaken by that Government, are also correct. Surprisingly, the

election petitioner though took stand in the election petition that he has

contract with the District Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village

Water and Sanitation Committee, but they would not fall within the

definition of appropriate Government under Section 9A read with

Section 7(a) of the Act of 1951, however, did not lead any evidence

before this Court and he confined his evidence to the extent of proving

the nomination papers Exs.P-11 to P-13 and the affidavit Ex.P-14 filed

in support of the said nomination papers.

48. The petitioner had an opportunity to take stand after filing nomination

papers when he was noticed by the Returning Officer and he filed

reply vide Ex.P-16 that he has no subsisting contract with the

appropriate Government for the supply of goods or for the executions

of any works undertaken by that Government and his contract is with
Page 38 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

the District Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and

Sanitation Committee which would not fall under the definition of

appropriate Government under Section 9A read with Section 7(a) of

the Act of 1951, but he did not took that stand before the Returning

Officer while filing his reply to the objection filed by Ram Kumar

Kindo. The Returning Officer in response to the objection filed by

Ram Kumar Kindo noticed the Executive Engineer, PHE Department

on two points whether the election petitioner has subsisting contract

with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government and whether

the said contracts are subsisting, which the Executive Engineer replied

in affirmative vide Ex.P-18. Again the election petitioner has

examined Shankar Prasad Mandavi as witness No.3 and proved the

contents of the reply Ex.P-18, but did not contradict that he has given

incorrect information that his existing contracts are not with the

appropriate Government and his contracts are with the District Water

and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation

Committee, it was open to the petitioner to take such stand and cross-

examine Shankar Prasad Mandavi, Executive Engineer, PHE

Department. As such, again the petitioner though has taken stand

before this Court in the election petition that the District Water and

Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation Committee

are not appropriate Government, but did not lead any evidence and in
Page 39 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

that regard, he has examined Shankar Prasad Mandavi (PW-3) who has

only proved that the information given vide Ex.P-18 holding that the

election petitioner has subsisting contract with the appropriate

Government for the supply of goods to that Government or for the

executions of any works undertaken by that Government, is the correct

information.

49. Lastly, the Returning Officer vide Ex.P-19 rejected the nomination

papers of the election petitioner. He has been examined as witness

No.2 and he narrated the action taken on the nomination papers and

has clearly admitted that the only reason to reject the nomination

papers is the information given by the Executive Engineer, PHE

Department that the election petitioner has subsisting contract with the

appropriate Government. The petitioner has cited him as witness and

did not cross-examine him on the point that his contract is with the

District Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and

Sanitation Committee, which is not the appropriate Government and

thus, he has no subsisting contract with the appropriate Government.

As such, at this stage also the petitioner has failed to lead any evidence

except proving what transpired before the Returning Officer. Even

independently, no evidence has been led by the election petitioner to

prove the fact that his contracts mentioned in the nomination papers

and the affidavit are not with any appropriate Government which the

petitioner was obliged to prove as express plea has been taken in this
Page 40 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

regard, rather he has clearly admitted in shape of nomination papers

Exs.P-11 to P-13 & affidavit Ex.P-14 and before the Court, the

statement made in Exs.P-11 to P-13 & Ex.P-14 which clearly

constitute substantive piece of evidence and he did not avail the

opportunity to explain his stand already taken before the Returning

Officer and which has been proved before this Court.

50. The petitioner has named Dr. Sarweshwar Narendra Bhure, who was

posted as Managing Director, Jal Jivan Mission, to examine him, but

however, on 2-2-2026 he was given up and was discharged. As such,

the fact whether the petitioner’s alleged contract with the District

Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and Sanitation

Committee is with the appropriate Government or not or the status of

the said Mission/Committee, could not be established.

51. The election petitioner cannot resile from those documents which also

even persuaded the Returning Officer to rely upon his own admission

that he has subsisting contract in the course of his trade or business

with the appropriate Government. Thus, the petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that rejection of his nomination papers was improper.

Merely filing certain documents showing that he had contract with the

District Water and Sanitation Mission and the Village Water and

Sanitation Committee would not suffice. The petitioner has failed to

discharge the burden placed upon him to prove that he was not
Page 41 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

disqualified from contesting the election and that he was qualified for

contesting the election and his nomination paper was wrongly rejected.

52. True it is that Article 299 of the Constitution of India is mandatory in

nature and Governmental contract must be executed as per the manner

indicated in Article 299, but mere non-execution of contract in the

manner indicated under Article 299 would not relieve the election

petitioner to prove the fact that he was qualified to contest the election

and he did not suffer any disqualification on the date of rejection of his

nomination paper. As such, the election petitioner has failed to plead

and establish that his nomination papers were improperly rejected by

the Returning Officer within the meaning of Section 100(1)(c) of the

Act of 1951.

53. The decisions cited by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner namely, Mulamchand (supra), K.P. Chowdhry (supra),

Bhikraj Jaipuria (supra), Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda (supra),

Shibu Soren (supra), Jagan Nath (supra), Kanta Kathuria (supra)

and Sushil Kumar Mehta (supra), are quite distinguishable to the

facts of the present case.

Relief and Cost: –

54. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, the election

petition deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and

circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own cost(s).
Page 42 of 42

(EP No.1/2024)

55. A copy of this order be sent to the State Election Commission

forthwith as required by Section 103 of the Act of 1951.

Sd/-

(Sanjay K. Agrawal)
Judge
Barve/Soma



Source link