Punjab-Haryana High Court
Munish Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Odthers on 1 May, 2026
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
105+207 CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
Date of Decision: 01.05.2026
Munish Kumar
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
State of Haryana and others
.....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present : Mr. Ram Kumar Saini, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Piyush Khanna, Addl. AG, Haryana.
Ms. Rajni Gupta, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 6.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (Oral)
CM-2379-CWP-2026
The present application has been filed under Section 151 of
CPC for placing on record letters dated 04.08.2025, 06.10.2025 and
01.08.2024 (Annexures P-13 to P-15) respectively, to the captioned petition.
In view of the grounds mentioned in the application, the same is
allowed, Annexures P-13 to P-15 are ordered to be taken on record.
Registry is directed to place the same at an appropriate place.
MAIN
1. The petitioner has approached this Court by way of the present
writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to
left the petitioner to re-join the post of Data Entry Operator and he be
allowed to join service in the office of Executive Engineer, OP Division,
DHBVN, Hansi (Hisar) by providing same relief on equal terms as has
already been given to similarly situated employees.
2. On 02.12.2025, the following order was passed by this Court:-
“Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that FIR
No.13 dated 11.01.2023 has been registered against the
petitioner along with five other co-employees. After obtaining
bail, the respondent/Nigam has permitted all the co-accused
employees to resume their duties subject to outcome of the
criminal trial, however, the petitioner has been denied this
benefit. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the reply
filed to the representation made by the petitioner wherein the
respondent/Nigam itself admits that other similarly situated
employees have been allowed to re-join. He further submits that
yet another employee namely Vishal Sandhu has been permitted
to join duty on 06.10.2025 by respondent No.6 whereas the
petitioner, who falls under the same jurisdiction, has been
denied re-joining solely on account of the registration of the
aforesaid FIR.
Adjourned to 23.12.2025.
In the meantime, respondent No.6 is directed to
file an affidavit clarifying the reasons for differential treatment
and explaining why the petitioner has not been allowed to re-
join the duty despite similarly situated employees having been
permitted to do so.”
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
3. At the very outset, learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 6
raises a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the
present writ petition. It is submitted that the petitioner had earlier
approached this Hon’ble Court by way of filing CWP-1388-2024 titled
Munish Kumar vs. State of Haryana and others, which came to be decided
on 05.11.2024 (Annexure P-9). During the course of hearing of the said writ
petition, after addressing arguments at some length, the petitioner chose to
withdraw the petition with a view to approach the competent authorities.
However, no liberty was sought or granted by this Hon’ble Court to file a
fresh writ petition on the same cause of action.
31. In this backdrop, it is contended that the present writ petition is
barred and not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service vs. State Transport Appellate
Tribunal, Gwalior, 1987 (1) SCC 5, wherein it has been categorically held
that once a writ petition is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, a second
petition on the same cause of action is not maintainable.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused
the record of the case with their able assistance. Admittedly, there is no
dispute to the fact that the petitioner had earlier approached this Hon’ble
Court by filing CWP-1388-2024 and the same was withdrawn without
seeking or being granted any liberty to institute fresh proceedings on the
same cause of action. In such circumstances, this Court finds substance in
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondents
regarding the maintainability of the present petition in view of the ratio laid
down in Sarguja Transport Service (supra).
4.1 Apart from the above, it is also not in dispute that an FIR has
been registered against the petitioner under the provisions of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988, and the matter is still under consideration before
the competent forum. The issues raised in the present petition involve
seriously disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon in the
exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India.
5. It is further pertinent to note that the petitioner was engaged as
a contractual employee, and the rights flowing from such engagement are
governed by the terms and conditions of the contract, which also require
factual adjudication. This Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction,
ordinarily refrains from entertaining such matters involving contractual
disputes coupled with disputed facts.
6. It is settled law that a fresh writ petition is not maintainable in
respect of the same subject-matter if the earlier writ petition had been
withdrawn without obtaining permission of the Court to file a fresh petition.
A two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport
Service (supra), speaking through Justice E.S Venkataramiah, has observed
as follows:
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
“9. The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after
withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the
permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ
petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the
decision in Daryao’s case (supra) is of no assistance. But we
are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 Order 23
of the Code should be extended in the interests of
administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ
petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the
ground of public policy as explained above. It would also
discourage the litigant from indulging in bench-hunting
tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a
case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ
petition filed in High Court without permission to file a fresh
writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution since such
withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution should be deemed to have been
abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action
relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without
such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right
in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable
before it in respect of the same subject-matter since the earlier
writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file
a fresh petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we
have stated in this order may not be considered as being
applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an
individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in
the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since such
a case stands on a different footing altogether. We, however,
leave this question open.”
(emphasis supplied)
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
7. Furthermore, a Division Bench of this Court in Sukhbir Kaur
vs. State of Punjab 1996(4) SCT 781, while relying on the judgment of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Sarguja Transport Service (supra) reiterated this
position of law. Speaking through Justice G.S. Singhvi, the following was
held:
“5. Since there is nothing in the order dated 20.8.1996 to indicate
that the writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to approach the
departmental authorities or with permission to institute a fresh
petition, the dismissal of writ petition on 20.8.1996 will have to be
treated as un-conditional. We cannot accept the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that in addition to what has been
recorded in the order sheet dated 20.8.1996 the court had made
some observations which should be read as a part of the order of the
court and relief should be given to the petitioner ignoring the fact
that previous writ petition filed on the same subject matter stands
dismissed as withdrawn.
6. In State of Maharashtra v. Ram Dass Shrinivas Nayak and another,
AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1249, a similar attempt was made before the
Apex Court to dra the court into controversy about the exact
happening in the proceedings of the High Court. Their Lordships
repelled such attempt by observing:
“The court is bound to accept the statement of the Judges
recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. It
cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by
statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the
Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or
admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the
subject. The principle is well settled that statement of fact as
to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of
the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can
contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If
a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly
recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while
the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the
attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the
fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a
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7CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to
have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter
must necessarily end there.”
Since the writ petition No. 12632 of 1996 was dismissed as
withdrawn on the request made by the learned counsel for the
petitioner and no permission was given to the petitioner to institute
fresh writ petition on the same subject matter, we have no hesitation
to dismiss this writ petition as not maintainable in view of the law
laid down by the Supreme Court in Sarguja Transport Service v.
State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior and others, AIR 1987
Supreme Court 88, wherein their Lordships observed as under:
“In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the
court by instituting suits again and again in the same cause of
action without any good reason the Civil Procedure Code
insists that he should obtain the permission of the court to file
a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds
mentioned in Order 23 Rule 1(3). The principle underlying
the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the
same as the rule of res judicata. This principles underlying
Rule 1 of Order 23 should be extended in the interests of
administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ
petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the
ground of public policy. That would also discourage the
litigant from indulging in bench hunting tactics. In any event
there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a
petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 once again. While the withdrawal of
a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file
a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or
a petition under Article 32 since such withdrawal does not
amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 should
be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect
of the cause of action relied on in the writ.”
For the reason enumerated above, the writ petition is
dismissed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
8 Moreover, the issues raised in the present writ petition entail
adjudication of disputed questions of fact, which would require appreciation
of evidence, an exercise that this Court, while exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not equipped to undertake.
9. It is settled law that where disputed questions of facts are
involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not the
proper remedy. A two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.P.S.
Rathore vs. State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 1, speaking through Justice
Y.K. Sabharwal, has held as follows:
“16. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani
Das [(1999) 7 SCC 298] the question which arose for consideration
was, can the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution award
compensation for death caused due to electrocution on account of
negligence, when the liability was emphatically denied on the ground
that the death had not occurred as a result of negligence, but because
of an act of God or of acts of some other persons. The Court held that
it is the settled legal position that where disputed questions of facts
are involved, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a
proper remedy. Therefore, questions as to whether death occurred
due to negligence or due to act of God or of some third person could
not be decided properly on the basis of affidavits only, but should be
decided by the civil court after appreciating the evidence adduced by
the parties. In T.N. Electricity Board v. Sumathi [(2000) 4 SCC 543]
it was held that when a disputed question of fact arises and there is
clear denial of any tortious liability, remedy under Article 226 of the
Constitution may not be proper. The Court carved out exception to
this general rule by observing that, it should not be understood that in
every case of tortious liability, recourse must be had to a suit. When
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there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is
there, it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under
Article 226 of the Constitution.”
10. Further a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Orissa Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs. Bharati Industries 2005 (12)
725 while speaking through Justice Arijit Pasayat, observed that as follows:
“9. A bare perusal of the High Court’s judgment
shows that there was clear non-application of mind. On one
hand the High Court observed that the disputed questions
cannot be gone into a writ petition. It was also noticed that
essence of dispute was breach of contract. After coming to the
above conclusions the High Court should have dismissed the
writ petition. Surprisingly, the High Court proceeded to
examine the case solely on the writ petitioner’s assertion and on
a very curious reasoning that though the appellant-Corporation
claimed that the value of articles lifted was nearly rupees 14.90
lakhs no details were specifically given. From the counter-
affidavit filed before the High Court it is crystal clear that
relevant details disputing claim of the writ petitioner were
given. Value of articles lifted by the writ petitioner is a disputed
factual question. Where a complicated question of fact is
involved and the matter requires thorough proof on factual
aspects, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition.
Whether or not the High Court should exercise jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution would largely depend
upon the nature of dispute and if the dispute cannot be
resolved without going into the factual controversy, the High
Court should not entertain the writ petition. As noted above,
the writ petition was primarily founded on allegation of breach
of contract. Question whether the action of the opposite party
in the writ petition amounted to breach of contractual
obligation ultimately depends on facts and would require
material evidence to be scrutinised and in such a case writ
jurisdiction should not be exercised. (See : State of Bihar v.
Jain Plastic & Chemicals Ltd., 2002(1) SCC 216).
10. In a catena of cases this Court has held that where
dispute revolves round questions of fact, the matter ought not
be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. (See :
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Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa LTd. (GRIDCO) and
Ors. v. Sukamani Das (Smt.) and Anr., 1999(4) RCR (Civil) 174
(SC) : (1999(7) SCC 298).”
11. A Two-Judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) Vs. Smt. Sukamani
Das 1999 (7) SCC 298, while speaking through Justice G.T Nanavati made
the following observations:
“6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in
entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not fit
cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding on the
basis that as the deaths had taken place because of
electrocution as a result of the deceased coming into contact
with snapped live wires of the electric transmission lines of the
appellants, that “admittedly/prima facie amounted to
negligence on the part of the appellants”. The High Court failed
to appreciate that all these cases were actions in tort and
negligence was required to be established firstly by the
claimants. Mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission
line belonging to the appellant No. 1 had snapped and the
deceased had come into contact with it and had died was not by
itself sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to
be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result of any
negligence of the appellants and under which circumstances the
deceased had come into contact with the wire. In view of the
specific defences raised by the appellants in each of these cases
they deserved an opportunity to prove that proper care and
precautions were taken in maintaining the transmission lines
and yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances
beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third
parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner stated
by the petitioners. These questions could not have been decided
properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is the settled legal
position that where disputed questions of facts are involved a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper
remedy. The High Court has not and could not have held that
the disputes in these cases were raised for the sake of raising
them and that there was no substance therein. The High Court
should have directed the writ petitioners to approach the Civil
Court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
12. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the judgement
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shubhas Jain v. Rajeshwari
Shivam, 2021 SCC Online SC 562 , Union of India v. Puna Hinda, (2021)
10 SCC 690 and of this Court in Sanchalakshri v. Vijayakumar
Raghuvirprasad Mehta and another, 1999(1) SCT 88 (SC) : JT 1998(8)
SC 55.
13. It is trite law that a writ petition under Article 226 is not an
appropriate remedy for resolving disputed questions of fact. In such cases,
the High Court cannot transform itself into a court of first instance to
reappreciate evidence or decide intricate factual disputes.
14. Clearly, CWP No.1388 of 2024 (supra) was dismissed as
withdrawn vide order dated 05.11.2024 without any liberty to file a fresh
petition on the same subject matter. As such, the present petition is not
maintainable and cannot be entertained by this Court in terms of the settled
principles of law. Moreover, the controversy involved in the present case
gives rise to disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon in
exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, without going further into the merits of the case, the present
writ petition is dismissed.
15. However, it is clarified that during the course of arguments,
petitioner’s counsel has raised a contention that similarly situated
contractual employee, who was also named in FIR (supra), has been
reinstated into service. The said contention has been disputed by
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CWP-4985-2025 (O&M)
respondents’ counsel. In the event it is found that any such contractual
employee, similarly placed and named in the aforesaid FIR, has been
reinstated, the respondents shall consider the claim of the petitioner as well,
and pass appropriate orders.
16. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
01.05.2026
Puneet Chawla
Whether speaking/reasoned. : Yes/No
Whether Reportable. : Yes/No
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