Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Mukesh Kumar vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17551) on 7 April, 2026
[2026:RJ-JD:17551]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 3288/2026
Mukesh Kumar S/o Shri Jagdish Kumar, Aged About 30 Years,
Resident Of Dantiwas Police Station Bhinmal District Jalore
Rajasthan (Presently Lodged In Central Jail Jodhpur)
----Petitioner
Versus
State Of Rajasthan, Through PP
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Dilip Sharma
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Pawan Bhati, PP
Mr. Vineet Jain, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Om Prakash Mehta
assisted by V.D. Gaur for complainant
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUKESH RAJPUROHIT
Order
07/04/2026
The instant fourth bail application for bail under Section 483
of BNSS (439 of Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the petitioner who has
been arrested in the present matter. The requisite details of the
matter are tabulated herein below:
S. No. Particulars of the case
1. FIR Number 424/2023
2. Police Station Sanchore
3. District Jalore
4. Offences alleged in the FIR Section 341, 302, 34 & 120-
B IPC and 3/25 Arms Act
5. Offences added, if any Section 212, 201 IPC and
7/27 Arms Act
The third bail application of the petitioner bearing S.B. Cri.
Misc. 3rd Bail Application No. 9138/2025 was dismissed as not
pressed on 10.11.2025. The present 4 th application for bail has
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been filed on the ground that after rejection of third bail
application, co-accused Mahendra Kumar @ Mahendra Singh, Sunil
@ Gopiya & Mahipal have been released on bail.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner
has been falsely implicated in the present case and no specific role
or allegation of causing firearm injury on deceased has been
attributed to petitioner. It is further submitted that the entire
prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence and
disclosure statements of co-accused persons, which are not
admissible in evidence.
It is contended that, as per the prosecution story, co-accused
Prakash Godara, in the presence of the present petitioner,
Kamlesh Kumar and Bhupendra Punia, allegedly entered into a
contract of ₹25 lakhs for arranging shooters to commit murder of
Laxman Dewasi, by contacting his associate Vishnoi Bishnoi @
Vishnu Khudala. It is further alleged that the entire conspiracy was
hatched at a hotel owned by Bhupendra Punia, however, neither
any CCTC footage of the hotel, where the petitioner had met the
co-accused, nor any call details or location have been placed on
record to establish the presence or involvement of the petitioner in
the alleged conspiracy. It is further contended that the role
attributed to the petitioner is that he, along with three alleged
shooters namely Sahil Alvi, Navin @ Gandhi, and Rajan Mehra,
arrived at Sanchore in a Fortuner vehicle, which was allegedly
driven by the petitioner. It is alleged that they chased the vehicle
of the deceased, intercepted it, and committed the murder before
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fleeing from the spot. The allegations against the petitioner are
thus of hatching the conspiracy and of driving the vehicle,
however, no recovery whatsoever has been effected from the
present petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that there
is no evidence available on record to establish the presence of the
petitioner at the place of incident at the relevant point of time. It
is contended that the petitioner is not seen in the CCTV footage
collected during investigation. It is also submitted that no
independent witness has been cited by the prosecution and the
witnesses relied upon are related/interested witnesses, thereby
rendering their testimony doubtful. It is further argued that the
F.I.R. has been lodged with a delay of about 14 hours, which
creates doubt over the prosecution story. It is also argued that no
Test Identification Parade was conducted and no recovery of any
weapon or incriminating article has been effected from the
petitioner.
Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is in
custody since 20.08.2023 and has undergone incarceration for
more than two and a half years. It is also contended that several
co-accused persons, including those alleged to be part of the
conspiracy, namely Vishnu @ Vishnu Khudala, Mahesh, Lalit,
Bhupendra, Tag Singh, Usman @ Bablu, Kamlesh Kumar, Mangilal
@ Tatiya, Hanuman Ram, Ghewarchand, Suresh Kumar,
Omprakash @ Pappu Ram, Sunil @ Gopiya, Mahipal, Mahendra
Kumar @ Mahendra Singh have already been enlarged on bail by
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this Court. It is additionally submitted that the petitioner was
earlier released on interim bail twice and he has not misused the
liberty granted to him. It is further contended that out of total 37
prosecution witnesses, not even a single witness has been
examined till date and the case is still at the stage of framing of
charge, hence, the trial of the case is likely to take considerable
time, therefore, the petitioner may be enlarged on bail.
Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned
counsel for the Complainant have vehemently opposed the bail
application and submit that the petitioner is an active participant
in a well-planned conspiracy to commit murder. It is argued that
as per the charge-sheet, the petitioner played a significant role in
facilitating the commission of offence by driving the vehicle used
in the crime and assisting the assailants. It is further contended
that there is sufficient material available on record, including
statements of witnesses and other circumstantial evidence, which
connects the petitioner with the alleged offence, furthermore the
petitioner have 10 other criminal antecedents against him and,
therefore, he does not deserve to be enlarged on bail.
In response, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
the criminal cases attributed to the petitioner pertain to the period
prior to the year 2023 and the petitioner has already been
enlarged on bail in most of those cases. It is further submitted
that none of the said cases are of similar nature to the present
offence and mere pendency of criminal cases cannot be a ground
to deny bail to the petitioner.
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I have considered the rival submissions and perused the
material available on record including the charge-sheet.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court notices that the allegation of firing the fatal shots is not
attributed to the present petitioner, rather, his alleged role is
limited to hatching the conspiracy and driving the said vehicle.
The case against the petitioner appears to be primarily based on
circumstantial evidence and disclosure statements. It is also not in
dispute that no recovery of weapon or vehicle has been effected
from the petitioner.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Sheikh vs.
State of Maharastra and Anr. (Crl.A.2787/2024) while
granting bail to the accused has observed that the petitioner has a
right to speedy trial under Article 21 which applies irrespective of
the nature of the crime. The relevant para are quoted hereinunder
as:
“7 Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record, we are inclined to exercise our
discretion in favour of the appellant herein keeping in mind the following
aspects:
(i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years;
(ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to
frame charge; and
(iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA,
the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses.
8 Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time, the
trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an
accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of
India.
9 Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment.
10 In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the High
Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti
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Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court reported in
(1978) 1 SCC 240. We quote:
“What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the
object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or
disposal of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898)
18 Cox] :
“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the
prisoner. It cannot be too strongly impressed on the,
magistracy of the country that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment, but that the requirements as to bail are
merely to secure the attendance of the prisoner at trial.”
11 The same principle has been reiterated by this Court in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab reported in (1980) 2 SCC 565 that the
object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that
the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail
should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will
appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment.
12 Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar
reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, this court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad
sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking
that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure
that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:
“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just” unless that
procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of
such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably
quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The
question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy
trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment
as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21.”
13 The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in several
judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar reported in
(1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak reported
in (1992) 1 SCC 225. In the latter the court re-emphasized the right to
speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged trial, has
no option:
“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the
obligation of the State or the complainant, as the case may be, to
proceed with the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly,
in this country, where the large majority of accused come from
poorer and weaker sections of the society, not versed in the ways(Uploaded on 16/04/2026 at 01:38:16 PM)
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application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a
given case, if an accused demands speedy trial and yet he is not
given one, may be a relevant factor in his favour. But we cannot
disentitle an accused from complaining of infringement of his
right to speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or
insist upon a speedy trial.”
14 In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in
2023 INSC 311, this Court observed as under:
“21 Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws
which impose stringent conditions for grant of bail, may be
necessary in public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in
time, the injustice wrecked on the individual is immeasurable.
Jails are overcrowded and their living conditions, more often
than not, appalling. According to the Union Home Ministry’s
response to Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as on 31st December 2021, over 5,54,034
prisoners were lodged in jails against total capacity of 4,25,069
lakhs in the country. Of these 122,852 were convicts; the rest
4,27,165 were undertrials.
22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at
risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala High
Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State reported in 1993 Cri LJ
3242, as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner:
“loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses
personal possessions. He has no personal relationships.
Psychological problems result from loss of freedom,
status, possessions, dignity any autonomy of personal
life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be dreadful.
The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary standards.
Self-perception changes.”
23. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as
crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the
crime, more honour is paid to the criminal” (also see Donald
Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects – where the accused
belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of
livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as
loss of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts
therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the
event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and
ensure that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact
stringent provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.”
15 The requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred to as
“the 2008 Act”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by a
Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and
have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to
be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in
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consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated
under Section 11 of the 2008.
16 A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713] had an occasion to consider the long
incarceration and at the same time the effect of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP
Act and observed as under : (SCC p. 722, para 17)
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not
oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both
the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable
under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised.
Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is
no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time
and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section
43- D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of
bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy
trial.”
17 In the recent decision, Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of
Investigation reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51, prolonged incarceration and
inordinate delay engaged the attention of the court, which considered the
correct approach towards bail, with respect to several enactments,
including Section 37 NDPS Act. The court expressed the opinion that
Section 436A (which requires inter alia the accused to be enlarged on bail if
the trial is not concluded within specified periods) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 would apply:
“We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each
special Act has got an objective behind it, followed by the rigour
imposed. The general principle governing delay would apply to
these categories also. To make it clear, the provision contained in
Section 436-A of the Code would apply to the Special Acts also
in the absence of any specific provision. For example, the rigour
as provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come
in the way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a
person. We do feel that more the rigour, the quicker the
adjudication ought to be. After all, in these types of cases
number of witnesses would be very less and there may not be
any justification for prolonging the trial. Perhaps there is a need
to comply with the directions of this Court to expedite the
process and also a stricter compliance of Section 309 of the
Code.”
18 Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in everyone is
good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption. This
humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with delinquents,
juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every sinner a future.
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When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making
the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic,
may be, the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be, because of
the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu
of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations.
19 If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has
no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to
have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on
the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the
Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime.
20 We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an accused; not a convict.
The over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly,
howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
21 We are convinced that the manner in which the prosecuting agency as
well as the Court have proceeded, the right of the accused to have a speedy
trial could be said to have been infringed thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
22 In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.”
The Co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Sultan @
Bida vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. 4th Bail
Application No. 13648/2024), while granting bail to the
accused under section 302 IPC considering long incarceration has
held that:
” In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the
judgment of Honb’le Supreme Court in the case of Balwinder Singh Vs.
State of Punjab & Anr. (Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.8523/2024) in
which while granting bail it has been observed as under:
” 9. The incident in the present case occurred on 25.06.2020 and
the petitioner was arrested soon thereafter on 26.06.2020. By
now, 6 co accused have been granted bail. As the prosecution
wishes to examine 17 more witnesses, the trial is unlikely to
conclude on a near date.
10. Considering the above and to avoid the situation of the trial
process itself being the punishment particularly when there is
presumption of innocence under the Indian jurisprudence, we
deem it appropriate to grant bail to the petitioner – Balwinder
Singh. It is ordered accordingly. Appropriate bail conditions be
imposed by the learned trial court.”
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A coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Umesh Vyas vs. State
of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. II Bail Application No.14958/2022), vide
order dated 17.03.2023, also observed as follows:
“The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Abdul Majeed Lone
Vs. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir [Special Leave to
Appeal (Crl.) No.3961/2022], Amit Singh Moni Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No.668/2020), Tapan Das
Vs. Union of India [Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal)
No.5617/2021], Kulwant Singh Vs. State of Punjab [Special
Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.5187/2019], Ghanshyam Sharma
Vs. State of Rajasthan [Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal)
No.5397/2019], Nadeem Vs. State of UP [Special Leave to
Appeal (Criminal) No.1524/2022] and Mukesh Vs. The State of
Rajasthan [Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No.4089/2021]
has granted bail to the accused persons, against whom the
allegations are of transporting or possessing narcotic contraband
above commercial quantity, on the ground of custody period and
taking into consideration the fact that the trial against the said
accused persons will take time in completion. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has ordered for release of the accused persons
who were in custody from two years to four years. Learned Public
Prosecutor has opposed the bail application.
Having regard to the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case, I deem it appropriate to allow this fifth
bail application solely on the ground of custody period of the
accused petitioner and keeping in view the fact that the trial
against him has not been completed till date.
Accordingly, without expressing any opinion on the merits
of the case, this third bail application filed under Section 439
Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is directed that petitioner Umesh Vyas S/
o Shri Ganeshlal Ji shall be released on bail in connection with
FIR No.15/2019 of Police Station Charbhuja, District Rajsamand
provided he executes a personal bond in a sum of Rs.50,000/-
with two sound and solvent sureties of Rs.25,000/- each to the
satisfaction of learned trial court for his appearance before that
court on each and every date of hearing and whenever called
upon to do so till the completion of the trial.”
The petitioner is in judicial custody since 21.11.2019 and the trial of
the case will take sufficiently long time. With these submissions, learned
counsel for the petitioner prayed that the benefit of bail may be granted to
the accused-petitioner.
Learned AAG and learned counsel for the complainant have opposed
the prayer of bail.
I have considered the arguments advanced before me and gone
through the material available on record.
It is not disputed that the accused petitioner has so far suffered
incarceration of more than 5 years and trial is still going on. Therefore, I
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deem it just and proper to grant bail to the accused petitioner under Section
483 B.N.S.S.”
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abhimanue Etc. Etc.
vs. State of Kerala passed in SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS.5814-
5816 OF 2025, while relying upon the decision in Ayub Khan vs.
State of Rajasthan has held that criminal antecedents by
themselves does not constitute a ground for denial of bail. The
Hon’ble Court has held that:
“23. Our attention was also invited to the status report “led by the State, to
indicate the various criminal antecedents of the appellants. Suffice it to say,
however, that such antecedents by themselves cannot constitute a ground for
denial of bail. In this context, a useful reference may be made to the
decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Ayub Khan v. State of
Rajasthan (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763) of which one of us (Augustine
George Masih, J.) was a member. The relevant paragraph therefrom is
extracted below:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of
the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made
by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima
facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of
incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to
deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only
on the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of
antecedents may not be relevant in such a case. In a given case,
the Court may grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the
accused are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the
peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the
existence of the antecedents. ……… .””
This Court further notices that several co-accused persons,
including those alleged to be part of the conspiracy, namely
Vishnu @ Vishnu Khudala, Mahesh, Lalit, Bhupendra, Tag Singh,
Usman @ Bablu, Kamlesh Kumar, Mangilal @ Tatiya, Hanuman
Ram, Ghewarchand, Suresh Kumar, Omprakash @ Pappu Ram,
Sunil @ Gopiya, Mahipal, Mahendra Kumar @ Mahendra Singh
have already been enlarged on bail by this Court; the petitioner is
in custody since 20.08.2023 and the trial is likely to take
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considerable time for its conclusion. The petitioner was also
granted interim bail earlier and there is no allegation of misuse of
such liberty.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid principles laid down,
without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and
considering the totality of facts and circumstances, particularly the
nature of allegations, the evidence available on record, the period
of custody and the principle of parity, this Court is inclined to
enlarge the petitioner on bail.
Accordingly, the present fourth bail application under Section
439 Cr.P.C. is allowed and it is ordered that the petitioner Mukesh
Kumar S/o Jagdish Kumar shall be released on bail in connection
with F.I.R. No. 424/2023 registered at Police Station Sanchore,
District Jalore, provided he furnishes a personal bond in the sum
of Rs. 50,000/- along with two sureties of Rs. 25,000/- each to
the satisfaction of the learned trial court. The petitioner shall
appear before the trial court on all dates of hearing and shall not
tamper with the evidence or influence any witness. He shall not
leave the country without prior permission of the trial court and
shall not indulge in any criminal activity. In case of breach of any
of the conditions, the prosecution shall be at liberty to seek
cancellation of bail.
(MUKESH RAJPUROHIT),J
194-/Jitender//-
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