Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mukesh Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 20 July, 2026
CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 1 of 16
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
231 Date of decision: 20.07.2026
1. CWP-20292-2024 (O&M)
Mukesh Kumar (deceased) now through
his Legal Representatives ...Petitioner(s)
Vs.
State of Haryana and others ...Respondent(s)
AND
2. CWP-17460-2024 (O&M)
Amit Kumar ...Petitioner(s)
Vs.
State of Haryana and others ....Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIDHI GUPTA
Present:- Mr. Rakesh Nagpal, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. Ravi Partap Singh, D.A.G., Haryana.
Mr. Saket Bhandari, Advocate for respondents
No.2 to 4.
***
NIDHI GUPTA, J.
CWP-20292-2024:
Present Civil Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for the issuance of
appropriate writ particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing the
order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13); whereby services of the petitioner
have been dispensed with without holding any regular departmental
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 2 of 16inquiry; and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondent to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.
CWP-17460-2024:
Present Civil Writ Petition under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner for the issuance of
appropriate writ particularly in the nature of certiorari for quashing the
order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-16); whereby services of the petitioner
have been dispensed with without holding any regular departmental
inquiry; and for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
respondent to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.
2. Both the above said Writ Petitions are being disposed of by this
common order as the facts and issues, and respondents involved in both
the cases are identical/similar. For the sake of convenience, facts are being
drawn from CWP-20292-2024 titled as Mukesh Kumar (deceased) now
through (deceased) now through his Legal Representatives vs. State of
Haryana and others.
3. It is inter alia submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner
that the petitioner-Mukesh Kumar was appointed as Mali-cum-Chowkidar
on contractual basis vide Office Order dated 29.01.2002 (Annexure P-3).
Extensions were granted to the petitioner from time to time vide various
orders (Annexures P-4 to P-9). After 17 years of service, a Show Cause
Notice dated 09.12.2019 (Annexure P-11) was issued to the petitioner to
show cause within 3 days of receipt of the order as to why appropriate
DIVYANSHI action be not taken against him. Learned counsel submits that the said
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17460 of 2024 (O&M) 3 of 16
period was not at all sufficient for the petitioner to properly reply to the
Show Cause Notice. Accordingly, vide request letter dated nil (Annexure P-
12), petitioner had sought time from the respondents to supply him Hindi
version of the Notice dated 09.12.2019 (Annexure P-11). However, without
granting time to the petitioner, in a totally arbitrary and inequitable
manner, the impugned order dated 13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13) has been
passed; whereby services of the petitioner have been terminated.
4. It is submitted that thereafter, the petitioner alongwith Amit
Kumar (petitioner in connected CWP-17460-2024) had filed
Representation/Appeal dated 19.12.2019 (Annexure P-17), against the
impugned action. But to know avail.
5. Subsequently, order dated 09.05.2024 (Annexure P-20) came
to be passed in CWP-2283-2020 titled as Sanjeev Kumar vs. State of
Haryana and others, and other connected matters, by this Court disposing
of a bunch of Writ Petitions holding that “When there are allegations of
misconduct which are stigmatic in nature, then charge-sheet had to be
served and departmental enquiry had to be conducted.” Accordingly,
termination orders in the said Writ Petitions were set aside by the
Coordinate Bench vide order dated 09.05.2024 (Annexure P-20). On
31.05.2024, petitioner had submitted another Representation (Annexure P-
21) seeking withdrawal of the order dated 13.12.2019, however no action
was taken by the respondents.
6. Learned counsel submits that the impugned order of
DIVYANSHI termination is unsustainable in view of the fact that principles of natural
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 4 of 16
justice has been flagrantly violated. It is submitted that misconduct has
been dealt with in Rule 5 of the Haryana Civil Services (Government
Employee’s Conduct) Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules, 2016’)
which had not been considered and/or adhered by the respondents while
passing impugned order. Thus, the action of the respondents is totally
arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. Moreover, Show Cause Notice has been given only to show cause as
to why appropriate action may not be taken without mentioning the
proposed punishment; whereas punishment of dismissal has been awarded
without holding any departmental enquiry. It is submitted that as per the
aforesaid Rules, 2016, at least minimum period of 15 days is required to be
given to file reply. Hence, action of the respondents also hit by provision of
Article 311 of Constitution of India as the services of the petitioner have
been terminated without holding any enquiry.
7. In support, besides the judgment passed in Sanjeev Kumar’s
case (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon judgment
passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP-33915-2019 titled as
Karam Singh vs. Managing Director, National Health Mission and others,
Law Finder Doc Id # 1944409; wherein it is held that Show Cause Notice is
required to be given even for contractual employees, and enquiry is
required to be conducted.
The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under: –
“5. Undoubtedly, the petitioner is a contractual employee and
in terms of the contract, his services could have been
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 5 of 16terminated without conducting any inquiry. However, the
termination was on account of misconduct as is evident from
the order dated 25.10.2019 (Annexure P-22) and in a Division
Bench judgment of this Court in Union Territory of Chandigarh
and others v. Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh
Bench and others 2011 (1) SCT 777, it has been held that
where the question is of misconduct, regular inquiry has to be
conducted even if the employee is a contractual employee. No
judgment to the contrary has been cited and thus, the
impugned order is liable to be set aside on this short ground
alone.”
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner accordingly prays that the
present Writ Petition be allowed; and the impugned order dated
13.12.2019 (Annexure P-13) be quashed.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel
for respondents No. 2 to 4 have opposed submissions made on behalf of
the petitioner. It is firstly informed that petitioner in CWP-20292-2024,
namely, Mukesh Kumar has expired.
10. It is further submitted that it is the admitted fact on record that
both the petitioners were appointed on contractual basis. Learned counsel
refers to the last extension dated 28.03.2019 (Annexure P-8) issued to the
petitioner and submits that it is clearly mentioned therein that
appointment of the petitioner is on temporary basis and is liable to be
terminated without notice. It is contended that therefore, no right accrues
to the petitioner.
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17460 of 2024 (O&M) 6 of 16
11. It is further submitted that reliance of the petitioner upon the
judgment of Sanjeev Kumar‘s case (supra) (Annexure P-20), is misconceived
as the said judgment was passed in case of regular employees. In respect of
judgment passed in Karam Singh’s case (supra), (Annexure P-19), it is
submitted that the reliance of the petitioner on the said judgment is
misconceived as it is contrary to the prevailing position in law in this regard.
Learned counsel refers to a Division Bench judgment of Delhi High Court in
case of Ravinder Kaushik vs. Union of India (Delhi) (DB) : Law Finder Doc Id
# 984606; wherein it has been held that “As the petitioner therein was not a
regular employee of the respondents, there was no need to initiate any
disciplinary proceedings against him by holding a full-fledged enquiry
before passing the termination order.”
12. It is further pointed out that case of the petitioner is barred by
delay and laches as order of termination was passed on 13.12.2019;
whereas present Writ Petition was filed only in July 2024 i.e. after a delay of
approximately 4 years and 7 months. It is accordingly prayed that present
Writ Petition be dismissed.
13. No other argument is raised on behalf of the parties. I have
heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the case file in great
detail. I find no merit in the submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner.
14. Factual matrix of the case has already been noted herein
above. It is not disputed that appointment of the petitioner was on
DIVYANSHI contractual basis. As per the last order of extension contract dated
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17460 of 2024 (O&M) 7 of 16
28.03.2019 (Annexure P-8), it is clearly mentioned therein in clause (vii)
that: “Your appointment shall be purely temporary and you will be liable to
be terminated even during the period of contract if your work and conduct
is not found satisfactory during the said period at any time without notice
and without assigning any reason.” Therefore, no right accrues to the
petitioner.
15. The main thrust of the argument on behalf of learned counsel
for the petitioner is reliance upon judgment in case of Karam Singh (supra);
wherein it has been held that “where the question is of misconduct, regular
inquiry has to be conducted even if the employee is a contractual
employee.” However, as clarified in the said judgment in the next line
itself, it has further been stated that “No judgment to the contrary has
been cited and thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on this
short ground alone.” Clearly, therefore, the said ruling was made in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case; and was therefore a
judgment in personam and could not operate as a judgment in rem.
Practice of parties of relying upon random observations made in judgments
rendered in particular facts and circumstances of a case has been castigated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, (SC) :
Law Finder Doc Id # 135714, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: –
“B. Constitution of India, 1950 – Precedents – The words used by
Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are
words in Act of Parliament – Courts should not place reliance
on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 8 of 16fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance
is placed.”
The relevant paras of the said judgment reads as under: –
“11. Reliance on the decision without looking into the factual
background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A
decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its
own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a
judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a
Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the
case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a
decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to
the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains
three basic postulates – (i) findings of material facts, direct and
inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which
the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii)
statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal
problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on
the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for
what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is
its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what
logically flows from the various observations made in the
judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which
a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as
a precedent. (See : State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra
and Ors., (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 647) and Union of India
and Ors. v. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors., (1996(6) SCC 44). A case
is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no
more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to
be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v.
Leathem, (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed
that every judgment must be read as applicable to the
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 9 of 16particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the
generality of the expressions which are found there are not
intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and
qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what
it actually decides.
12. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without
discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact
situation of the decision on which reliance is placed.
Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s
theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken
out of their context. These observations must be read in the
context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments
of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret
words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the
discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges
interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They
interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be
interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v.
Horton, (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by
treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J as though they were
part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of
interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from
the great weight to be given to the language actually used by
that most distinguished judge.””
16. Even otherwise, the question of law, as to whether even in
case of contractual employees departmental proceedings are required to
be conducted prior to termination, has been answered against the
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 10 of 16
petitioner. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents have relied
upon Division Bench judgment of the Delhi Court passed in Ravinder
Kaushik vs. Union of India and another; Law Finder Doc Id # 984606;
wherein while placing reliance upon another Division Bench judgment
passed in Neena Shad vs. MCD & Ors reported as (2010) 175 DLT 240 and
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union Public Service
Commission vs. Girish Javanti lai Vaghela (2006) 2 SCC 482, it has been
held as under: –
“13. In Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank
Staff Association and Anr. reported as (2000) 5 SCC 65, the
Supreme Court had examined the case of an employee whose
services had been terminated without holding any inquiry.
After sending a notice to him to show cause for his continued
absence, which notice was returned with the report that the
employee had refused to receive the same, the bank had
terminated the services of the employee, who had been on
unauthorised leave for more than 90 days. Upholding the order
of the bank terminating the services of the employee and
setting aside the orders of the Tribunal and the High Court, the
Supreme Court opined that the principles of natural justice
were complied with by the Bank in the said case and observed
as follows:-
“16. Now what are the requirements of principles of natural
justice, which are required to be observed? These are: (1) a
workman should know the nature of the complaint or
accusation; (2) an opportunity to state his case; and (3) the
management should act in good faith which means that the
action of the management should be fair, reasonable and just.
DIVYANSHI All these three criteria have been fully met in the present case.
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 11 of 16Principles of natural justice are inbuilt in clause 16 of the
Bipartite Settlement. When evidence was led before the
Tribunal, the Bank produced the registered covers, which had
been received back with the endorsement “refused” and the
addressee “not found during delivery time”. Dayananda said
that he never refused to receive the notice. In these
circumstances the Tribunal thought it necessary to hold that
notice was not served on Dayananda as the Bank did not
examine the postman. The notice was sent on the correct
address of Dayananda and it was received back with the postal
endorsement “refused”. A clear presumption arose in favour of
the Bank and against Dayananda. Yet the Tribunal held that no
notice was given to Dayananda as the postman was not
produced by the Bank. This appears to us to be rather an
incongruous finding by the Tribunal. Unfortunately, the High
Court did not go into this question at all. Considering the
conduct of Dayananda all this period and after three years of
his having voluntarily retired from the Bank in terms of clause
16 of the Bipartite Settlement his statement that he did not
receive the notice was a sheer lie. His whole edifice was built
on falsehood and yet the Tribunal was there to give him relief
on the platter though at the same time criticised his conduct
during his employment with the Bank.”
XXX XXX XXX
19. This undue reliance on the principles of natural justice by
the Tribunal and even by the High Court has certainly led to a
miscarriage of justice as far as the Bank is concerned. The
conduct of Dayananda as an employee of the Bank has been
astounding. It was not a case where the Tribunal should have
given any relief to Dayananda and yet the Bank was directed to
reinstate him with continuity of service and mercifully the latter
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 12 of 16
part of the relief the High Court struck down. There was no
occasion for the Tribunal to direct that Dayananda be
reinstated in service or for the High Court not to have exercised
its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to set aside
the award.
(emphasis added)
14. In the context of contractual employees, reference may be
made to the observations of a Division Bench of this court
in Neena Shad v. MCD & Ors. reported as (2010) 175 DLT 240,
wherein the court had considered whether the protection
available to a government servant under Article 311 of the
Constitution of India would be available to a contractual
employee. We deem it appropriate to reproduce paragraph 68
of the aforesaid decision which reads as under: –
“68. Sometimes due to rush of work or other exigencies
of service the government makes contractual
appointments. Such appointments are made in respect
of non-sanctioned posts and de-hors the recruitment
rules. A person appointed on contractual basis does not
enjoy the protection of Article 311(2) for the simple
reason he is not member of a civil service of the Union or
an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a
civil post under the Union or a State. (See the decision of
Supreme Court reported as Union Public Service
Commission v. Girish Javanti Lai Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC
482.””
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to dispute the
above said position in law. As such, the sole argument raised by learned
counsel for the petitioner is without merit.
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 13 of 16
18. It is also not disputed that judgment passed by this Court in
Sanjeev Kumar (supra) (Annexure P-20) has been passed in case of regular
appointees. Therefore, petitioner can derive no benefit from the said case.
19. Even otherwise, claim of the petitioner is liable to be rejected
being highly belated. In respect of termination order dated 13.12.2019;
present Writ Petition has been filed only in July 2024 i.e. after a delay of
approximately 4 years and 7 months. Clearly, the claim of the petitioner is
not maintainable at this belated stage. The said issue of delay stands settled
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind
Kumar Srivastava (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 627984, holding as under: –
“A. Constitution of India, Article 14 – Equality – Extending the
benefit of judgments to similar situated persons (fence
sitters) – Normal rule is that merely because other similarly
situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are
not to be treated differently – This rule is subject to well
recognised exceptions in the form of latches and delay as well
as acquiescence – Same would be valid ground to dismiss
claim – Exception is inapplicable in cases where judgment
pronounced by Court is judgment in rem with intention to
give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they
approached the Court or not.
B. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 16 and 226 –
Appointment – Cancellation of appointment – Challenged –
Delay and latches – Acquiescence – Cancellation challenged
after nine years when some of similarly situated aggrieved
persons got relief from Court – Unexplained delay and latches
in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years – TotallyDIVYANSHI
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
17460 of 2024 (O&M) 14 of 16unjust to give appointment after a period of 27 years – Order
of High Court allowing claim of appellant set aside.”
The relevant para of the said judgment reads as under:-
“23. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of
the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well
as the respondents, can be summed up as under:
(1) Normal rule is that when a particular set of
employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically
situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that
benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
This principle needs to be applied in service matters more
emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court
from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons
should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would
be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not
approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated
differently.
(2) However, this principle is subject to well recognised
exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the
wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same
and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that
their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in
time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot
claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of
similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be
treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the
acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.
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CWP Nos. 20292 of 2024 (O&M) and
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(3) However, this exception may not apply in those cases
where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in
rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated
persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such
a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to
itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person.
Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the
decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of
regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of
India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court
was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment
shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an
intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be
impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said
judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their
petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or
acquiescence.”
20. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in Sudhir Bala v. State of Punjab, (Punjab And
Haryana): Law Finder Doc Id # 2678248, decided on 11.12.2024; wherein
it is held that “Delay and laches in filing a writ petition under Article 226
of the Constitution of India can disentitle a petitioner to relief, especially
when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in asserting one’s
rights.”
21. It is not disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner that
although order of termination was passed on 13.12.2019 yet Writ Petition
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has been filed only on 20.07.2024. It has been submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that there was delay in filing the Writ Petition
because of Covid. However, Covid was over in July 2022; and as such, there
is no explanation for the extraordinary delay. Case of the petitioner is
therefore, hit by delay and laches as well.
22. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to controvert or
dispute the above said factual and legal position. Accordingly, both the Writ
Petitions stand dismissed.
23. Pending application(s) if any also stand(s) disposed of.
20.07.2026 (NIDHI GUPTA)
Divyanshi JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
DIVYANSHI
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