Jharkhand High Court
Mukesh Kr. Ray vs Bindu Kumari @ Bindu Devi on 7 July, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.171 of 2025
Mukesh Kr. Ray, aged about 38 years (now 39 years), S/o
Sri Parmanand Ray, present address: Villa No.195,
Grandla Casa, R.K. Farm Gate, Byagadadenahallz, P.O.
Byagadadhenahalli, P.S. Anekal, Bengaluru, Karnataka,
Permanent Address: Katiyani-14 east, Road No.1, Block-A,
Near Bharat Petrol Pump, Vastu Vihar, Phase-2,
Amaghata, Gobindpur, P.O. Jailgara, P.S. Govindpur, Dist.
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
... ... Plaintiff/Appellant
Versus
Bindu Kumari @ Bindu Devi, aged about 30 years, W/o-
Mukesh Kr. Ray, D/o Surendra Singh, Village-
Bahuriadih, P.S. Jamua (Nawadiha O.P), P.O. Gadi
Nawdiha, ,District Giridih, Jharkhand
...Defendant/Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Niladri S. Mukherjee, Advocate
Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Yogesh Modi, Advocate
-------------------
C.A.V. on 22nd June, 2026 Pronounced on 07/07/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Court
Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated 20th June,
2025 and decree signed on 30th June, 2025, passed by the
learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad in Original
Suit No. 28 of 2024, whereby and whereunder, the suit filed
by the appellant – husband for dissolution of marriage by
decree of divorce u/s 13(1)(ia) and (i-b) of Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 against respondent-wife, has been dismissed.
1
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
2. Briefly stated, the facts as stated by the plaintiff-appellant,
in nut-shell, is that prior to marriage there was discussions
between both the parties and photo of both the parties were
exchanged and the plaintiff’s-appellant‟s parents requested
to the defendant family to show the defendant before
marriage and when the plaintiff and his relatives saw the
defendant, they surprised that the girl was someone else
compared to the actual photo shared by the defendant
family. Thereafter, the plaintiff’s family decided not to
solemnize the marriage, as this was a case of cheating. Then
the defendant’s/respondent‟s family lodged false complaint
before Giridih Police Station.
3. It has been stated that the defendant’s/respondent‟s family
misbehaved with him and his family members and
threatened to send them to jail and assaulted badly. On 7th
May 2012, police arrived at his home and threatened them
with dire consequence if they didn’t agree to marry.
4. Being highly aggrieved by the police and having credible
threat of losing life and livelihood, and under huge pressure,
he performed his marriage on 29.06.2012 without his will
and consent. He has further stated that during ceremony of
marriage no other function has been done as it was forceful
marriage. No dowry and gift were exchanged between them.
After marriage, the defendant-respondent came to his house
at Dhanbad and he tried to continue his matrimonial life
2
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
and to maintain peace in the family. Surprisingly, he knows
from the first day that the defendant-respondent was highly
quarrelsome and abnormal and she quarrel with him and
his family members.
5. He has further stated that apart from marriage there was no
physical relation established between them. On 29.09.2012,
the parents of the defendant brought her in Maika and
thereafter she never returns to her matrimonial house on
several request made by him. It is further stated that he is
working in a Private Sector at Bengaluru for his livelihood.
He has further stated that since 30.09.2012 they were living
separately and since then she has been deserted him. From
the above facts, it is stated that it is impossible to continue
matrimonial life with the defendant-respondent, so, by filing
the suit prayer has been made that to dissolve the marriage
by granting a decree of divorce in his favour.
6. On being noticed, the respondent appeared and filed written
statement, in which, it has been stated that the suit filed by
the plaintiff is not maintainable either in law or in fact and
the same has been filed on false and fabricated grounds
without any cogent reason. There is no cause of action. The
plaintiff-appellant has committed cruelty and domestic
violence upon her for want of dowry for which she filed a
criminal case U/s-323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section-
4 of D.P. Act against the plaintiff and his family members at
3
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
Giridih Court. However, it is admitted that she got married
on 29.06.2012 at Baba Baidhyanath Mandir, Deoghar as per
Hindu Customs and Rites. At the time of marriage, the
plaintiff and his family members put pressure upon her
parents for want of dowry and her parents gave various gold
and silver jewelleries worth Rs.-6,50,000/- and Rs.-
6,00,000/- cash for goods and articles. Her parents spent
Rs.-20 lakh at the time of marriage. Her father gave Rs.-
1,51,000/- cash at the time of tilak and after engagement
the plaintiff-appellant and his family members started
demanding Rs.-50 lakh and threatened that if the said
amount shall not be given then they will not perform
marriage and after her father complained to local police then
with the intervention of police the plaintiff-appellant agreed
to marry. After marriage, she went to her matrimonial house
and after staying 2 days at her matrimonial house, she went
to Bangalore with the plaintiff-husband, the appellant
herein.
7. The plaintiff-appellant and his family members continued
their demand and upon pressure her father gave Rs.-
8,50,000/- to the plaintiff’s/appellant‟s father. However, the
plaintiff-appellant and his family members continued to
torture her. On 05.11.2023, the plaintiff-appellant and his
family members beaten respondent very badly and they took
away all her stridhan and ousted her from her matrimonial
4
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
house. Thereafter, she has filed a maintenance case before
the Principal Judge, Family Court, Giridih in which plaintiff-
appellant had not appeared.
8. It has been stated that she lived with the plaintiff
continuously for 11 years at various places. She was ousted
from her matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and since then
she is living in her Maika. She is always ready to live with
the plaintiff-appellant and ready to lead a happy conjugal life
with the plaintiff-appellant, therefore, she prayed that the
suit filed by the plaintiff for divorce is liable to be dismissed.
9. The learned family court, on the basis of pleadings of the
parties and after hearing the respective parties and
analyzing the evidence adduced on behalf of both the sides,
held that the appellant-husband has not been able to prove
the fact of cruelty and desertion against the respondent-wife
and accordingly dismissed the suit, against which the
present appeal has been filed.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-husband:
10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the
factual aspect which was available before the learned family
court supported by the evidences adduced on behalf of the
appellant has not properly been considered and as such, the
judgment impugned is perverse, hence, not sustainable in
the eyes of law.
5
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
11. It has been submitted that the issue of cruelty as also
desertion has not been taken into consideration in right
perspective.
12. Submission has been made that the learned family court
failed to appreciate the fact that the marriage between the
parties itself is a void since the consent of the appellant was
obtained under threat and coercion and even none of the
ceremonies of the marriage as contemplated under the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 like saptapadi; exchange of
garland; home yajnas etc. were performed and as such the
marriage itself is a nullity.
13. Further submission has been made that filing of false case of
dowry by the respondent-wife against the appellant-husband
and his family member itself is a cruelty but that aspect of
the matter has not been taken into consideration by learned
family court. Even, learned family court has ignored the
conversation between the police and the plaintiff-appellant
prior to the marriage, recorded and produced in a pen drive
and further disbelieved the conversation between DW 1 and
PW 2, wherein the DW 1 admitted filing of false dowry
complaint before marriage.
14. Further, on the point of desertion submission has been
made that for the last 12 years there was no physical
relation between the parties, which fact has also not been
taken into consideration by learned family court.
6
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
15. Further, the learned family court has brushed aside the
evidence produced by the appellant and has given no specific
finding with respect to the evidences produced by the
appellant.
16. Further, the parties are living separately for a long period of
time and there is no chance of restoration of conjugal right,
but this aspect of the matter has also not been taken into
consideration by the learned Family Court while passing the
impugned judgment.
17. Submission has been made that the relationship of husband
and wife is on the thread of trust which itself has been
broken and there is no chance of re-union.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers
from perversity, as such, is not sustainable in the eyes of
law.
Submission on behalf of respondent-wife:
19. Submission has been made that the appellant has miserably
failed to prove the allegation of cruelty and desertion against
the respondent-wife.
20. Submission has been made that it is the plaintiff-appellant
who committed cruelty and domestic violence upon
respondent-wife for want of dowry for which she filed a
criminal case U/s-323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section-
4 of D.P. Act against the appellant and his family members.
7
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
21. Further, submission has been made that at the time of
marriage, the appellant and his family members put
pressure upon her parents for wants of dowry and her
parents gave various gold and silver jewelries worth Rs.-
6,50,000/- and Rs.-6,00,000/- cash for goods and articles
as also spent huge amount at the time of marriage. Her
father gave Rs.-1,51,000/- cash at the time of tilak but after
engagement the plaintiff-appellant and his family members
started demanding Rs.-50 lakh and threatened that if the
said amount shall not be given then they will not perform
marriage for which her father complained to local police then
with the intervention of police the plaintiff-appellant agreed
to marry.
22. Submission has been made that after marriage, she went to
her matrimonial house and after staying for two days at her
matrimonial house, she went to Bangalore with the plaintiff-
husband, the appellant herein. It has been stated that she
lived with the plaintiff continuously for 11 years at various
places. But she was ousted from her matrimonial house on
05.11.2023 and since then she is living in her Maika.
23. Further submission has been made that the respondent-wife
is always ready and willing to lead conjugal life with the
appellant-husband.
Analysis:
8
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
24. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone through the finding recorded by the learned Family
Judge in the impugned judgment as also the trial court
record.
25. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been
filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion i.e., by filing an
application under Section 13 (1) (i-a), (i-b) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 and accordingly, evidence have been led
and argument has been advanced by learned counsel for the
appellant and the suit was dismissed and decided against
petitioner/appellant-husband.
26. From the pleadings available on record and the arguments
advanced on behalf of parties, the issues which require
consideration are as to:
Whether the judgment and decree of divorce
passed on the ground of cruelty under Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and/or on
the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib)
requires interference?
27. This Court, in order to appreciate the testimony available on
record, has gone through the testimonies of the witnesses,
as available in the impugned order.
28. In this case the petitioner-appellant has adduced two
witnesses in support of his case.
9
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
29. The P.W.-1 is Mukesh Kumar Ray (Plaintiff), in his chief-
examination on affidavit, he has reiterated his pleading. He
has produced a Pen-drive, which has been marked as Mark-
‘X’ for identification, which is recording of threatening of
police prior to marriage. He has further stated in para-11
that from the first day of marriage, defendant-respondent
started quarreling, abusing and insulting him and his family
members. In para-12, it is submitted that no physical
relation was made in between them. In para-13, it is stated
that he made complaint to her family members but they
insulted to him. In para-14, he deposed that her family
members took away to defendant on 29.09.2012 and they
refused for bidai. In para-15, he has stated that her wife is
living separately from 29.09.2012 and there is no any
contact with her. In para-17, it is stated that after 11 years
from 01.01.2024 again they started troubling to him. After
living separately from the so long period and torture,
statement has been made that it is not possible to live with
defendant-wife. So, he filed this suit for divorce.
30. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the marriage
was solemnized in Deoghar Mandir. He had not made any
objection at that time. He filed this suit for divorce after 12
years of marriage. He had not made any complaint that his
wife is not living with him. He went Darjeeling with his
mother and father. His wife did not go there. He had not
10
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
remembered that when he had gone to Darjeeling. Except
him other three members of his family had also not made
any complaint against his wife. His wife has lodged a
maintenance case against him. He has no knowledge that
his wife has lodged a C.P. Case no.-3335/2023 for demand
of dowry.
31. He has stated that it is the false to say that his wife is living
with him regularly after marriage. He has not lodged any
case for declaration of marriage voidable. He has not lodged
any case regarding Bidai of his wife. No Panchayati was
taken place in between them and no document was
prepared. He has further deposed that it is false to say that
on 05.11.2023, he ousted his wife from residence of
Govindpur regarding demand of dowry. On showing the
photographs to witness filed by the defendant, he told that
in the 1st photograph a girl is present with his mother and it
is as like his wife. In the 2nd and 3rd photographs a lady
present with his mother and father and it is similar to his
wife. In the 4th photograph, he was present within local seller
and a lady who is Bindu [respondent-wife] and this
photograph also of Darjeeling and in 5th photograph Bindu is
present with his mother and father. In the 6th photograph
Bindu is present with him and his parents. In the 7th
photograph, he was present with brother and Bindu. In the
8th photograph, Bindu is present with his mother. In the 9th
11
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
photograph, Bindu is also there. These all photographs are
of Darjeeling.
32. The P.W.-2 is Rishikesh Ray, (Brother of plaintiff), in his
chief-examination on affidavit, he has reiterated the pleading
of plaintiff-appellant. He has stated that he has recorded the
conversation with the defendant-wife, in which she has
stated that no demand of dowry was made at the time of
marriage, the said pen-drive has already been marked as
Mark-‘X’ for identification.
33. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the marriage of
Bindu Kumari was solemnized with his brother at Baba
Dham temple or not, he has no knowledge about it. The
defendant-respondent has lodged any case against his
brother and his family members or not, he has no knowledge
about it. He or his brother has not made any complaint that
defendant-respondent went away from the matrimonial
house. His brother has not lodged any case for cancellation
of marriage. He is living with his brother at Bangalore. He
has no knowledge that his brother went to Darjeeling with
his wife-defendant or not.
34. The D.W.-1 is Bindu Kumari (Defendant) in her chief-
examination on affidavit, has reiterated her pleading.
35. In her cross-examination, she has stated that she met with
plaintiff before marriage with their family members on
25.12.2011 and 05.01.2012. She had written at Giridih that
12
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
the plaintiff-appellant was ready for marriage after
intervention of police. She lodged two cases in Giridih. She
went Bangalore with his husband after marriage, but she
has no documentary proof about it. The address of her
husband of Bangalore is 18 Cross Pragati Layout,
Dodunkhundi, Marathali, Bangalore. She went there after
marriage. She visited to Bangalore in between year 2012 to
2023. After 2023, he constructed a new house and lived
there. At present her husband is not living at the aforesaid
address, because he has constructed a new house. The
occurrence of beating was taken place on 05.11.2023, but
no any treatment was done. She has not lodged any case for
Bidai.
36. The D. W.-2 is Surendra Singh @ Suresh Kumar Singh
(Father of the defendant), who in his chief-examination on
affidavit, has reiterated the pleading of defendant.
37. In his cross-examination, he has stated that it is true that
after intervention of Jamua police, the marriage of his
daughter was solemnized with the plaintiff-appellant. His
daughter went to Bangalore, but where she lived, he has no
knowledge about it. His daughter was ousted from
Govindpur and she was ousted last time on 05.11.2023 from
Nokhil, Deoghar. They lodged the case against the plaintiff-
appellant and his family members at Giridih. He has further
deposed that it is false to say that his daughter has not been
13
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
ousted from Govindpur on 05.11.2023. It is also false to say
that his daughter left her matrimonial house in the year-
2012 and after that she did not go to her matrimonial house.
38. The D. W.-3 is Rajendra Pd. Singh (Uncle of the
defendant), who in his chief-examination on affidavit, has
reiterated the pleading of defendant.
39. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the plaintiff was
ready for marriage after intervention of police. He was not
present there at that time. He did not go to Dajeeling with
plaintiff. He is witness in the case of Giridih. The defendant
was ousted from house and he got knowledge about it from
phone of defendant.
40. The D. W.-4 is Prabhakar Pd. Rai (Fufa of the defendant),
in his chief-examination on affidavit, he has reiterated the
pleading of defendant. He has proved the panchayatnama dt.
28.09.2024, which has been marked as Ext.-A. In his cross-
examination, he has stated that presence of both the parties
is necessary in Panchayat-nama. At the time of Panchayati
Mukesh Kumar Ray was not present there. He was not
resident of Baranokhil. He has made signature on
panchayatnama. The said panchayatnama had been
prepared after this suit. The girl told regarding tour of
Darjeeling. The defendant also told regarding beating. He
has written all the facts in affidavit as heard by the
14
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
defendant. The marriage was solemnized after intervention of
police. He is not witness in the case of dowry of Giridih.
41. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the learned
Principal Family Judge after appreciating the evidence,
dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-husband for
dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce u/s 13(1)(i-a), (i-
b) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, against which the present
appeal has been preferred.
42. It requires to refer herein that since appellate jurisdiction
has been invoked herein, therefore, before entering into
merit of the case, at this juncture it would be purposeful to
discuss the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court.
43. It needs to refer herein that under section 7 of the Family
Courts Act, the Family Court shall have and exercise all the
jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Sub-
ordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force
in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature which are
described in the explanation to section 7(1).
44. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts Act
provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to
the High Court “both on facts and on law”. Therefore, section
19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been dealt
with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in series of judgments.
15
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
45. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First Appeal
can examine every question of law and fact which arises in
the facts of the case and has powers to affirm, reverse or
modify the judgment under question. In “Jagdish Singh v.
Madhuri Devi” (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon’ble Supreme
Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court acting as
the First Appellate Court to enter into not only questions of
law but questions of fact as well and the appellate Court
therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire
evidence and can come to its own conclusion. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph of the said judgment is
being quoted as under:
“It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising power
as the first appellate court and hence it was open to the Court
to enter into not only questions of law but questions of fact as
well. It is settled law that an appeal is a continuation of suit.
An appeal thus is a rehearing of the main matter and the
appellate court can reappraise, reappreciate and review the
entire evidence–oral as well as documentary–and can come to
its own conclusion.”
46. Herein, the learned counsel for the appellant has argued
that the evidence of cruelty and desertion as also the
demand of dowry has not properly been considered and as
such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
47. This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on
behalf of learned counsel on the issue of perversity, needs to
16
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has
been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court which means
that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.
State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of
fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material
or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice
of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then,
the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as
under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a
number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1
SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse”
means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against
the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta) Employees’ Union v. Parry & Co.
Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse
finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994
SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can
be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no
evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person
would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant
58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious
violation of pleading and law is a perverse order.
17
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed
that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against
the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted
from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right,
proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English,
6th Edn.
“Perverse.–Showing deliberate determination to behave in a
way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or
unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.–Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.–Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence
or the direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe EncyclopedicEdn.)
Perverse.–Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or
petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.–A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one
that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence.”
48. Herein, submission has been made on behalf of the
appellant-husband that the respondent-wife committed
mental cruelty against him.
49. So far the allegation of cruelty is concerned, it
requires to refer herein the definition of „cruelty’ as has been
defined by Hon‟ble Apex in the judgment rendered in Dr.
N.G. Dastane Vs. Mrs. S. Dastane [(1975) 2 SCC 326],
18
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
wherein it has been held that the Court is to enquire as to
whether the charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to
cause in the mind of the petitioner, a reasonable
apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for him to
live with the respondent.
50. The cruelty has also been defined in the case of
Shobha Rani Vs. Madhukar Reddi [(1988) 1 SCC 105],
wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents
demanded dowry. The Hon‟ble Apex Court emphasized that
“cruelty” can have no fixed definition.
51. According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the
“conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct
in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations”. It is the
conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such cruelty
can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or
unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your
spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty;
intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be
present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a
question of fact and degree.”
52. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed
therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty
that it is important for the Court to not search for a
standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty
in another case. What must be considered include the kind
19
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social
conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which
they attach importance.”
53. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal
conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations
against the spouse in the written statement filed before the
court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute
cruelty.
54. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC
337, the wife alleged in her written statement that her
husband was suffering from “mental problems and paranoid
disorder”. The wife’s lawyer also levelled allegations of
“lunacy” and “insanity” against the husband and his family
while he was conducting cross-examination. The Hon‟ble
Apex Court held these allegations against the husband to
constitute “cruelty”.
55. In Vijay Kumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela
Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6 SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex
Court has observed by taking into consideration the
allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement
that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity
with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having
an extramarital affair. These allegations, given the context
of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute
“cruelty” itself.
20
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
56. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v.
Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been
pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct
is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct,
which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to
make one live with the other. The conduct may take the
form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental
pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct
complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial
irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not
constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
57. “Cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human
conduct and is always dependent on social strata or milieu
to which parties belong, their ways of life, relationship,
temperaments and emotions that are conditioned by their
social status, reference be made to the judgment rendered
by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case Vishwanath
Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC
288.
58. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of K. Srinivas
Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 has observed that
cruelty is evident where one spouse so treats other and
manifests such feelings in other, as to cause reasonable
apprehension in mind of other that it would be harmful or
21
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
injurious to reside with other spouse and cruelty may be
physical or mental. It has further been observed that
staying together under the same roof is not a precondition
for mental cruelty. Spouse can cause mental cruelty by his
or her conduct even while he or she is not staying under the
same roof.
59. In matrimonial relationship cruelty mean absence of
mutual respect and understanding between spouses which
embitters relationship. Sometimes it may take form of
violence, or at times may just be an attitude or approach.
Silence in some situations may also amount to cruelty
reference be made to the case of Ravi
Kumar v. Julmidevi, (2010) 4 SCC 476.
60. For considering dissolution of marriage at instance
of a spouse who alleges mental cruelty, result of such
mental cruelty must be such that it is not possible to
continue with matrimonial relationship reference may be
taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742.
61. Further the word „cruelty‟ is used relation to human
conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to
or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a
course of conduct and one which is adversely affecting the
other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
22
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
unintentional. There may be cases where the conduct
complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or
illegal. Then the impact or the injurious effect on the other
spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such
cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is
proved or admitted, reference in this regard be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of
Vinita Saxena v. Pankaj Pandit, (2006) 3 SCC 778.
62. Further, in the case of Manish Tyagi v. Deepak
Kumar, (2010) 4 SCC 339 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has
categorically observed that to constitute „cruelty‟, it is
enough that conduct of one of parties is so abnormal and
below accepted norm that other spouse could not
reasonable be expected to put up with it. Conduct is no
longer required to be so atrociously abominable which
would cause reasonable apprehension that it would be
harmful of injurious to continue cohabitation with another
spouse. Hence, it is not necessary to establish physical
violence. Continued ill-treatment, cessation of marital
intercourse, studied neglect, indifference may lead to
inference of cruelty.
63. The word “cruelty” under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the
Act has got no static connotation, and therefore, gives a very
wide discretion to the Court to apply it liberally and
contextually. What is cruelty in one case may not be the
23
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
same for another and has to be applied from person to
person while taking note of the attending circumstances.
Harm or injury to health, reputation, the working-career or
the like, would be important considerations in determining
whether the conduct of the defending spouse amounts to
cruelty. It has to be shown that the defending spouse has
treated him with cruelty to cause reasonable apprehension
in his/her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live
with the contesting spouse.
64. Further, it requires to refer herein that the word
„desertion‟ has been given in Explanation to Section 13 (1)
wherein it has been stated that “the expression desertion
means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to
the marriage without reasonable cause and without the
consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the
willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly.
65. It is pertinent to note that the word „desertion‟, as
has been defined in Explanation part of Section 13 of the
Act, 1955, means the desertion of the petitioner by the other
party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without
the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes
the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the
24
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly.
66. Rayden on Divorce ,which is a standard work on the
subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.), has summarised the case-law
on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the
other, with an intention on the part of the deserting
spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an
end without reasonable cause and without the
consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of
departure by one spouse does not necessarily make
that spouse the deserting party.”
67. The legal position has been admirably summarised
in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury’s Laws
of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one
spouse by the other without that other’s consent,
and without reasonable cause. It is a total
repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view
of the large variety of circumstances and of modes
of life involved, the Court has discouraged
attempts at defining desertion, there being no
general principle applicable to all cases.
68. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but
from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is
the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of
the married state; the state of things may usually be
termed, for short, „the home‟. There can be desertion
without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the
25
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
marriage having been consummated. The person who
actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the
deserting party.
69. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct
which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground
for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer.
70. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the
statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence
founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete,
but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted, desertion is a
continuing offence.
71. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of
meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one
of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from
wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in
a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will
not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far
as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of
separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
26
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
72. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the
deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent,
and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the
spouse leaving the matrimonial home to from the necessary
intention aforesaid.
73. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the
definition of „desertion‟ on the basis of the judgment
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lachman
Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which
has been consistently followed in several decisions of this
Court.
74. The law consistently has been laid down by this
Court that desertion means the intentional abandonment of
one spouse by the other without the consent of the other
and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must
prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an
intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the
cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there
should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of
the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse
should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse
to leave the matrimonial home.
27
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
75. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions
on the issue of cruelty and desertion, has gone through the
testimony of witnesses and found from the testimony of the
witnesses that the appellant has stated that the marriage
itself was solemnized against his will but admittedly no
complaint was lodged for this by this appellant.
76. Admittedly, the marriage was solemnized in the year 2012
and the appellant has brought the suit for divorce after 12
years and that too after filing of the case by the wife related
demand of dowry and maintenance, which was filed in the
year 2023. It is evident that the respondent-wife had filed
case of domestic violence and demand of dowry against the
appellant and his family members under Sections –
323/379/498(A)/34 of I.P.C. and Section-4 of D.P. Act.
77. So, it appears from the record that it is the
appellant-husband who committed cruelty against his wife
for which she filed case in the year 2023 and only in order
to save his skin from that case, he filed a suit for divorce in
the year 2024.
78. Further, from the testimonies of the defendant-
respondent it is evident that initially at the time of marriage
when there was huge demand of dowry by the appellant and
his family member, a complaint was made before the police
and only after intervention of the police, the marriage was
solemnized.
28
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
79. The learned family court, taking note of these facts
has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff-husband is
unable to prove any instance, which may be construed as
cruelty in the strict sense of the term as provided under
Section-13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The plaintiff-husband
has failed to prove any misconduct on the part of
defendant-wife, which could be considered grave and
weighty giving reasonable apprehension to him of such a
danger which could make it unsafe for him to continue the
matrimonial life with the defendant-wife. There may have
been ordinary wear and tear in the matrimonial life of the
parties, but certainly no cruelty is found to have been
committed by the defendant-wife towards the plaintiff-
husband. Thus, the plaintiff-husband has not able to prove
the fact of cruelty against the defendant-wife. This Court,
therefore, is of the view that the view taken by the learned
family court cannot be faulted with.
80. So far as the issue of desertion is concerned, the
defendant-respondent in unequivocal term has stated that
after the marriage continuously for 11 years she resided
with the appellant and she has been ousted from the
matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and since then she is
living in her Maika. Whereas, the appellant has stated that
for the last 12 years there was no physical relation between
them and even the marriage has not been consummated.
29
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
81. In sum and substance, as per pleading of plaintiff-
husband, the appellant herein, on 29.09.2012 the parents
of defendant-wife brought respondent-wife in her maika and
thereafter she never returns on repeated request and she
refused to talk over phone.
82. Whereas the defendant-wife, the respondent herein,
has denied the aforesaid pleading of plaintiff and pleaded
that on 05.11.2023, she was beaten very badly and ousted
her from matrimonial house on 05.11.2023 and during the
period of 11 years she lived with plaintiff at Govindpur,
Dhanbad, Dugdha, Nokhil, Deoghar and Bangalore.
83. The P.W.-1 (Plaintiff), the appellant herein though in
his testimony has stated that respondent-wife went to her
maika after bidai on 29.09.2012. But at para-40 of cross-
examination, he has stated that he has not lodged any case
for bidai of his wife. In para-52, he has identified his wife in
photographs and stated that this photograph (Mark-Y to
Y/8) is of Darjeeling.
84. Therefore, it appears that though in the deposition
he has stated that the defendant-wife went to her maika on
29.09.2012 and after that there is no conversation in
between them. But after showing photographs (Mark-Y to
Y/8), he has accepted that these photographs are of
Darjeeling, in which defendant-wife is present along with
him and his family members. It goes to suggest that the
30
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
appellant-husband is concealing the actual date and year
knowingly, when he went to Darjeeling with defendant-wife
and his family members. However, respondent-wife (D.W.-1)
has stated in her evidence that the appellant and his family
members started torturing mentally and physically for
demand of dowry. She specifically deposed that on
05.11.2023, they beat to her and ousted her from
matrimonial house, for which lodged a case.
85. Therefore, the withdrawal from the society of the
plaintiff-husband and the abandonment of the plaintiff-
appellant by the defendant-wife, the respondent herein is
not voluntarily rather in the compelling situation due to her
torture and ouster from her matrimonial house, she is living
in her maika from 05.11.2023. The criminal case instituted
by the defendant-wife against the plaintiff-husband further
speaks about the absence of willful abandonment of the
plaintiff by the defendant as claimed by the plaintiff.
86. For the discussions made hereinabove, this Court is
of the view that the desertion by the wife of her husband is
under compelling circumstances and not the voluntary one.
87. The learned family court taking these facts into
consideration has come to the conclusion that the
appellant-petitioner is not entitled for a decree of divorce,
which cannot be faulted with.
31
2026:JHHC:20016-DB
88. This Court, after discussing the aforesaid factual
aspect along with the settled legal position, is adverting to
the consideration made by the learned Family Judge in the
impugned judgment and found therefrom that the issue of
element of cruelty and desertion by the appellant-husband
has been properly considered by the learned Family Judge.
89. Accordingly, issue as framed by this Court is
decided against the appellant-husband.
90. This Court, on consideration of the aforesaid
discussion, is of the view that the impugned judgment and
decree passed by the learned Family Judge is not coming
under the fold of perversity, since, conscious consideration
has been made to the evidences available on record.
91. In view thereof, the impugned the judgment and
decree, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Dhanbad, requires no interference.
92. Accordingly, the instant appeal stands dismissed.
93. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also
stands disposed of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
7th July, 2026
A.F.R
Alankar/-
Uploaded on 9th July, 2026
32
