Delhi High Court
Ms Anuradha Sharma & Anr vs Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited & Ors on 21 April, 2026
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 18.03.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 21.04.2026
+ FAO (COMM) 334/2025 & CM. APPl. 75353/2025
MS ANURADHA SHARMA & ANR. .....Appellants
Through: Mr. Suhail Dutt, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Prakhar Sharma and Mr. Azhar Alam,
Advs.
versus
JIVA AYURVEDIC PHARMACY
LIMITED & ORS. ....Respondents
Through: Mr. Virender Goswami, Ms.
Soni Singh, Mr. Abhinav Bhalla, Ms. Swati
Goswami, Ms. Parkhi Singh and Mr.
Vedang Upadhayay, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
% 21.04.2026
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
1. This appeal is filed against order dated 17.11.2025 passed by
the learned District Judge (Commercial Courts), Central, Tis Hazari
Courts in CS (Comm) 554/2023. In the impugned order, the learned
Commercial Court disposed of the Respondents’ application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 1.
The application was filed by the Respondents, as Plaintiffs in the suit,
seeking an injunction to restrain the Appellants from using the mark
“SHATAM JEEVA” and its associated symbols, which are registered
1″CPC” hereinafter
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and in use by the Appellants, i.e., ” ” (Appellants’
registered mark) and ” ” (Appellants’ mark in use).
2. By the impugned order, the learned Commercial Court granted
the relief as sought by the Plaintiffs. It issued an injunction restraining
the Appellants, along with all others acting on their behalf from using
the mark “SHATAM JEEVA”2 or any other trademark that is identical
or deceptively similar to the Plaintiffs’ registered trademarks, namely
“JIVA”. Furthermore, the Appellants have been restrained from
engaging in any act that may amount to infringement, passing off, or
unfair competition in relation to the Plaintiff’s trademarks.
3. For the sake of convenience and consistency, the parties herein
will be referred to in the same manner as in the original suit.
Accordingly, the Appellants will be referred to as the ‘Defendants’,
and the Respondents will be referred to as the ‘Plaintiffs’ in this
appeal.
Case of the Plaintiffs as per the Plaint
4. Plaintiff No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies
Act, 1956, and Plaintiff No. 2 is a registered society under the
Societies Registration Act,1860, which purportedly owns the “JIVA”
2 Alternatively referred to as “impugned mark”
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trademarks. Plaintiff No. 3 is a Director of Plaintiff No. 1 and the
President of Plaintiff No. 2.
5. The Plaintiffs and their associated entities form part of the
‘JIVA Group’, which was founded by Plaintiff No. 3, Sh. Rishi Pal
Chauhan.
6. The Plaintiffs claim that they have been using the “JIVA” mark
since 1992, in respect of a wide range of Ayurvedic products and
services. They assert that “JIVA” was intentionally adopted as the
common trademark and trade name across all their associated entities,
thereby forming the “JIVA GROUP.” Due to consistent, continuous,
and widespread use since 1992, the trade name and trademark “JIVA”
has acquired significant goodwill. Additionally, the Plaintiffs state that
they have created a distinguished presence in the Ayurvedic, health,
wellness, and beauty industries.
7. The Plaintiffs aver that they have adopted the trademark
“JIVA”, with the prominent element being “Jiva” and other elements,
including the Lotus/flower symbol.
8. The Plaintiffs state in the plaint that they have obtained
registrations in various classes for the “JIVA” trademark, the details of
which are reproduced below:
S. Trademark Class Proprietor Date of
No. Registration
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1. 16 Plaintiff No. 3 18.02.2002
User since -
(Device) (1096505) 01.06.1994
2. 3 Plaintiff No. 1 03.12.2012
User since -
(Device) (2436446) 01.01.1992
3. 5, 35, 39, 41, 42, 45 Plaintiff No. 2 01.11.2017
Proposed to
(Device) (4085257) be used.
4. Jiva Vedic 41, 44 Plaintiff No. 1 01.11.2017
Psychology
Proposed to
(Word) (3667226) be used.
5. 41 Plaintiff No. 1 13.03.2021
User since –
(Device) (4903000) 01.01.1992
6. 44 Plaintiff No. 1 06.04.2021
User since -
01.11.2018
(Device) (4935494)
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7. JIVANANDA 41 Plaintiff No. 1 19.04.2021
(Word) (4950207) User since -
30.05.2009
9. Additionally, the Plaintiffs claim to have international
trademark registrations in countries such as Japan, Lithuania, Poland
and other European Union nations, as stated in paragraph 20 of the
plaint.
10. The Plaintiffs further state that the Jiva Group owns and
operates various active websites and online platforms, including a
Facebook page, YouTube channel and other domain names, the same
are as follows:
(i) www.jiva.org (registered on 28.04.1995)
(ii) www.jiva.com (registered on 16.04.1998)
(iii) www.jivaayurveda.com (registered on 26.08.2003)
(iv) www.jivapublicschool.com (registered on 23.06.2008)
(v) www.jivajobs.com (registered on 09.07.2013)
11. According to the Plaintiffs, their advertising and marketing
expenditure has exceeded Rs. 11 crores since the year 2015-16, and
that for the financial year 2021-22 alone, it stood at Rs.
12,85,24,966/-. Furthermore, their annual sales from the year 2015-16
to 2020-21 ranged between Rs. 67 crores and Rs. 93 crores, with sales
of Rs. 69,20,82,773/- in the year 2020-21.
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12. The Plaintiffs state that the cause of action arose in April of
2022, when a client approached them enquiring about a wellness
retreat named ‘Shatam Jeeva’, which was not affiliated with the
Plaintiffs. This led the Plaintiffs to discover that the Defendants had
adopted the name “SHATAM JEEVA” for operating their wellness
retreat and were also using the domain name www.shatamjeeva.com.
Upon scrutiny, the Plaintiffs found that the Defendants had registered
a device mark ” ” under Class 5 in 2018, which the
Plaintiffs’ claim is visually, structurally, and phonetically similar to
the Plaintiffs’ registered marks.
13. Thereafter, aggrieved by the Defendant’s adoption of the
impugned mark, the Plaintiffs sent a legal notice to the Defendants via
email on 25.04.2022. In their response dated 28.04.2022, the
Defendants denied any similarity between their marks and that of the
Plaintiffs.
14. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs instituted the suit seeking, inter
alia, a decree of permanent injunction to restrain the Defendants from
directly or indirectly dealing in goods bearing the impugned marks, on
the ground of trademark and copyright infringement as well as passing
off. Additionally, the Plaintiffs preferred an application under Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, seeking a temporary injunction to
restrain the Defendants from using the impugned marks during the
pendency of the suit.
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Case of the Defendants as per the Written Statement
15. It was averred by the Defendants that Defendant No. 1 is the
registered proprietor of the trademark ” ” (Registered
Trademark No. 3969212), which was registered in 2018 and later
assigned to Defendant No. 2. In addition, the Defendants are using the
mark ” ” (Shatam Jeeva By Baidyanath) along with
the domain name “https://shatamjeeva.life”.
16. The Defendants stated that to commemorate 100 years of their
family brand, “Baidyanath”, which is allegedly a well-known and one
of the oldest brands manufacturing Ayurvedic medicines and products,
they conceptualised the idea of a wellness retreat. In furtherance of
this, they applied for registration of ” ”
in 2018 under Class 5.
17. The Defendants launched the ‘Shatam Jeeva’ retreat in 2021 in
Jhansi, on the land owned by Defendant No. 2.
18. The Defendants further claim that the mark “SHATAM
JEEVA” is derived from the ancient notion of longevity and well-
being and is mentioned in the Vedas and other religious texts. The
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Defendants assert that the mark should be viewed as a whole, rather
than splitting the individual components for comparison. Moreover,
the use of the disclaimer “by Baidyanath” is said to be a distinguishing
factor between the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendants’ marks. Hence, the
Defendants argue that there is no deceptive similarity between the
rival marks.
19. The Defendants also claim that their adoption of the impugned
mark was honest and that their use predates the Plaintiffs’. The
Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs are relatively new in the market,
with Plaintiff No. 2 starting in 1992 and Plaintiff No. 1 being
incorporated in 2005. It is further asserted that the Plaintiffs
themselves purchased Ayurvedic medicines from the “Baidyanath”
and “Sharmayu” entities (another family group of the Defendants),
which undermines their claim to exclusive rights over the mark.
20. The Defendants argue that ‘Jiva’ or ‘Jeeva’ is a common
Sanskrit word, widely used in trade by third parties, and point out that
‘Jiva Auroville’ is another wellness retreat that operates under a
similar name, which, according to the Defendants, has been
deliberately concealed by the Plaintiffs.
21. The Defendants also allege that the Plaintiffs have acquiesced
to the use of the mark by the Defendants. They claim that despite the
Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the use of the “Baidyanath” and “Sharmayu”
marks, the Plaintiffs failed to take any action to seek the cancellation
of the impugned mark, thereby tacitly consenting to its use.
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22. The Defendants rely on Section 28(3) and 30(2)(e) of the Trade
Marks Act, 1999, asserting that since both rival marks are registered,
the Plaintiffs cannot claim exclusivity over the mark, i.e., they contend
that no infringement can be established if both marks are registered
under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act.
Impugned Order
23. The learned Commercial Court made the following findings:
(i) The Defendants cannot claim that ‘Jiva’ is a common
word, as they themselves sought registration for the same mark.
(ii) The contention of honest adoption by the Defendants was
rejected. The Court opined that the Defendants were aware of
Plaintiff’s mark prior to 2017-18, based on the Defendants’ own
admission that the Plaintiffs had purchased their products.
Further, since both parties operate in the same industry, the
Defendants should have been aware of the Plaintiff’s prior
registered mark. The Court supported this finding by
referencing the availability of news articles about the Plaintiffs’
mark on a Google search, which dated back to 2020.
(iii) The Court applied the standard laid down in Amritdhara
Pharmacy v. Staya Deo Gupta3 and observed that both parties
dealt in Ayurvedic medicines; considering the general
impressions or phonetic recollection of the marks, an ordinary
3 (1963) 2 SCR 484: AIR 1963 SC 449
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person of average intelligence may be deceived into believing
that the marks are related. The Court further opined that such a
person may not notice the subtle differences in the logos, the
Plaintiffs’ logo featuring a lotus and the Defendants’ logo
incorporating the letter ‘S’ along with herbs. To substantiate
this, the Court noted that confusion was evident in April 2022,
when a client of the Plaintiffs’ approached them to inquire
about their association with the Defendants’ wellness retreat.
(iv) The Court held that the Plaintiffs are the prior users of the
mark ‘Jiva’. The Plaintiffs were already operating a wellness
retreat under this mark before the Defendants began using it.
(v) The Court held that, prima facie, it did not appear that the
Defendants honestly adopted the impugned mark. Additionally,
the balance of convenience tilted in favour of the Plaintiffs.
(vi) As a result, the Court issued an injunction against the
Defendants, restraining them from dealing in the impugned
mark or any other mark that is identical or deceptively similar
to the Plaintiffs’ registered mark ‘Jiva’. The Defendants were
also restrained from engaging in any activity that may amount
to infringement, passing off or unfair competition.
Rival Submissions before this Court
24. Mr. Suhail Dutt, the learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellants/Defendants, vehemently opposed the impugned order,
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contending that it is untenable in law. He argued that the order
wrongly assumes that the Plaintiffs hold exclusive rights over the
mark ‘Jiva’, which has been registered by them. According to Mr.
Dutt, the Defendants adopted the mark “Shatam Jeeva” to celebrate
the centenary of the ‘Baidyanath’ brand. He explained that the term
‘Shatam’ means ‘one hundred’, and ‘Jeeva’ means ‘live’, thus
signifying the concept of a healthy life for a hundred years. Mr. Dutt
further submitted that the impugned order failed to consider that both
the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendants’ marks were registered, and
therefore, no action for infringement could lie under such
circumstances.
25. Mr. Dutt contended that the learned Commercial Court ought to
have adhered to the anti-dissection rule, as established in decisions
such as Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirat Vinodbhai Jadvani &
Anr.4 and South India Beverages v. General Mills5. He emphasized
that the impugned mark should be viewed in its entirety and not split
for comparison. Upon such a holistic comparison, he contended that
the rival marks were completely distinct and that there was no
likelihood of confusion among consumers. It was submitted that the
marks were neither phonetically nor visually similar, and that the use
of the disclaimer “By Baidyanath” created further distinction. He
highlighted that ‘Baidyanath’ has carried immense goodwill and
reputation for over a century.
4 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3370
52014 SCC OnLine Del 1953
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26. It was further submitted that since ‘Jiva’ is a common Sanskrit
word, the Plaintiffs were required to establish that the mark had
acquired secondary meaning, which they failed to do. Mr. Dutt
pointed out that the Plaintiffs did not possess a registration for the
word ‘Jiva’ itself and had also not applied for one. Moreover, the
Plaintiffs had not sought cancellation of the impugned mark, thereby
undermining their claim.
27. It was also urged by Mr. Dutt that the Defendants’ wellness
retreat caters to a different consumer segment, given that it is
positioned at a higher price point as compared to the Plaintiffs’
offerings.
28. Mr. Dutt further highlighted that there were several other
entities using the name ‘Jiva’ for their business, including wellness
centres and hotels. He pointed out the existence of another wellness
retreat called ‘Jiva Auroville’, arguing that the Plaintiffs could not
claim exclusivity over the word ‘Jiva’, especially since there were no
such exclusive rights granted in the Plaintiffs’ trademark registration.
In support of this argument, reliance was placed on Section 17 of the
Trade Marks Act, 1999, which grants exclusive rights to the registered
proprietor of a mark, to contend that the Plaintiffs could not claim
exclusivity over ‘Jiva’ given that they had not registered the mark.
29. Mr. Dutt vehemently contended that since the impugned mark is
registered, the Plaintiffs could not claim infringement under Sections
28(3) and 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. He relied on the
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rulings in S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Soluchana Bai6 and Vaidya Rishi
India Health Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Suresh Dutt Parashar & Ors.7 to
argue that infringement could not be made out when both marks are
registered. Additionally, Mr. Dutt contended that, upon comparison,
the rival marks were not similar in any respect, and therefore, no claim
for passing off could be established. He referred to Brihan Karan
Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari
Sakhar Karkhana8, to contend that the Plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate any misrepresentation, loss, likelihood of loss, or
confusion. Mr. Dutt emphasized that the learned Commercial Court
failed to find that the Plaintiffs had goodwill and reputation, which is
essential for establishing a passing off claim. He further relied on
Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act to argue that once a composite
mark is registered, the proprietor obtains protection over the entire
mark as a whole, and not over the individual components.
30. Per contra, Mr. Virender Goswami, learned Counsel for the
Respondents/Plaintiffs, ardently supported the impugned order. He
submitted that the Plaintiffs have been extensively and continuously
using the ‘Jiva’ trademarks and house mark since 1992 and, as a
result, have acquired distinctiveness both in India and abroad.
31. Mr. Goswami argued that “Jiva” is the dominant part of the
Plaintiffs’ mark. If this element were removed, only the lotus flower
remained. He argued that “Jiva” serves as the common denominator
across various trademarks and Classes, constituting the Plaintiffs’
6 (2016) 2 SCC 683
72025 SCC OnLine Del 6147
8(2024) 2 SCC 577
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house mark. To substantiate this, Mr. Goswami relied on sales
invoices dating back to 2004, newspaper extracts, sales revenue,
marketing expenditure, and domain name usage to establish the
Plaintiffs’ continuous and widespread use of the mark since 1992.
32. It was further argued that an action for infringement could lie,
as the mark used by the Defendants for their wellness retreat was
registered under Class 5, which pertains solely to Ayurvedic products,
and not wellness services. Hence, the impugned mark used for the
retreat was unregistered and could be subject to infringement.
33. Mr. Goswami clarified that in respect of the impugned mark
under Class 5, the Defendants’ action against the Plaintiffs amounted
to passing off. However, for the Plaintiffs’ trademarks in other classes
and for other alleged or proposed uses of the impugned mark by the
Defendants, both infringement and passing off claims applied, for
which the Defendants were liable to be injuncted. Reliance was placed
on the rulings in S. Syed Mohideen (supra), Brihan Karan (supra),
Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. and
Ors,9, N.R. Dongre and Ors. v. Whirlpool Corpn. and Ors.10 and
Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah and Ors.11 to contend that a
claim for passing off is maintainable even against a registered
trademark.
34. Mr. Goswami argued that the impugned mark was deceptively
similar to the Plaintiffs’ mark and was adopted to ride on the
9 (2018) 2 SCC 1
10 (1996) 5 SCC 714
11 (2002) 3 SCC 65
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Plaintiffs’ goodwill. He further contended that the similarity between
the marks would likely deceive an average consumer with imperfect
recollection. In support of this, he relied on several precedents,
including Amritdhara Pharmacy (supra), Cadila Health Care Ltd. v.
Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.12, Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma
v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories13, Parle Products (P)
Ltd. v. J.P. and Co., Mysore14, K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri
Ambal and Co. and Ors.15, Wow Momo Foods Private Limited v.
Wow Burger and Ors.16, Dindayal Industries Ltd. v. Dindayal
Ayurved Bhawan. and Ors.17 and South India Beverages (supra). It
was further contended that the Defendants’ arguments of adopting the
mark to commemorate 100 years of Baidyanath was merely an
afterthought. Mr. Goswami highlighted that there was no reference to
‘Baidyanath’ in the Defendants’ trademarks before the Trade Marks
Office. To buttress the claim of lack of honest adoption, Mr. Goswami
emphasized that the Defendants were aware of the Plaintiffs’ presence
and their trademarks as early as 2017-18. Additionally, Mr. Goswami
argued that the Defendants’ mala fide intention could be evidenced
from their conduct of falsely claiming use of the mark since 2018,
while admitting that their wellness retreat began in 2021. Reliance was
placed on the Defendants’ reply to the legal notice, wherein they
acknowledged that they aimed to build their brand post-pandemic,
specifically from 2022. Mr. Goswami also referred to the Plaintiffs’
12 (2001) 5 SCC 73
13 AIR 1965 SC 980
14 (1972) 1 SCC 618
15 (1969) 2 SCC 131
16 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6545
17 MANU/DE/0496/2025; FAO (COMM) 15/2024 decided on 22.12.2025
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invoices for the wellness centre, noting that only threeinvoices with
negligible amounts were presented as evidence of sales before 2022.
35. It was submitted that in the case of The Indian Hotels Co. Ltd.
& Ors. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science and Culture18, the Plaintiffs
were established prior users and had acquired goodwill and repute.
Mr. Goswami contended that one cannot copy the main or dominant
part of another’s trademark, especially when the original user is also
the prior user. He further contended that the Defendants’ use of the
dominant part of the Plaintiffs’ mark, ‘Jiva’, was made in bad faith.
Even if ‘Jiva’ is a common Sanskrit word, common words can acquire
secondary meaning through extensive use, as held in T.V. Venugopal
v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. and Ors.19and Century Traders v.
Roshan Lal Duggar Co.20.
36. Lastly, Mr. Goswami relied on the rulings in P.M. Diesels v.
S.M. Diesels21, Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. & Ors. v. Sudhir
Bhatia and Ors.22and Heinz Italia & Ors. v. Dabur India Ltd.23, to
argue that when dishonest adoption is proven, an injunction must
necessarily follow. He also cited Wander Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Antox
India P. Ltd.24, to emphasize that the Defendants’ adoption of the
impugned mark was dishonest and should be restrained by an
injunction.
18 MANU/DE/0892/2008; FAO(OS) 44/2007 decided on 30.05.2008
19 (2011) 4 SCC 85
20 AIR 1978 Del 250
21MANU/DE/0636/1994; 1994 SCC OnLine Del 117
22 (2004) 3 SCC 90
23 (2007) 6 SCC 1
24 1990 (Supp) SCC 727
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Analysis
37. We have heard the learned Counsel for both parties and perused
the material on record. This Court, vide order dated 01.12.2025, stayed
the operation of the impugned order and directed the learned
Commercial Courts to explicitly clarify whether the injunction was
granted on the grounds of infringement, passing off, or both.
Furthermore, with respect to the passing off claim, the learned
Commercial Courts were directed to clearly return a finding on the
issue of goodwill, in light of the principles established in Brihan
Karan (supra).
38. At the outset, we remind ourselves that an appeal against an
order of a commercial court is an appeal on principle, and interference
is justified only where the order is arbitrary, capricious, perverse,
ignores settled principles governing interlocutory injunctions, or
where the view taken by the learned Commercial Court was not
reasonably possible based on the material before it.25
39. However, even within the limited parameters established in
Wander (supra), we are of the view that this case warrants our
interference.
Applicable Principles of Law
25 Wander Ltd v Antox India P Ltd, 1990 Supp SCC 727 (para 14), Pernod Ricard (para 19.8)
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40. It is clear from Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 199926,
that infringement can only be established when the following
conditions are met: (a) the Plaintiffs have a registered trade mark, (b)
the Defendants’ mark is deceptively similar to the Plaintiffs’
registered trademark, (c) the Defendants’ mark is used in relation to
goods or services that are identical or similar to those for which the
Plaintiffs’ trademark is registered, and (d) because of these factors,
there exists a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public, or the
public might assume an association between the Plaintiffs’ and
Defendants’ marks.
41. It is also trite that infringement is not assessed solely by
comparing the dominant part of the marks. The ultimate test is
whether a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection is
likely to be confused between the two marks or believe there is an
association between them. While the dominant feature of a mark
might aid in assessing deceptive similarity, the courts must focus on
the overall impression created by the competing marks27.
42. As mentioned earlier, infringement is only available to
registered proprietors. Therefore, at the stage of seeking an
interlocutory injunction under Order XXXIX of CPC, the party
seeking the injunction must establish, prima facie, the validity of its
trademark registration. In this regard, Section 31of the Act stipulates
that the registration of the mark shall serve as prima facie evidence of
its validity. Thus, the registration of the “Jiva” marks serves as prima
26″Act” hereinafter
27Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Another vs. Karanveer Singh Chhabrra (para 42)
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facie proof of the Plaintiffs’ rights and the benefits associated with
that registration.
43. The manner in which competing marks are to be assessed has
been discussed in detail in the case of Pernod Ricard (supra). The
Court highlighted the need for a holistic approach to assess the
similarity of marks, taking into account not just individual features but
also the overall impression the marks create in the minds of the public.
The same merits reproduction:
“32. A foundational principle in trademark law is that marks must
be compared as a whole, and not by dissecting them into individual
components. This is known as the anti-dissection rule, which
reflects the real-world manner in which consumers perceive
trademarks – based on their overall impression, encompassing
appearance, sound, structure, and commercial impression. In
Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceuticals
Laboratories, this Court underscored that the correct test for
trademark infringement is whether, when considered in its entirety,
the defendant’s mark is deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s
registered mark. The Court expressly cautioned against isolating
individual parts of a composite mark, as such an approach
disregard how consumers actually experience and recall
trademarks.
32.1. While Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 restricts
exclusive rights to the trademark as a whole and does not confer
protection over individual, non-distinctive components per se,
courts may still identify dominant or essential features within a
composite mark to assess the likelihood of confusion. However,
this does not permit treating such features in isolation; rather, they
must be evaluated in the context of the overall commercial
impression created by the mark.
32.2. This approach finds further support in the observations of
scholars such as McCarthy in Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, who note that consumers seldom engage in detailed,
analytical comparisons of competing marks. Purchasing decisions
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are instead based on imperfect recollection and the general
impression created by a mark’s sight, sound, and structure. The
anti-dissection rule thus aligns the legal test for infringement with
the actual behaviour and perception of consumers in the
marketplace.
32.3. Consequently, in disputes involving composite marks, the
mere presence of a shared or generic word in both marks does not,
by itself, justify a finding of deceptive similarity. Courts must
undertake a holistic comparison examining visual, phonetic,
structural, and conceptual elements, to asses whether the overall
impression created by the rival marks is likely to mislead an
average consumer of ordinary intelligence and imperfect memory.
If the marks, viewed in totality, convey distinct identities, the use of
a common element – particularly if it is descriptive or laudatory –
will not by itself amount to infringement.
33. In determining whether a mark is deceptively similar to
another, courts often consider the dominant feature of the mark –
that is, the element which is most distinctive, memorable, and likely
to influence consumer perception. While the anti-dissection rule
requires marks to be compared in their entirety, courts may still
place emphasis on certain prominent or distinguishing elements,
especially where such features significantly contribute to the
overall commercial impression of the mark.
33.1. The principles of the anti-dissection rule and the dominant
feature test, though seemingly in tension, are not mutually
exclusive. Identifying a dominant feature can serve as an analytical
aid in the holistic comparison of marks. In certain cases, an
infringing component may overshadow the remainder of the mark
to such an extent that confusion or deception becomes virtually
inevitable. In such instances, courts – while maintaining a
contextual and fact-specific inquiry – may justifiably assign greater
weight to the dominant element. However, emphasis on a dominant
feature alone cannot be determinative; the ultimate test remains
whether the mark, viewed as a whole, creates a deceptive similarity
likely to mislead an average consumer of ordinary intelligence and
imperfect recollection.
33.2. An analogy that aptly illustrates the significance of a
dominant element in a composite mark is that of mixing milk andFAO(COMM) 334/2025
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water. If a small quantity of milk is added to a half-glass of water,
the mixture becomes cloudy – the change is perceptible, but the
dominant character remains watery. Conversely, if the same
amount of water is added to a half-glass of milk, the result still
appears to be milk – the dilution is imperceptible. Though the
components are the same, the perceptual impact differs, depending
on which element dominates. Similarly, in trademark analysis, the
presence of common elements across marks does not automatically
indicate a likelihood of confusion. What matters is the relative
prominence and distinctiveness of the elements. Just as the milk in
the second example visually and qualitatively overwhelms the
water, a dominant feature in a mark can subsume other
components and shape consumer perception. Therefore, while
assessing deceptive similarity, due weight must be given to the
dominant element, without disregarding the composite nature of
the mark.
33.3. The dominant feature of a mark is typically identified based
on factors such as its visual and phonetic prominence, placement
within the mark (with initial components often carrying greater
perceptual weight), inherent distinctiveness, and the degree of
consumer association it has generated. The dominant element
functions as the “hook” that captures the consumer’s attention and
facilitates brand recall. For instance, in composite marks such as
‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ or ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, the terms
‘BLENDERS’ and ‘IMPERIAL’ may be regarded as dominant,
owing to their distinctive and less frequently used character. In
contrast, elements such as ‘PRIDE’ or ‘BLUE’ are relatively
generic, descriptive, or commonplace in the liquor industry, as
evidenced by other marks like ROCKFORD PRIDE, ROYAL
PRIDE, or OAK PRIDE. Such shared or non-distinctive terms
cannot be monopolized, unless it is established that they have
acquired secondary meaning through extensive and exclusive
use,and are uniquely associated with the plaintiff’s goods in the
minds of the public.”
(emphasis supplied)
44. Turning to the aspect of passing off, the case of Brihan Karan
(supra) clarifies the essential ingredients of an action for passing off.
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It was delineated that an action for passing off is founded on the
classical trinity, namely goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. The
Plaintiffs must establish prior goodwill in the mark, a
misrepresentation by the Defendants likely to deceive the purchasing
public, and the consequent or likely injury to the Plaintiffs’ goodwill.
45. In addition to above, as clarified in Pernod Ricard (supra), to
satisfy the ingredient of goodwill in a passing off action, the party
seeking injunction must show the accumulation of goodwill prior to
the Defendants’ use of the mark. The volume of sales, extent of
advertisement, and the overall market presence of the Plaintiffs’ mark
are all relevant factors in determining the accumulation of goodwill.28
46. Having outlined the legal principles applicable to the present
appeal, we will now proceed to test the impugned order on the anvil of
the above-mentioned principles.
Fallacies in the Impugned Order
47. The learned Commercial Court observed that both parties
operate in the same field of Ayurvedic medicine and that any ordinary
person may be deceived upon encountering the “SHATAM JEEVA”
retreat. According to the learned Commercial Court, an ordinary
person would likely associate “SHATAM JEEVA” with the Plaintiffs’
mark.
28Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna SahakariSakharKarkhana,
(2024) 2 SCC 577
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48. Further, the learned Commercial Court justified the injunction
on the following reasons, which are reproduced for ease of analysis:
“19. In the present case also plaintiffs and defendants both operate
in the same field of Ayurvedic medicines and treatment. Any
ordinary person may be deceived that the retreat Shatam Jeeva
belongs to JIVA group or is associated with them in any manner.
20. It is rightly submitted by learned Ms. Soni Singh that the court
need not to see dissimilarities by pitting the two marks together as
the marks are remembered by general impressions rather than the
complete details or photographic recollection of the same. It is
further rightly submitted that even the picture or logo associated
with the defendant’s mark cannot be said to be having no potential
of causing confusion in the mind of an ordinary person. The logo
of the plaintiff is stated to be having figure of a lotus flower
whereas logo of the defendant is reflecting some herbs with the
letter S written in the middle. An ordinary person may not surely
decipher these minute details in the two logos and may be
confused. The confusion of the an ordinary man further appears to
be spelled out by the plaintiffs when it is pleaded that in April 2022
one of their clients “approached the plaintiffs and inquired about a
Shatam Jeeva wellness retreat of the plaintiffs”
21. From the record it is clear that the plaintiffs are prior user of
their trademark JIVA and were also running their holistic
therapy/medicine center or wellness center prior to the defendants.
Prima facie it do not appear that the use of the words Shatam J
eeva for the similar services by the defendants is bonafide.
Plaintiffs thus appear to have a prima facie case in their favour
being registered proprietors of JIVA marks.
22. Balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiffs as
defendants launched their wellness centers only in the year 2021
and once they are found to be infringing th trademark of the
plaintiff, continuous user thereof should not be allowed.
23. Continuous use of the infringing trademark by the defendants
may dilute the trademark, goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs
thereby causing irreparable loss.
24. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to injunction m their favour.”
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(emphasis supplied)
49. Upon a plain reading of the impugned order, it is apparent that
the learned Judge granted the injunction on the premise that (i) a
consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection may be
deceived or confused, and (ii) the Plaintiffs are the prior users of the
mark.
50. Additionally, it is unclear from the impugned order whether the
injunction was granted on the basis of passing off or trademark
infringement. Moreover, the learned District Judge failed to return a
specific finding of goodwill, which is an essential element for
establishing passing off.
51. In addition to the above, the impugned order fails to consider
the significant distinction created by the addition of the phrase “By
Baidyanath”, which clearly differentiate the services and goods of the
Defendants from those of the Plaintiffs. This distinction should have
been factored into the analysis of likelihood of confusion or deception.
52. The learned Commercial Court, unfortunately, has failed to
provide a clear and coherent basis for granting the injunction. The
Court’s reasoning appears to lack a sound legal foundation and fails to
address the key elements necessary for granting such relief.
53. In light of the above, we find it necessary to record our own
findings.
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Prima facie infringement
54. At this stage, we reproduce the competing marks for assessment
below as per the record before us:
Plaintiffs’ Registered Mark Defendants’ Registered Mark
Plaintiff’s mark in use for the Retreat Defendants’ mark in use for the Retreat
55. After comparing the competing marks as a whole, in their
entirety, and considering all the principles mentioned above, this
Court is of the opinion that there is no phonetic, visual, or conceptual
similarity between the two trademarks. Hence, even an ordinary
consumer would not mistake the Defendants’ product for the
Plaintiffs’.
56. Upon careful perusal of the rival marks, it is clear that the
Defendants’ mark uses “EE” in the word ‘Jeeva’, while the Plaintiffs’
mark use “I”. The colour schemes and artwork used in the marks are
also distinct. The Plaintiffs’ mark consists of the word “Jiva” with a
device of a lotus flower, whereas the Defendants’ consists of the
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words “Shatam Jeeva” with a device featuring a circle containing the
letter “S” along with the depictions of herbal plants.
57. Thus, the Defendants’ impugned mark, when considered in its
entirety, has no similarity with the Plaintiffs’ marks. As such, there is
no likelihood of confusion between the said marks.
58. Furthermore, the use of the word “Shatam” and the phrase “By
Baidyanath” clearly distinguishes the source of the products and
services. Average consumers would easily distinguish the Defendants’
mark from that of the Plaintiffs’.
59. Mr. Goswami, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs, submitted
that it is a settled principle that no party can copy an essential or
dominant part of another’s trademark. He contended that “Jiva” was
the dominant part of the Plaintiffs’ mark, which had acquired
distinctiveness for goods and services that are identical to those
provided by the Defendants’, hence, creating a likelihood of
confusion.
60. However, following the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Pernod Ricard (supra), even assuming arguendo that “Jiva”
is the dominant part of the Plaintiffs’ mark, the ultimate inquiry must
still be the overall impression created by the marks in mind of the
average consumer.
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61. While it is true that the dominant part of the Plaintiffs’ mark
may be “Jiva”, the overall impression created by both marks is
distinct.
62. “Jiva” cannot be dissected and viewed independently, as both
competing marks are composite device marks. The Defendants’
impugned mark contains other prominent elements that make it clearly
distinguishable and different from the Plaintiffs’ mark, as discussed
above.
63. Additionally, it cannot be argued that device marks, being
composite in nature, protect only the specific visual representation of
the mark and not the word elements contained therein. In cases
involving composite device marks, both the visual elements and the
word elements are crucial in determining the likelihood of confusion,
and their overall impression must be considered.
64. In the decision of K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal
& Co29, the Supreme Court clarified that deceptive similarity is not to
be assessed purely based on evidence, but rather on the Court’s
perception. The Court observed:
“6. The vital question in issue is whether, if the appellant’s mark is
used in a normal and fair manner in connection with the snuff and
if similarly fair and normal user is assumed of the existing
registered marks, will there be such a likelihood of deception that
the mark ought not to be allowed to be registered (see In the matter
of Broadhead’s Application [ (1950) 57 RPC 209, 214] for
registration of a trade mark). It is for the court to decide the
question on a comparison of the competing marks as a whole and29(1969) 2 SCC 131
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their distinctive and essential features. We have no doubt in our
mind that if the proposed mark is used in a normal and fair manner
the mark would come to be known by its distinguishing feature
“Andal”. There is a striking similarity and affinity of sound
between the words “Andal” and “Ambal”. Giving due weight to
the judgment of the Registrar and bearing in mind the conclusions
of the learned Single Judge and the Divisional Bench, we are
satisfied that there is a real danger of confusion between the two
marks.”
(emphasis supplied)
65. Therefore, in light of the foregoing discussion, in the absence of
deceptive similarity and the failure to establish any likelihood of
confusion, we conclude that an action for infringement cannot
succeed.
66. We also find no merit in the argument that by using the prefix
“Shatam”, the Defendants are attempting to position their product as a
superior version of the Plaintiffs’ product and that the phrase “By
Baidyanth” is merely an afterthought.
67. Clearly, “Shatam” is a Sanskrit word meaning “hundred”. There
is no logical or reasonable connection between the word “Shatam” and
the Plaintiffs’ mark or products, thus eliminating the possibility of it
being construed as an attempt to associate with the Plaintiffs’ mark.
68. Further, even assuming arguendo that the use of “By
Baidyanath” is an afterthought, it still clearly indicates a deliberate
attempt to differentiate the Defendants’ mark from that of the
Plaintiffs. The addition of such a phrase serves to further disassociate
the two marks, mitigating any possible confusion.
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69. Hence, we find no deceptive similarity between the marks, nor
do we see any scope for confusion between them from the perspective
of an average consumer.
70. In these circumstances, after thoroughly assessing the marks in
their entirety, we are not persuaded that the Defendants’ mark is
deceptively similar to the Plaintiffs’ mark or that there exists a
likelihood of confusion among average consumers.
Passing off
71. We shall now address the aspect of passing off.
72. The distinction between the enquiry for passing off and
infringement has been discussed in detail in the case of Kaviraj Pandit
Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceuticals Laboratories30,
the same is reproduced thus:
“28. The other ground of objection that the findings are
inconsistent really proceeds on an error in appreciating the basic
differences between the causes of action and right to relief in suits
for passing off and for infringement of a registered trade mark and
in equating the essentials of a passing off action with those in
respect of an action complaining of an infringement of a registered
trade mark. We have already pointed out that the suit by the
respondent complained both of an invasion of a statutory right
under Section 21 in respect of a registered trade mark and also of
a passing off by the use of the same mark. The finding in favour of
the appellant to which the learned counsel drew our attention was
based upon dissimilarity of the packing in which the goods of the
two parties were vended, the difference in the physical appearance30AIR 1965 SC 980
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of the two packets by reason of the variation in the colour and
other features and their general get-up together with the
circumstance that the name and address of the manufactory of the
appellant was prominently displayed on his packets and these
features were all set out for negativing the respondent’s claim that
the appellant had passed off his goods as those of the respondent.
These matters which are of the essence of the cause of action for
relief on the ground of passing off play but a limited role in an
action for infringement of a registered trade mark by the registered
proprietor who has a statutory right to that mark and who has a
statutory remedy for the event of the use by another of that mark or
a colourable imitation thereof. While an action for passing off is a
Common Law remedy being in substance an action for deceit, that
is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another,
that is not the gist of an action for infringement. The action for
infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered
proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of the
exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those
goods” (Vide Section 21 of the Act). The use by the defendant of
the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an action for
passing off, but is the sine qua non in the case of an action for
infringement. No doubt, where the evidence in respect of passing
off consists merely of the colourable use of a registered trade
mark, the essential features of both the actions might coincide in
the sense that what would be a colourable imitation of a trade
mark in a passing off action would also be such in an action for
infringement of the same trade mark. But there the correspondence
between the two ceases. In an action for infringement, the plaintiff
must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant’s mark is
likely to deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiff’s
and the defendant’s mark is so close either visually, phonetically or
otherwise and the court reaches the conclusion that there is an
imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the
plaintiff’s rights are violated. Expressed in another way, if the
essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been
adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and
other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he
offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate
clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered
proprietor of the mark would be immaterial; whereas in the case of
passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he can show thatFAO(COMM) 334/2025
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the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of
the plaintiff.
29. When once the use by the defendant of the mark which is
claimed to infringe the plaintiff’s mark is shown to be “in the
course of trade”, the question whether there has been an
infringement is to be decided by comparison of the two marks.
Where the two marks are identical no further questions arise; for
then the infringement is made out. When the two marks are not
identical, the plaintiff would have to establish that the mark used
by the defendant so nearly resembles the plaintiff’s registered trade
mark as is likely to deceive or cause confusion and in relation to
goods in respect of which it is registered (Vide Section 21). A point
has sometimes been raised as to whether the words “or cause
confusion” introduce any element which is not already covered by
the words “likely to deceive” and it has sometimes been answered
by saying that it is merely an extension of the earlier test and does
not add very materially to the concept indicated by the earlier
words “likely to deceive”. But this apart, as the question arises in
an action for infringement the onus would be on the plaintiff to
establish that the trade mark used by the defendant in the course of
trade in the goods in respect of which his mark is registered, is
deceptively similar. This has necessarily to be ascertained by a
comparison of the two marks — the degree of resemblance which
is necessary to exist to cause deception not being capable of
definition by laying down objective standards. The persons who
would be deceived are, of course, the purchasers of the goods and
it is the likelihood of their being deceived that is the subject of
consideration. The resemblance may be phonetic, visual or in the
basic idea represented by the plaintiff’s mark. The purpose of the
comparison is for determining whether the essential features of the
plaintiff’s trade mark are to be found in that used by the defendant.
The identification of the essential features of the mark is in essence
a question of fact and depends on the judgment of the Court based
on the evidence led before it as regards the usage of the trade. It
should, however, be borne in mind that the object of the enquiry in
ultimate analysis is whether the mark used by the defendant as a
whole is deceptively similar to that of the registered mark of the
plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
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73. It has been held that in passing off actions, added elements can
make a significant difference. The enquiry in passing off involves a
comparison of the entire representation of the competing goods or
services.
74. In this regard, since the Defendants are using the impugned
mark in relation to a wellness retreat, it becomes necessary to
reproduce the competing trade dressing of the rival marks for the sake
of clarity, as follows:
Plaintiffs Defendants
/
75. Upon examining the competing trade dresses, it is evident that
there is no visual or conceptual similarity between the two marks.
Apart from the occurrence of the words “Jeeva” and “Jiva”, there are
no substantial similarities in the trade dresses. The Defendants’ mark
features herbal plants, while the Plaintiffs’ mark consists of a lotus
flower. These are entirely different visual elements.
76. The use of the phrase “By Baidyanath” in the Defendants’ mark
clearly acts as a source-identifying feature, eliminating any reasonable
doubt that a consumer might associate the Defendants’ mark with the
Plaintiffs’ mark. The additional elements, such as the prefix “Shatam”
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and the disclaimer “By Baidyanath”, result in sufficient dissimilarity
between the competing trade dresses. Thus, the likelihood of
confusion or the possibility of a consumer associating the Defendants’
product with the Plaintiffs does not arise.
77. Additionally, the Defendants have failed to place any material
on record to demonstrate actual damage or the likelihood of damage to
their goodwill or reputation. The Plaintiffs have not provided any
evidence to support claims of loss or harm caused by the Defendants’
mark.
78. However, as established in the case of Brihan Karan (supra),
misrepresentation remains a crucial ingredient in passing off, and this
is notably absent in the present lis. There is no evidence that the
Defendants have misrepresented their goods or services as those of the
Plaintiffs.
79. Therefore, in the absence of any deceptive similarity or
misrepresentation between the competing trade dresses, no case of
passing off can be sustained.
80. Since the Defendants’ case fails on the ground of deceptive
similarity, we do not find it necessary to examine the remaining two
ingredients of passing off, namely, goodwill and damage.
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Conclusion
81. In light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that no
prima facie case for infringement or passing off exists. This is because
there is no deceptive similarity between the rival marks, nor has any
misrepresentation been established.
82. Resultingly, no case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction
has been made out. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside.
83. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed.
84. We clarify that the observations and findings in this judgment
are prima facie in nature and are made for the purpose of adjudicating
the application for the interlocutory injunction only. These
observations will not, in any manner, influence the learned
Commercial Court’s consideration of the merits of the suit pending
before it.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C.HARI SHANKAR, J.
APRIL 21, 2026/ss/gunn
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