Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Moniza Farooquee & Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Anr on 28 April, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE UDAY KUMAR
CRR 619 OF 2025
MONIZA FAROOQUEE & ANR.
-VS-
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.
For the Petitioner s : Mr. Debabrata Acharyya,
Mr. Sital Samanta
For the State : Mr. Arindam Sen,
Ms. Sudeshna Das
Hearing concluded on : 30.03.2026
Judgment on : 28.04.2026
UDAY KUMAR, J.: -
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. This revisional application, preferred under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), is
directed towards the quashing of the proceedings in G.R. Case
No. 2655 of 2023. The matter originates from Beniapukur
Police Station Case No. 275 of 2023 dated 08.11.2023,
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presently pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd
Court, Sealdah, South 24-Parganas.
1.2. The petitioners herein, Moniza Farooquee and Sharik Hossain,
are the married sister-in-law and brother-in-law, respectively,
of the Opposite Party No. 2 (the de-facto Complainant). They
have been impleaded for alleged commission of offences
punishable under Sections 498A, 406, and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
1.3. The foundational challenge to the continuation of the
impugned proceedings rests on the contention that the
petitioners have been “roped in” to the criminal net solely by
virtue of their matrimonial affinity to the principal accused
(the husband). This challenge is predicated on three distinct
yet interconnected grounds:
i. a documented domestic severance exceeding a
decade;
ii. the conspicuous absence of specific prima facie
material linking them to the alleged overt acts of
cruelty; and
iii. a manifest factual admission by the complainant in
her own written statement which effectively negates
the essential ingredients of “entrustment” required
for a charge of Criminal Breach of Trust.
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2. DETAILED BACKGROUND FACTS
2.1. The marital union between the Complainant, Sania Tasnim,
and Meraj Ahmed (the brother of Petitioner No. 1) was
solemnized on 28.10.2022. According to the narrative set
forth in the First Information Report (FIR), the relationship
reportedly deteriorated within two months of the marriage,
allegedly on account of unsatisfied dowry demands amounting
to ₹3,00,000/- intended for the husband’s business. This
discord eventually led to the complainant departing from the
matrimonial home on 07.04.2023.
2.2. A pivotal fact, which remains largely uncontroverted, is that
the petitioners were never constituents of the immediate
matrimonial household. Petitioner No. 1 entered into wedlock
with Petitioner No. 2 on 28.12.2014–nearly eight years prior
to the complainant’s marriage. Since their union, they have
maintained an entirely independent and settled establishment
in Tangra, Kolkata. This residence is not only geographically
distinct from the matrimonial home in Beniapukur but is also
functionally autonomous. Petitioner No. 2 is a professional
(Senior Associate at PwC), and the couple manages a
separate nuclear household with their two minor children.
2.3. Following the complainant’s departure from the matrimonial
home in April 2023, there ensued a significant and
unexplained silence of six months. It was only on 09.10.2023
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that the FIR was lodged at Beniapukur Police Station. In this
belated narrative, the petitioners were impleaded alongside
the principal accused through generalized, “omnibus”
allegations of “instigation” and “frequent visits.” Crucially, the
complaint is conspicuously void of any specific overt act,
documented date, or time-stamped incident of the alleged
torture attributed to these distantly residing relatives.
2.4. The investigative process yielded further material that
contradicts the petitioners’ involvement. During the seizure
conducted on 23.11.2023 at the matrimonial home on Tiljala
Road, all recovered articles were found in the possession of
the husband and his parents. No property or incriminating
material was traced to the petitioners’ residence in Tangra.
Most significantly, the complainant’s own written statement
(Annexure “C”) categorically records that her gold ornaments
(Stridhan) were kept in the exclusive custody of her father-in-
law. This admission effectively negates the essential legal
ingredients of “entrustment” or “misappropriation” as against
the present petitioners.
2.5. Notwithstanding this apparent vacuum of evidence, Charge
Sheet No. 09 of 2024 was submitted on 05.01.2024, and the
Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on
08.02.2024. The petitioners have moved this Court
contending that the continuation of the trial against them, in
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the absence of foundational legal ingredients, constitutes a
manifest abuse of the process of law.
3. QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
3.1. Following a rigorous analysis of the Case Diary, the
documented domestic severance of the parties, and the
prevailing judicial mandates, this Court frames the following
questions for determination:
I. Whether the allegations against Petitioner Nos. 1
and 2, restricted to the nebulous and
uncorroborated term “instigation,” are generic and
“omnibus” in nature, thereby failing to satisfy the
requirement of specific overt acts and temporal
proximity necessary to constitute “Cruelty”?
II. Whether the admitted separate residence of the
petitioners since 2014, coupled with their settled
professional and domestic status, renders the
allegations of “daily” presence and systematic
torture at the matrimonial home in Beniapukur
logically and legally improbable?
III. Whether a prima facie case of Criminal Breach of
Trust is maintainable against the petitioners when
the complainant’s own written statement explicitly
identifies the father-in-law as the sole custodian of
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CRR 619 OF 2025her ornaments, and when the investigation confirms
a total absence of recovery from the petitioners’
premises?
IV. Whether the record contains any substantive
material to establish a “prior meeting of minds” or a
synchronized criminal objective between the
principal accused and these distantly residing
petitioners, sufficient to attract the doctrine of
vicarious liability?
V. Whether the six-month unexplained delay in lodging
the FIR, viewed in the context of the “tendency to
rope in” settled relatives, indicates a malicious
intent to wreak vengeance, thereby rendering the
continuation of this proceeding a manifest abuse of
the process of law?
VI. Whether, upon a holistic assessment of the
materials on record, any prima facie case is
established against the petitioners that would
warrant the rigors of a criminal trial?
4. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS
4.1. Mr. Debabrata Acharyya, the learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners, in assailing the sustainability of the Charge
Sheet and the underlying FIR, submitted that the petitioners
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have been victimized by an instrumental abuse of the criminal
machinery. He forcefully contended that Petitioner No. 1 (the
married sister-in-law) and Petitioner No. 2 (her husband)
have maintained a complete domestic severance from the
matrimonial household for over a decade. Residing
independently in Tangra since 2014, their lives are governed
by separate domestic and professional obligations. Mr.
Acharyya emphasized that Petitioner No. 2, as a Senior
Associate at a reputed firm (PwC), and Petitioner No. 1, as a
mother of two, lead a settled life that is fundamentally
incompatible with the narrative of constant interference in the
Beniapukur household.
4.2. Regarding the charges of “Cruelty,” Mr. Acharyya argued that
the prosecution’s narrative is purely “omnibus” in nature. It
was submitted that the mere use of the label “instigation,”
without the accompaniment of specific dates, documented
overt acts, or a discernible mode of incitement, fails to satisfy
the statutory threshold of Section 498A IPC. Relying on the
landmark ratio in Preeti Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand
(2010), he asserted that the “tendency to rope in” distantly
residing relatives in matrimonial disputes has become a
pervasive social malaise. He argued that the mere
geographical presence within the same city cannot bridge the
gap created by ten years of independent nuclear living.
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4.3. Adverting to the charge of Criminal Breach of Trust, Mr.
Acharyya pointed toward a “foundational estoppel” appearing
within the complainant’s own written statement (Annexure
“C”). He highlighted that the complainant explicitly identified
the father-in-law as the sole custodian of her gold ornaments.
In light of this judicial admission, coupled with the fact that
the Seizure List confirms no recovery was made from the
petitioners’ premises, it was argued that the essential
ingredient of “entrustment” is legally non-existent. Invoking
the principle in Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada
(1997), he maintained that a charge of misappropriation
cannot be sustained against parties who never held dominion
over the property.
4.4. The invocation of Section 34 IPC was challenged on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish a “meeting of
minds.” It was argued that “common intention” requires a
pre-arranged plan or synchronized participation, neither of
which find any reflection in the Case Diary. Mr. Acharyya
argued that criminal liability cannot be inferred merely from
matrimonial affinity; it requires a documented “nexus of
intent” that is conspicuously absent in the present
investigation. Relying on Ganesh Das vs. State of Assam
(2009), he submitted that the petitioners’ separate residence
makes a “shared criminal objective” logically improbable.
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4.5. Finally, Mr. Acharyya raised the issue of the unexplained six-
month delay in lodging the FIR. It was submitted that the
interval between the separation in April 2023 and the FIR in
October 2023 indicates a period of “legal brainstorming”
utilized to fabricate a narrative against the petitioners. Relying
on the mandates of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992)
and Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam vs. State of Bihar (2022),
counsel concluded that the proceedings are maliciously
intended to wreak vengeance. Accordingly, the petitioners
prayed for the quashing of the proceedings to prevent the
judicial process from being utilized as a tool of harassment.
5. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES
5.1. Mr. Arindam Sen, learned counsel for the State, supported by
the learned counsel for the de-facto complainant, vehemently
opposed the prayer for quashing. It was submitted that with
the filing of Charge Sheet No. 09 of 2024, the investigation
has reached a stage of maturity. Counsel contended that at
this interlocutory stage, the High Court is not required to
conduct a “mini-trial” or weigh the evidence with
mathematical precision. Relying on the settled principles in
State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992), it was argued that
since the allegations in the FIR and the statements recorded
under Section 161 Cr.PC (Section 180 BNSS) disclose the
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commission of cognizable offences, the inherent powers of
this Court should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
prosecution.
5.2. Addressing the allegations under Section 498A IPC, the
Opposite Parties submitted that the term “instigation” is not a
mere label but a triable factual reality. It was argued that in
the contemporary Indian socio-matrimonial context, physical
distance does not equate to a lack of influence. Counsel
contended that the petitioners, despite their residence in
Tangra, maintained a “pivotal presence” through frequent
visits and psychological provocation. The submission
maintained that “mental cruelty” is often subtle and exerted
through consistent interference, making the petitioners’
degree of involvement a matter of evidence to be adjudicated
during the trial.
5.3. On the charge of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 406
IPC, Mr. Sen submitted that the concept of “dominion over
property” within a joint family setup is fluid. While the
complainant acknowledged the father-in-law’s physical
custody, it was contended that the petitioners acted in concert
with the principal accused to withhold the property. The
submission asserted that the lack of recovery from the
petitioners’ specific residence is not a ground for discharge at
this threshold, as Section 34 IPC binds all family members
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who participated in the collective demand and subsequent
withholding of the Stridhan.
5.4. Regarding the six-month delay in lodging the FIR, the de-
facto complainant submitted that a woman in a fractured
marriage often undergoes a period of immense trauma and
attempts at social reconciliation before seeking legal recourse.
It was argued that such a hiatus should not be viewed
through a lens of suspicion or as “legal brainstorming,” but
rather as a reflection of the complainant’s hesitance to
permanently sever marital ties. Counsel argued that in
matrimonial offences, the spirit of the law prioritizes the
victim’s plight over procedural technicalities like delay.
5.5. Finally, the Opposite Parties submitted that the statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC from the complainant’s
mother and brother provide sufficient prima facie material to
proceed. It was argued that quashing the proceedings against
the sister-in-law and brother-in-law at this stage would
prejudice the trial and ignore the “common intention”
underlying the demand for ₹3,00,000/-. The State concluded
by asserting that the petitioners’ defences, including their
separate residence and professional status, constitute “triable
issues” of fact that must be tested in cross-examination
before the Learned Trial Court.
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6. DISCUSSION FOR DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS
6.1. ADJUDICATION ON QUESTION NO. I: THE LEGAL
STANDARD OF “CRUELTY” AND SPECIFICITY OF
ALLEGATIONS
6.1.1. The legislative intent behind Section 498A of the Indian
Penal Code is to provide a protective umbrella to women
against “Cruelty” by the husband or his relatives. However,
the statute defines “Cruelty” under two distinct limbs: (a)
willful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause
grave injury, or (b) harassment to coerce her to meet
unlawful property demands. In the context of a criminal
trial, these ingredients must be established against each
accused individual with specific factual precision. The term
“relative” does not imply a collective criminal liability;
rather, it requires a distinct overt act that links the accused
to the alleged victimization.
6.1.2. Upon a meticulous examination of the FIR and the
statements recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.PC
(Section 180 BNSS), this Court finds that the petitioners,
Moniza Farooquee and Sharik Hossain, are impleaded
primarily on the strength of a singular, nebulous allegation,
that they “instigated” the principal accused (the husband) to
intensify his torture. The records are conspicuously silent on
the specific verbal or physical triggers of such instigation;
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the dates or times when such instigation purportedly
occurred; and the proximate link between the petitioners’
occasional visits from Tangra and the husband’s alleged
escalations of cruelty in Beniapukur.
6.1.3. The petitioners place heavy reliance on the ratio in Preeti
Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667. In
that landmark judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, at
Paragraph 32, observed:
“The allegations against the appellants are generic in
nature and no specific role is assigned to them in the
commission of the crime… It would be a travesty of
justice to compel the appellants to undergo the rigors
of a criminal trial.”
Further, at Paragraph 35, the Apex Court noted:
“The allegations of harassment of husband’s close
relations who had been living in different cities and
never visited or rarely visited the place where the
complainant resided would have an entirely different
complexion. Such allegations of the complaint are
required to be scrutinized with great care and
circumspection.”
6.1.4. The learned counsel for the State attempted to distinguish
the ratio of Preeti Gupta by contending that the relatives in
that case resided in different cities, whereas here, both
residences are within Kolkata. This Court finds such a
distinction legally fragile. For the purpose of quashing
proceedings against distant relatives, “distance” is not
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merely a geographic metric but a domestic and functional
severance. The petitioners have established, through
marriage certificates and residential records, that they have
maintained a separate household for over ten years.
Petitioner No. 2’s professional rigor as a Senior Associate at
PwC further underscores a lifestyle that is functionally
independent of the day-to-day affairs of the complainant.
6.1.5. In view of the aforesaid legal and factual analysis, this
Court arrives at the following definite findings that, the
allegations against Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are purely
“omnibus” and vague. The term “instigation” as utilized by
the prosecution, is a legal conclusion devoid of a factual
substrate. The decade-long domestic severance of the
petitioners makes the generic claims of harassment
inherently improbable. To allow the trial to proceed on such
nebulous material would be a violation of the fundamental
right to a fair legal process and would also be an exercise in
judicial futility. Consequently, this question is answered in
the affirmative for the petitioners as their impleadment is
found to be a manifest abuse of the process of law, and the
charge under Section 498A IPC as against them is found to
be unsustainable in law.
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6.2. ADJUDICATION ON QUESTION NO. II: THE LOGICAL
IMPROBABILITY OF DAILY INTERFERENCE AND
DOMESTIC SEVERANCE
6.2.1. In assessing a prima facie case under Section 498A IPC, the
Court cannot operate in a vacuum of social reality. The
fundamental test for the continuation of a criminal
proceeding is whether the allegations, when viewed through
the lens of common human conduct and documented facts,
possess a “hallmark of probability.” Where an allegation is
so inherently improbable that no prudent person could
accept it as the basis for a trial, the threshold for judicial
intervention is met.
6.2.2. The complainant’s primary grievance against these
petitioners, rests upon the assertion that they visited the
matrimonial home in Beniapukur “almost every day” to
facilitate or instigate torture. However, this Court finds an
undisputed factual reality that stands in stark contrast to
this narrative:
i. Petitioner No. 1 and Petitioner No. 2 were married
on 28.12.2014 and have maintained a settled,
independent household in Tangra for over a decade.
ii. Petitioner No. 2 is a Senior Associate at PwC, a role
that entails significant professional responsibilities
and specific working hours.
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iii. The petitioners are parents to two minor children,
managing their own domestic and educational
requirements.
Logically, the claim that a working professional
and a mother of two, residing in a different
police station area, would dedicate their daily
routine to interfering in the micro-affairs of a
separate household in another locality stretches
the bounds of human probability.
6.2.3. This Court relies upon the ratio in Geeta Mehrotra vs. State
of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 741. At Paragraph 20, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed:
“Where the relatives of the husband were not even
living with the couple and there were no specific
allegations, it would be an abuse of the process of law
to allow the prosecution to continue.”
Further, the Court refers to the protective ratio in Preeti
Gupta & Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667,
specifically Paragraph 36, where the Apex Court noted:
“It is a matter of common knowledge that
exaggerated versions of the incident are frequently
reflected in matrimonial complaints… The tendency of
implicating husband and all his near relatives is also
not uncommon.”
6.2.4. The learned counsel for the State argued that geographical
proximity within the city limits of Kolkata allows for daily
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interference. This Court, however, must distinguish between
geographical proximity and domestic integration. In the case
of Geeta Mehrotra, the Court emphasized that when the
accused do not share the same roof, the burden on the
prosecution to show specific instances of interference is
significantly higher.
6.2.5. In the present case, the Case Diary is conspicuously void of
any corroborative material, such as travel logs, neighbor
statements, or digital footprints, that would substantiate this
“daily” presence. The mere proximity of two localities in a
metropolitan setup does not bridge the domestic gap
created by ten years of independent nuclear living.
Therefore, the prosecution’s attempt to distinguish the cited
cases based on city limits is a narrow interpretation that fails
to account for the functional domestic severance established
by the petitioners.
6.2.6. Based on the professional and domestic status of the
petitioners, this Court arrives at the following definite
findings:
i. The allegation of “daily” interference is not only
evidentially weak but logically implausible.
ii. The prosecution has failed to produce any material
to bridge the gap between the petitioners’ separate
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CRR 619 OF 2025residence and their alleged constant presence at
the scene of the crime.
iii. The narrative appears to be an ex post facto
embellishment intended to “rope in” the extended
family, which falls squarely within the prohibition
laid down in Geeta Mehrotra.
6.2.7. Consequently, Question No. II is also answered in the
affirmative for the petitioners, and this Court finds the
allegation of daily interference to be a figment of legal
brainstorming rather than a reflection of factual reality.
6.3. ADJUDICATION ON QUESTION NO. III: THE FACTUAL
ESTOPPEL OF ENTRUSTMENT (SECTION 406 IPC)
6.3.1. The offence of Criminal Breach of Trust, as defined under
Section 405 IPC and punishable under Section 406, is
predicated on the dual pillars of “entrustment” and
“dishonest misappropriation.” In matrimonial disputes
involving Stridhan, the prosecution must establish that the
complainant handed over her property to a specific person,
who then exercised “dominion” over it and subsequently
refused to return it upon demand. In criminal jurisprudence,
entrustment is an individual act; it cannot be inferred
collectively against an entire family without distinct evidence
of a transfer of possession.
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6.3.2. Upon a meticulous scrutiny of the complainant’s own written
statement, which forms the bedrock of the FIR, this Court
finds a manifest inconsistency that serves as a legal
discharge for the petitioners. a meticulous scrutiny of the
complainant’s own written statement, which forms the
bedrock of the FIR, this Court finds a staggering
contradiction to the prosecution’s theory. The complainant
has categorically recorded:
“Even my all-gold ornaments were kept in the custody
of father-in-law and I was not given opportunity to
use gold ornaments.”
This statement constitutes an explicit factual
admission identifying the father-in-law as the
exclusive custodian of the property. Legally, this
admission creates a factual estoppel against the
complainant. Having identified one specific
individual as the trustee of her ornaments, she
cannot, through subsequent “omnibus”
allegations, extend that criminal liability to
Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, who have maintained a
separate domestic setup since 2014.
6.3.3. This Court relies on the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Rashmi Kumar vs. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997) 2 SCC
397. In that case, the Court clarified at Paragraph 13:
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“The property must have been entrusted to the
accused or the accused must have dominion over the
property. The accused must have dishonestly
misappropriated or converted it to his own use.”Furthermore, this Court refers to the ratio in Onkar Nath
Mishra vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (2008) 2 SCC 561, where
the Apex Court held that in the absence of a specific
allegation of entrustment against a particular relative, a
charge under Section 406 IPC cannot stand.
6.3.4. The learned counsel for the State argued that in a joint
family, the husband and his siblings are deemed to have
“constructive custody” of the dowry and Stridhan. However,
this Court refuses to accept this ratio in the present facts.In
the cases where “joint custody” was discussed, the accused
relatives usually resided under the same roof as the
complainant. This case is factually distinct because:
a. The petitioners have led a severed domestic
existence for a decade, precluding the possibility of
“shared dominion.”
b. The Seizure List dated 23.11.2023 confirms that all
articles were recovered exclusively from the
matrimonial home at Tiljala Road.
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c. No recovery was made from the petitioners’
premises in Tangra, corroborating the absence of
possession.
The ratio in Rashmi Kumar demands a clear
“dominion.” Since the complainant herself
admits that the father-in-law held the custody,
and since no physical possession was ever
traced to the petitioners, the charge against
them lacks its primary statutory ingredient.
One cannot “misappropriate” that which one
never “possessed.”Therefore, the ratio in
Rashmi Kumar,(demands clear dominion,) is
conspicuously found absent here.
6.3.5. In view of the evidentiary materials and the complainant’s
own admissions, this Court arrives at the following definite
findings:
i. The essential ingredient of “entrustment” is legally
non-existent as against Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2.
ii. The complainant’s admission in Annexure “C”
operates as a factual estoppel, absolving these
petitioners of any role in the custody of ornaments.
iii. The investigation has failed to produce a single
seizure memo or witness statement suggesting
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CRR 619 OF 2025that the petitioners ever held “dominion” over the
property.
6.3.6. Therefore, this question is answered in favour of the
petitioners, and the charge under Section 406 IPC as
against them is found to be a gross overreach of the
criminal machinery.
6.4. ADJUDICATION ON QUESTION NO. IV: THE
CONCEPTUAL FAILURE OF COMMON INTENTION
(SECTION 34 IPC)
6.4.1. Regarding the applicability of the doctrine of constructive
liability, Section 34 of the IPC serves as a rule of evidence
that attributes vicarious liability to individuals acting in
furtherance of a “common intention.” To attract this
provision, the prosecution must establish more than a mere
coincidence of presence or a shared biological lineage; it
requires a “prior meeting of minds” and synchronized
participation in the criminal act. Common intention is a
state of mind that must be manifested through overt
conduct pointing unequivocally to a pre-meditated,
collective criminal objective.
6.4.2. A rigorous audit of the Case Diary and the materials on
record reveals that the prosecution’s narrative is devoid of
any temporal or factual nexus between the husband’s
alleged conduct in Beniapukur and the petitioners’ residence
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CRR 619 OF 2025in Tangra. For Section 34 to be legally sustainable, the
record must reflect:
i. Evidence of call logs or digital records suggesting
a pre-arranged plan to harass the complainant.
ii. Specific incidents where the petitioners and the
husband acted in unison to perpetrate cruelty.
iii. Material suggesting the petitioners shared the
specific goal of coercing the complainant for the
additional demand of ₹3,00,000/-.
The record is conspicuously silent on all these
fronts.
6.4.3. This Court relies on the ratio in Ganesh Das vs. State of
Assam (2009) 15 SCC 154. At Paragraph 12, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court observed:
“Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is
only a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the
section is the element of participation in action.”
Further, in Ramesh vs. State of T.N. (2005) SCC (Cri) 735,
the Court emphasized at Paragraph 6:
“The bald allegations made against the sister-in-law
seem to suggest the anxiety of the informant to rope
in as many of the husband’s relations as possible
rather than a genuine shared intent.”
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6.4.4. The learned counsel for the State argued that common
intention can develop “on the spot” and that the petitioners’
frequent visits satisfy the “participation” requirement. This
Court refuses to accept this contention. The ratio in cases
where “on the spot” intention is applied usually involves a
single, continuous transaction of violence. In the present
matrimonial context:
i. The alleged acts of cruelty were periodic and
localized to the Beniapukur household.
ii. The petitioners lead a severed domestic existence
in Tangra, making a “shared atmosphere” of
criminal intent logically improbable.
iii. The prosecution is attempting to substitute “intent”
with “relationship.”
Unlike the principal accused, whose intent is
inferred from direct conduct, the intent of
distantly residing relatives cannot be presumed.
The ratio in Ganesh Das demands “participation
in action,” whereas the record here shows only
“matrimonial affinity.”
6.4.5. In view of the total absence of evidence regarding a pre-
arranged plan, this Court arrives at the following definite
findings:
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i. the foundational requirement of a “prior meeting
of minds” remains entirely unfulfilled,
ii. the prosecution has failed to demonstrate a
single overt act that would bind these distantly
residing petitioners to the husband’s
independent actions,
iii. the impleadment under Section 34 IPC appears
to be a procedural reflex rather than a reasoned
legal conclusion, a product of “legal
brainstorming” to widen the net of accused
persons.
6.4.6. Accordingly, question No. IV is answered in favour of the
petitioners, and this Court finds that the principle of
vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC cannot be attracted
in this vacuum of material.
6.5. ADJUDICATION ON QUESTION NO. V: THE DOCTRINE
OF ABUSE OF PROCESS AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
DELAY
6.5.1. In criminal jurisprudence, the promptness of a First
Information Report (FIR) is not a mere procedural formality
but a diagnostic tool for assessing the “hallmark of
spontaneity.” While the courts traditionally allow for some
delay in matrimonial disputes due to the sensitive nature of
the relationship, such delay must be cogently explained. An
26
CRR 619 OF 2025unexplained and substantial gap between the date of
separation and the lodging of the complaint often serves as
an indicator of “coloured versions” or “fabricated
afterthoughts,” specifically designed to involve innocent
relatives.
6.5.2. The timeline of the present case reveals a conspicuous and
unexplained gap that severely undermines the prosecution’s
narrative:
i. The complainant left the matrimonial home on
07.04.2023.
ii. The formal complaint was lodged only on
09.10.2023.
iii. During this six-month interval, there is no
record of any General Diary (GD) entry, no
interim complaint to the CAW (Crime Against
Women) cell, and no documented grievance
specifically naming the petitioners for the
alleged “daily” torture or withholding of
Stridhan.
Logically, if Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 had
indeed engaged in daily harassment or
misappropriated Stridhan, such grave
allegations would have surfaced in the
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CRR 619 OF 2025
immediate aftermath of the separation. The
six-month silence leads this Court to the
inevitable conclusion that this period was
utilized for “legal brainstorming” to
maximize the pressure on the husband’s
family by roping in his settled, professional
sister-in-law and her husband.
6.5.3. This Court relies on the ratio in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan
Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335),wherein the Apex Court
identified categories warranting the exercise of quashing
powers, specifically:
“Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
Further, in Preeti Gupta &Anr. vs. State of Jharkhand (2010)
7 SCC 667, the Court observed at Paragraph 34:
“The Courts must ensure that the matrimonial
litigation is not utilized as a tool for harassment. The
courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in
dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration.”
6.5.4. This is further reinforced by the warning in Kahkashan
Kausar @ Sonam vs. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599,
where the Court observed that the misuse of Section 498A
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CRR 619 OF 2025
to settle personal scores with distant relatives is a trend that
the judiciary must stem with a heavy hand.It establishes
that when allegations are generic and follow a significant
delay, they must be quashed to prevent the judicial process
from becoming a tool of oppression. In the present case, the
delay acts as a multiplier of doubt. To subject Petitioner No.
2 (a PwC professional) and Petitioner No. 1 to the “scarring”
experience of a criminal trial based on an afterthought would
be a manifest failure of justice.
6.5.5. The State’s argument that the delay reflects “marital
trauma” and a “hope for reconciliation” might be valid as
against the husband, but it fails to justify the delayed
implication of the petitioners. If the complainant were truly
seeking reconciliation, the act of roping in distantly residing
relatives with generic allegations would be counter-
productive to that objective. In cases where delay is
condoned for reconciliation, there is usually evidence of
mediation or family meetings. However, this Court rejects
this argument as it lacks any evidentiary support in the Case
Diary. Here, the vacuum is absolute. Further, the timing
suggests that the petitioners were included as an
afterthought to ensure that no member of the husband’s
family remained untouched by the litigation.
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CRR 619 OF 2025
6.5.6. In view of the analysis of the timeline and the nature of the
allegations, this Court arrives at the following definite
findings:
i. The six-month delay is not merely a procedural
lapse but evidence of a calculated and deliberated
narrative.
ii. The continuation of this proceeding against the
petitioners is not in the interest of justice but is a
manifest abuse of the process of law.
iii. The proceedings are maliciously intended to wreak
vengeance, satisfying the criteria for quashing as
laid down in Bhajan Lal.
6.5.7. Consequently, Question No. V is answered in favor of the
petitioners, and this Court finds that the proceedings as
against them are liable to be quashed to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.
6.6. EVALUATION OF PRIMA FACIE CASE AND LEGAL
SUSTAINABILITY
6.6.1. In determining whether a prima facie case stands against
Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2, this Court has looked beyond the
veneer of the Charge Sheet to scrutinize the quality of the
underlying materials. A prima facie case is not established
by the mere naming of individuals in an FIR; it requires the
existence of the fundamental ingredients that constitute the
30
CRR 619 OF 2025alleged offences. Upon a meticulous review of the Case
Diary, this Court finds a total vacuum of specific overt acts.
The allegation of “instigation” remains a nebulous legal
conclusion without any factual substrate, lacking details of
the mode, manner, or timing of such incitement.
Furthermore, the charge under Section 406 IPC is factually
extinguished by the complainant’s own admission in
Annexure “C”, where she identified the father-in-law as the
sole custodian of her Stridhan. In the absence of
“entrustment” and any subsequent recovery of property
from the petitioners, the statutory requirements for Criminal
Breach of Trust remain entirely unfulfilled.
6.6.2. The sustainability of this prosecution must be tested against
the protective guidelines established by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court to prevent the “net-widening” phenomenon
in matrimonial disputes. This Court finds that the present
proceedings fall squarely within the prohibited categories
defined in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992), as the
allegations, even if taken at face value, do not disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence by these petitioners. The
narrative against them is a textbook example of “omnibus
allegations” condemned in Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam vs.
State of Bihar (2022), where the Apex Court warned against
roping in married relatives without specific roles.
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CRR 619 OF 2025
Furthermore, the decade-long domestic severance of the
petitioners brings this case under the cautionary mandate of
Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010), which requires
the Court to scrutinize generic allegations against distantly
residing relatives with extreme circumspection.
6.6.3. The logical and legal explanation for this Court’s findings
rests on the principle that a criminal trial is a serious inroad
into personal liberty and must not be allowed to proceed as
a matter of routine when the foundation is visibly fragile.
The six-month unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, coupled
with the petitioners’ independent professional identity at
PwC and their settled nuclear life in Tangra, renders the
prosecution’s theory of “daily interference” inherently
improbable. There is no substantive material to bridge the
gap between the petitioners’ separate residence and the
alleged acts of cruelty. Consequently, this Court finds that
the impleadment of Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 is a product of
“strategic inflation” rather than factual truth.
6.6.4. Based on the aforementioned evaluation, this Court derives
that this revision is liable to be allowed. To compel these
petitioners to stand trial in the absence of a scintilla of prima
facie material would be to permit the judicial process to be
utilized as a tool of harassment and vengeance. The interest
of justice demands that the proceedings against Petitioner
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CRR 619 OF 2025
Nos. 1 and 2 be quashed at the threshold to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice and to uphold the integrity of
the criminal justice system.
7. CONCLUSION AND RATIO DECIDENDI
7.1. The core principle that emerges from this discussion is that in
matrimonial disputes, “geographical proximity” within a
metropolitan city cannot be equated with “domestic
integration.” When relatives have maintained a separate,
independent household for a significant period (in this case,
ten years), the burden on the prosecution to provide specific,
documented overt acts becomes absolute. Generic allegations
of “instigation” or “interference” without temporal precision
are insufficient to sustain a criminal trial against such
distantly residing relatives.
7.2. The charge under Section 406 IPC cannot be sustained
through “omnibus” claims when the complainant has made a
specific prior admission naming a particular individual as the
sole custodian of her property. Such an admission creates a
factual estoppel that protects other relatives from vicarious
liability regarding the Stridhan, especially where no recovery
is made from their independent premises.
7.3. A substantial, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR (six months
in the present case) serves as a diagnostic indicator of “legal
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CRR 619 OF 2025
brainstorming.” Such a delay, when coupled with generic
allegations against distantly residing relatives, leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the proceedings are an attempt to
“widen the net” and constitute an abuse of the process of law.
8. CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER AND DIRECTIONS
8.1. In light of the findings recorded under the discussions on
Questions I through VI, this Court is of the firm opinion that
the continuation of the criminal proceedings against Petitioner
Nos. 1 and 2 would be a hollow exercise in judicial futility and
a manifest violation of the ends of justice.
8.2. Accordingly, the Revisional Application is allowed and the
following consequential order and directions are hereby
issued:
I. The proceedings in G.R. Case No. 2655 of 2023,
arising out of Beniapukur Police Station Case No. 275
of 2023 dated 08.11.2023, currently pending before
the Learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Sealdah,
and the resultant Charge Sheet No. 09 of 2024, are
hereby quashed and set aside, only in so far as they
relate to the petitioners, Moniza Farooquee and
Sharik Hossain.
II. The petitioners are hereby discharged from their
respective bail bonds, and any restrictions imposed
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CRR 619 OF 2025upon them by virtue of the said proceedings stand
vacated.
III. The trial shall proceed in accordance with the law as
against the remaining accused persons(the husband
and the parents-in-law), with utmost expedition
without being influenced by any observations made
herein.
IV. It is clarified that the observations made in this
judgment pertain exclusively to the lack of prima
facie material against Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and
shall not influence the trial or the assessment of
evidence as against the remaining accused persons.
V. There shall be no order as to costs. VI. All connected applications are disposed of. VII. A copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the
Learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court, Sealdah,
South 24-Parganas immediately for necessary
compliance and for inclusion in the record of G.R.
Case No. 2655 of 2023.
VIII. The Trial Court Record (TCR), if any, shall be sent
down to the Trial Court, at once.
IX. Case diary, if any, be returned forthwith.
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CRR 619 OF 2025
8.3. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all
requisite formalities.
(Uday Kumar, J.)
