Chattisgarh High Court
Mohommad Baks vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 26 May, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1
SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR
ALI
Digitally
signed by
SYED
2026:CGHC:23475-DB
ROSHAN
ZAMIR ALI NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1471 of 2026
1. Mohommad Baks S/o Sameed Ansari Aged About 38 Years
R/o Village - Anirudhpur Police Station - Ramchandrapur
Distt- Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Police
Station Ramchandrapur Distt- Balrampur- Ramanujganj
(C.G.)
2. Khileshwar Ram S/o Budheshwar Ram Aged About 33 Years
R/o Village- Prem Nagar Police Station Karondha Distt-
Balrampur- Ramanujganj (C.G.)
... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. Amarnath Pandey, Advocate
For Respondents : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General
DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J
& Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bibhu Datta Guru, J
Order on Board
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
26.05.2026
1. Petitioner has invoked inherent jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
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for short ‘BNSS’) seeking quashment of charge sheet
No.25/2025 filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1 st
Class Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj in
connection with FIR No.3/2025 registered against the
petitioner at Police Station Ramchandrapur for the offence
punishable under Sections 331 (3), 296, 132, 174 of the
Bharatiya Nyay Sanhita, 2023 (for short ‘BNS’) Section 3 of
the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984 and
Section 7 () of the Chhattisgarh Local Authorities (Electoral
Offences) Act, 1964. Petitioner has also prayed for setting
aside of the order dated 13.10.2025 by which learned
Magistrate has taken cognizance on the final report submitted
by the police.
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that on 5.3.2025 respondent
No.2-complainant submitted a written complaint before the
concerned police station alleging that when the complainant
was engaged in the duty of panchayat election at Booth
No.115, village Ramchandrapur, 100-150 people including
petitioner herein reached there, entered the polling booth
centre while abusing them filthily, broke open two locks of
booth centre and tried to snatch election materials and
thereby they have caused obstruction in discharge of official
duty by the complainant and other government officials who
were on election duty. Based on aforesaid complaint, FIR
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bearing No.03/2025 was registered against petitioner and
100-150 others for the offence under Sections 331 (3), 296,
132, 174 of the BNS; Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage
to Public Property Act 1984 and Section 7 ([k) of the
Chhattisgarh Local Authorities (Electoral Offences) Act, 1964.
In the course of investigation, police recorded statement of
witnesses under Section 180 of BNSS (Section 161 CrPC) as
also supplementary statement and on completion of
investigation, the police submitted charge sheet on which the
concerned Court has taken cognizance on 13.10.2025
against the petitioner for the offence as aforementioned.
3. Learned counsel for petitioner would submit that petitioner
has been falsely implicated in instant crime due to political
rivalry as he is elected as a Member of Janpad Panchayat
Ramchandrapur in two consecutive terms. He submits that in
the panchayat election of 2025 petitioner has defeated the
candidate of ruling party in the State, due to which they were
annoyed with the petitioner and therefore, they colluded with
the Presiding Officer and got lodged a false complaint against
the petitioner. He submits that FIR against the petitioner is
registered with inordinate delay i.e. after 10 days from the
date of alleged incident, and despite due knowledge, delay of
10 days has not been explained by the complainant. Delay of
10 days in reporting of alleged incident, particularly when
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police station is at a distance of just 500 meter from the place
of alleged incident, clearly indicates that FIR is not a
spontaneous document but it is the result of deliberations and
afterthought.
4. He further submits that the order taking cognizance against
the petitioner is wholly illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the
settled principles in this regard, inasmuch as the learned trial
Court has failed to properly appreciate the material available
on record and has mechanically taken cognizance on the
report submitted by police without there being sufficient
ground for proceeding. He further submits that while taking
cognizance, learned trial Court has not applied its judicial
mind and failed to consider whether there exists a prima facie
case against the petitioner. Hence, the order is cryptic and
non-speaking, and does not reflect any reasoning as to how
the ingredients of the alleged offences are made out.
5. He next contended that the entire prosecution case, even if
taken at its face value and accepted in its entirety, does not
disclose the commission of any offence much less the
offences for which final report is submitted. Hence, it is
prayed that the charge sheet No.25/2025 submitted against
the petitioner and all subsequent proceedings initiated
thereon be quashed.
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6. On the other hand, learned State Counsel opposing
submissions of learned counsel for petitioner, would submit
that present petition seeking quashment of FIR, charge-sheet
and the order taking cognizance on final report, is wholly
misconceived and not maintainable in law. FIR against the
petitioner is registered based on written complaint lodged by
the Presiding Officer engaged in panchayat election duty.
After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed
before the competent Court and learned trial Court has rightly
taken cognizance after due consideration of material available
before it and after due application of mind. He also submits
that factual controversy cannot be considered at this moment.
FIR and the outcome of investigation, prima facie disclose the
commission of cognizable offences. At this stage, meticulous
appreciation of evidence or adjudication on disputed facts is
impermissible. Hence, the petition is liable to be dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents filed along with petition.
8. Upon a perusal of the FIR and material placed on record, this
Court finds that there are clear and specific allegations
attributable to petitioner about causing hindrance in
performance of official duty by the complainant and others,
who were on election duty. It is specifically mentioned in the
complaint that petitioner along with 100-150 persons broke
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open locks, entered Polling Booth No.115 of village
Ramchandrapur, hurled filthy abuses at the government
officials, who were on election duty and also tried to snatch
election materials. Statement of witnesses is also recorded by
police under Section 180 of BNSS and thereafter police
submitted final report before learned Magistrate. Thus, there
is prima facie material against the petitioner that he had tried
to obstruct the complainant from doing his official duty.
9. This Court while hearing the matter under Section 528 BNSS
at the initial stage of proceedings, cannot examine
genuineness of statement, allegations made in FIR in
question. In case of Teeja Devi vs. State of Rajasthan,
reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221 Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held as under :
“5. It has been rightly submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellant that ordinarily power under
Section 482 CrPC should not be used to quash an
FIR because that amounts to interfering with the
statutory power of the police to investigate a
cognizable offence in accordance with the
provisions of CrPC. As per law settled by a catena
of judgments, if the allegations made in the FIR
prima facie disclose a cognizable offence,
interference with the investigation is not proper and
it can be done only in the rarest of rare cases where
the court is satisfied that the prosecution is
malicious and vexatious.”
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10. In case at hand, though submission is made by learned
counsel for petitioner of false implication, however, upon
perusal of the documents enclosed along with the petition, it
is apparent that the complainant is a Presiding Officer of
Polling Booth No.115. He is a government servant holding
post of Lecturer. Other employees engaged in election duty
along with complainant are also Teachers. Statement of Cook
of Anganbadi Centre is also recorded under Section 180 of
BNSS. Upon going through the entire material at this stage,
we are unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for
petitioner that the report lodged against him is vexatious. It is
subject-matter of evidence.
11. So far as submission of learned counsel for petitioner that
incident is dated 23.2.2025 and FIR was lodged on 5.3.2025
with delay, is concerned, it cannot be overlooked that
complainant is a government servant, he was deputed in
election duty as Presiding Officer of Polling Booth No.115 of
village Ramchandrapur. In written complaint, there is mention
that due to act of petitioner and other group of persons, they
became afraid and have intimated the police of Police Station
Ramchandrapur and the Zonal Officer, upon which the Police
and Zonal Officer came there and intervened. In the facts of
the case and nature of allegation, ground of delay is to be
appreciated by learend trial Court after recording of evidence
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in a trial where petitioner will have an opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses on that point also. In the given facts
of the case and nature of allegations, we do not find it
appropriate to accept said ground raised on behalf of
petitioner for quashment of criminal proceedings at this stage.
12. In case of State of Haryana and others vs Bhajanlal and
others, reported in (1992) Supp (1) 335, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has laid down the guidelines for exercising inherent
powers under Section 482 CrPC, corresponding to Section
528 of BNSS, which are as follows:-
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise
of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety
9do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under
an order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6). Where there is an express legal bar en-grafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
10providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to
private and personal grudge.
103. We also given a note of caution to the effect that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and
that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act
according to its whim or caprice.”
13. In case of Madan Razak v State of Bihar and others,
reported in (2015) 16 SCC 269, Hon’ble Supreme Court while
considering the ground raised for recording statement of
witnesses under Section 161 CrPC with delay, has observed
thus”-
“10. It is not necessary for us to evaluate the
statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The only
question to be determined is, whether the
statements disclosed a prima facie case, leading to
an offence triable under the provisions of the Indian
Penal Code. We are of the considered view, that it is
11not possible for us to overlook the statements of the
witnesses recorded, reference to some of which, has
been indicated in the instant order. The reason for
the delayed recording of statements is also disclosed
in the daily diary report. The evaluation of the truth or
falsity thereof, will be possible only after evidence is
recorded, in the matter. At the present juncture to
quash the proceedings initiated against the accused
by quashing the summoning order dated 6.4.2011 in
exercise of the power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is clearly not made out.
12. Since prima facie, commission of offences under
the Indian Penal Code, are shown to be emerging
from the statements of witnesses recorded (as is
apparent from the order dated 6.4.2011 passed by
the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rosera), we
are satisfied, that the impugned order dated
26.08.2013, passed by the High Court deserves to
be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set
aside.”
14. In case of Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka and
another, reported in (2022) 2 SCC 129, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has observed that the High Court while exercising the
powers under Section 482 of CrPC (corresponding to Section
528 of BNSS), does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically
laid down in the section itself. It is further observed that when
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no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine
the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it
is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the
report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even
if the allegations are accepted in toto. The High Court, under
Section 482 CrPC, should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy.
15. In case of Amish Devgan Vs. Union of India, reported in
(2021) 1 SCC 1, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that
quashing of FIR can only be in exceptional circumstances
and some of the exceptional circumstances are held to be
where manifestly there is some legal bar against institution or
continuation of prosecution; where allegations made even if
taken at face value do not constitute any offence; allegations
made do not constitute cognizable offence and allegations
made are so absurd and improbable that any prudent person
can ever reach to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against accused. In case at hand, apart from
raising above grounds, counsel for petitioner could not able to
show at this stage that allegations are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against petitioner.
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16. In case of Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh
and others, reported in (2023) 18 SCC 399, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed that as per cardinal principle of
law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of criminal
proceedings, while exercising the inherent powers, the Court
is not required to conduct a mini trial. Relevant portion of the
said decision is quoted herein below for ready reference:-
“6. From the impugned common judgment and order
[Aryan Singh v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4158]
passed by the High Court, it appears that the High
Court has dealt with the proceedings before it, as if,
the High Court was conducting a mini trial and/or the
High Court was considering the applications against
the judgment and order passed by the learned trial
court on conclusion of trial. As per the cardinal
principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or
quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising
the powers under Section 482 CrPC, the Court is not
required to conduct the mini trial. The High Court in the
common impugned judgment and order has observed
that the charges against the accused are not proved.
This is not the stage where the
prosecution/investigating agency is/are required to
prove the charges. The charges are required to be
proved during the trial on the basis of the evidence led
by the prosecution/investigating agency.
7. Therefore, the High Court has materially erred in
going in detail in the allegations and the material
collected during the course of the investigation against
the accused, at this stage. At the stage of discharge
14and/or while exercising the powers under Section
482CrPC, the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and
is required to consider “whether any sufficient material
is available to proceed further against the accused for
which the accused is required to be tried or not.”
17. From the above quoted decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court,
it is clear that at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of
criminal proceedings, it is not for the High Court to conduct
mini trial and evaluate evidence. It is only for the trial Court to
consider. The High Court has to only consider whether there
is prima facie material or not. In the present case, the
allegations made in the FIR; the material collected during
investigation and submitted along with final report, do
disclose prima facie commission of offences and the matter
requires adjudication on evidence during trial.
18. Thus in view of facts and circumstances of present case,
material available in record and in light of above decisions of
Hon’ble Supreme Court, we do not find any good ground to
quash FIR, charge sheet and order dated 13.10.2025 taking
cognizance on final report submitted by police against
petitioner.
19. For the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in this
petition, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) (Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge Judge
r/-
