Karnataka High Court
Mohideen Adnan vs State By on 17 July, 2026
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
-1-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF JULY, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 10523 OF 2026
BETWEEN:
1. MOHIDEEN ADNAN,
S/O ABUBAKAR,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
5-51 (11), AMEMAR HOUSE,
AMEMAR ROAD,
AMEMAR PUDU VILLAGE,
BANTWAL, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
KARNATAKA 574143.
MOB: 9096889593.
2. HARSH,
S/O ABUBAKAR,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
5-51 (11), AMEMAR HOUSE,
Digitally signed AMEMAR ROAD,
by AMEMAR PUDU VILLAGE,
PADMAVATHI B
K BANTWAL, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
Location: High KARNATAKA 574143.
Court of
Karnataka MOB: 9096889593.
3. MOHAMMAD MANSOOR,
S/O IBRAHIM,
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS,
R/O #5-51/3, AMMEMMAR HOUSE,
PUDU VILLAGE, BANTWAL,
FARANGIPET,
BANTWAL, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
KARNATAKA-574143.
-2-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
4. ABDUL LATHIF,
S/O IBRAHIM,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS,
5-51/3 (11), AMEMAR PUDU VILLAGE,
FARANGIPETE BANTWAL,
PO: FARANGIPETE, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
KARNATAKA 574143.
5. YASEER MUHAMMAD HANEEF,
S/O A MUHAMMAD HANEEF,
AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS,
5-122 (1), AMEMAR HOUSE PUDU,
BANTWAL, DAKSHINA KANNADA,
KARNATAKA 574 143.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. ABDUL ANSAR P, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE BY
BANTWALA RURAL POLICE STATION,
DAKSHINA KANNADA,
REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING, BANGALORE.
2. RAHYAN ZAKARIYA,
S/O RIYAZ AHAMMAD,
AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS,
KARBALA CROSS ROAD,
KUDROLI, MANGALORE,
DAKSHINA KANNADA, KARNATAKA.
[AS PER THE FIR]
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. NAGESHWARAPPA, HCGP FOR R-1;
SMT. SAIRA K. ZUBAIR, ADVOCATE FOR R-2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528
BNSS) TO ALLOW THE ABOVE CRIMINAL PETITION AND QUASH
THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT IN CRIME NO.98/2026
-3-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
DATED 23.06.2026 REGISTERED BY THE BANTWAL RURAL
POLICE STATION, DAKSHINA KANNADA, FOR THE OFFENCES
P/U/S 352, 351(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 49 AND 190 OF THE
BNS, 2023, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 1ST ADDITIONAL
CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, BANTWAL.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY,
ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
ORAL ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court seeking the following
prayers:
“a) Allow the above Criminal Petition and quash the First
Information Report in Crime No.98/2026 dated
23.06.2026 registered by the Bantwal Rural Police
Station, Dakshina Kannada, for the offences punishable
under Sections 352, 351(2), 115(2), 118(1), 109, 49
and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, pending
on the file of the 1st Additional Civil Judge and JMFC,
Bantwal, in the interest of justice and equity;
b) Pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court
may deem fit, just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case, including in the interest of
justice and equity.”
2. Heard Sri.Abdul Ansar P, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners, Sri. K.Nageshwarappa, learned HCGP
-4-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
appearing for respondent No.1, Smt. Saira K. Zubair, learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the
material on record.
3. Though the offences is the one punishable under
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, the facts in the case at
hand is that the second respondent-Complainant was alleged
taken by the petitioners in an auto-rickshaw from Thumbe Bus
Stand to an empty shed situated at Ammemar, Pudu Village,
Bantwal Taluk. The dispute arose in connection with a female
relative of the petitioners during a college excursion. It is
alleged that when the complainant refused to show the
photographs, the petitioners assaulted him with wooden sticks,
caused simple injuries, abused him in filthy language, criminally
intimidated him and thereafter petitioner No.3 allegedly
attempted to assault him with a sword, resulting in an injury to
his left shoulder. The wound certificate indicates that injuries
are simple in nature. Now the parties to the lis have settled the
dispute amongst themselves and have filed the Joint Affidavit in
that regard, which reads as follows:
-5-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
"Joint Affidavit
“1. We state that the petitioners are arrayed as Accused
Nos.1 to 5 in Crime No.98/2026 registered by Bantwal
Rural Police Station, Dakshina Kannada, for the offences
punishable under Sections 352, 351(2), 115(2), 118(1),
109, 49 and 190 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
2. We state that the above crime came to be registered
pursuant to a complaint lodged by Respondent No.2 arising
out of a personal dispute and misunderstanding between
the parties.
3. We state that the allegations in the complaint are that
on 22.06.2026 at about 10.40 a.m., Respondent
No.2/complainant was allegedly taken by the petitioners in
an auto-rickshaw from Thumbe Bus Stand to an empty
shed situated at Ammemar, Pudu Village, Bantwal Taluk, in
connection with certain photographs allegedly taken by the
complainant with a female relative of the petitioners during
a college excursion. It is alleged that when the
complainant refused to show the said photographs, the
petitioners assaulted him with wooden sticks, caused
simple injuries, abused him in filthy language, criminally
intimidated him and that Petitioner No.3 allegedly
attempted to assault him with a sword, resulting in an
injury to the left shoulder of the complainant while he
allegedly escaped from the spot. We state that the said
allegations gave rise to the registration of Crime
No.98/2026. We further state that the parties have now
amicably resolved all their disputes and differences and
have voluntarily decided to put an end to the litigation.
4. We respectfully submit that with the intervention of
elders, relatives, friends and well-wishers, all the disputes
and misunderstandings between us have been amicably
resolved. The settlement has been arrived at voluntarily,
without any force, coercion, undue influence or pressure
from any person.
5. We state that Respondent No.2 has no grievance
whatsoever against any of the petitioners and has no
-6-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
objection for quashing the FIR in Crime No.98/2026 dated
23.06.2026 registered by Bantwal Rural Police Station and
all further proceedings arising therefrom.
6. We further state that Respondent No.2 does not intend
to prosecute the complaint any further and has voluntarily
consented to the quashing of the criminal proceedings
pending against the petitioners.
7. We state that continuation of the criminal proceedings,
despite the amicable settlement, would serve no useful
purpose and would only result in unnecessary hardship to
both parties. Since the dispute is purely personal in nature,
continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse
of the process of law.
8. We further state that we have no surviving claims,
demands or grievances against each other in relation to
the subject matter of the complaint and all disputes
between us have been amicably settled.
9. We therefore respectfully pray that this Hon’ble Court
may kindly take this Joint Affidavit on record and be
pleased to allow the Criminal Petition by quashing the
FIR in Crime No.98/2026 dated 23.06.2026 registered by
Bantwal Rural Police Station, Dakshina Kannada, and all
further proceedings arising therefrom, in the interest of
justice and equity.”
4. Since the injuries are simple in nature, it would not
attract the ingredients of Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.
In an identical issue, the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
MADHYA PRADESH VS. LAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS1,
has held as follows:
1
(2019) 5 SCC 688
-7-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026CNR: KAHC010490132026
“12. Now so far as the decision of this Court
in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] is concerned,
this Court in para 29.6 admitted that the offences under
Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and
serious offences and therefore are to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. However, this Court further observed
that the High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR
or the charge is framed. Its further corroboration with
the medical evidence or other evidence is to be seen,
which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the
decision in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] shall
be of no assistance to the accused in the present case.
13. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the
decision of this Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10
SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] , while quashing the
FIR by observing that as the complainant has
compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of
recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be
an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion
that the High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR
on the aforesaid ground. It appears that the High Court
has misread or misapplied the said decision to the facts
of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have
appreciated that it is not in every case where the
complainant has entered into a compromise with the
accused, there may not be any conviction. Such
observations are presumptive and many a time too early
to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the
prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent
evidence and examining the other witnesses and the
relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the
dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil
nature and/or is not a private wrong.
In Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1
SCC (Cri) 101] , this Court found that the case had its
origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which
dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court
observed that: (SCC p. 713, para 19)
-8-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
“19. … that being so, continuance of the prosecution
where the complainant is not ready to support the
allegations … will be a futile exercise that will serve no
purpose.”
In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed
“that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however,
closely related to the complainant, were not supporting
the prosecution version”, and to that this Court observed
and held that the continuance of the proceedings is
nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 CrPC
can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the
High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and
thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts
below. Even in the said decision, in para 18, it is
observed as under: (Shiji case [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011)
10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] , SCC p. 713)
“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the
plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the
same with utmost care and caution. The width and the
nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is
sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for
reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that
continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an
abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor
proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the
exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All
that we need to say is that the exercise of power must
be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases
where refusal to exercise that power may result in the
abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be
justified in declining interference if it is called upon to
appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an
appellate court while dealing with a petition under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to
the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts
and circumstances of each case to determine whether it
is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be
invoked.”
Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a
case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the
parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the
-9-
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
offence is not against the society at large and/or the
same may not have social impact; the dispute is a
family/matrimonial dispute, etc. The aforesaid decision
may not be applicable in a case where the offences
alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a
social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC.
Therefore, without proper application of mind to the
relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High
Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the
FIR, by observing that in view of the compromise, there
are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further
trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has
mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this
Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] , without considering the
relevant facts and circumstances of the case.
14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions
of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54]
and Shambhu Kewat [State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu
Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781] is
concerned, in Shambhu Kewat [State of
Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 :
(2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781] , this Court has noted the
difference between the power of compounding of
offences conferred on a court under Section 320 CrPC
and the powers conferred under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In
the said decision, this Court further observed that in
compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court
is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section
320 CrPC and the court is guided solely and squarely
thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing criminal
proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482
CrPC is guided by the material on record as to whether
ends of justice would justify such exercise of power,
although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent
decision in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] , the
very Bench ultimately concluded in para 29 as under:
(SCC pp. 482-84)
– 10 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up
and lay down the following principles by which the High
Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to
the settlement between the parties and exercising its
power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the
Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the
Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High
Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter
between themselves. However, this power is to be
exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement
and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form
an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the
offences alleged to have been committed under special
statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in
that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have
resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
– 11 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases
would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
are to be generally treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High
Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the
body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in
respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be
the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie
analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there
is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it
can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the
criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would
be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be
swayed by the fact that the settlement between the
parties is going to result in harmony between them
which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the
settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still under
investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting
the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason
that at this stage the investigation is still on and even
– 12 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet
to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High
Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other
hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete
or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
the stage of argument, normally the High Court should
refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of
the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits and to come
to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section
307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases
where the conviction is already recorded by the trial
court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the
High Court, mere compromise between the parties would
not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal
of the offender who has already been convicted by the
trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC
and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime
and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict
found guilty of such a crime.”
15. Considering the law on the point and the other
decisions of this Court on the point, referred to
hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-
compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code
can be exercised having overwhelmingly and
predominantly the civil character, particularly those
arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the
parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society;
– 13 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for
the offences under the special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that capacity are not
to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms
Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious
offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual alone, and
therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under
Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a
serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in
exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the
ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not
rest its decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC
is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is
inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the
High Court would be permissible only after the evidence
is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is
filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such
exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras
29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder
Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC
466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5 [Ed.: Para 15.5 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./22/2019 dated 3-4-
2019.] . While exercising the power under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect
of non-compoundable offences, which are private in
nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on
– 14 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
the ground that there is a settlement/compromise
between the victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the
conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused
was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had
managed with the complainant to enter into a
compromise, etc.”
16. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the
High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the
offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically
and even when the investigation was under progress.
Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a
compromise with the complainant and sought quashing
of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The allegations
are serious in nature. He used the firearm also in
commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the
offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all
considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a
settlement between the accused and the complainant,
the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which
is not sustainable in the eye of the law. The High Court
has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused.
17. In view of the above and for the reasons stated,
the present appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment
and order dated 7-10-2013 passed by the High Court
in Laxmi Narayan v. State of M.P. [Laxmi
Narayan v. State of M.P., 2013 SCC OnLine MP 7987] is
hereby quashed and set aside, and the
FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded
against the accused, and they shall be dealt with, in
accordance with law.”
5. The Apex Court considers whether offence under
section 307 of IPC could be accepted and closed on a
compromise. The Apex Court holds that the injuries should be
seen and injuries seen in the case at hand depict that they are
simple in nature.
– 15 –
HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:36909
CRL.P No. 10523 of 2026
CNR: KAHC010490132026
6. The injury sustained by the complainant is said to
be simple in nature. Therefore, the wound certificate would
depict that the injuries are simple in nature.
7. In that light, there would be no impediment for this
Court to close the proceedings by accepting the settlement
between the parties.
8. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Criminal Petition is disposed.
(ii) Proceedings in Crime No.98/2026 pending before
the 1st Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Bantwal,
stands quashed, qua the petitioners.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
CBC
List No.: 4 Sl No.: 4
