Chattisgarh High Court
Mohd. Izrail vs Shri Amolak Singh Bhatiya on 14 May, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
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SYED
ROSHAN
ZAMIR
ALI
Digitally 2026:CGHC:23061-DB
signed by
SYED AFR
ROSHAN
ZAMIR ALI
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WP227 No. 287 of 2024
1. Mohd. Izrail S/o Raza Khan Aged About 45 Years R/o
Vinobha Nagar, Street No. 2, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner
versus
1. Shri Amolak Singh Bhatiya S/o Late Harvansh Singh Bhatiya
R/o Dayalband, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (CG)
... Respondent
For Petitioner : Mr. J.K. Gupta, Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Waquar Naiyer, Advocate
DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu,J
& Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sachin Singh Rajput, j
Order on Board
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
14.05.2026
1. Present writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by petitioner, who is aggrieved by the
order dated 20.02.2024, Annexure P-4, by which the
Chhattisgarh Rent Control Tribunal, Raipur (for short ‘the
Tribunal’) has dismissed the application for condoning delay
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in filing appeal against the order dated 28.7.2023 passed by
the Rent Control Authority, Bilaspur in Case No.32/A-90
(7)/2022-23 and consequently dismissed appeal also.
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that respondent filed an
application under Section 12 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control
Act 2011 (for short ‘the Act of 2011’) seeking eviction of
petitioner herein from the premises in question and arrears of
rent. Upon receipt of summons, petitioner appeared before
the Rent Control Authority through his counsel and filed reply.
Based on pleadings of the parties, issues were framed on
3.4.2023 and thereafter the case was fixed for recording of
evidence of the parties. However, petitioner or counsel
engaged by him stopped appearing thereafter and
accordingly, an ex-parte order was passed against the
petitioner on 28.7.2023. On 20.9.2023, petitioner filed an
appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 along with an
application for condonation of delay on the ground that he
came to know about eviction order only upon service of notice
of execution proceeding. The Tribunal dismissed the
application for condonation of delay as also appeal on the
ground that the same is barred by limitation recording that
petitioner was aware of the proceeding since before,
therefore, reason assigned for condoning the delay in filing
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appeal that he came to know for the first time about the case
on 14.09.2023, is not proper.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
petitioner was not having knowledge of the impugned order
dated 28.7.2023 passed ex-parte. Petitioner came to know
about the eviction order for the first time when, notice of
execution proceeding initiated by respondent was received by
him. Just after knowledge of order of eviction, petitioner
immediately filed the appeal as well as application for
condoning delay. However, learned Tribunal disbelieved the
reason assigned for condoning delay by adopting a very rigid
approach and rejected application of petitioner seeking
condonation of delay as also the appeal.
He submits that present is not the case where petitioner
avoided service of eviction proceeding or after service of
notice has avoided the Court. Rather, after service of notice
of eviction proceeding, petitioner caused his appearance,
engaged a counsel and submitted reply also, which show
petitioner’s intention to defend the case. Therefore, it cannot
be said that delay occurred in filing appeal is deliberate or on
account of negligence on the part of petitioner. He further
submits that the pleadings in an application for condonation of
delay are required to be interpreted liberally and in a justice-
oriented manner, the Courts should examine the substance
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and bona fides of the explanation offered for delay caused
rather than adopt a pedantic or hyper-technical approach. In
these circumstances, the Tribunal ought to have condoned
the delay in preferring appeal, which is not inordinate.
4. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent supports the impugned order and opposes
submissions made by learned counsel for petitioner. He
submits that the absence of the petitioner was willful in nature
just to avoid passing of decree of eviction against him.
Petitioner is duty bound to explain the delay of each and
every day and from the contents of application for
condonation of delay it is clear that petitioner did not properly
explain the delay caused even after 14.09.2023. The Tribunal
has assigned just and proper reason for rejecting the
application for condonation of delay, which does not call for
interference.
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents available in record of writ petition.
6. From perusal of record it is noticed that after service of notice
of application for eviction, petitioner appeared before the Rent
Control Authority, engaged the counsel namely Shri Raj
Kamal Kaushik, Advocate who filed vakalatnama on behalf of
petitioner-tenant on 8.12.2022 and thereafter reply on
28.2.2023. Petitioner-tenant was proceeded ex-parte on
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12.7.2023 as on previous dates of hearing neither petitioner
nor the counsel engaged by him appeared. Thereafter on
28.7.2023 ex-parte eviction order was passed against
petitioner under Section 12 of the Act of 2011. Said order was
appealable under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 and there was
a limitation of 30 days in filing appeal as per Rule 10 of the
Chhattisgarh Rent Control Adaptation Rules, 2016. Petitioner
filed appeal on 20.9.2023 i.e. after 21 days of the period of
limitation, and reason assigned for condoning such delay is
that petitioner was not aware about passing of the impugned
order and came to know about the same only on 14.9.2023
when notice of eviction proceeding was received by him. The
Tribunal vide order impugned rejected the application for
condonation of delay and consequent thereto appeal being
barred by time recording that petitioner though aware of the
eviction proceeding but submitted false affidavit that he came
to know about the case on 14.09.2023, therefore, the reason
assigned for condoning the delay is not proper and as such,
petitioner failed to offer sufficient reason.
7. In view of above, the question that falls for consideration is
whether learned Tribunal was justified in refusing to condone
the delay in filing the appeal.
8. In case of Vedabai alias Vaijyanatabai Baburao Patil vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, reported in (2001) 9
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SCC 106 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that pragmatic
attitude should be adopted by Courts and liberal approach is
required while considering application for condonation of
delay and distinction is made between cases in which delay is
inordinate, thus giving rise to question of prejudice to the
other side and the cases where delay is of a few days only.
9. In case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh
and others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 786, Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held that unless mala-fides are writ large on
conduct of the party, as a normal rule delay should be
condoned. It has further been held that attempt should always
be made to allow the matter to be contested on merits rather
than throw it out on technicalities and each case is to be
weighed on its facts and circumstances.
10. In case of S. Ganeshraju (Dead) through L.Rs and another
Vs. Narasamma (Dead) through L.Rs and others reported
in (2013) 11 SCC 341, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus:
“12.The expression “sufficient
cause” as
appearing in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice.
Unless the respondents are able to show mala fides in
not approaching the court within the period of limitation,
generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned.
The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter
with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more
towards condoning delay and directing the parties to
7contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such
technicalities have been given a go-by.
13] The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or
foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see
that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek
their remedy promptly.
14] We are aware of the fact that refusal to condone
delay would result in foreclosing the suitor from putting
forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in
approaching the court is always deliberate. In fact, it is
always just, fair and appropriate that matters should be
heard on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice
at the threshold. Since sufficient cause has not been
defined, thus, the courts are left to exercise a discretion
to come to the conclusion whether circumstances exist
establishing sufficient cause. The only guiding principle
to be seen is whether a party has acted with reasonable
diligence and had not been negligent and callous in the
prosecution of the matter……”
11. In the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others,
reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon’ble Supreme Court while
summarizing the principles applicable while dealing with
application for condonation of delay, has observed thus;:-
“21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that
can broadly be culled out are:
21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
with an application for condonation of delay, for
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the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice
but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2 The terms “sufficient cause” should be
understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and
purpose regard being had to the fact that these
terms are basically elastic and are to be applied
in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and
pivotal the technical considerations should not be
given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4 No presumption can be attached to
deliberate causation of delay but, gross
negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is
to be taken note of.
21.5 Lack of bona fides imputable to a party
seeking condonation of delay is a significant and
relevant fact.
21.6 It is to be kept in mind that adherence to
strict proof should not affect public justice and
cause public mischief because the courts are
required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7 The concept of liberal approach has to
encapsule the conception of reasonableness and
it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8 There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days,
for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That
apart, the first one warrants strict approach
whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It
is so as the fundamental principle is that the
courts are required to weigh the scale of balance
of justice in respect of both parties and the said
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principle cannot be given a total go by in the
name of liberal approach.
21.10 If the explanation offered is concocted or
the grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11 It is to be borne in mind that no one gets
away with fraud, misrepresentation or
interpolation by taking recourse to the
technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12 The entire gamut of facts are to be
carefully scrutinized and the approach should be
based on the paradigm of judicial discretion
which is founded on objective reasoning and not
on individual perception.
21.13 The State or a public body or an entity
representing a collective cause should be given
some acceptable latitude.”
12. On a conspectus reading of the above principles set out in
above decisions, it is clear that a liberal approach should be
extended while considering the application for condonation of
delay as refusal to condone the delay may result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. However, while adopting
liberal approach, Court cannot ignore the principle of law that
law comes to rescue only diligent litigants. It is also clear to
the effect that it is not the number of days of delays that
matters, but the conduct, behaviour and attitude of the party
which caused the delay. Substantial justice being paramount
and pivotal, the technical considerations should not be given
undue and uncalled for emphasis.
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13. In case at hand, as noticed above, after service of notice of
eviction proceeding, petitioner put in appearance, engaged a
counsel to defend the proceeding of eviction filed against him
and also filed reply to application for eviction, however, the
petitioner was proceeded ex-parte and ex-parte order of
eviction was passed against him. It is also evident from the
order sheets of the Rent Control Authority that no notice was
issued/sent to petitioner before passing ex-parte order.
Petitioner getting knowledge of ex-parte order of eviction
when notice of execution proceeding was served upon him,
filed an appeal along with application for condonation of
delay, within 06 days of knowledge, through another counsel.
Thus, it can be safely inferred that the petitioner was not
careless or negligent in prosecuting the eviction proceeding.
14. There is no quarrel on the point that the pleadings are hand-
work of the lawyers and therefore, while interpreting
pleadings, the real intention of the parties will have to be seen
rather than adopting a hyper-technical approach based on
drafting imperfections. In case at hand also, the application
for condonation of delay might not be drafted eloquently or
articulately, but the real intention of the petitioner to contest
the case on merits can be gathered from steps taken by him
while prosecuting eviction proceeding, as discussed above.
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15. In view of the above, we are of the considered view that the
Tribunal erred in mechanically dismissing the application for
condonation of delay as also appeal on the ground that the
same is barred by limitation. In the considered opinion of this
Court, petitioner deserves opportunity to contest the case on
merits.
16. Resultantly, present writ petition is allowed. Impugned order
dated 20.02.2024 (Annexure P-4) passed by the learned Rent
Control Tribunal, Raipur is hereby set aside. Delay in filing
appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2011 before the Rent
Control Tribunal is condoned and the appeal is restored. The
Rent Control Tribunal is directed to decide the appeal on
merits, as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law
after providing opportunity of hearing to both the parties.
Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on
03.06.2026.
17. Record be sent back forthwith.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge Judge
roshan/-
