Mohan Naik vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026

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    Karnataka High Court

    Mohan Naik vs The State Of Karnataka on 13 March, 2026

                                        Crl.A.No.824 of 2023
    
                                                               R
    
           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
    
               DATED THIS THE 13TH DAY OF MARCH 2026
    
                             PRESENT
    
               THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G BASAVARAJA
    
                CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 824 OF 2023
    
    BETWEEN:
    
    1.     MOHAN NAIK
           S/O GOVINDA NAIK,
           NOW AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
           R/O AMMANAPURA,
           AVVERAHALLI POST,
           KAILANCH HOBLI,
           RAMANAGARA TALUK.
           RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159
           [Now in Judicial Custody]
    
    2.     APPU NAIK
           S/O VINOD KUMAR,
           NOW AGED ABOUT 23 YEARS,
           R/O AMMANAPURA,
           AVVERAHALLI POST,
           KAILANCH HOBLI,
           RAMANAGARA TALUK.
           RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159
           [Now in Judicial Custody]
    
                                                 ...APPELLANTS
    (BY SRI K.A. CHANDRASHEKARA, ADVOCATE)
    
    AND:
    
    1.     THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
           BY RAMANAGARA WOMEN POLICE STATION
                                  2        Crl.A. No.824 of 2023
    
    
    
    
          RAMANAGARA-562159.
          REPTD BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
          HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
          BENGALURU-560001.
    
    2.    M/S. GOWRI BAI
          W/O MANJU NAIK
          R/O AMMANAPURA
          AVVVERAHALLI POST
          KAILANCH HOBLI,
          RAMANAGARA TALUK.
          RAMANAGARA DISTRICT-562159
    
          AMENDED AS PER ORDER DATED 29.07.2025
    
                                                   ...RESPONDENT
    (BY SRI B. LAKSHMAN, HCGP FOR R1;
     R2 SERVED, UNREPRESETED)
    
         THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2)
    OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE
    THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
    DATED 28-03-2023/31-03-2023 PASSED IN S.C. NO.26/2022 BY
    THE III ADDL., DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE RAMANAGARA
    CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS HEREIN FOR THE OFFENCE
    PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 376-D IPC; AND ETC.
    
          THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
    ON 18.02.2026, COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS,
    THIS DAY, THE COURT, DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
    
                         CAV JUDGMENT
    

    1. The appellants prefer this appeal under Section 374(2) of

    the Code of Criminal Procedure, aggrieved by the judgment of

    SPONSORED

    conviction and order on sentence dated 28th/31st March, 2023,
    3 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    passed in SC No.26 of 2022 by the III Additional District and

    Sessions Judge, Ramanagara convicting the appellants for the

    offence under sections 376-D IPC and sentenced them to undergo

    25 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-

    each in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple

    imprisonment for one year.

    2. In the present judgment, I would like to withhold the name

    of the victim lady in view of the provisions of Section 228A IPC

    and in pursuance of the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court

    in STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. SHREE KANTH SHEKARI (AIR

    2004 SC 4404). The prosecutrix hereinafter referred to as “the

    victim”.

    3. The facts, as unfolded by the prosecution, in short

    conspectus, is that on 16.06.2021 at about 5.30 p.m., the accused

    Nos.1 and 2 are alleged to have visited the house of C.W.1, the

    victim. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused were

    under the influence of alcohol at the relevant point of time,

    immediately upon entering the house, they are stated to have

    bolted the main door from inside and closed the windows, thereby
    4 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    preventing any possibility of outside intervention. Both the

    accused, having common intention, committed forcible sexual

    intercourse upon the victim one after the other, thereby attracting

    the offence punishable under Section 376D of the Indian Penal

    Code. Further, the accused attempted to strangulate the victim,

    thereby causing injuries and committing an act amounting to an

    offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code.

    4. During the course of investigation, the statement of the

    victim was recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal

    Procedure before the jurisdictional Magistrate on 21.06.2021. The

    accused were apprehended and remanded to judicial custody.

    Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer laid the

    charge sheet before the Court of the Principal Senior Civil Judge

    and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanagara, which, after taking

    cognizance of the offences, committed the matter to the Court of

    Sessions by order dated 08.02.2022. Upon receipt of the

    committal records, the Sessions Court secured the presence of the

    accused and, after hearing both sides, framed charges against

    accused Nos.1 and 2 for the offences punishable under Sections
    5 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    376D and 307 of the Indian Penal Code on 17.11.2022. The

    accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

    5. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the

    prosecution examined in all 20 witnesses as PWs1 to 20, marked

    Exs.P1 to P30 and eight material objects as MOs.1 to 8. After

    closure of the prosecution evidence, the statements of the

    accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were

    recorded, wherein the incriminating circumstances appearing

    against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses were

    put to them. The accused denied all such circumstances as false.

    Further the accused No.1 has stated that, £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀİè AiÀiÁgÀÆ

    ¨ÁrUÉUÉ E®è. £Á£ÀÄ Hj£À°èzÁÝUÀ ¥ÉÆÃ°ÃgÀÄ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV ºÉÆqÉzÀgÀÄ.

    7-8 ¥ÉÃ¥Àj£À°è ¸À» ºÁQ¹PÉÆAqÀgÀÄ. £Á£ÀÄ AiÀiÁgÀ ªÉÄÃ&ÉAiÀÄÆ PÀA¥ÉèAmï

    PÉÆnÖ®è. The accused No.2 has stated that, £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀİèzÁÝUÀ

    ¥ÉÆÃ°Ã¸ÀgÀÄ PÀgÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀÄ ºÉÆÃV 2 ¢ªÀ¸À ºÉÆqÉzÀgÀÄ, SÁ° ¥ÉÃ¥Àgï ªÉÄÃ&É ¸À»

    ºÁQ¹PÉÆAqÀgÀÄ. They did not choose to adduce any defence

    evidence.

    6 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    6. The trial court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties

    and after scrutinizing and assessing the evidence on record,

    convicted and sentenced the appellants herein for the offence

    punishable under Section 376-D IPC and sentenced them to

    undergo 25 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of

    Rs.1,00,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to undergo

    simple imprisonment for one year and has acquitted for the

    offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Being aggrieved by

    the impugned judgment of conviction and order on sentence, the

    appellants have preferred this appeal.

    Submissions of Counsel for the Accused/Appellants:

    7. Sri Veeranna G. Tigadi, learned counsel appearing for the

    appellants vehemently contended that the impugned judgment of

    conviction and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court is

    contrary to law, facts and probabilities of the case. It is submitted

    that the Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence

    on record in its proper perspective and has erroneously convicted

    the appellants under Section 376-D IPC.

    7 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    8. It is further submitted that the conviction is primarily based

    on the solitary testimony of PW4-victim, whose evidence,

    according to the learned counsel, is riddled with material

    contradictions and inconsistencies. Though it is a settled principle

    that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the

    prosecutrix, the same must be of sterling quality and must inspire

    confidence. In the present case, the evidence of PW-4 does not

    meet that standard.

    9. The learned counsel would draw the attention of this Court

    to the material admissions elicited in the cross-examination of

    PW-4, wherein victim has stated that victim does not know the

    accused. Victim has further deposed that victim is aged about 50-

    60 years, married, having three married sons and grandchildren.

    More importantly, victim has admitted that victim had not seen

    the faces of the persons who allegedly committed the offence and

    has even stated that the persons present before the Court are not

    the persons who committed rape on her. These admissions,

    according to the learned counsel, strike at the root of the

    prosecution case and demolish the identification of the accused.
    8 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    10. It is also contended that though PW-4 stated that her

    statement was recorded in the police station, Ex.P-3 reflects that

    written information was submitted; however, victim has not

    affixed her LTM on the said document. This discrepancy creates

    serious doubt about the very genesis of the complaint.

    11. The learned counsel further submits that the prosecution

    examined as many as 20 witnesses to prove its case. Out of them,

    PWs3, 9, 10, 14 and 15 were cited as independent witnesses to

    corroborate the testimony of PW-4. However, all these material

    witnesses have not supported the prosecution case. In the

    absence of corroboration from independent witnesses, the

    conviction solely on the shaky testimony of PW-4 is unsustainable.

    12. With regard to the medical evidence, it is contended that

    PW-13, the Doctor, has deposed that the history given was of

    “misbehavior by two persons with hands.” On examination, no

    external injuries were found on the body of PW-4; there was no

    disfigurement on her face and no signs indicative of forcible sexual

    intercourse. The learned counsel would submit that the medical

    evidence does not corroborate the allegation of gang rape. Even
    9 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    the FSL report does not support the prosecution case. There is

    also inconsistency regarding who accompanied PW-4 to the

    hospital, as the version of PW-13 is not in consonance with that of

    PW-12.

    13. It is further contended that the essential ingredients of

    Section 375 IPC have not been established, and much less the

    additional requirement under Section 376-D IPC of common

    intention and participation of more than one accused in the

    commission of gang rape. Mere use of the expression “rape” by

    PW4, without proof of the foundational facts constituting the

    offence, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction under Section 376-

    D IPC. At the highest, the allegations, even if taken at face value,

    may attract an offence under Section 354 IPC, but certainly not

    the offence of gang rape.

    14. The learned counsel would also place reliance on Exhibits P-

    30 and P31 to contend that accused No.1 had earlier lodged a

    complaint in Crime No.121/2021 before Ramanagara Rural Police

    against PWs 14 and 15 for offences under Sections 324, 504 and

    506 read with Section 34 IPC. It is submitted that due to prior
    10 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    enmity and ill-will, the appellants have been falsely implicated in

    the present case, and this aspect has not been properly

    appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge.

    15. It is further argued that the Trial Court has acquitted the

    appellants of the charge under Section 307 IPC, holding that the

    prosecution failed to prove the said offence. Having disbelieved

    the prosecution case in respect of one serious charge, the learned

    Judge ought to have exercised similar caution while appreciating

    the evidence for the charge under Section 376-D IPC.

    16. The learned counsel submits that the entire prosecution case

    is doubtful from its inception and appears to be an afterthought,

    possibly the result of deliberation and previous animosity. The

    learned Trial Judge, without extending the benefit of doubt to the

    appellants, has proceeded on presumptions and has misapplied

    the legal principles governing criminal jurisprudence.

    17. It is finally contended that in criminal law, the burden is

    always on the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable

    doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has miserably failed to
    11 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    discharge that burden. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to

    the benefit of doubt and consequent acquittal.

    Submissions on behalf of the respondent-State:

    18. Per contra, Sri B. Lakshman, learned High Court

    Government Pleader appearing for the respondent-State, would

    stoutly support the impugned judgment of conviction and order on

    sentence and contend that the same is legal, proper and based on

    sound appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record.

    19. It is submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has

    meticulously examined the entire material placed before the Court

    and has rightly come to the conclusion that the prosecution has

    proved the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt for

    the offence punishable under Section 376-D IPC.

    20. He would further contend that the evidence of PW-4, the

    victim, is natural, cogent and trustworthy. It is a settled principle

    of law that the testimony of the prosecutrix stands on par with

    that of an injured witness and, if found reliable, can form the sole

    basis for conviction without the necessity of corroboration. In the
    12 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    present case, PW-4 has clearly narrated the manner in which the

    accused came to her house and committed the offence. Nothing

    substantial has been elicited in her cross-examination to discredit

    her core version regarding the commission of the offence.

    21. It is further submitted that minor discrepancies or omissions

    in the evidence of a rustic witness cannot be magnified to discard

    the entire prosecution case. The learned Trial Judge has rightly

    observed that trivial contradictions, which do not go to the root of

    the matter, cannot be made a ground to extend benefit of doubt

    to the accused.

    22. With regard to the contention that certain independent

    witnesses have not supported the prosecution, the learned High

    Court Government Pleader would submit that merely because

    some witnesses have turned hostile, the prosecution case does

    not fail, particularly when the testimony of the victim is clear and

    consistent. The evidence of a hostile witness need not be rejected

    in toto and can be relied upon to the extent it supports the

    prosecution case.

    13 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    23. As regards the medical evidence, it is submitted that

    absence of external injuries is not fatal to the case of the

    prosecution in an offence of rape, especially when the victim is a

    grown-up woman. The medical evidence in the present case does

    not rule out sexual assault. The history noted by the Doctor and

    the findings on examination are consistent with the version of PW-

    4. It is well settled that medical evidence is corroborative in

    nature and when the ocular testimony of the victim is trustworthy,

    minor inconsistencies in medical evidence do not discredit the

    prosecution case.

    24. It is further contended that the ingredients of Section 376-D

    IPC are clearly made out from the evidence on record. The victim

    has specifically deposed about the involvement of more than one

    accused acting in furtherance of their common intention. The

    learned Trial Judge, after proper analysis of the evidence, has

    rightly recorded a finding that the offence of gang rape stands

    proved.

    25. With regard to the alleged prior complaint filed by accused

    No.1, it is submitted that the same has no bearing on the present
    14 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    case. The defence theory of false implication on account of prior

    enmity is a mere bald suggestion without any substantive

    evidence. The learned Trial Court has rightly rejected the said

    defence as an afterthought.

    26. It is also contended that the acquittal of the appellants for

    the offence under Section 307 IPC does not in any manner dilute

    the prosecution case with regard to the offence under Section

    376-D IPC. Each charge has to be independently assessed on the

    basis of evidence available, and the learned Sessions Judge has

    done so in accordance with law.

    27. Finally, he submitted that the impugned judgment reflects

    proper appreciation of evidence and correct application of legal

    principles. The findings recorded by the Trial Court are neither

    perverse nor contrary to the material on record so as to warrant

    interference by this Court in an appeal against conviction.

    Accordingly, sought for dismissal of the appeal.

    28. Upon hearing the rival contentions urged by the learned

    counsel for the appellants and the learned HCGP for the State, and
    15 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    upon perusal of the oral and documentary evidence available on

    record, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal:

    (i) Whether appellants/accused have made out a

    case to interfere with the impugned judgment

    conviction and order on sentence passed by

    the trial Court?

    (ii) What Order?

    29. My answer to the above points is as under:

    Point No.1: in affirmative

    Point No.2: as per final order

    Regarding Point No.1:

    30. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments

    advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. I have carefully

    perused the entire oral and documentary evidence on record,

    including the original records secured from the Trial Court. Being

    an appellate Court under Section 374(2) of the Cr.PC, this Court is
    16 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    duty-bound to re-appreciate the evidence in its entirety and arrive

    at an independent conclusion.

    31. In order to attract Section 376-D IPC, the prosecution must

    establish not merely the commission of rape, but also the

    participation of more than one person acting in furtherance of a

    common intention. The statutory requirement is not satisfied by

    proving the act of sexual assault alone; it must be demonstrated

    through clear, cogent and convincing evidence that each accused

    was present and actively involved in the commission of the

    offence, sharing a common intention. The evidence on record

    must, therefore, unequivocally establish both the presence and

    participation of the accused in the alleged occurrence. Before

    adverting to the appreciation of evidence in the present case, it is

    necessary to revisit the settled principles laid down by the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court regarding the evidentiary value to be attached to

    the testimony of a prosecutrix in cases of sexual assault,

    particularly where the prosecution case rests substantially, if not

    entirely, on her evidence. It is well settled that the testimony of

    the victim of a sexual offence stands on a higher pedestal and, if
    17 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    found to be trustworthy and credible, can form the sole basis for

    conviction without the necessity of corroboration. At the same

    time, such testimony must be evaluated with due care, caution

    and sensitivity, keeping in view the overall circumstances of the

    case.

    32. The law is equally well settled that oral testimony may

    broadly be classified into three categories, namely: (i) wholly

    reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor

    wholly unreliable. In cases falling under the first category, the

    Court may safely base a conviction on the testimony of a single

    witness without corroboration. In cases falling under the second

    category, the testimony is to be rejected outright. However, it is in

    the third category–where the witness is neither wholly reliable

    nor wholly unreliable–that the Court must exercise greater

    circumspection. In such cases, as a rule of prudence, the Court

    looks for corroboration in material particulars, either through

    direct or circumstantial evidence, before recording a finding of

    guilt.

    18 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    33. In RAI SANDEEP v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) reported in

    (2012) 8 SCC 21, the Court found totally conflicting versions of

    the prosecutrix, from what was stated in the complaint and what

    was deposed before Court, resulting in material inconsistencies.

    Reversing the conviction and holding that the prosecutrix cannot

    be held to be a ‘sterling witness’, the Courtm at paragraph 22 of

    the judgment, has opined thus:

    “22. In our considered opinion, the ‘sterling
    witness’ should be of a very high quality and calibre
    whose version should, therefore, be unassailable. The
    court considering the version of such witness should be in
    a position to accept it for its face value without any
    hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
    status of the witness would be immaterial and what would
    be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by
    such a witness. What would be more relevant would be
    the consistency of the statement right from the starting
    point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness
    makes the initial statement and ultimately before the
    court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of
    the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any
    prevarication in the version of such a witness. The
    witness should be in a position to withstand the cross-
    examination of any length and howsoever strenuous it
    may be and under no circumstance should give room for
    19 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons
    involved, as well as the sequence of it. Such a version
    should have co-relation with each and every one of other
    supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
    weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
    scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
    version should consistently match with the version of
    every other witness. It can even be stated that it should
    be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial
    evidence where there should not be any missing link in
    the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of
    the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of
    such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other
    such similar tests to be applied, can it be held that such a
    witness can be called as a ‘sterling witness’ whose version
    can be accepted by the court without any corroboration
    and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be
    more precise, the version of the said witness on the core
    spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other
    attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and
    material objects should match the said version in material
    particulars in order to enable the court trying the offence
    to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting
    materials for holding the offender guilt of the charge
    alleged.”

    34. In KRISHAN KUMAR MALIK v. STATE OF HARYANA reported

    in (2011)7 SCC 130, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that
    20 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    although the victim’s solitary evidence in matters related to sexual

    offences is generally deemed sufficient to hold an accused guilty,

    the conviction cannot be sustained if the prosecutrix’s testimony is

    found unreliable and insufficient due to identified flaws and

    lacunae. It was held thus:

    “31. No doubt, it is true that to hold an accused
    guilty for commission of an offence of rape, the solitary
    evidence of the prosecutrix is sufficient provided the
    same inspires confidence and appears to be absolutely
    trustworthy, unblemished and should be of sterling
    quality. But, in the case in hand, the evidence of the
    prosecutrix, showing several lacunae, which have already
    been projected hereinabove, would go to show that her
    evidence does not fall in that category and cannot be
    relied upon to hold the appellant guilty of the said
    offences.

    32. Indeed there are several significant variations
    in material facts in her Section 164 statement, Section
    161
    statement (CrPC), FIR and deposition in court. Thus,
    it was necessary to get her evidence corroborated
    independently, which they could have done either by
    examination of Ritu, her sister or Bimla Devi, who were
    present in the house at the time of her alleged abduction.
    The record shows that Bimla Devi though cited as a
    witness was not examined and later given up by the
    21 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    public prosecutor on the ground that victim been won
    over by the appellant.”

    35. The entire oral and documentary evidence on record has

    been re-appreciated, as is required in an appeal against

    conviction. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the

    appellants is that the conviction is based solely on the testimony

    of PW-4, the victim, and that her evidence is not of such quality as

    to inspire confidence. It is urged that material contradictions and

    admissions elicited in her cross-examination go to the root of the

    prosecution case, particularly with regard to identification of the

    accused. It is well settled that the testimony of a prosecutrix, if

    found credible and trustworthy, can form the sole basis of

    conviction and does not require corroboration as a matter of rule.

    The evidence of the victim stands on par with that of an injured

    witness. However, where the testimony suffers from inherent

    improbabilities, material inconsistencies or serious doubts

    regarding identification of the accused, the Court is duty-bound to

    scrutinize the same with greater circumspection.
    22 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    36. In the present case, PW-4 has narrated in her examination-

    in-chief that accused Nos.1 and 2 entered her house, bolted the

    doors and windows, gagged her and committed forcible sexual

    intercourse one after the other. Victim has also spoken about an

    attempt to strangulate her. Her statement under Section 164

    Cr.PC. marked as Ex.P-27, is stated to be consistent with her

    version before the Court. However, in the cross-examination,

    certain significant admissions have been elicited. Victim has stated

    that victim did not know the accused earlier. More importantly, it

    is brought on record that victim has deposed that victim had not

    seen the faces of the persons who allegedly committed the offence

    and that the persons present before the Court were not the

    persons who committed rape on her. Such an admission, if read in

    its plain terms, strikes at the very foundation of identification.

    Identification of the accused is a foundational fact in a criminal

    trial, and where the same is rendered doubtful, the entire

    prosecution case stands on a fragile footing.

    37. The prosecution has examined as many as twenty

    witnesses. PWs3, 9, 10, 14 and 15, who were cited as
    23 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    independent witnesses, have not supported the prosecution case.

    Though it is true that the evidence of hostile witnesses need not

    be rejected in toto, in the present case, their evidence does not

    lend any meaningful corroboration to the testimony of PW-4.

    38. The medical evidence also requires careful consideration.

    PW-13, the Doctor, has deposed that the history furnished was

    one of “misbehavior by two persons with hands.” On examination,

    no external injuries were found on the body; there was no

    disfigurement and no definite signs suggestive of forcible sexual

    intercourse. While it is trite that absence of injuries is not by itself

    fatal to a prosecution for rape, especially in the case of a grown-

    up woman, the medical evidence must at least not contradict the

    ocular testimony. In the present case, the medical evidence does

    not positively corroborate the allegation of gang rape. The FSL

    report also does not provide any conclusive support to the

    prosecution version.

    39. Another aspect that merits attention is the discrepancy

    relating to the lodging of the complaint. Though PW-4 has stated

    that her statement was recorded at the police station, Ex.P-3 is
    24 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    shown as written information, and it is contended that victim has

    not affixed her LTM on the said document. The genesis of the

    complaint, therefore, assumes significance in the backdrop of the

    defence plea of false implication due to prior enmity.

    40. The defence has also placed reliance upon Exs.P-30 and P-

    31 to demonstrate that accused No.1 had earlier lodged a

    complaint in Crime No.121/2021 against certain prosecution

    witnesses. Though prior enmity by itself cannot be a ground to

    discard the prosecution case, it assumes relevance where the

    prosecution evidence is otherwise shaky and doubtful. The

    learned Trial Judge has acquitted the appellants of the offence

    under Section 307 IPC on the ground that the prosecution failed to

    establish the same beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that

    each charge must be independently assessed, the overall

    appreciation of evidence must be consistent and guided by the

    cardinal principle that the prosecution must prove its case beyond

    reasonable doubt.

    41. On perusal of complaint-Ex.P3 dated 17.06.2021 registered

    in Crime No.64/2021 of Ramanagara Women Police Station, it is
    25 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    seen that the complaint was lodged at about 11.45 am on

    17.06.2021. Exhibit P21 is the First Information Report. In

    Exhibit P3, victim-PW4, has narrated that at about 5.30 p.m. on

    16.06.2021, the accused came to her house, asked for food and,

    treating them like her children, victim served food. Thereafter,

    under the influence of alcohol, they allegedly molested her by

    touching her breasts and committed sexual assault. Victim has

    further stated that when she screamed, they attempted to

    strangulate her and at that time, one Jayasimha Naik (her uncle’s

    son), rushed and rescued her, and subsequently Ramaswamy and

    Kumar assaulted the accused and saved her. Victim was taken to

    the hospital at midnight. She has also alleged that the accused

    were involved in illegal activities and sale of liquor and sought

    protection.

    42. Ex.P5 is the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.PC on

    21.06.2021 before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) &

    JMFC, Ramanagara. Exhibit P14 indicates that FSL report was

    pending at the relevant time. Exhibit P20 is the FSL

    acknowledgment spoken to by PW17.

    26 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    43. The appellants were charged for the offences under Sections

    307 and 376-D IPC. Section 307 IPC contemplates an act done

    with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances

    that, if death had been caused, the act would amount to murder.

    Section 376-D IPC requires proof that a woman was raped by one

    or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of

    common intention.

    44. The principal contention of the learned counsel for the

    appellants is that the very identity of the accused is doubtful. In

    paragraph No.15 of her cross-examination she has stated that

    gÉÃ¥ï ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä §AzÀªÀgÀ ªÀÄÄRªÀ£ÀÄß D ¢£ÀªÀÇ £ÉÆÃr®è, EªÀvÀÆÛ £ÉÆÃr®è.

    CªÀgÀ£ÀÄß F ¢£À £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄ°è £ÉÆÃrgÀÄwÛÃgÉÆÃ JAzÀgÉ CªÀgÀÄ EªÀgÀ®è

    J£ÀÄßvÁÛgÉ. PW-4 has clearly stated that victim has not identified the

    accused either on the date of incident or before the Court. In

    paragraph No.17, victim has stated ¥ÉÆÃ°¸ÀgÀÄ K£ÀÄ §gÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀgÉÆÃ

    CzÀPÉÌ £Á£ÀÄ ¸À» ªÀiÁrzÉÝ JAzÀgÉ ¸Àj. The victim does not know the

    contents of Ex.P1-complaint. These admissions are material in

    nature. Identification of the accused is a foundational fact and
    27 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    when the victim herself disowns identification, the substratum of

    the prosecution case becomes doubtful.

    45. PW-13, the Doctor, examined the victim at 2.58 a.m. on

    17.06.2021. He has deposed that the history given was of

    “misbehaviour by two of her relatives” and that no external

    injuries were found. PW-4 herself has stated that victim has not

    sustained any injuries. The absence of injuries, though not always

    fatal, assumes significance in the present case in view of the

    allegation of forcible gang rape and attempted strangulation.

    46. PW19-Dr. Geetha, has not examined the victim. Victim has

    merely identified the handwriting and signature of Dr. Mamatha,

    who allegedly examined the victim. Dr. Mamatha has not been

    examined. Thus, the medical evidence is not proved in accordance

    with law through the author of the document. This omission

    affects the evidentiary value of the medical records.

    47. The final FSL opinion-Exhibit P19 indicates that seminal

    stains were detected on Item No.3 and that possibility of recent

    sexual intercourse could be concluded. However, the prosecution

    has not established that MOs1 to 8 (including undergarments)
    28 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    belonged to the victim. PW-12 has deposed that victim procured

    eight objects from the victim and sealed them, but during the

    evidence of PW-4 and PW-12, M.O. Nos.1 to 8 were not shown.

    They were marked for the first time during the evidence of PW-18.

    This creates serious doubt about the proper identification and

    proof of material objects.

    48. PW6-Dr. Syed Nadeem, examined accused No.1 and issued

    wound certificate Ex.P7. Though police records indicate arrest on

    17.06.2021, Ex.P7 shows that accused No.1 was examined on

    22.06.2021 and the injuries were noted as five days old. Column

    No.9 of Ex.P7 (history of injuries) is left blank. PW-6 has admitted

    that he has not mentioned the history of assault. This

    inconsistency in arrest and medical examination dates casts doubt

    on the prosecution version regarding arrest and alleged assault by

    public.

    49. The order sheet of the committal Court reveals that accused

    No.2 was produced on 17.06.2021 and accused No.1 on

    22.06.2021. However, PW-7 has deposed that he arrested both

    accused on 17.06.2021 and produced them before higher
    29 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    authorities. The alleged arrest report is not produced. The

    Investigating Officer (PW-18) has not explained these

    discrepancies. Such inconsistencies in arrest and production

    before Court go to the root of the investigation. Another

    significant aspect is the discrepancy regarding the time of incident

    In Ex.P3 and Ex.P5 (Section 164 statement), the time of incident

    is stated as 5.30 p.m. However, certain witnesses and police

    records indicate the time as between 10.00 p.m. to 11.00 p.m.

    Such material contradiction regarding the time of occurrence

    affects the credibility of the prosecution case. As the Ex.P5 is the

    statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 21.06.2021

    before the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.) & JMFC,

    Ramanagara, it is significant to notice that the alleged incident has

    happened on 16.06.2021 at about 5.30 p.m., by the accused

    Nos.1 and 2 , however the 164 statement was recorded on

    21.06.2021,there is a delay in recording the statement of victim

    which is not explained by the prosecution.

    50. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF

    KARNATAKA BY NONAVINAKERE v. SHIVANNA @ TARKARI
    30 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    SHIVANNA reported in AIR ONLINE 2014 SC 233, has issued

    guidelines, which are as follows:

    “9. On considering the same, we have accepted the
    suggestion offered by the learned counsel who appeared
    before us and hence exercising powers under Article
    142
    of the Constitution, we are pleased to issue interim
    directions in the form of mandamus to all the police
    station in charge in the entire country to follow the
    direction of this Court which are as follows:

    (i) Upon receipt of information relating to the
    commission of offence of rape, the Investigating
    Officer shall make immediate steps to take the
    victim to any Metropolitan/preferably Judicial
    Magistrate for the purpose of recording her
    statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. A copy of
    the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. should
    be handed over to the Investigating Officer
    immediately with a specific direction that the
    contents of such statement under Section 164
    Cr.P.C. should not be disclosed to any person till
    charge sheet/report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is
    filed.

    (ii) The Investigating Officer shall, as far as possible,
    take the victim to the nearest Lady
    Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate.

    (iii) The Investigating Officer shall record specifically
    the date and the time at which he learnt about
    the commission of the offence of rape and the
    date and time at which he took the victim to the
    Metropolitan/preferably Lady Judicial Magistrate
    as aforesaid.

    31 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    (iv) If there is any delay exceeding 24 hours in taking
    the victim to the Magistrate, the Investigating
    Officer should record the reasons for the same in
    the case diary and hand over a copy of the same
    to the Magistrate.

    (v) Medical Examination of the victim: Section 164 A
    Cr.P.C. (inserted by Act 25 of 2005 in Cr.PC.

    imposes an obligation on the part of Investigating
    Officer to get the victim of the rape immediately
    medically examined.) A copy of the report of
    such medical examination should be immediately
    handed over to the Magistrate who records the
    statement of the victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C.

    10. A copy of this order thus be circulated to all the
    Director Generals of Police of all the States/Commissioner
    of Police in Metropolitan cities / Commissioner of Police of
    Union Territories who are then directed to send a copy of
    this order to all the police stations in charge in their
    States/Union Territories for its compliance in cases which
    are registered on or after the receipt of a copy of these
    directions. Necessary instructions by the DGPs/
    Commissioners of Police be also issued to all the police
    station incharge by the DGPs/Commissioner of Police
    incorporating the directions issued by us and recorded
    hereinbefore.

    11. The matter be posted again after four weeks to
    ensure compliance of this order by the DGS &
    Commissioners of Police in the country before the
    appropriate Bench and also for such other further order or
    orders which may be considered necessary.

    32 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    The IO has not followed the mandatory guidelines and has

    handled the case in a very negligent manner by not explaining the

    delay in producing the victim before the Magistrate to record the

    statement under Section 164(5) of Cr.PC.

    51. The demeanor of the victim, as recorded by the Trial Court,

    also assumes relevance. It is noted that victim was murmuring to

    herself, was earning livelihood by begging, used to scream and

    was not properly dressed. Though demeanor alone cannot

    discredit testimony, when read along with the inconsistencies and

    admissions, it raises doubt regarding reliability. It is further

    observed that during cross-examination, the learned Trial Judge

    recorded certain observations, which are as under:

    “28. ಘಟ ೆ ಾ ಾಗ ನ ೆ ತು ಎಂದು ಖರ ಾ ೇಳಲು
    ಬರುವ ಲ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ . ನನ! “ೖ”ೕ$ೆ ಒಂದು &ೆ ೆಯಷು) ಕೂಡ &ಾಯ
    ಆ ಲ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ . ಾವ .ೇ ಅ0ಾ12ಾರ 3ಾ4ಲ ಮತು6 ಸುಳ78
    ೇಳ796.ೆ:ೕ ೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ ಯಲ . ಾನು ಈಗ 3ಾತ ಾ4ರುವ ದನು! ಇನು! 5
    =ಷದ> ಮ ೆಯು0ೆ6ೕ ೆ ಎಂದ ೆ ಸ ಯಲ . (?ಾ@.ಾರಳ7 ತಮAಷ)BೆC
    0ಾ ೇ ಏ ೇ ೋ &ೊಣ Bೊಳ780ಾ6 ಇರು0ಾ6 ೆ ಎನು!ವ ದನು! ಈ
    ಾ1 ಾಲಯ ಗಮ F.ೆ.)”

    33 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    55. Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 confers very

    wide powers upon a trial Judge to put questions to any witness, in

    any form, at any stage of the proceedings, in order to discover or

    obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The provision expressly

    authorises the Judge to ask questions “in any form,” which

    includes leading questions. Therefore, as a matter of law, a Judge

    can put leading questions even to a rape-victim during trial. This

    power operates notwithstanding the restrictions contained in

    Sections 141 to 143 of the Evidence Act relating to leading

    questions. However, though the power is extensive, it is not

    arbitrary or unregulated; it must be exercised judiciously,

    cautiously, and in furtherance of justice. In trials for offences

    under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, the recording of the

    victim’s evidence carries additional sensitivity. Statutory

    safeguards such as the proviso to Section 146 of the Evidence Act,

    Section 53A of the Evidence Act, and Section 327(2) of the Code

    of Criminal Procedure mandate protection of the dignity and

    privacy of the prosecutrix. The Court is required to ensure that

    victim is not subjected to humiliating or irrelevant questioning and

    that the atmosphere of the courtroom does not become
    34 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    intimidating. In this context, the Judge is not expected to remain

    a silent spectator; rather, the Judge may intervene to clarify

    ambiguities, to ensure that the testimony is properly understood,

    or to prevent confusion created during cross-examination.

    3. ಅವ ಬGರೂ ೇI 3ಾಡಲು ಬಂದರು. ಮುಖ1 K2ಾರLೆ .ಾಖಲು 3ಾಡು96ರುವ ಸಮಯದ>
    ಆ ೋMತರ ವNೕಲರು ಪ.ೇ ಪ.ೇ ಮಧ1 ಪQ ೇRಸು96ದು:, ಆದ: ಂದ ಾ ೇ ಸSತಃ ?ಾ@.ಾರ &ೆ
    ಆ ೋMತರು ಮA “ೕ$ೆ ೇI 3ಾ4.ಾ: ಾ ಎಂದು BೇU.ಾಗ ಆBೆ ಸVಷ) ಾ ೇI 3ಾ4.ಾ: ೆ
    ಎಂದು ೇUರು0ಾ6 ೆ.)

    4. ಪ ನಃ ಆ ೋMತರ ವNೕಲರ Bೋ Bೆಯ “ೕ ೆ&ೆ ಪ ನಃ ಪQR!F.ಾಗ ೇI 3ಾಡಲು ಪQಯತ! ಪಟ)ರು
    ಎನು!0ಾ6 ೆ.”

    In the case on hand the trial court has interfered in the recording

    of evidence. The role of the judge while recording the evidence is

    to facilitate all the stake holders of the case, that too in the

    matters of offences against women. The adversial system of

    criminal jurisprudence expects the same.

    52. The Supreme Court in STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. ANI,

    (1997)6 SCC 162, cautioned that judicial intervention must not

    appear to fill up lacunae in the prosecution case. These principles

    apply with equal force in rape trials. Thus, although a Judge may

    legally ask leading questions to a rape victim under Section 165,
    35 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    such power must be exercised only for clarification and to obtain

    proper proof of relevant facts. The Judge cannot suggest answers,

    introduce material facts not already spoken to by the witness, or

    supply essential ingredients of the offence–such as penetration–

    if the witness herself has not deposed to them. Nor can the Judge

    neutralize contradictions brought out in cross-examination or

    repair weaknesses in the prosecution case. Any such intervention

    may give rise to an apprehension of bias and may affect the

    fairness of the trial, which is an integral component of Article 21 of

    the Constitution.

    53. In essence, the role of the trial Judge in recording the

    evidence of a rape victim is to strike a careful balance between

    sensitivity and neutrality. The Court must protect the dignity of

    the victim and ensure that her testimony is clearly and properly

    recorded, but it must not abandon its impartial position or assume

    the mantle of the prosecuting agency. The power under Section

    165 of Indian Evidence Act is meant to advance the cause of

    justice and discovery of truth, not to tilt the balance in favour of

    either party. In the present case the Trial court has put leading
    36 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    question as to the directly commission of alleged offences by the

    accused persons which has prompted the victim to say

    affirmatively, however when the same question was putforth the

    victim has answered that the accused have attempted to commit

    rape, which is against to the jurisprudence of role of judges during

    trial of sexual assault cases.

    54. No doubt, it is a settled principle of law that conviction for

    the offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the

    prosecutrix, provided her evidence inspires confidence and is

    found to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. It is equally settled

    that no rule of law requires corroboration in every case. However,

    this principle applies only when the testimony of the prosecutrix is

    clear, consistent and free from material contradictions. In the

    present case, on careful scrutiny of the evidence, it is seen that

    the testimony of the prosecutrix suffers from several material

    inconsistencies and omissions, as already discussed above. These

    infirmities are not minor discrepancies but go to the root of the

    prosecution case. Therefore, victim’s evidence cannot be said to

    be of such sterling quality so as to form the sole basis for
    37 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    conviction without corroboration. A comparison of victim’s

    statement under Section 164 CrPC, the contents of the FIR and

    victim’s deposition before the Court reveals substantial variations

    on material particulars. These contradictions relate to important

    aspects of the alleged incident and affect the credibility of victim’s

    version. In such circumstances, it would not be safe to rely solely

    upon victim’s testimony. As a matter of prudence, independent

    corroboration on material particulars was necessary before

    recording a finding of guilt against the appellant.

    55. In the present case, in view of the serious doubt regarding

    identification and the absence of convincing corroboration from

    medical and independent evidence, this Court is of the considered

    opinion that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the

    guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt for the offence

    punishable under Section 376-D IPC. Criminal jurisprudence

    mandates that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of

    proof. Where two views are possible on the evidence on record,

    the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. The benefit

    of doubt must necessarily enure to the accused.

    38 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    56. Upon a comprehensive re-appreciation of the entire

    evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed

    to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence does

    not disclose clear and consistent identification of the accused by

    PW-4; the medical evidence does not cogently prove forcible

    sexual intercourse; the seizure, custody and proof of material

    objects suffer from serious infirmities; the arrest and production of

    the accused are clouded by discrepancies; and the independent

    witnesses have not furnished unimpeachable corroboration. The

    cumulative effect of the non-identification by the victim,

    contradictions regarding the time of incident, absence of injuries,

    defective proof of medical evidence, inconsistencies in the arrest

    procedure, improper marking of material objects, and lack of

    reliable corroboration, creates a substantial and reasonable doubt

    as to the guilt of the appellants under Section 376-D IPC. It is a

    cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden lies

    entirely on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable

    doubt, and suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of

    proof. In the present case, the benefit of such doubt must

    necessarily enure to the appellants.

    39 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    57. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

    prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond

    all reasonable doubt. The appellants are therefore entitled to

    acquittal by extending the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, I answer

    Point No.1 in the affirmative, holding that the appellants have

    made out a case for interference with the impugned judgment of

    conviction and order on sentence.

    Regarding point No.2:

    For the reasons aforestated, I proceed to pass the following:

    ORDER

    (i) The appeal is allowed;

    (ii) The judgment of conviction and order on

    sentence dated 28th/31st March, 2023 passed

    in SC No.26 of 2022 by the III Additional

    District and Sessions Judge, Ramanagara,

    convicting the appellants for the offence

    punishable under Section 376-D IPC, is hereby

    set aside;

    40 Crl.A. No.824 of 2023

    (iii) The appellants are acquitted of the offence

    punishable under Section 376-D IPC;

    (iv) The Registrar (Judicial) shall communicate this

    order forthwith to the concerned jail authority

    through e-mail and the appellants shall be set

    at liberty, if they are not required in any other

    case;

    Registry to send the copy of the judgment along with trial

    Court records to the concerned Court.

    Sd/-

    (G. BASAVARAJA)
    JUDGE

    lnn

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