Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Meena Ghosh vs Pankaj Kumar Dasgupta (Since Deceased) on 3 July, 2026
Author: Supratim Bhattacharya
Bench: Supratim Bhattacharya
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:-
The Hon'ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya
S.A. 100 of 2019
Meena Ghosh
Vs.
Pankaj Kumar Dasgupta (since deceased)
Bina Dasgupta and Ors.
For the Appellant : Mr. Snehatosh Majumder
Mr. Ujjwal Dutta
Mr. Amar Nath Ghosh
Mr. Sattwik Majumder
For the Respondents : Mr. Tarak Nath Halder
Delivered On : 03.07.2026
Supratim Bhattacharya, J.:
1. The present appeal has been preferred by the landlady being aggrieved
by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the
learned First Appellate Court dated 4th September, 2017 in Ejectment
Appeal No. 11 of 2016 whereby and wherein the learned judge of the
First Appellate Court has allowed the said appeal thereby setting aside
the judgment of eviction passed by the learned Trial Court dated 29th
February, 2016 in Ejectment Suit No. 52 of 2006.
2. Factual Matrix
The fact of the instant lis is that the property was Debottar property
being in the name of Sree Sree Nikunja Behari Thakur. It is a two
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storied building situated at 13C, Rajendralal Street, KMC ward No. 28,
P.S. Narkeldanga, Kolkata -700006.
The sebaits of the said Debottar property were Sabitri Dey, the
mother and her three sons namely Shyamal Kumar Dey, Amal Kumar
Dey and Bimal Kumar Dey.
The property was being possessed through tenant namely
Ranibala Dasgupta, wife of late Ananta Dasgupta (since deceased).
The tenants are in possession of the suit property consisting of two
storied brick built building with stair case having four bedrooms, two
kitchen at a monthly rental of Rs. 100/- payable according to English
calendar month.
The erstwhile sebaits being unable to maintain the premises in
habitable condition decided to sell the same and in pursuance to the
said decision entered into an agreement to sell the premises to the
appellant /plaintiff. The said agreement was a registered conveyance
and the same was to take place after obtaining lawful permission
from the learned District Judge, Alipore.
The sebaits /owners applied before the learned District Judge,
Alipore seeking permission to sell the property on the ground that
they did not have the capacity to maintain the premises. The said
proceeding was Miscellaneous Case No. 179 of 1999 before the
learned District Judge at Alipore. The said miscellaneous case had
been finally disposed of by the learned District Judge, Alipore vide
order No. 6 dated 10.09.1999 thereby allowing and permitting the
joint trustees of the said trust to sell the property being premises No.
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13C, Rajendralal Street Kolkata 700006 to Smt. Meena Ghosh on the
condition that the sale proceeds shall be invested in any Nationalised
Bank, with the liberty given to the sebaits or the managing sebaits
thereof to collect the interest accrued therefrom for the purpose of
meeting the expenses of the seba puja of the deity and for meeting
other essential expenses required for the said Debottar estate.
Thereafter on 02.08.2000 Smt. Sabitri Dey expired leaving
behind his three sons as the only sebaits of the said trust.
The surviving sebaits after being permitted by the learned
District Judge sold the premises by executing a registered deed of sale
dated 14.03.2005.
On the death of Ranibala Dasgupta her four sons and one
married daughter have inherited the tenancy being tenants-in-
common.
In spite of receiving the letter of attornment, the tenants have
not paid rent to the transferee landlord since the month of March,
2005.
Through the plaint it has also been stated that out of the four
brothers two of them have constructed their own house and are
residing therein with their family but have kept the occupied rooms
under lock and key since January, 2002.
The landlady in spite of purchasing the suit property is residing
along with her family in a tenanted house at Garpar Road, PS
Narkeldanga, Kolkata 700009, wherein she is under constant threat of
eviction by the owner of the said property.
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Thereafter, on 25.11.2005 a notice of eviction under Section 6(4)
of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (for short the 1997
Act) has been issued by the learned Advocate calling upon the
tenants to quit and deliver vacant, peaceful possession of the tenanted
suit property on the expiry of the last day of December, 2005.
In spite of service of notice for eviction dated 25.11.2005, the
tenants have neither quit nor vacated the said suit property, as a
consequence of which the landlady has been compelled to institute a
suit seeking eviction of the tenants from the suit property on the
grounds of default, nuisance, reasonable requirement and keeping
the tenanted portion under occupation while residing at their own
dwelling houses elsewhere.
As such the landlady has sought for relief/reliefs under the
1997 Act.
Written statement has been filed on behalf of the tenants being
Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 denying and disputing the allegations made by the
landlady against them.
It has been stated through the written statement that Sri Sri
Nikunja Behari jew thakur the inducting landlord of the predecessor
of the defendants, who is the owner of the property is a necessary
party. It has also been stated that the plaintiff is bound to prove her
derivative title by production of her deed of conveyance and also the
permission of the Ld. District Judge.
It has also been stated that the plaintiff has intentionally
suppressed the number of the deed and the place of registration
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which infers that the registration was not complete till the date of
presentation of the plaint.
The tenants have not admitted the plaintiff as the landlady on
the ground of derivative title and has stated that the plaintiff has
acquired the property by virtue of so called erroneous deed of
conveyance.
It has also been stated by the tenants that two of their brothers
have left the premises for paucity of accommodation but none of them
has acquired his own house.
On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Judge framed
the following issues:
“1) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and
prayer?
2) Is there any cause of action to file the suit?
3) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property?
4) Whether the notice to quit is legal, valid sufficient and
duly served on the defendants?
5) Whether the defendants are defaulters in payment of
rents?
6) Whether the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit
property?
7) Whether the plaintiff has other reasonable and
suitable accommodation?
8) Is the plaintiff entitled to the decree as prayed for?
9) To what other relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?”
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On behalf of the landlady, one Mr. Abani Kumar Ghosh adduced
evidence being PW1.
He has proved the following documents which have been
marked as Exhibit Nos. 1 to 13 which are as follows:
1. Exhibit -1- Deed of Conveyance dated 13.03.2005.
2. Exhibit-2 – Ration card of the family is marked as Exhibit-2
series.
3. Exhibit-3- Voter ID card of PW1.
4. Exhibit -4- Madhyamik Admit Card of Snehashis Ghosh .
5. Exhibit- 5-Admit card issued by University of Calcutta in the
name of Sanjukta Ghosh.
6. Exhibit- 6- Trade Licence for 2010-2011 in the name of PW1 by
KMC.
7. Exhibit- 7- The original letter of tenancy dated 15.07.1981
8. Exhibit- 8- 09 rent receipts.
9. Exhibit- 9 – Rent receipt.
10. Exhibit-10- Original certificate dated 04.06.12
11. Exhibit- 11- Certified copy of deed No. 5846 dated
20.06.1999
12. Exhibit-12.- True copy of assessment register.
13. Exhibit-13- The notice to quit PR Slip and AD card.
On behalf of the defendant tenants two persons adduced
evidence, they are Amit Kumar Dasgupta (DW1) and Pradip Kumar
Dasgupta (DW2).
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Apart from one evidence a certified copy of an assessment
register has been proved and exhibited.
After adjudication the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit
by passing the following:
" Hence, it is
ORDERED
That the instant suit be and the same is
decreed on contest. The plaintiff to do get decree of
her recovery of possession by evicting the
defendants from the suit property. The defendants is
further directed to quit and vacate and deliver khas
possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within
60 days from the date of order in default the
plaintiff would be entitled to execute the decree as
per law.
Interim order if any, stands vacated.”
Before the First Appellate Court
Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment passed by
the learned Trial Judge the tenants preferred the first appeal before
the learned District Judge, South 24 Parganas, Alipore being
Ejectment Appeal No. 11 of 2016.
The said first appeal was heard by the learned Civil Judge
Senior Division Sealdah, South -24- Parganas.
After hearing the learned counsels representing the
tenants/appellants and the landlady /respondent the learned First
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Appellate Court allowed the said appeal setting aside the decree of
eviction passed by the learned Trial Court by passing the following:
" Hence, it is
ORDERED
that the instant appeal be and the same is
allowed on contest against the respondent and
exparte against the proforma respondent but without
any order as to costs.
The impugned judgment and decree dated
29.02.2016, passed by the Court of Ld. Civil Judge
(Junior Division), 1st Court, Sealdah in Ejectment Suit
No. 52 of 2006 is hereby set aside and it is hereby
ordered that the said suit be and the same is
dismissed on contest.”
The aforementioned judgment passed by the learned First
Appellate Court is the bone of contention in the present appeal.
3. At the time of admission one substantial question of law was framed
being:
Whether a notice of suit issued under Section 6(4) of the West Bengal
Premises Tenancy Act can be regarded as invalid and bad in law
having issued within one year from the date of the acquisition of title
by the landlady appellant in view of the embargo created under
Section 6(2) of the said Act ?
At the time of hearing, another substantial question of law has been
framed which is as follows:
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Whether the learned Trial Court has correctly taken into considerationthe decision arrived at the time of disposal of the application under
Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as that
the appellant is the owner of the property and whether the First
Appellate Court has been correct in coming to the finding that the
appellant is not the owner of the said property without the certified
copy of the ‘permission of the learned District Judge not being
exhibited’?
4. So from the substantial questions of law framed it transpires that
there are two points to be considered as to whether the issuance of
the notice under Section 6(4) of the 1997 Act as has been issued
within one year from the date of purchase of the suit property is valid
and as to whether without the permission of the learned District
Judge being exhibited can it be considered that the appellants are the
owners of the suit property.
5. The learned Counsel representing the appellant during his
exhaustive argument has submitted the following
I. That the appellant/ plaintiff /landlady has filed the present lis
seeking decree of eviction against the tenants on four grounds
being under Section 6(1) (b), 6 (1)(d), 6 (1)(i) and 6 (1)(l) upon
due service of notice of quit dated 25.11.2005 under Section
6(4) of the 1997 Act.
II. He has further submitted that the landlady is a transferee
landlord and has purchased the suit property which had been
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a Debottar property on the strength of registered deed of
purchase dated 14.03.2005.
III. He has further submitted that on the expiry of clear one year
the landlady has instituted the suit on 06.04.2006 which is in
compliance with the requirement under Section 6(2) of the
1997 Act.
IV. He has also submitted that prior to execution of the deed of
sale the sebaits of the deity obtained permission from the
learned District Judge Alipore.
V. He has further submitted that one Ranibala Dasgupta since
deceased was the last tenant and on her death the defendants
respondents have become tenants in common by operation of
law.
VI. He has further submitted that the landlady is residing at a
rented premises situated at 52, Garpar Road PS Narkeldanga
in spite of being owner of the suit property.
VII. He has further submitted that the learned First Appellate Court
allowed the said appeal only on one ground that is notice to
quit dated 25.11.2005 holding it to be bad as it has been
issued prior to the expiry of one year as contemplated under
Section 6(2) of the said Act.
VIII. He has further submitted that apart from the above issue the
learned First Appellate Court as regards to the ownership has
come to the same finding as that the Trial Court. Both the
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courts have come to a concurrent finding that the appellant
plaintiff is the owner of the suit property.
IX. He has further submitted that as regards to the issue of
reasonable requirement of the suit property by the appellant
plaintiff the First Appellate Court has not framed any issue and
in accordance with Order VIII Rules 3 to 5 has admitted the
fact of requirement on the ground that the defendants have
admitted the said requirement. He has stressed upon the point
that as regards to reasonable requirement also there has been
concurrent finding by both the courts.
X. He has relied upon a judgment passed by a Division Bench of
this Court in the case between Bindeswar Prasad Gupta Vs.
Murari Mohan Bhandari and Dalimbala Ghosh and others
Vs. Murari Mohan Bhandari published in 1992 1 CLT 48
corresponding to 1991 SCC Online Calcutta 105 and has
submitted that through the said judgment it has been held that
there is bar in filing a suit for eviction imposed by Section 13
(3A) of the Premises Tenancy Act 1956 but there is no bar in
issuing a notice of eviction under Section 16 (6) of the said Act
before the expiry of three years from the date of acquisition of
title by the transferee landlord.
XI. He has further submitted that Section 6 (2) of the 1997 Act is
pari materia with the contents of Section 13 (3A) of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
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XII. He has further submitted that as regards to the second
substantial question of law, non-production and non-exhibiting
the permission of the learned District Judge, allowing the
erstwhile sebaits to sell out the Debottar property to the
appellant landlord, is fatal. In this context he has further
submitted that mere mentioning of the proceedings and the
date of the order of permission in the deed of conveyance
which is registered is enough to establish the appellant
landlord’s title to the suit property.
XIII. In this aspect the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment
of the Division Bench of this Hon’ble Court in the case between
Howrah Municipal Corporation and others vs. Smt.
Shakuntala Devi Dalmia and another.
Relying upon the aforementioned submission the learned counsel
has prayed for allowing the present appeal.
6. The learned counsel representing the respondents during his
exhaustive argument has submitted as follows:
I. That the plaintiff has to prove his own case and would not
depend upon the weakness of the defence witness. In this
context he has referred to a judgment passed in the case
between Satyabrata Bose Vs. Amiya Bala Bose and ors.
reported in AIR 1984 CAL 392.
II. He has further submitted that in the present case the Debottar
property has been sold for the benefit of the sebaits and not
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for the benefit of the idol or for the purpose of preservation ofthe Debottar property.
III. He has further submitted that Debottar property if sold in its
entirety the very purpose of sale of the Debottar property for
preservation of the same to keep it in habitable condition is
futile.
IV. He has further submitted that no deed of trust has been
produced in support of their claim that they had inherited the
sebaitship of the Debottar property and no permission of the
learned District Judge has been produced to substantiate that
prior permission of the District Judge which is a pre-condition
of transfer of a Debottar property as such no title has passed
to the appellant /plaintiff.
V. He has further submitted that from the judgment of the learned
Trial Court it transpires that the issue of ownership has been
decided in favour of the appellant plaintiff solely on the basis of
the decision arrived at the time of disposal of the application
under Section 7 (2) of the 1997 Act and upon the recitals of the
deed.
VI. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that it is settled law
that any finding arrived at the time of disposing of the
application under Section 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997 will not be binding upon the Trial Court at
the time of trial. In this context the Ld. Counsel has relied upon
a judgment reported in (2006) (3) CHN 689 and another
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judgment reported in 1987 (1) CHN 362 and anotherjudgment reported in 1991 (1) CHN 443.
VII. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that in order to get a
decree of eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement it is
required to be ascertained by holding local inspection.
VIII. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that in a suit for
eviction valid notice to quit is a condition precedent for
institution of a suit and if there is any defect in the said notice
suit cannot be stand and is liable to be dismissed in this
context the Ld. Counsel has relied upon a judgment reported in
2008 (3) CHN 962.
IX. The Ld. Counsel has further submitted that if the notice to quit
is bad and inoperative the suit is liable to be dismissed. In
this context he has relied upon the judgments reported in
1987 (2) CHN 436 and 1974 CHN.
Relying upon the aforementioned submission the Ld. Counsel
has prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
7. From the contentions of the Ld. Counsels it transpires that the
present appeal revolves upon two issues. Firstly, as to whether the
landlady is the owner of the suit property on the basis of the deed of
purchase or not and secondly as to whether the landlady is entitled to
eviction of the tenants on the basis of the notice of eviction having
been issued within one year from the date of purchase of the suit
property.
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8. As regards to the validity of the deed of purchase by the
appellant/landlady, without the production of the order of permission
of the Ld. District Judge as regards to the sale of debottar property,
the Courts have relied upon the deposition of Amal Kumar Dasgupta
son of late Ananta Kumar Dasgupta, who is one of the co-tenants
being the respondent No.2 herein. During his cross-examination on
24.08.2009 at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 7 (2) of
the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 this witness has
deposed the following:
” … It is a fact that the plaintiff became the owner of the
suit premises after purchasing the same from the then
shebaits of the ‘debottar’ property, after receiving
permission from Ld. District Judge. …”
Having deposed the same which is mentioned hereinabove in a
proceeding in the self same lis, the respondents/tenants cannot
challenge the ownership of the landlady, on the ground that the
original permission of the concerned Ld. District Judge has not been
produced.
One cannot approbate and reprobate in a self same lis although the
same has been deposed in an inter locutory proceeding.
In addition to the above on perusal of the deed of sale, through which
the said landlady has purchased the suit premises, it transpires that
in the recital of the said deed the following has been specifically
mentioned:
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“AND WHEREAS since the execution of the instant sale and
that of the formal Deed of Conveyance pursuant to the said
Agreement for Sale dated 30.5.1999 required a formal
order of the Concerned District Judge, the property under
Sale being a Trust Property, the then Joint Trustee and
Shebaits, as named above, had made an application before
the Learned District Judge at Alipore in accordance with
their said purpose and praying for therein a formal Order of
the said Learned Court for enabling the applicants therein,
being the Joint Trustees of the said Trust Estate, to execute
sale of the property as aforesaid and the said proceeding
had been numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 179 of
1999 before the Learned District Judge at Alipore.
AND WHEREAS the said Miscellaneous Case No.179 of
1999 had finally been disposed of by the said Learned
District Judge at Alipore by his order No. 6 dated 10.9.1999
allowing and/or permitting the parties thereof, being the
Joint Trustees of the said Trust Estate as aforementioned to
cause sale of the property as described in the Schedule of
the said petition, being the Premises No. 13C, Rajendralal
Street, Kolkata – 700 006 to the said Smt. Meena Ghosh,
being the Purchaser hereof on condition that the sale
proceeds out of the said proposed sale be invested in any
Nationalised Bank with liberty given to the Shebaits or the
managing Shabaits thereof to collect the interest accrued
therefrom for the purpose of meeting the expenses of the
Seva Puja of the Deity of the said Trust Estate and for
meeting other essential expenses required for the said
Debutter Estate. ….”
Thus, on perusal of the said deed it transpires that in the said deed it
has been mentioned in details as regards to seeking of permission to
execute a sale deed by the shebaits and the granting of the said
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permission by the Ld. District Judge Alipore. Therein it has also beenmentioned that a Miscellaneous case being Miscellaneous Case No.
179 of 1999 was filed and the Ld. District Judge had permitted the
same subject to the provisions.
So it transpires that permission had been granted by the concerned
Ld. District Judge and accordingly deed was executed. So the
contention of the respondents/tenants cannot be taken into
consideration and is not sustainable and the ownership of the
appellant/landlady is not questionable.
As such this issue is decided in favour of the landlady/appellant.
9. The next issue is as to whether the issuance of notice of eviction
dated 25.11.2005 is valid or not in the perspective of Section 6(2)
of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.
Section 6(2) of the 1997 Act lays as follows:
” where a landlord has acquired his interest in the
premises by transfer, no [suit] for the recovery of
possession of the premises on the ground of
requirement for building or rebuilding or addition or
alteration or requirement for own occupation shall be
instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a
period of one year from the date of acquisition of such
interest ”
Substituted by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment)
Act, 2006 (W.B. Act 12 of 2006) for “proceeding” (with effect from
01.06.2006).
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So Section 6(2) of the said Act till 31.05.2006 was stated to be
that no proceeding could have been instituted by a landlord who had
acquired his interest in the premises by transfer for the recovery of
possession of premises on the ground of requirement for own
occupation before expiration of the period of one year from the date
of acquisition of such interest and since 01.06.2006 the word
“proceeding” being substituted by the word “suit” so a landlord who
had acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the
recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground of
requirement for own occupation could have been instituted by the
landlord before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of
acquisition of such interest.
Earlier the word proceeding was there as because during those
days eviction or ejectment of tenant were being dealt by the rent
controller and thereafter once again eviction suit or ejectment suit is
being dealt by the Court.
So from the said aforementioned section it is crystal clear that
there is bar in institution of a suit but there is no bar in the issuance
of a notice for eviction within the period of one year from the date of
purchase of the suit premises. In the present lis the suit premises
was purchased on 14.03.2005 and the notice for eviction was issued
on 25.11.2005 and ultimately the suit for ejectment has been
instituted on 06.04.2006. So the institution of the suit has taken
place beyond the period of one year of purchase of the suit premises.
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As there being no bar in issuance of notice for eviction of a tenant by a
landlord on the ground of his requirement for own occupation so the
notice dated 25.11.2005 is valid and is tenable in law.
So this issue is also decided in favour of the
landlady/appellant.
10. As regards to reasonable requirement of the suit property by the
landlady which has been specifically and elaborately laid down in the
plaint the tenants /respondents have not specifically controverted the
same. In their written statement there has not been any specific
denial on the issue of reasonable requirement of the suit property by
the landlady. In this context this Court relies upon Order VIII Rules
3, 4 and 5 which are placed hereinbelow.
Order VIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that
Denial to be specific.
It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written
statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the
plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each
allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except
damages.
Order VIII Rule 4 states as follows :
Evasive Denial
Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he
must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance.
Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it
shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular
amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part
thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation
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is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to
deny it along with those circumstances.
Order VIII Rule 5 states as follows :
Specific Denial
(1) [Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied
specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not
admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to
be admitted except as against a person under disability :
Provided that the Court may in it discretion require any fact
so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
…
Thus, in the present lis there being no specific denial by the tenants
through their written statement as regards to reasonable requirement
of the suit property by the landlady and her family, so the issue of
reasonable requirement goes in favour of the respondent/landlady on
the ground of non-traverse by the appellants/tenants .
11. The judgment cited on behalf of the respondents/tenants been
reported in AIR 1984 CAL 392 is not applicable in the present case
as because herein the landlady has proved her right over the suit
property being the landlady and it is not the case that the landlady
has not proved her case. She has produced her deed of purchase
wherein it has been specifically laid down mentioning the order of
permission to sale of the concerned Ld. District Judge.
The Ld. Counsel has relied upon a judgment published in 2008 SCC
Online CAL 90. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this Court has dealt with the issue of non-maintainability of a suit for
eviction in the absence of valid notice to quit. In the present case, the
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said principle does not come into play as because Section 6(2) of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 has clearly and explicitly
laid down the law that a suit cannot be instituted within one year
from the date of purchase and in the present case the suit for eviction
has been instituted after one year of purchase of the suit property so
the case cited on behalf of the respondent in not applicable herein.
The Ld. Counsel has also relied upon a judgment published in 1987
(2) CHN 436 . The said case referred is also not relevant though
therein the issue of ejectment has been dealt but the issue involved
was post notice default which is not the case in the present lis.
The Ld. Counsel has also relied upon a judgment passed by a
coordinate bench of this court in a case between Gangadhar Adak
Vs. Gour Chandra Bag. In the said case two issues have been dealt
those are whether conditions for eviction must exist where notice is
issued and whether the plaintiff can avail of a situation which existed
at the time of the institution of the suit but not at the time of issue of
the notice to quit. In the said judgment the Hon’ble Single Judge has
laid down ” …. that the grounds must be in existence when the notice is
issued. ….”. The issue dealt in the referred case is not at all applicable
in the present situation after the statute that is West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997 having laid down the law under Section 6(2) of the
said act in unequivocal, clear, precise and unambiguous terms stating
that … no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on the
ground of requirement for building or rebuilding or addition or
alteration or requirement for own occupation shall be instituted by the
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landlord before the expiration of a period of one year from the date of
acquisition of such interest. So the said judgment is not applicable in
the present situation.
In this context this Court relies upon Paragraphs 10, 11, 12
and 13 of the judgment passed by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Hon’ble Court in the case between Bindeswar Prasad Gupta Versus
Murari Mohan Bhandari and Dalimbala Ghosh & Ors Versus
Murari Mohan Bhandari reported in 1991 SCC Online Cal 105
which is laid down as follows:
” …. 10. It is clear from the above provision that sub-section (3A)
puts a bar upon the landlord acquiring his interest in the
premises by transfer not to file a suit for recovery of possession
of the premises on any grounds mentioned in Clause (f) or
Clause (ff) of sub-Section (1) before the expiration of period of
three years from the date of acquisition of such interest. The
plain language of sub-section (3A) is that “no suit………shall be
instituted by the landlord”. If we have to go by the plain
language of the statute it cannot be read in sub-section (3A) the
further embargo that the notice of ejectment u/S. 13.(6) cannot
also be issued upon the tenant before the expiry of the period of
three years, when the statute on its plain reading does not put
such an embargo to a transferee-landlord.
11. Mr. Shakti Nath Mukherjee appearing for the respondent has
drawn my attention to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. pages
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64-65 where it has been clearly observed that if the words ofstatute are themselves precis and unambiguous, then no more
can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary
and natural sense and the words themselves alone do in such a
case best declare the intention of the law giver. The similar
observation is found in Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes,
Page 143. In this particular case also the clear and
unambiguous expression of the Legislature contained in sub-
section (3A) is to prohibit only filing a suit for eviction on the
ground of Clause (f) or Clause (ff) of section 13(1) of the Act prior
to the expiry of three years. However, the embargo is not an
absolute one. The proviso gives the right to such transferee-
landlord to approach the Rent Controller praying for permission
to institute such suit on the ground of building and re-building
and the Rent Controller after giving the tenant an opportunity of
being heard can give such permission.
12. In view of the above, there can be no bar for a transferee-
owner to issue the notice of ejectment even prior to the expiry of
three years which is admittedly a sine qua non to the filing of an
ejectment suit under the Act and thereafter immediately after
expiry of three years to file a suit for ejectment. If the transferee-
landlord has to issue the notice of ejectment only on expiry of
three years from the date of the purchase then he cannot
exercise his right to file a suit for ejectment immediately on
242026:CHC-AS:1001
expiry of three years and he has to wait some time more to file asuit for ejectment because a tenant has to give a notice for a
period of at least one month with the expiry of the month of
tenancy before an ejectment suit under the Act can be filed
against the tenant.
13. In view of the above, we are unable to accept the contention
of the appellants that both the suits filed by the respondent are
hit by sub-section (3A) of section 13. When in this case both the
suits have been filed after the expiry of three years from the
date of purchase by the plaintiff-respondent, the suits on the
ground of reasonable requirement against the appellants are
quite maintainable.” ….
The aforementioned judgment referred by this Court has been passed
in respect of an eviction suit under the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956. The principle remains the same in respect of the
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 and West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1997, only the period has been changed from three
years to one year . As per the 1997 Act there is bar in institution of
the suit within one year from the date of acquiring the ownership.
12. Thus all the issues, that is the issue of ownership in respect of
the suit property by the landlady, issuance of notice of eviction and
there being non-specific denial as regards to reasonable requirement
by the landlady and her family, are decided in favour of the
landlady/appellant.
25
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13. This being the position this Court is of the opinion that the
judgment passed by the Ld. First Appellate Court in the Title Appeal
requires interference and as such the said impugned judgment is set
aside and the present appeal being No. SA 100 of 2019 stands
allowed.
14. The respondents/tenants are directed to vacate the suit
property and hand over khas possession of the same to the landlady
within three months from this date.
15. Parties shall be entitled to act on the basis of the server copy of
the judgment and order placed on the official website of the Court.
16. Urgent Xerox certified photo copies of this judgment, if applied
for, be given to the parties upon compliance of the requisite
formalities.
(Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)
