Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Mani Kant Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 22 May, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
W.P.A. 25799 of 2007
Mani Kant Singh
-Vs-
Union of India & Ors.
For the Petitioner : Mr. K.B. S. Mahapatra
Mr. Aditya Shit
For the Respondents/CISF : Mr. Uttam Basak
Judgment on : 22.05.2026 Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.:-
1. The writ petitioner introduced himself as a member of the Central Industrial
Security Force presently attached to the Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose
International Airport, Kolkata, though at the material point of time he had
been serving at Bagdogra Airport in the district of Darjeeling. According to
the petitioner, the Unit at Bagdogra Airport functioned under the supervision
of Shri Rohitashwa Kumar, Deputy Commandant, whose disposition towards
the petitioner, as alleged, was marked by personal hostility and a sustained
endeavour to implicate him on grounds wholly unconnected with the faithful
discharge of official duty. The petitioner asserted that notwithstanding his
diligence, discipline and unwavering devotion to service, the Deputy
Commandant remained dissatisfied and persistently searched for occasions
2
to bring the petitioner within the fold of disciplinary action by resorting to
contrived “dummy checks”.
2. The narrative of the petitioner proceeds to disclose that a memorandum
dated 31st October 2005 was issued under Rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 2001
alleging that the petitioner had failed to frisk a Sub-Officer of CISF posted at
Airport Headquarters, Kolkata, and that such omission constituted gross
negligence, carelessness and dereliction of duty. The petitioner maintained
that immediately upon receipt of the memorandum he sought supply of the
relevant documents by an application dated 2nd November 2005, yet the
authorities failed to furnish the same. By a further representation dated
20th November 2005, he reiterated his grievance regarding non-supply of
records and questioned the propriety of proceeding under Rule 37 in a
matter involving disputed questions of fact. The petitioner requested that a
regular charge-sheet under Rule 36 be issued so that a proper enquiry could
be conducted upon disclosure of the relevant materials.
3. The petitioner further recounted that notwithstanding such request, the
disciplinary authority by a final order dated 12th December 2005 imposed
the penalty of censure. Being dissatisfied with the said order, the petitioner
preferred an appeal on 11th January 2006 before the Appellate Authority.
The appeal, however, came to be rejected by order dated 27th September
2006, whereupon the petitioner invoked the revisional jurisdiction by filing a
revision petition dated 8th November 2006. The Revisional Authority, by
order dated 10th July 2007, declined interference and affirmed the penalty.
3
4. The petitioner thereafter elaborated the factual foundation underlying his
allegation of mala fides. He contended that the Deputy Commandant had
orchestrated several dummy checks with the object of falsely implicating
him. In one such exercise, a Head Constable, namely HC/GD A.K. Chhetry,
allegedly permitted a decoy to pass after examining certain proof of identity.
According to the petitioner, the said Head Constable admitted his lapse
before the Deputy Commandant, yet, at the latter’s insistence, a General
Diary entry was made attributing responsibility to the petitioner.
Apprehending adverse action on the basis of the said GD entry, the
petitioner submitted an application dated 9th November 2005 requesting
preservation of the CCTV footage of 6th November 2005 so that the recording
might be used as exculpatory evidence.
5. The petitioner asserted that despite the admitted involvement of the said
Head Constable, an explanation was called for from the petitioner alone
upon the allegation that he too had checked the decoy. By his reply dated
28th November 2005, the petitioner specifically denied the accusation and
maintained that neither had HC/GD A.K. Chhetry informed him regarding
the decoy nor had he personally checked the individual concerned.
6. According to the petitioner, the hostility of the Deputy Commandant
thereafter deepened into a further disciplinary proceeding. A second
memorandum of charges dated 5th December 2005 was issued under Rule
35 of the CISF Rules, 2001. Once again the petitioner sought supply of
relevant documents by an application dated 11th December 2005. The
response dated 12th December 2005 informed him that official documents
4
could not be furnished and directed him merely to submit his reply to the
charge-sheet. The petitioner, by a detailed representation dated 24th
December 2005, denied all allegations and asserted that the proceeding had
been initiated under the influence of personal bias and predetermined
hostility.
7. The petitioner stated that notwithstanding such defence, the disciplinary
authority by final order dated 30th December 2005 imposed upon him the
penalty of withholding of one increment for a period of one year. An appeal
dated 28th January 2006 was preferred against the said punishment, yet the
Appellate Authority rejected the same by order dated 28th September 2006.
A revision petition dated 14th November 2006 also met with identical fate
when the Revisional Authority by order dated 19th July 2007 affirmed the
punishment.
8. The petitioner consistently maintained that the appellate and revisional
authorities failed to appreciate that the entire disciplinary exercise had been
vitiated by personal prejudice harboured by the disciplinary authority. It was
specifically urged that although the proceedings had purportedly been
initiated under Rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 2001, once the delinquent
employee had demanded a formal enquiry in view of disputed factual
allegations, elementary fairness required that no punishment be inflicted
without conducting such enquiry. The petitioner lastly contended that when
another Head Constable had already admitted that he had checked the
alleged decoy, the continuance of disciplinary liability against the petitioner
5
stood bereft of any rational foundation and the impugned penalties were
therefore liable to be quashed.
9. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the
disciplinary proceedings as a manifestation of personal animosity rather
than a bona fide exercise of statutory authority. It was urged that the Deputy
Commandant, who functioned as the disciplinary authority, harboured a
deeply entrenched prejudice against the petitioner and, under the cloak of
administrative discipline, initiated proceedings actuated not by institutional
necessity but by individual hostility. According to the submissions advanced,
the penalties ultimately imposed upon the petitioner were the consequence
of an arbitrary and excessive exercise of authority, wholly divorced from
fairness, objectivity and reasoned adjudication.
10. The petitioner’s learned Advocate contended that the initiation of the
proceedings themselves lacked any lawful or substantial foundation. The
allegations contained in the memoranda of charges, it was argued, were
unsupported by any reliable material capable of sustaining disciplinary
culpability. The disciplinary authority, notwithstanding the absence of
substantive evidence, proceeded to inflict punishments upon conjectural
assumptions and speculative inferences. Such findings, according to the
petitioner, were not merely erroneous but perverse, inasmuch as they rested
upon no legally acceptable evidentiary basis.
11. A substantial limb of the petitioner’s challenge centred around the denial of
access to the relevant documents. Learned counsel submitted that repeated
prayers were made seeking supply of official records and materials connected
6
with the allegations, yet the authorities withheld the same without
justification. Such refusal, it was argued, struck at the very root of natural
justice, for a delinquent employee deprived of the foundational documents of
the proceeding is effectively denied a meaningful opportunity of defence. The
petitioner asserted that the disciplinary exercise thus became procedurally
infirm from its inception.
12. Particular emphasis was laid upon the nature of the proceedings initiated
under the CISF Rules, 2001. Learned counsel submitted that even in
matters concerning minor penalties, once the delinquent employee disputes
the allegations and specifically seeks a regular departmental enquiry,
elementary fairness obliges the disciplinary authority to hold such enquiry
before arriving at adverse findings. In the present matter, despite the
petitioner’s unequivocal demand for a formal enquiry, no such process was
undertaken. According to the petitioner, the omission was deliberate, for the
disciplinary authority was fully conscious that no dependable evidence
existed to substantiate the accusations contained in the charge-sheets.
13. The Learned Advocate further argued that the allegations themselves were
inherently fragile. The gravamen of the accusation related to failure to detect
a “dummy check” or decoy. It was contended that inability to detect a
simulated decoy, unlike failure in relation to an actual security threat, could
not automatically or mechanically amount to negligence or dereliction of
duty. The petitioner maintained that the authorities impermissibly elevated a
controlled internal exercise into a finding of misconduct without
demonstrating any real lapse compromising airport security. Such
7
reasoning, according to the petitioner, revealed a predetermined effort to
fasten blame upon him irrespective of the factual realities.
14. The petitioner also questioned the integrity of the appellate and revisional
processes. Learned counsel submitted that within the departmental
mechanism, whenever an appeal or revision petition is preferred, paragraph-
wise comments are sought from the disciplinary authority whose decision is
under challenge. In the present case, such comments were allegedly
prepared behind the back of the petitioner and thereafter formed the basis
upon which the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority affirmed the
punishments. The petitioner asserted that the continuation of the same
prejudicial influence throughout the appellate hierarchy deprived the
subsequent proceedings of impartiality and rendered the affirming orders
equally tainted.
15. It was further contended that the penalties inflicted upon the petitioner
constituted a gross misuse of the disciplinary powers vested in the authority
concerned. The petitioner maintained that the entire process bore the
unmistakable imprint of personal vendetta rather than institutional
discipline. The impugned orders, according to the submissions advanced,
exposed the petitioner to serious civil consequences, professional humiliation
and irreparable prejudice affecting his service career and reputation.
16. The learned Advocate finally submitted that no efficacious or alternative
remedy survived in the facts of the present case and that unless the
impugned orders of punishment, together with the appellate and revisional
affirmations, were set aside by judicial intervention, the petitioner would
8
continue to suffer grave and irreversible injury. The writ petition was
therefore presented as the only effective constitutional recourse available for
restoration of fairness, procedural propriety and protection against arbitrary
exercise of disciplinary power.
17. The Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents resisted the
writ petition by presenting the disciplinary action as a measured and lawful
response to a grave security lapse occurring within the sensitive precincts of
an airport installation guarded by the Central Industrial Security Force. The
respondents contended that the petitioner, while posted at CISF Bagdogra
Airport, was proceeded against strictly in accordance with the provisions of
the CISF Rules, 2001 and that no element of arbitrariness, prejudice or
procedural impropriety could be attributed to the authorities concerned.
18. The respondents narrated that on 24th September 2005 the petitioner had
been deployed at the main entry gate on the landside of Bagdogra Airport
from 9:00 A.M. until 8:00 P.M. During the course of a routine dummy
security exercise, a decoy officer carrying a fabricated personal identity card
approached the gate seeking access to the airport premises. According to the
respondents, the petitioner failed to examine the false identity card and
permitted the decoy to enter the airport building without proper scrutiny.
Such conduct, it was urged, amounted to a serious dereliction of duty in an
area where vigilance and verification constituted the primary obligations of
the deployed security personnel. On the basis of the said lapse, the
disciplinary authority, namely the Deputy Commandant Shri Rohitaswa
9
Kumar, initiated proceedings under Rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 2001 by
issuing Charge Memorandum No. 369 dated 31st October 2005.
19. The respondents further submitted that instead of furnishing a substantive
reply to the charge memorandum, the petitioner initially sought certain
documents by an application dated 2nd November 2005. The authorities,
however, by communication dated 10th November 2005, declined to furnish
the same upon the ground that the documents sought bore no nexus with
the allegations contained in the charge memorandum. It was contended that
the petitioner thereafter, by a further application dated 20th November 2005,
characterised the departmental explanation as inadequate and sought an
enquiry under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2001.
20. According to the respondents, the disciplinary authority carefully examined
the petitioner’s explanation and found the same unsatisfactory. The
authorities maintained that the petitioner had failed in the discharge of his
elementary duty of checking entry credentials and preventing unauthorised
ingress into the airport premises. In view of such lapse, the disciplinary
authority imposed the penalty of “censure”. The respondents emphasised
that the petitioner’s function at the gate was neither ceremonial nor passive;
rather, he had been specifically entrusted with the responsibility of verifying
passes, tickets and identity credentials before permitting entry to any
individual within the airport complex.
21. The respondents further disclosed that the petitioner carried the matter in
appeal, yet the Appellate Authority by order dated 27th September 2006
affirmed the punishment. The appellate authority observed that the
10
petitioner’s contention that he had no instruction to verify entry passes was
wholly untenable, for the very object of deploying security personnel at an
entry gate is to ensure that only authorised persons are permitted access
upon due verification of identity documents and passes. The appellate
authority thus found no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the
disciplinary authority.
22. The respondents thereafter referred to the revision petition dated 8th
November 2006 preferred by the petitioner. The Revisional Authority, upon
consideration of the materials on record, rejected the revision petition by
order dated 10th July 2007 holding the same devoid of merit. The revisional
authority observed that the petitioner had not been posted at the gate merely
as a silent observer but as a trained security personnel entrusted with the
solemn responsibility of preventing unauthorised access to a highly sensitive
establishment.
23. It was additionally submitted that by order dated 31st December 2005 the
petitioner had also been visited with the punishment of withholding of one
increment for a period of one year. The respondents maintained that the
disciplinary action was entirely consistent with the framework of the CISF
Rules, 2001 and arose out of the petitioner’s proven negligence in relation to
security duties. The respondents clarified that proceedings were initially
commenced under Rule 37 and thereafter the disciplinary process continued
in accordance with the applicable provisions governing departmental action.
24. The Learned Advocate for the respondents laid particular stress upon the
nature of the petitioner’s duties as a member of a uniformed force entrusted
11
with aviation security. It was urged that the petitioner, having undergone
specialised Aviation Security training and being attached to an armed
security establishment, was fully conscious of the grave consequences that
even a seemingly minor lapse could produce within an airport environment.
In institutions connected with civil aviation, negligence in verification
procedures cannot be trivialised, for a single act of inattention possesses the
potential to expose the airport and its passengers to serious hazards.
25. The respondents further narrated that on 24th September 2005, prior to the
arrival of the Chief Minister of the State, a routine dummy check had been
conducted at Bagdogra Airport by a Sub-Officer of the airport authorities.
During the exercise, the decoy officer pretending to be an airport official was
allegedly permitted entry without proper verification of the visual particulars
appearing upon the fabricated identity card and without formal frisking by
the petitioner. The respondents therefore asserted that the petitioner’s
negligence stood clearly established from the contemporaneous
circumstances and justified the disciplinary measures imposed upon him.
26. The respondents ultimately maintained that the punishment of censure did
not warrant judicial interference. It was submitted that the penalty had been
imposed after due consideration of the petitioner’s explanation and did not
carry any enduring adverse consequence affecting his future promotional
prospects or financial entitlements beyond the immediate disciplinary
context. According to the respondents, the writ petition thus disclosed no
ground warranting exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court.
12
27. The gravamen of the allegations levelled against the petitioner pertains to his
failure, while discharging duties at the entry gate of Bagdogra Airport, to
subject a decoy officer carrying a fabricated identity card to the degree of
scrutiny expected from a trained member of the Central Industrial Security
Force entrusted with aviation security. The petitioner has endeavoured to
portray the disciplinary action as an outcome of personal hostility
entertained by the Deputy Commandant and has further contended that the
proceedings stood vitiated by denial of documents, absence of a regular
enquiry and lack of evidence. The respondents, on the other hand, have
consistently maintained that the petitioner was deployed at a highly sensitive
point of access within the airport premises and that the disciplinary action
arose from a demonstrable lapse in the discharge of official duty.
28. It is undeniable that members of the CISF entrusted with airport security
perform functions carrying profound implications for public safety and
institutional security. Verification of entry passes, identity credentials and
authorisation documents cannot be reduced to a routine mechanical
exercise, for the efficacy of airport security architecture rests substantially
upon vigilance at points of ingress. Even a seemingly minor omission
possesses the potential to compromise the sanctity of a protected
establishment. The materials placed before this Court reveal that during a
routine dummy check conducted prior to the arrival of the Hon’ble Chief
Minister of the State, the decoy officer succeeded in entering the airport
premises without effective verification of the identity credentials presented
13
before the petitioner. The disciplinary authority, therefore, cannot be said to
have acted upon a wholly imaginary or non-existent factual foundation.
29. The petitioner has repeatedly emphasised that another security personnel
had admitted his own lapse and that the proceedings were animated by
personal prejudice. Yet, allegations of mala fides demand a degree of
precision and substantiation far greater than mere suspicion or
dissatisfaction with administrative action. Except for broad assertions
imputing hostility to the disciplinary authority, no cogent material has been
placed before this Court from which institutional bias or deliberate
victimisation may be conclusively inferred. The record rather discloses that
the petitioner was afforded opportunity to submit explanations, pursue
appellate remedies and invoke revisional jurisdiction.
30. Equally unpersuasive is the contention that the absence of a full-fledged
departmental enquiry by itself vitiates the proceedings. The punishment
initially imposed was one of censure, falling within the category of minor
penalties contemplated under the CISF Rules, 2001. Though fairness
remains the governing principle even in proceedings concerning minor
penalties, the extent and formality of enquiry necessarily varies according to
the nature of punishment proposed and the surrounding circumstances. The
materials on record demonstrate that the petitioner was informed of the
allegations, permitted to furnish his explanation and heard at successive
departmental stages. The Court cannot lose sight of the distinction between
a disciplinary irregularity causing substantial prejudice and a mere
procedural dissatisfaction incapable of invalidating the ultimate decision.
14
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF M.P. AND ANR. V. I.A.
QURESHI1, has held the following:
“8. We are unable to accept the said contention of Shri Khanduja.
“Censure” cannot be equated with a warning since under Rule 10 of the
M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966,
“censure” is one of the minor penalties that can be imposed on a
government servant. It cannot, therefore, be said that the penalty of
censure which was imposed on the respondent in the departmental
proceedings was not a penalty as contemplated in the circular dated 2-5-
1990. Once it is held that a minor penalty has been imposed on the
respondent in the departmental proceedings, the direction given in the
said circular would be applicable and the sealed cover containing
recommendations of the DPC could not be opened and the
recommendations of the DPC could not be given effect because the
respondent has not been fully exonerated and a minor penalty has been
imposed. The respondent can only be considered for promotion on
prospective basis from a date after the conclusion of the departmental
proceedings.”
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of UNION OF INDIA & ORS. V. LT.
COL. KULDEEP YADAV2, has held the following:
“38. The Policy of awarding of censure provides that the censure, which
can be ‘Severe Displeasure (Recordable)’, ‘Severe Displeasure
(Non-Recordable)’ and ‘Displeasure’, is awarded for an act, conduct,
omission or offences of minor nature and not in case involving moral
turpitude, fraud, theft, dishonesty and misappropriation. The respondent
authority having issued the show cause notice asking the applicant to1
AIRONLINE 1996 SC 9042
AIRONLINE 2019 SC 1140
15show cause as to why he should not be censured, has accepted the fact
that the applicant’s act or conduct is not serious, but of minor nature and
not an act involving moral turpitude, fraud, theft, dishonesty or
misappropriation, for which one has to be tried either by Court Martial or
by prosecution in a Civil Court.
39. The applicant, however, undoubtedly has to punished for his lapses,
which he has admitted. Hence though we are of the considered opinion
that while the action of the respondents in awarding censure cannot be
faulted, punishment of ‘Severe Displeasure (Recordable)’ does not
commensurate with the act and conduct of the applicant having regard to
the facts and circumstances involved as it leads to denial of promotion to
otherwise a bright officer.
26. The Tribunal also erroneously assumed that the competent authority
opted to resort to administrative action by awarding censure instead of
Court Martial, because it had condoned the misconduct of respondent
being of a minor nature and not being a case involving moral turpitude,
fraud, theft, dishonesty and misappropriation. This basis is plainly
misdirected and not in conformity with the applicable policy regarding
award of censure to Officers and JCO’s circulated vide communication
dated 23rd April, 2007. In fact, the Tribunal has extracted the relevant
portion of the said policy, which clearly predicates that in cases, which
are not of a minor nature and not an act involving moral turpitude, fraud,
theft, dishonesty, financial irregularities or misappropriation where trial
by a Court Martial is not practicable or is inexpedient due to other
reasons, may if found appropriate, be forwarded to Integrated HQ of MoD
(Army) (DV Dte) at the discretion of the GOCinC for consideration of the
award of censure by the COAS/Government. The case of the respondent
would certainly fall within the purview of the said clause. Indubitably,
just because the competent authority chose to dispense with the
disciplinary action of Court Martial qua the respondent, does not make
16the misconduct and misdemeanour of the respondent any less serious
much less to be of a minor nature as assumed by the Tribunal. Notably,
the Tribunal has taken such erroneous approach despite having noticed
that the respondent had admitted all the allegations made against him in
the show cause notice.”
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of STATE OF U.P VS VIJAY KUMAR
TRIPATHI & ANR3, has held the following:
“7. Rule 55-B (a) of the U.P.C.C.A. Rules, it is obvious does not exclude or
prohibit the observance of the principles of natural justice. It only says, it
is not obligatory to either frame-formal charges or to call for the
explanation of the concerned employee before imposing the penalty of
censure. The normal rule enunciated by this Court is that wherever it is
necessary too ensure against the failure of justice, principles of natural
justice must be read into a provisions. Such a course, of course, is not
permissible where the rule excludes, either expressly or by necessary
intendment, the application of the principles of natural justice but in that
event validity of Rule may fail for consideration. Consistent with the
above rule, we must hold that, ordinarily speaking, an opportunity to
show cause against the proposed imposition of penalty of censure should
be given to the concerned employee before its imposition. Censure is a
penalty. It cannot also be said that it has no adverse consequences; it
has. Hence, the necessity to read the said principles. It would certainly be
open to the competent authority in a given case to provide a post-
decisional opportunity instead of pre-decisional hearing. (There may
indeed be exceptional situations where the principles of natural Justice
may have to be dispensed with, but they are an exception.) It is upto the
competent authority to decide whether in the given circumstances the3
AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 1130
17opportunity to be provided should be a prior one or a post- decisional
opportunity. Normal rule, of course, is prior opportunity.”
34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of RANI LAXMIBAI KSHETRIYA
GRAMIN BANK& … VS MANOJ KUMAR CHAK ETC 4.:
“40. There is another very good reason for not accepting the submissions
made by Mr. Dhruv Mehta. Different rules/regulations of the banks
provide specific punishments such as “withholding of promotion,
reduction in rank, lowering in ranks/pay scales”. However, there is
another range of penalty such as censure, reprimand, withholding of
increments etc. which are also prescribed under various staff regulations.
To debar such an employee from being considered for promotion would
tantamount to also inflicting on such employee, the punishment of
withholding of promotion. In such circumstances, a punishment of
censure/ reprimand would, in fact, read as censure/reprimand + 5 years
debarment from promotion. Thus the circulars issued by the bank
debarring such employees from being considered would be clearly
contrary to the statutory rules. The circulars clearly do not fall within the
ratio in Sant Ram’s case (supra).”
35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held the following in STATE BANK OF
INDIA VS. C.K. KARUNAKARAN 5:
“In State of M.P. & Anr. Vs. I.A. Qureshi1 it has been opined that once a
minor penalty has been imposed on the employee in departmental
proceedings, the directions given in respect of the relevant circular would
be applicable and the sealed cover recommendation of DPC cannot be
opened and the recommendation of the DPC cannot be given effect to
because the employee has not been fully exonerated when a minor4
AIR 2013 SUPREME COURT 2473
5
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6821/2009
18penalty has been imposed. The employee can only be considered for
promotion on prospective basis from the date after the conclusion of the
departmental proceeding. Similarly, c2 it has been opined that awarding
of censure is a blame worthy factor and where even such a penalty has
been imposed the findings of the sealed cover are not to be acted upon
and the case for promotion may be considered by the next DPC in the
normal course.”
36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held the following in STATE OF
RAJASTHAN & ORS VS SHANKAR LAL PARMAR 6:
“8. Another Department of the Appellant-State, Office of Director General
of Police (Rajasthan) in its wisdom, deemed it fit to further clarify the
position and issued another Circular dated 23.07.1992. The relevant
portion of the said circular is reproduced hereinbelow:
“As far as there is question of censure, it shall be not taken into account
as unsatisfactory service record for the purpose of grant of selection pay
scale, and it shall not be obstructive in grant of selection pay-scale. The
period of last seven years shall be counted from the year, for which he is
to be given promotion.”
10. However, during the interregnum period between 25.01.1992 to
24.07.1995, certain employees were granted the benefit of the Selection
Grades, despite having earned censure. But after issuance of the
subsequent Office Order/ letter dated 24.07.1995, Appellant-State
started the recovery of the amounts from those employees who were
granted Selection Grades even though they had earned censure. This led
to filing of several Writ Petitions in the High Court, the 1st being Devi
Singh’s case (supra) referred hereinabove. All the subsequent line of
cases followed the same process.
6
AIR 2012 SUPREME COURT 1913
19
11. To further clarify the Circular dated 23.07.1992 issued by Director
General of Police, Rajasthan, relevant portion, reproduced at Para 8
hereinabove, another clarificatory Circular dated 24.08.1995 was issued.
Thus, vide this subsequent Circular, the last paragraph containing the
following words “as far as there is question of punishment of censure, it
shall not be considered in service record as unsatisfactory in grant of
selection grade and shall not be impediment in grant of selection grade”
mentioned in last paragraphs of Circular No. V.
15(10)P.Force/Const./90/3439"
37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held the following in UNION OF
INDIA & ORS VS A.N. MOHANAN 7:
“Though learned counsel for the respondent submitted that awarding of
censure does not amount to awarding of penalty, the same is clearly
untenable. In Union of India etc.etc. v. K.V. Jankiramanetc.etc. (AIR 1991
SC 2010) at page 2017 it was held as follows:
“We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal
that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he
is not found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty
even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher
post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have
normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings.
However, there may be cases where the proceedings, whether
disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the
employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in
the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-
availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In
such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the
power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the
intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life
7
2007 AIR SCW 2773
20being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively
all the circumstances under which such consideration may become
necessary. To ignore, however, such circumstances when they exist and
lay down an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is
exonerated from disciplinary/ criminal proceedings he should be entitled
to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the,
administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable
to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would
in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the
said last sentence in the first sub-paragraph after clause (iii) of paragraph
3 of the said Memorandum, viz., “but no arrears of pay shall be payable
to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual
promotion”, we direct that in place of the said sentence the following
sentence be read in the Memorandum:
dated 23.07.1992 issued by this office, being contrary to Rules, was
withdrawn with immediate effect. This Circular alongwith the office
order/letter of Finance Department (Rules Division) dated 24.07.1995,
clearly stipulates that for the purposes of grant of Selection Grade, in
cases where an employee has earned a censure, the censure should not
be treated either as an impediment or obstruction for consideration of his
promotion but his case for such a grant would be deferred by one year.”
38. At this juncture, it becomes necessary to remind oneself of the settled
contours governing the jurisdiction of a writ court in disciplinary matters.
Judicial review does not operate as an appellate reassessment of factual
conclusions reached by departmental authorities. The High Court, while
exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, does not re-
appreciate evidence as though sitting in appeal over disciplinary findings.
Interference is ordinarily justified only where the proceedings are vitiated by
21
patent illegality, violation of natural justice, absence of jurisdiction, manifest
perversity or punishment so outrageously disproportionate as to shock the
conscience of the Court. So long as there exists some material upon which
the disciplinary authority could reasonably arrive at its conclusion, the writ
court refrains from supplanting its own opinion for that of the competent
authority.
39. In the present case, this Court is unable to hold that the finding of
negligence was founded upon no evidence whatsoever. The petitioner
admittedly stood deployed at the entry gate of the airport and the allegation
relates to failure in verifying the credentials of a decoy officer during a
security exercise. Whether the lapse deserved a sterner or more lenient
treatment lies primarily within the disciplinary domain of the employer and
not within the discretionary substitutionary jurisdiction of this Court.
40. Simultaneously, this Court is conscious that the punishment imposed upon
the petitioner is one of censure. A censure is not a mere warning
administered in casual terms; it constitutes a recognised minor penalty
within the disciplinary framework governing the service. Nevertheless, the
proportionality of the punishment must also be appreciated in the context of
the nature of the lapse alleged and the fact that the authorities themselves
have not considered the misconduct grave enough to warrant removal,
reduction in rank or any major civil consequence. The penalty imposed thus
cannot be characterised as shockingly disproportionate requiring judicial
interdiction.
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41. However, having regard to the nature of the punishment and in order to
ensure that the minor penalty does not assume consequences
disproportionate to the misconduct alleged, this Court deems it appropriate
to clarify that the punishment of censure imposed upon the petitioner shall
not operate to his detriment in relation to future promotional avenues or
financial benefits arising in the ordinary course of service with reference to
the instant charge. The censure shall remain confined to the disciplinary
record pertaining to the episode in question and shall not be construed in a
manner causing enduring prejudice to the petitioner’s service career beyond
what is legitimately contemplated under the Rules.
42. In view of the above discussions, the instant writ petition being WPA 25799
of 2007 is disposed of.
43. There is no order as to costs.
44. Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on
priority basis on compliance of all formalities.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)
