Orissa High Court
Mangul Chatar vs State Of Orissa on 22 May, 2026
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRA No. 27 of 2002
(In the matter of an application under Section 374 (2) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973)
1. Mangul Chatar
2. Sujan Chatar
3. Subnath Chatar ...... Appellants
-Versus-
State of Orissa ...... Respondent
For the Appellants : Ms. Ananya Mishra, Amicus Curiae
For the Respondent : Mr. Jateswar Nayak, AGA
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA
Date of Hearing: 05.05.2026 : Date of Judgment: 22.05.2026
S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal has been preferred by the
appellants assailing the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 29.01.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Bolangir in Sessions Case No. 86/15(B) of 2000 (Arising out of G.R.
Case No.39 of 2000 of the Court of S.D.J.M., Patnagarh), whereby
the learned Trial Court, while acquitting the accused persons of thecharges under Sections 294/307/34 of the Indian Penal Code,
convicted the accused-appellants for the offence punishable under
Section 325/34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a period of two years, with the benefit of set-off for
the period already undergone as under trial prisoners.
2. The appeal has been pending since 2002. When the matter was
called for hearing, none have been appearing for appellants
continuously. Therefore on 16.12.2025, when the matter was taken up
for hearing, Ms. Ananya Mishra, learned counsel, who was present in
Court, was requested to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae, who has
readily accepted the same and obtained the record of the case and
assisted the Court very effectively in the capacity of Amicus Curiae.
3. Heard Ms. Ananya Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae for the
appellant and Mr. Jateswar Nayak, learned Additional Standing
Counsel for the State.
4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the informant, Gomati
Chhatar (P.W.3), the wife of the injured, Daitari Chhatar (P.W.8).
Page 2 of 19
Accused Mangulu Chhatar is the younger brother of P.W.8 and the
remaining accused persons are the sons of accused Mangulu Chhatar.
It is alleged that on 25.03.2000 at about 10.00 A.M., while P.W.8 was
cutting trees standing on his own land, the accused persons arrived at
the spot and questioned him as to why he was cutting the trees. When
P.W.8 replied that he intended to sell the trees, the accused persons
allegedly became enraged, abused him in obscene language and
assaulted him by means of ‘merhas’ (lathis), causing multiple injuries
on his person. Due to the assault, P.W.8 allegedly sustained fracture
injuries on his right arm and left thigh.
During the course of the occurrence, when P.W.3 protested, accused
Sujan allegedly assaulted her, causing injuries to her hand.
Immediately thereafter, P.W.3 went to the village and narrated the
occurrence before P.Ws.1, 4 and 5 and other villagers, who, on her
request, removed the injured P.W.8 back to the village. The villagers
noticed the injuries on the person of P.W.8. Subsequently, with the
assistance of others, P.W.3 shifted the injured to Lathore P.H.C. and
lodged a written report vide Ext.6 at Lathore Outpost.
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On receipt of the said report, the A.S.I. attached to the Outpost made
an entry in the station diary, forwarded the report to Khaprakhol
Police Station for registration of the case and took up investigation.
On 26.03.2000, the O.I.C., Khaprakhol P.S., registered the case and
directed the A.S.I. of Lathore Outpost to continue with the
investigation.
During investigation, the Investigating Officer visited the spot,
examined the witnesses and got P.Ws.3 and 8 medically examined at
Lathore P.H.C. Since the condition of P.W.8 required further
treatment, he was referred to and medically examined at the Sub-
Divisional Hospital, Patnagarh.
It is further alleged that on 28.04.2000 at about 10.30 A.M., the A.S.I.
of Lathore Outpost seized three lathis produced by accused Mangulu
Chhatar at village Patrapali in presence of witnesses and sent the
same to the Medical Officer, Lathore P.H.C., for opinion as to
whether the injuries sustained by P.W.8 could have been caused by
the said weapons. The Medical Officer reportedly opined in the
affirmative. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was
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submitted against the accused persons through the O.I.C., Khaprakhol
P.S.
5. The accused-appellants denied the allegations levelled against
them in toto and pleaded complete innocence. The defence case, in
substance, is that on the date of the alleged occurrence, P.W.8
assaulted accused Mangulu Chhatar on his head by means of an axe,
causing bleeding injury. It is contended that accused Mangulu
Chhatar immediately reported the matter at Lathore Outpost and,
pursuant to police requisition, he was medically examined by the
Medical Officer of Lathore P.H.C. It is further stated that the police
also seized his blood-stained clothes during investigation. According
to the defence, since accused Mangulu Chhatar had lodged the report
against P.W.8, the present case has been falsely foisted against the
accused persons with fabricated allegations.
6. In order to substantiate the charges against the accused persons,
the prosecution examined altogether eight witnesses, while the
defence did not adduce any oral evidence. P.Ws.1, 4 and 5 were post-
occurrence witnesses. P.W.2 was also a post-occurrence witness and
the scribe of the F.I.R. marked as Ext.6. P.W.3 was the informant,
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whereas P.W.8 was the injured witness. P.W.6, the Medical Officer of
Lathore P.H.C., had medically examined P.Ws.3 and 8 on police
requisition on 25.03.2000. P.W.7, the doctor attached to the Sub-
Divisional Hospital, Patnagarh, had also medically examined P.W.8
on police requisition on 26.03.2000. The Investigating Officer,
however, could not be examined by the prosecution as he had expired
during the pendency of the case.
7. The learned trial court after analyzing the evidence on
record and by taking into consideration the relevant provisions of law
came to the conclusion that the essential ingredients to attract the
offence under Sections 294/307/34 of IPC in the present case is
lacking, however, convicted the accused appellants U/s.325/34 of
IPC. Relevant parts of the impugned judgment read thus:-
“10. As regards the offence u/s.294 I,P.C. there is no
evidence on record showing that the accused persons had
uttered obscene words to the annoyance of p.w.8 in or
near a public place. Thus, the charge u/s.294/34 I.P.C.
against the accused persons fails.
11. In the decision reported in (1995) OCR-44
(Meghanath alias Meghanad Pradhan-vrs-State) it has
been held by the Hon’ble Court as follows:-
“The language employed in Sec. 307 I.P.C. makes
it clear that intention or knowledge of the
assailant is the primary requirement to constitutePage 6 of 19
the offence. It depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case to find out whether the
accused had the intention to cause death or knew
in the circumstances, that his act was going to
cause death. Though no direct evidence can be led
as to what was the intention of the accused,
however, same can be ascertained from the nature
of the weapon used, the intention expressed by
him at the time of the act, the motive for the crime,
the nature and size of the injuries, the seat of
assault and the severity of the blow or blows. It is,
however, not necessary that the injury actually
caused to the victim should be sufficient in the
ordinary circumstances to cause death. What the
court is to see is whether the act irrespective of its
result, was done with the intention or knowledge
and under circumstances mentioned in the
Section.”
In the instant case the evidence brought on record clearly
shows that the accused persons in furtherance of their
common intention voluntarily caused grievous hurt to
p.w.8 on the alleged, date time, and place. The grievous
injuries had not been caused on any vital part of the body
of p.w.8. There is no evidence on record showing that the
accused, persons had expressed their intention to kill
p.w.8 at the time of the occurrence. On the other hand, it
is in the evidence of p.w.8 that the accused persons
stopped assaulting him when p.w.3 requested them not to
assault him any further. Taking into consideration the
above facts, it can safely be held that the prosecution has
failed to prove the charges u/s.307/34 I.P.C. against the
accused persons.
11. In view of my foregoing discussions, I find that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges
u/ss.294/307/34 I.P.C. but has successfully proved the
charge u/s.325/34 I.P.C. against the accused persons
beyond all reasonable doubts. Hence, while acquitting the
accused persons of the charges u/ss.294/307/34 I.P.C. I
find them quilty of the charge u/s.325/34 I.P.C. and
convict them thereunder.”
Page 7 of 19
8. Ms. Mishra, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the
appellants, at the outset, submitted that the present case admittedly
arises out of a case and counter-case situation, the connected matter
being G.R. Case No.38 of 2000. It was contended that although the
initiation of the cross case is evident from the materials available on
record, neither the outcome thereof nor the nature and effect of the
proceedings conducted therein have been brought on record or
discussed by the learned Trial Court while adjudicating the present
case. Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the injured
witness, namely Daitari Chhatar (P.W.8), and accused-appellant No.1,
Manglu Chhatar, are brothers by relationship and that the occurrence
in question stemmed from a family feud relating to landed property
and cutting of trees standing over the disputed land. It was argued that
the entire prosecution case has to be viewed in the backdrop of such
strained familial relations and the admitted enmity existing between
the parties.
It was further contended that accused-appellant No.1, Manglu
Chhatar, was in fact the informant in the aforesaid G.R. Case No.38
of 2000 and had himself sustained injuries in the same occurrence.
Page 8 of 19
Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the defence version
consistently remained that P.W.8 had assaulted accused Manglu
Chhatar on the head by means of an axe, causing bleeding injuries,
pursuant to which he immediately approached the police and lodged
the report. It was argued that the very institution of the counter case
probabilises the defence plea that the occurrence was a mutual fight
between close agnates arising out of a sudden quarrel and not a
unilateral assault as projected by the prosecution. Such suppression of
the occurrence which is clearly revealed from the cross examination
of the examining doctor, creates serious doubt regarding the fairness
and completeness of the prosecution story.
It was thus contended that in absence of proper consideration of
the cross case, the learned Trial Court ought to have exercised greater
caution while appreciating the testimony of the interested and related
witnesses, especially when the independent witnesses examined by
the prosecution are merely post-occurrence witnesses.
9. In the light of the aforementioned submissions advanced on
behalf of the appellants, this Court has meticulously examined and
scrutinized the evidence available on record. Though it appears from
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the materials on record that the occurrence had its genesis in a family
dispute relating to land and cutting of trees standing thereon,
nevertheless, there remains no room for doubt that the injured, namely
P.W.8, sustained grievous injuries in the course of the occurrence.
The factum of such injuries stands clearly established from the
consistent and cogent medical evidence adduced by the prosecution
through P.Ws.6 and 7, who had medically examined the injured at
different stages. Their evidence fully corroborates the ocular
testimony of the injured witness with regard to the nature and extent
of injuries sustained by him. For the sake of ready reference and
proper appreciation, the relevant portions of the evidence of the said
medical witnesses are reproduced herein below:
Evidence of P.W.6
“I examined Daitarii Chhatar, S/o late Kaintu, Chhatar of
vill-Patrapali, on police requisition and found the
following injuries on his person:
1) One laceration 2 c.m. x 1/2 C.m.x 1/2c.m. on scalp over
right parietel region; The injury was simple in nature and
might have been caused by friction on a hard and blunt
object. Time of injury was within 24 hour’s.
2. I have detected two fractures on his person. (1)
Fracture on right humerus and fracture on the left femour.
I referred the injured to Patnagarh hospital for X-ray and
necessary, treatment. This is my injury report marked
Ext.2 and my signature is Ext.2/1.”
Page 10 of 19
Evidence of P.W.7
“I examined Daitari Chhatar, S/o Kaintu Chhatar of
Patrapali on police requisition and found the following
injuries on his person.
i) Laceration 3″ x ½” x scalp deep over the vertex
obliqually 2″ left to mid-line and above the left pina.
ii) Fracture of right arm at the junction of upper 2/3rd and
lower 1/3rd. Huge swelling was there at the site of fracture
due to haematoma.
iii) Fracture of left thigh at the junction of upper 2/3rd and
lower 1/3rd. There was huge swelling due to large
haematoma at the fracture site.
iv) Laceration 1″ x 1/2″ x skin deep over middle of right
leg lying vertically over the shin of tibia.
Injury Nos. 2 and 3 were grievous in nature and injury
Nos.1 and 4 were simple in nature. All the injuries can, be
caused by hard and blunt object. The general condition of
the patient was bad. Patient was in a stage of shock. X-ray
plates taken on same day also shows fractures as
described in injury Nos.2 and 3.”
Merely because the occurrence arose out of a family dispute or
because there existed a counter case between the parties, the same by
itself cannot be a ground to discard the otherwise reliable evidence
regarding the grievous injuries sustained by the injured witness.
It further appears from the impugned judgment that upon
careful appreciation of the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court
did not find sufficient material to hold the accused persons guilty of
the offences under Sections 294 and 307 IPC and accordingly
acquitted them of the said charges. However, having found the
prosecution evidence trustworthy insofar as the offence of voluntarily
Page 11 of 19
causing grievous hurt is concerned, the learned Trial Court convicted
the appellants under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC.
This Court finds no infirmity in the said finding recorded by the
learned Trial Court. The conclusion arrived at by the court below is
well-founded on the evidence. Accordingly, the conviction and
sentence of the appellants under Section 325/34 IPC are hereby
affirmed.
10. At this stage, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the
appellants submitted that the occurrence in question relates back to
the year 2000. At the time of the alleged incident, appellant No.1 was
about 50 years of age, whereas appellant Nos.2 and 3 were aged about
23 years and 21 years respectively, and by now they have advanced
considerably in age. It was further submitted that the appellants were
convicted by judgment dated 29.01.2002 and since then the present
appeal has remained pending for more than two decades. Additionally
it is also submitted that the accused appellants have already
undergone about 3 months and 26 days to custody. Learned counsel
accordingly contended that considering the long lapse of time, the
period undergone, the age of the appellants and the protracted
Page 12 of 19
pendency of the appeal since the year 2002. She further submitted that
during the long intervening period, the appellants have been leading a
peaceful and dignified life in society and are presently settled in their
respective family lives. It was contended that after lapse of more than
two decades from the date of occurrence and conviction, sending the
appellants back to custody at this stage would serve no meaningful
penological purpose and may rather prove counter-productive,
particularly when there is nothing on record to indicate their
involvement in any subsequent criminal activity.
Learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that at the stage of
hearing on the question of sentence, the appellants had prayed before
the learned Trial Court to extend them the benefit of the provisions of
the Probation of Offenders Act. However, the said prayer was
declined by the learned Trial Court without assigning adequate
reasons. It was, therefore, contended that considering the nature of the
offence, the background in which the occurrence took place arising
out of a family dispute, the age of the appellants, the prolonged
pendency of the appeal since the year 2002 and the absence of any
criminal antecedent or subsequent misconduct, this Court may take a
Page 13 of 19
reformative and lenient view in the matter of sentence and extend to
the appellants the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of
Offenders Act.
11. The record reveals that the occurrence in question relates
back to the year 2000 and over the passage of more than two decades,
much water have flown under the bridge. Considering the long lapse
of time, the period already undergone, the age of the appellants and
the circumstances attending the case, this Court is of the considered
view that the matter deserves to be examined in the light of the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal and Another
v. State represented by the Inspector of Police1 wherein it has been
held that it is the statutory obligation of the sentencing Court to
consider the applicability of the provisions of the Probation of
Offenders Act and that denial of such benefit must be supported by
cogent and convincing reasons.
In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
emphasized that the reformative object underlying the Probation of
1
2025 INSC 540
Page 14 of 19
Offenders Act cannot be overlooked and that the sentencing court is
duty-bound to consciously apply its mind to the question as to
whether the benefit under the Act ought to be extended to the accused
persons, particularly in cases where the circumstances justify a lenient
and reformative approach.
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chellammal (supra) has
elaborately explained the scope, object and significance of the
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 while considering the question of
extending the benefit of probation to a convict. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has underscored that the legislative intent behind the enactment
of the Probation of Offenders Act is essentially reformative in nature,
aiming to provide an opportunity to first-time or less serious offenders
to reform themselves rather than subjecting them to incarceration. It
has been emphasized that the provisions of the Act are intended to
prevent the deleterious effects of imprisonment on individuals who
can otherwise be rehabilitated as responsible members of society. The
Court has further highlighted that Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act confers a wide discretion upon the courts to release an
offender on probation in appropriate cases and that the said provision
Page 15 of 19
has a broader and more expansive ambit than Section 360 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
While discussing the interplay between the aforesaid
provisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also clarified that courts
are duty-bound to consider the applicability of the Probation of
Offenders Act in cases where the circumstances justify such
consideration, and if the court decides not to extend the benefit of
probation, it must record special reasons for such refusal. The relevant
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced
hereunder:
“26. On consideration of the precedents and based on
a comparative study of Section 360, Cr. PC and sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act, what is
revealed is that the latter is wider and expansive in its
coverage than the former. Inter alia, while Section
360 permits release of an offender, more twenty-one
years old, on probation when he is sentenced to
imprisonment for less than seven years or fine,
Section 4 of the Probation Act enables a court to
exercise its discretion in any case where the offender
is found to have committed an offence such that he is
punishable with any sentence other than death or life
imprisonment. Additionally, the non-obstante clause
in sub-section gives overriding effect to sub-section
(1) of Section 4 over any other law for the time being
in force. Also, it is noteworthy that Section 361, Cr.
PC itself, being a subsequent legislation, engrafts a
provision that in any case where the court could have
dealt with an accused under the provisions of the
Page 16 of 19
Probation Act but has not done so, it shall record in
its judgment the special reasons therefor.
27. What logically follows from a conjoint reading of
sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act and
Section 361, Cr. PC is that if Section 360, Cr. PC
were not applicable in a particular case, there is no
reason why Section 4 of the Probation Act would not
be attracted.
28. Summing up the legal position, it can be said that
while an offender cannot seek an order for grant of
probation as a matter of right but having noticed the
object that the statutory provisions seek to achieve by
grant of probation and the several decisions of this
Court on the point of applicability of Section 4 of the
Probation Act, we hold that, unless applicability is
excluded, in a case where the circumstances stated in
subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are
attracted, the court has no discretion to omit from its
consideration release of the offender on probation;
on the contrary, a mandatory duty is cast upon the
court to consider whether the case before it warrants
releasing the offender upon fulfilment of the stated
circumstances. The question of grant of probation
could be decided either way. In the event, the court in
its discretion decides to extend the benefit of
probation, it may upon considering the report of the
probation officer impose such conditions as deemed
just and proper. However, if the answer be in the
negative, it would only be just and proper for the
court to record the reasons therefor. ”
Regard being had to the facts of the present case,
particularly the long lapse of time since the occurrence, the absence of
criminal antecedents of the appellants and the overall circumstances
emerging from the record, this Court is of the considered view that
Page 17 of 19
the case of the appellant deserves consideration under the beneficialprovisions of the Probation of Offenders Act. The said view also finds
support from the decisions of this Court in Pathani Parida & another
vs. Abhaya Kumar Jagdevmohapatra2 and Dhani @ Dhaneswar
Sahu vs. State of Orissa3 wherein in somewhat similar circumstances
the benefit of probation was extended to the convicts. In view of the
aforesaid legal position and the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, this Court is inclined to extend to the appellant the benefit
contemplated under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.
13. In such view of the matter, the present Criminal Appeal in so
far as the conviction is concerned is turned down. But instead of
sentencing the appellants to suffer imprisonment, this Court directs
the appellants to be released under Section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act for a period of one year on their executing bonds of
Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) each within one month with one
surety each for the like amount to appear and receive the sentence
when called upon during such period and in the meantime, the
2
2012 (Supp-II) OLR 469
3
2007 (Supp.II) OLR 250Page 18 of 19
appellants shall keep peace and good behavior and they shall remainunder the supervision of the concerned Probation Officer during the
aforementioned period of one year.
14. Accordingly, the CRA is partly allowed and disposed of.
15. This Court records the appreciation for the effective and
meaningful assistance rendered by Ms. Ananya Mishra, learned
Amicus Curiae. She is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/-
(Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as token of
appreciation.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge
The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack.
Dated the 22nd of May, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 25-May-2026 19:03:40 Page 19 of 19
