Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17491) on 15 April, 2026

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    Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur

    Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:17491) on 15 April, 2026

    Author: Anil Kumar Upman

    Bench: Anil Kumar Upman

    [2026:RJ-JD:17491]
    
          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                           JODHPUR
             S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 736/2025
    
    Mangesh Ulhasrao Zambre S/o Sh. Ulhasrao Martandrao Zambre,
    Aged About 40 Years, R/o Khadki Takali, Post Sukoda, Taluka-
    Akota,     District    Akola       (Maharashtra)          Presently     Working     As
    Director Varhad Grains Agriculture Producer Company Ltd. Agar,
    Tehsil And District Akola (Maharashtra)
                                                                            ----Petitioner
                                            Versus
    1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through PP
    2.       Rakesh       Joshi       S/o   Sh.     Jagdish        Prasad    Joshi,     R/o
             Parbatnagar       Thermal         Colony,      Suratgarh,       District   Sri
             Ganganagar.
                                                                        ----Respondents
    
    
    For Petitioner(s)             :     Mr. CS Rathore, Adv.
    For Respondent No.1           :     Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, PP
    For Respondent No.2           :     Mr. Pankaj Kumar Gupta, Adv.
    
    
    
               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN

    Order

    15/04/2026

    SPONSORED

    1. This Criminal Misc. Petition under Section 528 of the BNSS

    has been preferred on behalf of the accused petitioner with the

    prayer to quash the FIR No.309/2024, registered at Police Station

    Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for offences punishable under

    Sections 420, 406 and 120B of the IPC and all consequential

    proceedings arising out of it.

    2. Brief facts in nutshell are that the complainant-respondent

    No.2, employed as a Manager with Maa Parvati Transport

    Company, which is engaged in the business of transportation of

    goods, filed a complaint under Section 175(4) of the BNSS before

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    the Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh, District Sriganganagar, alleging

    inter alia that in the year 2019, he came into contact with the

    accused-petitioner, who is working as a Manager in Varhad Grains

    Agriculture Producer Company Ltd. along with co-accused Jitesh

    Nalak. An agreement dated 19.11.2019 was executed between the

    complainant’s company and petitioner’s company for the

    transportation of gypsum @ Rs. 2,750/- per ton. In pursuance of

    the said agreement, the complainant’s company transported a

    total of 804 tons of gypsum during the period from 12.11.2019 to

    06.12.2019, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/-. Out of the said

    amount, a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid on 20.11.2019 while

    the remaining amount of Rs. 17,11,000/- remained outstanding.

    The complainant kept on demanding the outstanding amount but

    but the accused did not make the payment on one pretext or the

    other and always gave false assurances and lastly, refused to pay

    the outstanding amount. It was thus, alleged that the accused

    persons had dishonestly induced the complainant and thereby

    committed offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust. Upon

    consideration of the complaint, the learned trial Court sent the

    complaint to Police Station Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for

    investigation, pursuant to which FIR No.309/2024 came to be

    registered against the accused-petitioner and co-accused Jitesh

    Nalak for offences punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B

    of the IPC.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the

    impugned FIR is based upon false and fabricated facts. He submits

    that essentially, there is a civil dispute between the parties arising

    out of business transactions. However, in order to create pressure

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    and take undue advantage in such dispute, the

    respondent/complainant has intentionally given it a colour of

    criminal conspiracy and thus, the impugned FIR is nothing but an

    abuse of process of law. Counsel submits that both petitioner and

    complainant are engaged in the business of transportation of

    agricultural goods. In the year 2019, an agreement was executed

    between the parties for transportation of gypsum @ Rs. 2,750/-

    per ton. It is further submitted that, in pursuance of the said

    agreement, 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/-

    were transported by the complainant to the petitioner’s company,

    out of which a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- was paid by the petitioner’s

    company. Counsel submits that thereafter, certain disputes arose

    between the parties with regard to payment of the remaining

    amount of Rs. 17,11,000/- and in order to settle the said dispute,

    the complainant/respondent has filed the impugned FIR, which is

    bad in the eyes of law. It is also contended that the impugned FIR

    has been lodged after an inordinate delay of more than five years,

    without there being any reasonable or plausible explanation for

    such delay.

    4. Learned counsel further submits that even if the allegations

    in the FIR are taken at their face value, no criminal offence is

    made out against the petitioner and the co-accused. The dispute

    between the parties arises out of an agreement executed for

    transportation of goods on certain terms and conditions. The

    so-called non-payment of the outstanding amount, owing to

    subsequent disputes between the parties, at best gives rise to a

    civil liability and does not attract any criminal culpability. Counsel

    thus, prays that the entire criminal proceedings arising out of the

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    impugned FIR be quashed. It is further contended that the

    allegations levelled in the FIR at best constitute a breach of

    contract, and the initiation of criminal proceedings in such

    circumstances would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

    Counsel places reliance upon the following judgments:-

    (i). Sachin Garg versus State of U.P. and Anr., reported in
    (2024) 11 SCC 687.

    (ii). Paramjeet Batra versus State of Uttarakhand & Ors.,
    reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673.

    (iii).Mohd. Ibrahim & Ors. versus State of Bihar & Anr.,
    reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751.

    (iv).Dalip Kaur & Ors. versus Jagnar Singh & Anr., reported in
    (2009) 14 SCC 696.

    5. Per contra, learned State Counsel and learned counsel

    appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2 have vehemently and

    fervently opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the

    petitioner. It is submitted that in terms of the agreement, the

    complainant delivered 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to

    Rs. 22,11,000/- to the petitioner however, the petitioner paid only

    Rs.5,00,000/- towards the said amount. Despite repeated

    reminders, the petitioner failed to pay the outstanding balance,

    compelling the complainant to lodge the impugned FIR. It is

    submitted that the petitioner had no intention, from the very

    inception, to make payment of the due amount and has

    deliberately withheld the same. In response to the contention

    raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the dispute is

    purely civil in nature and that the criminal proceedings are not

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    maintainable, it is submitted that even in disputes arising out of

    contractual obligations, if there exists an element of mens rea and

    breach of trust, the same may give rise to criminal liability. It is

    thus, contended that merely because the dispute also has civil

    aspects, the criminality involved therein cannot be disregarded.

    6. It is submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

    repeatedly cautioned that the inherent powers under Section 528

    of the BNSS (Corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) should

    be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the

    rarest of rare cases. Lastly, it is submitted that if this misc.

    petition is accepted and the proceedings of the impugned FIR are

    quashed, then, such a course would result in miscarriage of justice

    and would encourage the accused in repeating the crime. They

    have placed reliance upon the following judgments:-

    (i). Google India Private Ltd. versus Visaka Industries,
    reported in AIR 2020 SC 350.

    (ii). Dr. Lakshman versus State of Karnataka & Ors., reported
    in (2019) 9 SCC 677.

    (iii).Rajesh Bajaj versus State NCT of Delhi & Ors., reported in
    (1999) 3 SCC 259.

    (iv).Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri & Anr. versus State of
    Andra Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2007) 13 SCC 165.

    7. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at

    bar and have gone through the material available on record.

    8. It is well settled law that criminal proceedings cannot be

    resorted to for the purpose of resolving civil disputes or for

    recovery of money. In simple terms, a breach of contract

    constitutes an infringement of a private right, which is ordinarily

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    remediable under civil law, such as by instituting proceedings for

    recovery of money. However, for such a dispute to attract criminal

    liability, there must be evidence indicating that the accused had no

    intention to fulfill the promise from the very inception of the

    agreement and, with such dishonest intention, persuaded the

    other party to believe the promise. Hence, where the breach is

    due to mere non-fulfillment of the contract without any fraud or

    deceitful intentions during the initial stages of signing the

    contract, the dispute remains civil in nature and does not warrant

    initiation of criminal proceedings.

    9. A careful reading of the complaint, the gist of which, this

    Court has extracted above, would show that none of the

    ingredients of any of the offences complained against the

    petitioner are made out. Even if all the averments contained in the

    FIR are taken to be true, they do not make out any of the offences

    alleged against the petitioner. Therefore, I am unable to

    understand how an FIR was registered and offences have been

    found proved. When FIR itself disclosed nothing more than

    business relations, which broke, it is not possible for respondent

    No.2 to enlarge the scope of his complaint by merely adding the

    language used in the text of the Indian Penal Code. A perusal of

    the FIR would indicate that there were business transactions

    between the parties. In terms of agreement, the complainant

    delivered 804 tons of gypsum, amounting to Rs. 22,11,000/- to

    the petitioner, however, the petitioner paid only Rs.5,00,000/- and

    as per the allegations of the FIR, despite repeated reminders, the

    petitioner did not make payment of outstanding balance,

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    compelling the complainant to lodge the impugned FIR. Thus, it is

    clear that the dispute between the parties is purely of civil nature

    but in order to attract criminal liability and for initiation of criminal

    proceedings against the petitioner, language used in the text of

    Indian Penal Code, has been added in the FIR.

    10. This Court finds that no offence is made out and the

    continuation of further proceedings based on the FIR against the

    petitioner and/or the co-accused would undoubtedly amount to an

    abuse of the process of law. It is well settled law that where the

    foundational allegations do not disclose a cognizable offence,

    permitting criminal proceedings to continue would defeat the very

    purpose of instituting such a case and would result in injustice and

    harassment to the accused.

    11. In Dalip Kaur & Ors. versus Jagnar Singh & Anr.,

    reported in (2009) 14 SCC 696, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

    considered the earlier cases regarding scope and ambit of

    jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and concluded as follows:-

    “10. The High Court, therefore, should have posed
    a question as to whether any act of inducement on
    the part of the appellant has been raised by the
    second respondent and whether the appellant had
    an intention to cheat him from the very inception.
    If the dispute between the parties was essentially a
    civil dispute resulting from a breach of contract on
    the part of the appellants by non-refunding the
    amount of advance the same would not constitute
    an offence of cheating. Similar is the legal position
    in respect of an offence of criminal breach of trust
    having regard to its definition contained in Section

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    405 of the Indian Penal Code. (See Ajay Mitra v.
    State of M.P.
    reported in (2003) 3 SCC 11).

    11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that
    the High Court would exercise its inherent
    jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions
    of law, as laid down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta
    and Ors.
    , reported in (2009) 1 SCC 516, is
    attracted, which are as under:

    “(1) The High Court ordinarily would not
    exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a
    criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First
    Information Report unless the allegations
    contained therein, even if given face value
    and taken to be correct in their entirety,
    disclosed no cognizable offence.
    (2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and
    except in very exceptional circumstances,
    would not look to any document relied upon
    by the defence.

    (3) Such a power should be exercised very
    sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR
    disclose commission of an offence, the Court
    shall not go beyond the same and pass an
    order in favour of the accused to hold
    absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
    (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute,
    the same by itself may not be a ground to
    hold that the criminal proceedings should not
    be allowed to continue.”

    12. Yet again, in Hira Lal and Ors. v. State of U.P.
    and Ors.
    , reported in (2009) 11 SCC 89, this Court
    held:

    “12. The parameters of interference with a
    criminal proceeding by the High Court in
    exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482
    of the Code are well known. One of the

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    grounds on which such interference is
    permissible is that the allegations contained
    in the complaint petition even if given face
    value and taken to be correct in their
    entirety, commission of an offence is not
    disclosed. The High Court may also interfere
    where the action on the part of the
    complainant is mala fide.” (See also
    Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and Ors. v.
    State of Punjab and Ors.
    , reported in (2009)
    7 SCC 712).”

    12. Recently in the case of Sachin Garg versus State of U.P.

    and Anr., reported in (2024) 11 SCC 687, Hon’ble Supreme

    Court has held as under:-

    “14. Past commercial relationship between the
    appellant’s employer and the respondent no.2 is
    admitted. It would also be evident from the petition
    of complaint the dispute between the parties
    centered around the rate at which the assigned
    work was to be done. Neither in the petition of
    complainant nor in the initial deposition of the two
    witnesses (that includes the complainant) the
    ingredients of the offence under Section 405 of the
    1860 Code surfaced. Such commercial disputes
    over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an
    offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code
    without presence of any aggravating factor leading
    to the substantiation of its ingredients. We do not
    find any material to come to a prima facie finding
    that there was dishonest misappropriation or
    conversion of any material for the personal use of
    the appellant in relation to gas supplying work
    done by the respondent no.2. The said work was
    done in course of regular commercial transactions.

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    It cannot be said that there was misappropriation
    or conversion of the subject property, being
    dissolved acetylene gas which was supplied to the
    factory for the purpose of battery manufacturing at
    EIL. The dispute pertains to the revision of rate per
    unit in an ongoing commercial transaction. What
    has emerged from the petition of complaint and the
    initial deposition made in support thereof that the
    accused-appellant wanted a rate variation and the
    entire dispute arose out of such stand of the
    appellant. On the basis of these materials, it cannot
    be said that there was evidence for commission of
    offence under Section 405/406. The High Court
    also did not apply the test formulated in the case of
    Dalip Kaur (supra). We have narrated the relevant
    passage from that decision earlier.”

    13. While expressing similar view, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    case of Paramjeet Batra versus State of Uttarakhand & Ors.,

    reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673 has held as under:-

    “7. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
    482
    of the Code the High Court has to be cautious.
    This power is to be used sparingly and only for
    the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of
    any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
    Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or
    not depends upon the nature of facts alleged
    therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
    offence are present or not has to be judged by the
    High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions
    may also have a criminal texture. But the High
    Court must see whether a dispute which is
    essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of
    criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil
    remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has

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    happened in this case, the High Court should not
    hesitate to quash criminal proceedings to prevent
    abuse of process of Court.

    8. As we have already noted, here the dispute is
    essentially about the profit of the hotel business
    and its ownership. The pending civil suit will take
    care of all those issues. The allegation that forged
    and fabricated documents are used by the
    appellant can also be dealt with in the said suit.
    Respondent 2’s attempt to file similar complaint
    against the appellant having failed, he has filed the
    present complaint. The appellant has been
    acquitted in another case filed by respondent 2
    against him alleging offence under Section 406 of
    the IPC. Possession of the shop in question has
    also been handed over by the appellant to
    respondent 2. In such a situation, in our opinion,
    continuation of the pending criminal proceedings
    would be abuse of the process of law. The High
    Court was wrong in holding otherwise.”

    14. Section 528 of the BNSS plays a vital role in ensuring no civil

    cases are turned into criminal cases. Inherent power of the High

    Courts allow them to quash any such cases which have been

    initiated due to mala fide incidents. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in

    the famous case of State of Haryana & Ors. versus Bhajan Lal

    & Anr., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, stated that the

    case should be quashed “where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

    attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

    maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking

    vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to

    private and personal grudge.”

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    15. This Court is cognizant of the fact that the co-accused,

    against whom criminal proceedings are pending, has not

    separately approached and sought any relief from this Court but

    this Court cannot overlook the fact that the allegations levelled in

    the FIR are identical against both the petitioner and the

    co-accused, and that the facts of the case are interdependent.

    Therefore, since no offence is made out even on a prima facie

    consideration of the FIR, this Court holds that the co-accused is

    equally entitled to the relief granted to the petitioner,

    notwithstanding the fact that he has not approached this Court.

    This proposition is bolstered by the long held legal doctrine

    established by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which recognizes that

    a Court has the power, in the interest of justice, to extend the

    benefit of its judgment to similarly situated persons, even if they

    are not before the Court. It is evident that a failure to grant such

    relief would result in a grave anomaly and injustice, particularly

    where the very foundation of the proceedings is found to be

    untenable. Earlier, this Court has already decided this issue in the

    case of Sanyukt Shekhari Vs. State of Rajasthan [2026:RJ-

    JD:16370] while relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

    Supreme Court in the case of Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi

    versus State of Gujarat, reported in (2023) 9 SCC 164.

    16. In the backdrop of the aforesaid discussions, this Court

    deems it a fit case for exercising powers under Section 528 of the

    BNSS (Corresponding to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) for quashing

    the impugned FIR and all other subsequent proceedings arising

    out of it against the petitioner, as well as the co-accused Jitesh

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    Nalak, though he is not before this Court but his case stands on

    same footing as that of the petitioner.

    17. Accordingly, the impugned FIR No.309/2024 registered at

    Police Station Rajiasar, District Sriganganagar for offences

    punishable under Sections 420, 406 and 120B of the IPC and all

    consequential proceedings arising out of it are hereby quashed

    against the petitioner as well as co-accused, Jitesh Nalak.

    18. Needless to observe here that the respondent/complainant

    would be free to adopt civil proceedings against the petitioner and

    co-accused Jitesh Nalak for recovery of outstanding amount, as

    alleged in the impugned FIR.

    19. The Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed accordingly.

    20. The stay application and pending application(s), if any, also

    stand disposed of.

    (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J
    58-Manoj Solanki/-

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