Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manaklal Barkade vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 30 April, 2026
Author: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
Bench: Dwarka Dhish Bansal
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Cr. R-4146 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT J AB A L PU R
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DWARKA DHISH BANSAL
ON THE 30th OF APRIL, 2026
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 4146 of 2022
MANAKLAL BARKADE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Ms. Arti Sahu - Advocate for the petitioner.
Ms. Samta Jain - Govt. Adv. for the State.
ORDER
This criminal revision has been preferred by the petitioner/accused
challenging the order dated 22.09.2022 framing charges against the
petitioner/accused for the offences punishable under Section 304 Part-II, 379 of
IPC and Section 194(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
2. As per prosecution story on 03.02.2022 at about 1.45 p.m. deceased
Aman Marve s/o Anand Marve, aged 20 years, R/o Near Mahatma Tent House,
Bilahari was going on his motorcycle to Kajarwara and when he reached Pink
City, Kajarwara Road in front of Mangleshwari Complex, then co-accused Krishna
negligently opened the door of his Bolero Jeep, due to which deceased Aman
Marve fell down, immediately co-accused Manaklal Badkare by transporting the
sand illegally and without royalty through his Hyva (Truck) No. MP 04 HE 7779
and by driving the same rashly and negligently caused death/injury likely to cause
death.
3. In view of the aforesaid, in short the case of prosecution against the
petitioner is that petitioner-Manaklal Badkare by transporting the sand illegally
and without royalty through his Hyva (Truck) No. MP 04 HE 7779 and by driving
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the same rashly and negligently caused death/injury likely to cause death of the
deceased Aman Marve.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even on the basis of
allegations made in the FIR and other documents, at the most, charge under
Section 304-A of IPC can be said to have been made out and since necessary
ingredients for the offence under Section 304 Part-II of IPC are not there, the
Court below has committed an illegality in framing the charges against the
petitioner including under Section 304 Part-II of IPC. With these submissions, she
prays for setting aside the impugned order and for allowing the criminal revision.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State supports the
impugned order and prays for dismissal of the criminal revision.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. For the sake of convenience extract of Sections 304 and 304-A of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 is quoted as under :
“304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with
both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to
cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
304A. Causing death by negligence.
Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable
homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.”
8. So, in the present case it is to be considered as to whether the
petitioner, who is a driver of Hyva, as a prudent man, was having any knowledge
that his act of driving the Hyva on public road, loaded with illegal sand, rashly and
negligently, is sufficient to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
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Cr. R-4146 of 2022
death. Undoubtedly, such an act may fall within the category of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder.
9. Aforesaid aspect had been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648,
wherein it was held as under:-
“39. Like Section 304A, Sections 279, 336, 337 and 338 IPC are attracted for only the negligent
or rash act. The scheme of Sections 279, 304A, 336, 337 and 338 leaves no manner of doubt that
these offences are punished because of the inherent danger of the acts specified therein
irrespective of knowledge or intention to produce the result and irrespective of the result. These
sections make punishable the acts themselves which are likely to cause death or injury to human
life.
40. The question is whether indictment of an accused under Section 304 Part II and Section 338
IPC can co-exist in a case of single rash or negligent act. We think it can. We do not think that
two charges are mutually destructive. If the act is done with the knowledge of the dangerous
consequences which are likely to follow and if death is caused then not only that the punishment
is for the act but also for the resulting homicide and a case may fall within Section 299 or Section
300 depending upon the mental state of the accused viz., as to whether the act was done with one
kind of knowledge or the other or the intention. Knowledge is awareness on the part of the
person concerned of the consequences of his act of omission or commission indicating his state
of mind. There may be knowledge of likely consequences without any intention. Criminal
culpability is determined by referring to what a person with reasonable prudence would have
known.
41. Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character and
the likely effect of the act and resulting in death may fall in the category of culpable homicide
not amounting to murder. A person, doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of a risk
that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, may be held guilty not only
of the act but also of the result. As a matter of law – in view of the provisions of the IPC – the
cases which fall within last clause of Section 299 but not within clause `fourthly’ of Section 300
may cover the cases of rash or negligent act done with the knowledge of the likelihood of its
dangerous consequences and may entail punishment under Section 304 Part II IPC. Section 304A
IPC takes out of its ambit the cases of death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act
amounting to culpable homicide of either description.
42. A person, responsible for a reckless or rash or negligent act that causes death which he had
knowledge as a reasonable man that such act was dangerous enough to lead to some untoward
thing and the death was likely to be caused, may be attributed with the knowledge of the
consequence and may be fastened with culpability of homicide not amounting to murder and
punishable under Section 304 Part II IPC. There is no incongruity, if simultaneously with the
offence under Section 304 Part II, a person who has done an act so rashly or negligently
endangering human life or the personal safety of the others and causes grievous hurt to any
person is tried for the offence under Section 338 IPC.
43. In view of the above, in our opinion there is no impediment in law for an offender being
charged for the offence under Section 304 Part II IPC and also under Sections 337 and 338 IPC.
The two charges under Section 304 Part II IPC and Section 338 IPC can legally co-exist in a case
of single rash or negligent act where a rash or negligent act is done with the knowledge of
likelihood of its dangerous consequences.
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Cr. R-4146 of 2022
***** ***** ***** *****
49. It is a fact that no charge under Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section
66(1)(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 was framed against the appellant. It is also a fact
that in the charge framed against the appellant under Section 304 Part II IPC, the words `drunken
condition’ are not stated and the charge reads; `on November 12, 2006 between 3.45 to 4.00 a.m.
he was driving the car bearing Registration No. MH-01-R-580 rashly and negligently with
knowledge that people are sleeping on footpath and likely to cause death of those persons
rammed over the footpath and thereby caused death of 8 persons who were sleeping on footpath
on Carter Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II IPC‘. The question is whether the omission of the words, `in drunken
condition’ after the words `negligently’ and before the words `with knowledge’ has caused any
prejudice to the appellant.
50. Section 464 of the Code reads as follows:
“S.464. – Effect of omission to frame, or absence of, or error in, charge.-
(1) No finding sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed
invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error,
omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in the
opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact
been occasioned thereby.
(2) If the court of appeal, confirmation or revision is of opinion that a failure of justice
has in fact been occasioned, it may-
(a) In the case of an omission to frame a charge, order that a charge be framed
and that the trial be recommenced from the point immediately after the framing
of the charge.
(b) In the case of an error, omission or irregularity in the charge, direct a new
trial to be had upon a charge framed in whatever manner it thinks fit:
Provided that if the court is of opinion that the facts of the case are such that no
valid charge could be preferred against the accused in respect of the facts
proved, it shall quash the conviction.”
10. Similarly in the case of Padman Singh Diwaan v. State of
Chhattisgarh and Anr., 2024 Supreme (Chh) 442=CRR No. 1069 of 2023, a
coordinate Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur, has held as under:-
“15. In the case at hand, the applicant, driver of offending vehicle, is holding the post of Sub-
Divisional Officer, Public Works Department, and as such, had the knowledge that if the vehicle
is driven at an excessive high speed and in dangerous manner, that too in inebriated condition, it
may cause fatal accident. It is seen from the statements of the witnesses, who were present on the
spot, the offending Bolero vehicle was being driven at such high speed that it had first dashed
backside of Activa two-wheeler of deceased and then collided with a tractor parked in front of
tractor showroom, due to impact of accident, stationary tractor moved 8-10 feet ahead and
dashed another vehicle. Thus, it is clear that applicant was driving the vehicle in drunken
condition at utmost high speed, he could not able to come out of the vehicle for long time. The
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Cr. R-4146 of 2022condition, conduct and act of applicant shows that in spite of having knowledge being a prudent
person that such reckless driving may cause death of any by-stander, himself or his fellow
passengers as well as damage or loss to the amount of Rs.50/- or upwards. A prudent person will
not drive a vehicle at a very high speed and in dangerous manner which he cannot control
because a man of prudence has the knowledge that there is obvious chance of fatal accident if a
vehicle is driven at very high speed and in dangerous manner, that too under the influence of
liquor or drug.
16. In the cases of like nature, there cannot be any direct evidence of knowledge or intention of
the offender. It can be only ascertained through circumstantial evidence. The test adopted by the
Courts under such circumstances is the test of prudent person under the same facts and
circumstances. A prudent person is someone who acts sensibly and takes proper precautions to
protect themselves and others.
17. In case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be borne in mind for proper exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 or 482 CrPC, as the case may be, particularly in the context of
quashing of charge. The principles in Amit Kapoor‘s case (supra) were recently quoted with
approval in case of Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar Tiwari & another, reported in 2022
SCC Online SC 1057. One of the principles on which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised is
that if the allegations are patently so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not
satisfied then the Court may interfere. Relevant principles culled out by Hon’ble Supreme Court
in aforementioned decision read thus:-
“27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as
made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie
establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently
improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the
evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the
stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot
examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is
sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is
concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an
offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount
to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may
quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and
substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.”
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Cr. R-4146 of 2022
11. Even otherwise, this Court at the stage of charge, in exercise of
revisional jurisdiction is not required to go for mini trial as held by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and
Anr., (2019) 15 SCC 584, para 7 of which, reads thus:-
“7. We are of the view that the High Court could not have conducted a mini trial at the stage of
framing of charge, and that too in revision filed against the order framing charges. We are of the
view that it is impossible to state at this stage that no case could possibly be made out for
ultimate conviction of Respondent No.2. This being the case, we set aside the judgment of the
High Court and restore that of the trial Court.”
12. In view of the aforesaid factual and legal scenario, this Court does not
deem fit to make any interference in the impugned order framing the charges
against the petitioner.
13. Resultantly, the criminal revision fails and is hereby dismissed.
14. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(DWARKA DHISH BANSAL)
JUDGE
pb
Digitally signed by PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE
PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH JABALPUR, 2.5.4.20=062bc13272373e2768c883468695ccafcb8f7bf9db7cbd37ad359bc82069bcdf,
ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH JABALPUR,CID – 7057681, postalCode=482001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=a08ae25aceff18c7a0f94698e1bc6a3ccf1dc9654549200eb1bc8e5ddf6349b0, cn=PRASHANT BAGJILEWALE
Date: 2026.05.02 15:52:14 +05’30’
