Delhi High Court
Mamta Anand Alias Sangeeta Anand vs Ravinder Kaur on 26 May, 2026
Author: Prathiba M. Singh
Bench: Prathiba M. Singh
$~64
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 26th May, 2026
Uploaded on: 27th May, 2026
+ CONT.APP.(C) 8/2026 & CM APPL. 36653/2026, CM APPL.
36809/2026
MAMTA ANAND ALIAS SANGEETA ANAND .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ashok Kumar, Adv.
versus
RAVINDER KAUR .....Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
CM APPL. 36809/2026 (for exemption)
2. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions. Application is disposed of.
CM APPL. 36653/2026 (for modification)
3. The present application has been filed by the Appellant under Section
151 of CPC seeking modification of the order dated 27th March, 2026 passed
by this Court.
4. By way of the said order dated 27th March, 2026, this Court had come
to the conclusion that the appeal filed by the Appellant was not maintainable
at that stage and was premature in nature, as the ld. Single Judge vide the
impugned order dated 6th September, 2022 and 10th February, 2026 passed in
CONT. CAS (C). 428/2016 titled ‘Ravinder Kaur v. Mamta Anand & Anr.
had held that the Appellants were guilty of contempt. However, no sentence
was awarded and the matter is still pending before the ld. Single Judge for
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CONT.APP.(C) 8/2026 Page 1 of 12
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
determining the quantum of punishment.
5. The submission of ld. Counsel for the Appellant today is that the said
order dated 27th March, 2026 deserves to be modified as a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in R.K. Yadav Through Director of Income Tax Inv-II & others
Vs. Dinesh Kumar in Cont. App. (C) No.2/2025 has taken into consideration
the decision of the Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd.
v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399 and the decision of a Coordinate Bench
of this Court in Sarojini Nagar Jhuggi Jhopri Vikas Samiti v. Suresh
Kumar, 2022 SCC Online Del 3669 to hold that an appeal under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, is maintainable if an order records the
guilt of the Contemnor or punishment thereof.
6. This Court has, in the past, had the occasion to consider the judgment
in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra) repeatedly in
CONT.APP.(C) 7/2026 titled Dalbir Singh Yadav & Ors. v. Rajdarbar
Heritage Ventures Ltd. and in CONT.APP.(C) 2/2026 titled Raghunath
Singh & Ors. v. Chetan Prakash Jain & Anr.
7. The findings of this Court in its decision dated 10th February, 2026 in
Dalbir Singh Yadav (supra), is as under:
“15. The law on the aspect of maintainability of an
appeal against orders passed in contempt petitions is well
settled. The Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop.
Bank Ltd. (Supra) has held that appeals under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would be
maintainable only against an order imposing punishment
for contempt. The relevant portion of the said decision
reads as under:
“10. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
(“the CC Act” for short) provides for appeals. Relevant
portion of sub-section (1) thereof is extracted below:
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
“19. (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order
or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt–
(a) where the order or decision is that of a Single
Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the
Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench,
to the Supreme Court:”
The scope of Section 19 has been considered by this
Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna
Misra [(1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 99 : AIR
1974 SC 2255] , Purshotam Dass Goel v. Justice B.S.
Dhillon [(1978) 2 SCC 370 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 195 : AIR
1978 SC 1014] , Union of India v. Mario Cabral e Sa
[(1982) 3 SCC 262 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1982 SC
691] , D.N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal [(1988) 3 SCC 26 :
1988 SCC (Cri) 546] , State of Maharashtra v.
Mahboob S. Allibhoy [(1996) 4 SCC 411 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 675] and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar [(1996)
6 SCC 291 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1422] . These cases dealt
with orders refusing to initiate contempt proceedings
or initiating contempt proceedings or
acquitting/exonerating the contemnor or dropping the
proceedings for contempt. In all these cases, it was
held that an appeal was not maintainable under
Section 19 of the CC Act as the said section only
provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing
for contempt.
10.1. In Baradakanta Mishra [(1975) 3 SCC 535 : 1975
SCC (Cri) 99 : AIR 1974 SC 2255] a three-Judge Bench
of this Court held that an order declining to initiate a
proceeding for contempt amounts to refusal to assume
or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and,
therefore, such a decision cannot be regarded as a
decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt. The question as to whether an appeal would
be maintainable under Section 19 where the court
initiates a proceeding for contempt but after due
Signature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
consideration and hearing finds the alleged contemnor
not guilty of contempt, or having found him guilty
declines to punish him, was left open.
10.2. In Purshotam Dass Goel [(1978) 2 SCC 370 :
1978 SCC (Cri) 195 : AIR 1978 SC 1014] certain
aspects of Section 19 were left open. This relevant
portion is extracted below: (SCC pp. 371-72, para 3)
“The [contempt] proceeding is initiated under
Section 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there
may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said
proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the
intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal
to this Court as a matter of right from each and every
such order made by the High Court. The order or the
decision must be such that it decides some bone of
contention raised before the High Court affecting the
right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a
proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice
on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for
drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any
question. … It is neither possible, nor advisable, to
make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which
may be appealable to this Court under Section 19. A
final order, surely, will be appealable.
***
If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice
appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the
proceeding on the ground of its being barred under
Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that
the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an
appeal would lie to this Court under Section 19 from
such an order although the proceeding has remained
pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to
express our final opinion in regard to such an order,
but we merely mention this type of order by way of an
example to show that even orders made at some
intermediate stage in the proceeding may be
appealable under Section 19.”
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
10.3. While Baradakanta Mishra [(1975) 3 SCC 535 :
1975 SCC (Cri) 99 : AIR 1974 SC 2255] and Purshotam
Dass [(1978) 2 SCC 370 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 195 : AIR
1978 SC 1014] left open the question whether an appeal
under Section 19 would be maintainable in certain
areas, in D.N. Taneja [(1988) 3 SCC 26 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 546] a three-Judge Bench of this Court
categorically held that appeals under Section 19 would
lie only against the orders punishing the contemnor
for contempt and not any other order passed in
contempt proceedings. We extract below the relevant
portions from the said decision: (SCC pp. 29-32, paras
8, 10 & 12)
“The right of appeal will be available under sub-
section (1) of Section 19 only against any decision or
order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. … When the High
Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged
contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its
jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The
jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no
punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is
difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its
jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article
215 of the Constitution.
***
It is true that in considering a question whether the
alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the
court hears the parties and considers the materials
produced before it and, if necessary, examines
witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either
acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the
High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court
does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for
such exercise will mean that the High Court should
act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing
punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment
is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot
Signature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to
punish for contempt under Article 215 of the
Constitution.
***
The aggrieved party under Section 19(1) can only be
the contemnor who has been punished for contempt
of court.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.4. In Mahboob S. Allibhoy [(1996) 4 SCC 411 : 1996
SCC (Cri) 675] this Court reiterated the above position
thus: (SCC p. 414, para 3)
“On a plain reading Section 19 provides that an
appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision
of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to
punish for contempt. In other words, if the High
Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction
to punish any person for contempt of court, then only
an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section
(1) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of
Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right
from any order, an impression is created that an
appeal has been provided under the said sub-section
against any order passed by the High Court while
exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings.
The words ‘any order’ have to be read with the
expression ‘decision’ used in the said sub-section
which the High Court passes in exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. ‘Any order’ is not
independent of the expression ‘decision’. They have
been put in an alternative form saying ‘order’ or
‘decision’. In either case, it must be in the nature of
punishment for contempt. If the expression ‘any
order’ is read independently of the ‘decision’ then an
appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19
even against any interlocutory order passed in a
proceeding for contempt by the High Court which
shall lead to a ridiculous result.”
Signature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
10.5.J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar [(1996) 6 SCC 291
: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1422] is nearest to this case, on facts.
A contempt petition was filed alleging that the seniority
list drawn pursuant to the order of the High Court was
not in conformity with the said order. The High Court
found it to be so, but held that the disobedience was not
wilful and, therefore, did not punish for contempt. But
the High Court gave a direction to redraw the seniority
list. The State Government challenged the said direction
in an intra-court appeal. The Division Bench held that
the appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the
CC Act, but was maintainable as an intra-court appeal
as the direction issued by the Single Judge would be a
“judgment” within the meaning of that expression in
Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance.
Accordingly, the Division Bench set aside the direction
of the learned Single Judge to redo the list. The said
order was challenged before this Court. This Court
confirmed the decision of the Division Bench and held
as follows: (SCC pp. 293-94, paras 5 & 6)
“Therefore, an appeal would lie under Section 19
when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the
High Court punishing the contemnor has been
passed. In this case, the finding was that the
respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So,
there is no order punishing the respondent for
violation of the orders of the High Court.
Accordingly, an appeal under Section 19 would not
lie.
***
The question is whether seniority list is open to
review in the contempt proceedings to find out
whether it is in conformity with the directions issued
by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an
order passed by the Government on the basis of the
directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh
cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be
wrong or may be right or may or may not be in
conformity with the directions. But that would be a
fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail
of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot
be considered to be the wilful violation of the order.
After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt
proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single
Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In
other words, the learned Judge was exercising the
jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the
contempt proceedings. It would not be
permissible….”
11. The position emerging from these decisions, in
regard to appeals against orders in contempt
proceedings may be summarised thus:
I. An appeal under Section 19 is maintainable only
against an order or decision of the High Court
passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for
contempt.
II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings
for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for
contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for
contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the
contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC
Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to
challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution.
III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can
decide whether any contempt of court has been
committed, and if so, what should be the punishment
and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding,
it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue
relating to the merits of the dispute between the
parties.
IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High
Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties,
will not be in the exercise of “jurisdiction to punishSignature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
for contempt” and, therefore, not appealable under
Section 19 of the CC Act. The only exception is where
such direction or decision is incidental to or
inextricably connected with the order punishing for
contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19
of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or
inextricably connected directions.
V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides
an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits
of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt
proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without
remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an
intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned
Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-
court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in
other cases).
The first point is answered accordingly.”
16. The aforesaid position has been reiterated by the
Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Bhalla (Supra). After
quoting Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. (Supra) the
Court has held as under:
“12. Following the decision in Midnapore Peoples’
Coop. Bank, it is a settled principle that an appeal
under Section 19 lies only against an order
imposing punishment for contempt.
XXX
14. The Single Judge, after recording the
submissions as adverted to above, entered a specific
finding in SCC OnLine Del para 64 that “this Court
is therefore, of the opinion that there is wilful
disobedience” (emphasis supplied). The above
finding follows immediately upon the previous
paragraph of the order which records the
contention of the respondent herein that he was
entitled to promotion to the rank of IG, in any event
with effect from 2021.
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
15. Bearing in mind the above finding, the Single
Judge gave an opportunity to the appellants “to
issue a fresh order granting promotion to the
petitioner to the rank of IG” to bring him on a par
with his immediate junior. Reading the entirety of
the order of the Single Judge, it is clear that besides
holding that the appellants (who were the
respondents before the Single Judge) were guilty of
contempt of court, there is a crystallised finding that
the respondent herein was entitled to promotion as
IG, in any event with effect from 2021.
XXX
17. The judgment of the Division Bench lost sight of
the fact that whether the appeal was maintainable
would have to be construed on a plain reading of the
judgment of the Single Judge. Two aspects were
covered by the judgment of the Single Judge:
(i) Firstly, a finding that the appellants
were guilty of contempt of the order dated
24-12-2019; and
(ii) Secondly, that the respondent was
entitled to promotion to the rank of IG.
The first aspect is not amenable to an appeal under
Section 19 at the present stage. The finding that the
respondent was entitled to promotion to the rank of IG
would be amenable to an appeal in terms of the law laid
down by this Court in Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank,
more particularly in para 11(V) which has been extracted
above.”
Thus, it is only an order punishing for contempt which would be appealable
under Section 19 of the Act, as per the above decision.
8. Further, the finding of this Court on the same aspect in its decision
dated 6th February, 2026 in Raghunath Singh (supra) is as under:
Signature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
“19. However, this Court is constrained under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Ld. Counsel for the
Appellants however submits that the present appeals would
be maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.
20. However, the law is well settled in this regard.
Contempt appeals under Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts are maintainable only when there is a punishment
for contempt. The Supreme Court in the decision in
Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda,
(2006) 5 SCC 399, held that an appeal under Section 19
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would be
maintainable only against an order or decision of the
High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish
for contempt i.e., an order imposing punishment for
contempt…..
xxxx
21. The decision of the Supreme Court in Midnapore
Peoples’ Coop. Bank Ltd. has been followed by this Court
in CONT.APP.(C) 23/2025 titled ‘RK Sharma v. Sh.
Amarjeet Singh’. Accordingly, the present appeals filed
under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are
not maintainable.
9. In the present case, the order dated 6th September, 2022 passed by the
ld. Single Judge holds that the Appellant is guilty of gross contempt.
However, no punishment has been awarded and arguments are yet to be heard
by ld. Single Judge on the sentence to be awarded.
10. Under such circumstances, the present contempt appeal was clearly
premature in nature, as no punishment has yet been determined by the ld.
Singh Judge.
11. Further on the date when the matter was taken up by this Court i.e., on
27th March, 2026, there was no appearance on behalf of the Appellants.
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
12. The Court has queried the ld. Counsel for the Appellant as to what
transpired on 22nd April, 2026 before the ld. Single Judge, to which the
submission is that the said contempt petition has been adjourned and no
punishment has yet been pronounced.
13. This Court is clearly of the view that if and when the punishment is
pronounced, the Appellant would be clearly entitled to challenge both, the
main order and the sentence order at that stage.
14. At this stage, the Court cannot predict as to what view the ld. Single
Judge would be taking in the contempt petition. Hence, the appeal cannot be
considered by this Court at this Court.
15. Accordingly, there is no reason to modify the order dated 27th March,
2026.
16. The present application is disposed of in said terms.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
MADHU JAIN
JUDGE
MAY 26, 2026
Rahul/ss
Signature Not Verified
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By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
Signing Date:27.05.2026
17:10:46
