Allahabad High Court
Mahesh And Ors. vs State Of U.P. on 9 July, 2026
Author: Manish Mathur
Bench: Manish Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC-LKO:45071
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 405 of 2010
Mahesh And Ors.
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
R.N. Yadav
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Govt. Advocate
Court No. - 12
HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for appellants and learned A.G.A. for respondent-State.
2. The instant Criminal Appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC has been filed against judgment and order dated 15.02.2010 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-4, Lucknow in Sessions Trial No.694 of 2008; State of U.P. v. Mahesh & Ors., arising out of Crime No.297 of 2005, under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 504, 506 IPC, Police Station Sarojani Nagar, District Lucknow convicting and sentencing the appellants as under:-
(i) under Section 147 IPC to one year rigorous imprisonment each
(ii) under Section 323 IPC to six months rigorous imprisonment each,
(iii) under Section 506 IPC to two years rigorous imprisonment each,
(vi) under Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC to five years rigorous imprisonment each and a fine of Rs.2,000/-each and in default of fine, six months additional simple imprisonment as well as convicted appellants Manoj and Man Singh under Section 148 IPC to one year imprisonment each.
(v) All the sentences are run concurrently.
3. As per prosecution version, incident is said to have taken place on 25.12.2005 at about 07.30 P.M. when the informant was at the village tap for providing water to animals and the appellants due to previous enmity allegedly assaulted him by bricks, sticks as well as stones leading to grievous injuries. Allegation has also been levelled that the accused Manoj and Man Singh open fired upon informant with their licensee firearms leading to injury in the leg of the informant.
4. Upon leading of investigation, charge-sheet was filed under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323, 504 & 506 IPC with charges has also been framed under the same sections. Ten prosecution witnesses were examined while defence was led under Section 313 Cr.P.C. leading to conviction of appellants.
5. Learned counsel for appellants submits that the trial court has erred in recording a conviction under Section 307 IPC particularly in view of the fact that there were serious contradictions in the statements of the attending doctors Dr. Chandan Singh Negi as P.W.3, Dr. Narendra Agrawal as P.W. 5 and Dr. Shiv Prakash as P.W. 6 particularly with regard to injury having been sustained as a result of discharge of firearm. It is submitted that even otherwise there were two injuries suffered by informant with both of them on his non-vital parts, being legs and with contradictory testimonies with regard to discharge of firearm. The aspect of intention of the appellants to cause death or to cause such grievance injuries which would ordinarily lead to death were not established by the prosecution. It is submitted that even intention of the appellants to cause such grievance injuries as would be contemplated under Section 307 IPC are not made out. It is therefore submitted that conviction under Section 307 IPC is required to be interfered with. It is submitted that at worst, conviction can be recorded only under Section 324 IPC, for which trial court should have adverted to the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act 1958 while granting benefit of same.
6. Learned AGA has opposed appeal with the submission that judgment of trial court is perfectly cogent and conviction has been rightly recorded under Section 307 IPC looking into the testimonies of the informant/injured as P.W.1 as well as the depositions of Doctors which clearly established firearm injuries having been inflicted upon the injured.
7. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the aspect requiring adjudication is whether the conviction of appellant under Section 307 IPC is sustainable or not.
8. From a perusal of the impugned judgment, it is evident that trial court has recorded conviction under Section 307 IPC adverting to the testimony of the injured as well as those of the attending doctors to reach a conclusion that firearm injury was sustained by injured.
9. Learned counsel has placed reliance on judgment rendered by Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal versus The State of Haryana and another, 2026 SCC Online SC 921. It is further submitted that despite plea of probation being taken, the same has been rejected without indicating any cogent reason.
10. Provisions of Section 307 IPC would require examination and are as follows:
“307. Attempt to murder.- Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts. When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued. A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A’s keeping; A has not yet committed the offence defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or delivers it to Z’s servant to place it on Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.”
11. In the case of Roshan Lal (supra) Supreme Court has indicated the aspects of applicability of provisions of Section 307 IPC. The relevant portion of judgment are as follows:
“26. In order to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC elements are essential to be established. First, the intention or knowledge to commit murder. Secondly, the actual act of trying to commit the murder. Thus, it must have both the necessary mens rea and actus reus. Hence, to sustain a conviction under this section, it is necessary to establish that had the accused succeeded in his attempt and had the victim met his death because of such act, the offence of murder punishable u/s 302 IPC would be established.
27. However, an accused charged u/s 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of simple hurt, as the determinative factor is intention or knowledge and not the nature of the injury. This principle was discussed by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru, (2005) 5 SCC 554 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1329, the relevant paragraph of which reads hereunder:
?12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.?
Nevertheless, the nature of injury actually caused does render considerable assistance to the court in ascertaining the intention of the accused. However, courts may also ascertain the intention from other circumstances, even without reference to actual wounds. The aforesaid principle stands reiterated in the case of Bipin Bihari v. State of M.P., (2006) 8 SCC 799: (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 25, as follows:
?9. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof?
31. The words ?such intention? found in Section 307 IPC, refer to the intention referred to in Section 300 IPC. It means : (i) intention to cause death; (ii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which the offender knows is likely to cause death; (iii) intention to cause such bodily injury, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The essential ingredient of the offence of attempt to murder is the intention to cause death. Such intention exists prior to the actual attempt and must be established independently of the act itself or the actus reus. Once the requisite intention to commit murder is proved, the eventual outcome of the attempt becomes irrelevant, unless the attempt culminates in death, in which case the offence would fall within Section 300 IPC. In the absence of proof of intention, a conviction under this provision cannot be sustained.
32. Intention, however, can be inferred from surrounding circumstances, such as the type of weapon employed, the words spoken by the accused at the time of the incident, the motive behind the act, the parts of the body targeted, the nature and extent of the injuries inflicted, as well as the force and manner in which the blows were delivered.
33. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid legal principles, the factual matrix of the present case may now be considered. There is no history of enmity known between the appellants and the injured. The prosecution has also failed to bring on record any material suggesting prior planning, preparation, or concerted intention on the part of the appellants to cause the death of Amar Singh (PW3). On the contrary, the evidence reveals that the incident occurred suddenly when the injured intervened in an altercation involving the driver of the jeep. The assault, therefore, appears to have arisen in the heat of the moment and as a spontaneous reaction to such intervention, rather than pursuant to any pre-conceived intention to eliminate the complainant.
34. The circumstances, viewed holistically, suggest that the object of the appellants was primarily to deter or intimidate the complainant from interfering in the ongoing altercation. It is also significant that the weapons allegedly used by the appellants were ordinary lathis, which, though capable of causing grievous hurt depending upon the manner of use, cannot in the facts of the present case be regarded as inherently deadly weapons. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appellants persisted in the assault with such brutality or ferocity so as to unmistakably disclose an intention to cause death.
35. Undoubtedly, the injuries sustained by Amar Singh (PW3) were grievous in nature, and the medical evidence demonstrates that the injury to the head subsequently led to serious complications. However, the gravity of the injury by itself cannot be determinative of the offence under Section 307 IPC the prosecution is able to establish the requisite mens rea contemplated under the provision. The intention to commit murder cannot be presumed merely because the injuries were ultimately opined to be dangerous to life. In the absence of evidence showing prior motive, premeditation, repeated deliberate blows with deadly weapons, or any conduct indicative of a determined effort to cause death, this Court is unable to hold that the appellants possessed the intention or knowledge necessary to attract Section 307 IPC the light of Bipin Bihari (supra).
36. At the same time, the evidence on record clearly establishes that the appellants voluntarily caused grievous injuries to the complainant, particularly on vital parts of the body, resulting in fractures and prolonged medical treatment. At this juncture, it is imperative to reproduce Section 320 IPC for our reference:?
Grievous hurt.? The following kinds of hurt only are designated as ?grievous?:?
First. ?Emasculation.
Secondly. ?Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly. ?Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly. ?Privation of any member or joint.
Fifthly. ?Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
Sixthly.?Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly.?Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly.? Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits”
12. Upon applicability of provisions of Section 307 IPC as enunciated by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal (supra), the aspect requiring consideration is whether there was any intention on the part of appellants either to cause death of the injured or to inflict such grievous injures which would ordinarily lead to death.
13. A perusal of the impugned judgment indicates that a sudden quarrel having broken out between parties. Although in the FIR as well as in his testimony, the injured as P.W.1 has indicated brick batting at the instance of all the appellants, the same do not appear to be corroborated by the injuries sustained which are two in number and are as follows:
“1- ??? ??? ??? 2.00 ???? x 1.00 ???? ??? ?? ????? ?? ????? ?? ????? ?? ??? ??? ????? ?? ??? 10.00 ???? ????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??? ???
2- ??? ??? ??? .5 ???? x .5 ???? ??? ?? ???? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ????? ?? 2.00 ???? ???? ??? ?? ??? ???
3- ????? ????? ?? ?????? ?? ???? ???? ??? ????? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ?? ????? ???? ??? ???? ???”
14. It is thus evident that both the injuries suffered are on non-vital parts being the legs of the injured. The testimony of Dr. Shiv Prakash as P.W.6 indicates pellet injuries being present on the legs of the injured. It is on that basis that trial court has recorded a conviction under Section 307 IPC establishing that firearm was discharged by the appellants which resulted in such pellet injuries.
15. However as has been enunciated by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal (supra), the nature of injuries suffered is only one of the factors which would determine applicability of Section 307 IPC with the intention of accused being of paramount importance. It is also established law as indicated in the aforesaid judgment that it is for the prosecution to establish intention of the accused either to cause death or inflict such grievous injury which would lead to death of the injured.
16. In the present case, trial court has not adverted to the distance from which firearm was allegedly discharged by the appellants. In the considered opinion of this Court, such a factor would have had a major bearing in order to advert to the intention of the accused either to cause only hurt to the injured or to cause grievous hurt which would result in death particularly since injury has been suffered on non-vital parts being legs of the injured.
17. From a perusal of deposition of injured informant as P.W.1, it appears that brick batting and assault upon the injured took place at the village tap. Deposition also indicates that such assault took place at close quarters and therefore the aspect of firearm being discharged within such close quarters would assume importance. It is not the case of prosecution that the firearm was discharged at more than six paces from the place where injured was present. In such circumstances, it can be safely said that the firearm was discharged within six paces of the place where accused was present and therefore in such circumstances, it could have been convenient for the accused to have aimed for vital part of the body of accused in case intention was to cause his death.
18. On the contrary, the firearm injury being pellet injuries have been sustained in the non-vital lower part of the body.
19. Such an aspect itself clearly indicates that there was no intention of the accused to cause such a grievous injury to the injured which would ordinarily lead to death.
20. As has already been discussed here-in-above and as per judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Lal (supra), the ingredient of intention is essential to be established by prosecution for applicability of Section 307 IPC.
21. In view of discussion made here-in-above, it is thus evident that the said essential ingredient of intention to cause death or to cause such grievous injury which would ordinarily result in death was not established by the prosecution.
22. In such circumstances, conviction of appellants under Section 307/149 IPC not being made out is hereby set aside.
23. However, it also evident as per deposition of the injured as P.W. 1 and the depositions of doctors as P.W.3, 4 and 5, discharge of firearm at the instance of appellants are made out which resulted in injury to the informant/injured.
24. In such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, the nature of injury suffered as corroborated by evidence, would bring the aspect within the purview of Section 324 IPC whereby hurt has been caused voluntarily by dangerous weapon or means.
25. Considering aforesaid facts and circumstances, the conviction under Section 307/147 IPC is converted to one of Section 324/149 IPC and the sentence also being modified to one of three years.
26. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444 has clearly enunciated that the appellate court as well is empowered to consider the aspect of Probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 although such a plea has not been taken before trial court.
27. In the present case, the said aspect is evident from the impugned judgment where it has been stated by the appellants that they do not have previous criminal history.
28. Learned counsel for accused-appellant submits that in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances including the fact that appellant has not been convicted previously for any offence, trial court ought to have invoked the provisions of The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act, 1958’). It is further submitted that the trial court neither invoked provisions of the Act, 1958 nor the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C., while sentencing accused-appellant. Impugned judgment also does not indicate any special reason for not giving benefit of provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or the provisions of Act, 1958.
29. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the accused-appellant has statutory right for claiming benefit of beneficial legislation, i.e., the provisions of the Act, 1958 and the court was under a duty to consider the applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958 as mandated under Section 361 Cr.P.C. If the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or provisions of the Act, 1958 were not applied, then the court should have recorded reasons for same. It is, thus, submitted to that extent, impugned judgment and order suffers from serious illegality being violative of provisions of section 361 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it cannot be sustained.
30. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, since only the aspect of probation for good conduct is being adjudicated upon, Sections 360 and 361 CrPC pertain to order to release on probation of good conduct or after admonition and provides that where a person not under the age of 21 years is convicted of an offence punishable with fine only or with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less, or when a person under the age of 21 years is convicted of an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and no previous conviction is proved against the offender, the Court recording conviction is required to consider various aspects including age, character or antecedents of the offender and circumstances in which offence was committed and should release the offender on probation on good conduct and instead of sentencing him to any punishment, direct that he may be released on his entering into a bond with or without sureties to appear and receive sentence for said period to keep the peace and good behaviour. Provision has also been made for exercise of such powers by Appellate Court or by the High Court or Court of Session.
31. Section 361 of the said Code indicates special reasons to be recorded in certain cases to the effect that in case an accused is entitled to benefit of Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or the Youthful Offender under the Children Act, 1960 or any other law pertaining to training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not been granted such benefit, it shall record special reasons in its judgment for not having done so.
32. The Central Legislation on the subject being Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 particularly Sections 3 and 4 thereof indicate power of court to release certain offenders after admonition and power to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.
33. The State Legislation applicable in the State of U.P. is the Uttar Pradesh First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938 in which also Sections 3 and 4 pertain to powers of Court to release certain offenders after admonition and on probation of good conduct respectively.
34. The aspect of applicability of Sections 360 and 361 CrPC was dealt with by a Division Bench of this Court in Uttar Pradesh v. Misri Lal and others reported in 1982 CrLJ 1420. Relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:-
“26. …The application of Section 360 in Utter Pradesh was taken away by an Ordinance of the year 1975. The Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Criminal P.C. (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 1976. This Act received the assent of the President on 30-4-1975 and published in the Utter Pradesh Extraordinary Gazette dated 1-5-1976. Section 12 of this Act repealed the Ordinance and laid down that notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Ordinance shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the provisions of this Act as if this Act had come into force on November, 28, 1975. The learned trial judge decided the case on 2-2-1976. Section 10 of the Amending Act No. 16 of 1976 amended S.484 of the Code and inserted the following clause (e) after clause (d) :-
“(e) …the United Provinces First Offenders’ Probation Act 1938……shall continue in force in the State of Uttar Pradesh …. and accordingly the provisions of Section 360 of this Code shall not apply to that State and the provisions of Section 361 shall apply with the substitution or reference to the Central Acts named therein by references to the corresponding Act in force in that State”.
Section 361 of the CrPC lays down that where in any case the Court could have dealt with an accused person under Section 360 or under the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, or a youthful offender under the Children Act, 1960 or any other law for the time being in force for the treatment, training or rehabilitation of youthful offenders, but has not done so, it shall record in its judgement the special reasons for not having done so.
It follows from this provision read with clause (e) of S.484 mentioned above, the Court is required to record special reasons for not extending the benefit of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh First Offenders’ Probation Act, 1938.”
35. Thus, provisions of U.P. Probation of First Offenders’ Act shall be followed, in the geographical area where that has been made applicable and not Section 360 of the CrPC. In this way enforcement of Probation Act in some particular area, thus excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 360 of the Code in that particular area, however, it will be the bounden duty of the Court to consider as to why not to proceed to grant the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, as provided under Section 361 of the CrPC.
36. Coming to the point of desirability of extending the benefit of Probation Act to the accused-appellant, in Sitaram Paswan and another Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2005 SC 3534, Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as under:-
“For exercising the power which is discretionary, the Court has to consider circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the Court must take a realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim. Thebenefit available to the accused under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act is subject to the limitation embodied in the provisions and the word “may” clearly indicates that the discretion vests with the Court whether to release the offender in exercise of the powers under Section 3 or 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender and overall circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act vest with the Court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed, not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the Courts while finding the person guilty and if the Court thinks that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be extended to the accused, the power can be exercised by the Court even at the appellate or revisional stage and also by this Court while hearing appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.”
37. In Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P and others, reported in AIR 2017 SC 660, Hon’ble Supreme Court opined as under:-
“20. …In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab AIR 1965 SC 444. Subba Rao, J., speaking for the majority, opined thus:-
“The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated, the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the conditions laid down in the appropriate provisions of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case; including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.”
38. Upon applicability of aforesaid provisions and judgments in the present case, it is evident that the incident is said to have taken place in the year 2005 with maximum sentence of three years with fine having been imposed. Almost twenty one years since have passed and as per impugned judgment, there is no other pre or post-criminal antecedent of the accused appellants.
39. So far as the conviction part is concerned, this Court does not find any illegality, perversity or infirmity in the order passed by the courts below, but keeping in view the discussion made above, the sentence inflicted on the accused-appellants stands modified as indicated here-in-above.
40. The appeal is partly allowed with following modifications:-
40.1 The conviction of the accused-appellants by trial court is modified to the extent that conviction of appellants under Section 307/149 IPC is set aside and is converted to one of Section 324/149 IPC and sentenced them to three years rigorous imprisonment whereas the impugned judgment is upheld in respect of other sections as recorded in the judgment. The sentence of appellants-accused is modified to the tune that they are provided benefit of Section 4 of the U.P. Probation of Offenders Act and is released on probation on the condition that each of them will keep peace and good conduct for two years from today and shall file two sureties to the tune of Rs.20,000/- each along with their personal bonds before the court below and also an undertaking to the effect that they shall maintain peace and good behavior during the period of one year from today. In case of breach of any of the conditions mentioned above, the appellants will be subjected to undergo the sentence as awarded by the courts below. The bonds aforesaid will be filed by the appellants within one month from today before the District Probation Officer, Lucknow under intimation to the concerned court.
41. A certified copy of the order be also sent to the court concerned and District Probation Officer, Lucknow for necessary compliance, forthwith.
(Manish Mathur,J.)
July 9, 2026
Subodh/-
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