Chattisgarh High Court
Mahatma Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:16805-DB
NAFR
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 452 of 2023
Digitally
signed by
ROHIT KUMAR
CHANDRA
Mahatma Yadav S/o Jangali Yadav Aged About 33 Years R/o Village
Hariharpur, Police Station Ramchandrapur, District Balrampur-
Ramanujganj (Chhattisgarh)
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Ramchandrapur District Balrampur-Ramanujganj (Chhattisgarh)
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Shailendra Dubey, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
13.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Shailendra Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant as
well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate,
appearing for the appellant.
2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence dated 23.01.2023 passed by the learned
First Additional District & Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District –
2
Balrampur-Ramanujganj (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No. 102 of 2020,
whereby the appellant/accused has been convicted for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of
Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for 30 days.
3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the complainant, Smt.
Anita Yadav (PW-1), appeared at Police Station Ramchandrapur
and lodged a written report against the accused stating that on the
date of the incident, she was plastering (coating) her parental
house when the accused arrived there driving a pickup vehicle.
The accused began abusing her over the issue of moving/storing
firewood inside the house. At that time, her father (the deceased)
came to the spot and tried to restrain the accused. Thereupon, the
accused started the pickup vehicle and intentionally hit the
deceased and drove the vehicle over him, causing serious
injuries. The injured was taken to Ramanujganj for treatment and
thereafter was undergoing treatment at Ranchi, but he
succumbed to his injuries about nine days after the incident. On
the basis of the information given by the complainant, a merg
intimation (death report) bearing No. 04/2020 was registered, and
subsequently, upon lodging of the First Information Report, Crime
No. 07/2020 was registered at Police Station Ramchandrapur
against the accused Mahatma Yadav under Section 302 of IPC.
4. During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer, Sub-
Inspector N.K. Painkra (PW-10), visited the place of occurrence
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on 03.03.2020 and prepared a spot map (Nazri Naksha) as per
the statement of Anita Yadav. For preparation of the Patwari map,
a requisition was sent to the Tehsildar, Ramanujganj, and
accordingly, the Patwari prepared the map in the presence of
witnesses. Notices were issued to witnesses for inquest
proceedings, and a Panchnama of the dead body was prepared in
their presence. The dead body was sent to Community Health
Centre, Ramanujganj for postmortem examination, and the
postmortem report was provided by Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta
(PW-12). After the postmortem, the body was handed over to the
relatives of the deceased as per customary rites. The constable
Manohar Lakra, who facilitated the postmortem and handing over
of the body, was issued a duty certificate. The vehicle used in the
offence, i.e., a white passenger pickup bearing registration No.
JH-03 B-7201 along with its documents, was seized from
Musawwar Hussain of Village Kalikapur in the presence of
witnesses. During investigation, the statement of witness Mathura
Vishwakarma (PW-4) was recorded. On finding sufficient evidence
against the accused, he was arrested on 04.03.2020 in the
presence of witnesses, and intimation of his arrest was given to
his family members.
5. After completion of the entire investigation, the final report
(charge-sheet) was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Balrampur (Ramanujganj). Since the offence was triable by the
Court of Sessions, the case was committed vide order dated
4
25.11.2020 and was registered before the Court of the District and
Sessions Judge, Balrampur (Ramanujganj), from where it was
transferred to the Court of First Additional District & Sessions
Judge, Balrampur, District – Balrapur-Ramanujganj for trial.
Thereafter, on 02.01.2021, the charges were framed against the
accused under Section 302 IPC. The charges were read over and
explained to the accused, who denied the same and claimed trial.
In his statement under Section 313 CrPC, the accused pleaded
innocence and stated that he had been falsely implicated.
However, upon being given an opportunity, the accused
expressed his intention to lead evidence in his defence.
6. The prosecution has produced in support of it’s case, the
evidence of Mrs. Anita Yadav (PW-1), Kumari Rinki Yadav (PW-2),
Sirpati (PW-3), Mathura Vishwakarma (PW-4), Mahesh Yadav
(PW-5), Muslim Ansari (PW-6), Baleshwar Yadav (PW-7), Munnu
Yadav (PW-8), Shivnath Thakur (PW-9), N.K. Paikra (PW-10),
Vijeta Gupta (PW-11) and Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-12).
7. In his defence, the accused has produced the evidence of
Musabbar Hussain (DW-1), Zafaruddin (DW-2) and Laxman
(DW-3).
8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 23.01.2023,
convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforementioned,
against which, this criminal appeal has been filed.
5
9. Mr. Shailendra Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the appellant has been falsely implicated and that the
prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredients of
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, particularly the existence of
intention (mens rea) to commit murder. He further submitted that
the prosecution’s own case indicates that the incident arose out of
a sudden quarrel regarding storage of firewood, with no prior
enmity or premeditation attributable to the appellant. The alleged
act, even if accepted, occurred in the heat of the moment and
does not satisfy the threshold of murder. He also submitted that
the testimony of the complainant, Smt. Anita Yadav (PW-1), being
an interested witness, requires careful scrutiny, and in the
absence of strong independent corroboration, cannot be solely
relied upon. Furthermore, the deceased succumbed to injuries
nine days after the incident while undergoing treatment at different
places, which raises doubts about the direct causal link between
the act and the death. The medical evidence also does not
conclusively establish that the injuries were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is further submitted
that the investigation suffers from material lapses, including the
seizure of the alleged vehicle from a third party and the absence
of reliable forensic or mechanical evidence to prove its use in the
alleged offence. The prosecution has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of evidence pointing unequivocally
to the guilt of the appellant. In criminal jurisprudence, the burden
6
lies on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt, and any such doubt must enure to the benefit of the
accused. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to acquittal.
Alternatively, and without prejudice, even if the prosecution
version is accepted in its entirety, the case would at best fall under
Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code, as there was no
intention to cause death, but at most knowledge that the act was
likely to cause harm. Accordingly, it is prayed that the conviction
under Section 302 IPC be set aside and appropriate relief be
granted.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government
Advocate, appearing for the respondent/State supported the
impugned judgment and submitted that the prosecution has
successfully established the guilt of the accused beyond all
reasonable doubt under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
The testimony of the complainant, Smt. Anita Yadav (PW-1), is
clear, cogent, and trustworthy, and there is no reason to
disbelieve her merely on the ground of her relationship with the
deceased. Her presence at the scene is natural, and her account
of the incident is consistent with the surrounding circumstances.
The evidence on record clearly demonstrates that the accused,
after being confronted, intentionally started the pickup vehicle and
drove it over the deceased, an act which by its very nature is
imminently dangerous and sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. The medical evidence, including the
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postmortem report, fully corroborates the ocular testimony and
establishes that the death was the direct result of the injuries
inflicted in the incident. It is further submitted that the alleged
delay in death does not weaken the prosecution case, as the
deceased remained under continuous medical treatment and
ultimately succumbed to the injuries caused by the accused. The
chain of circumstances is complete and points unerringly towards
the guilt of the accused. The investigation was conducted in
accordance with law, and the seizure of the vehicle, preparation of
spot map, inquest proceedings, and recording of witness
statements all lend support to the prosecution version. The
defence has failed to bring on record any material contradiction or
plausible explanation to discredit the prosecution case. The
nature of the act clearly reflects intention and knowledge sufficient
to attract Section 302 IPC, and no case for reduction to a lesser
offence is made out. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction and
sentence awarded by the learned trial court be upheld and the
appeal be dismissed.
11. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also
went through the records with utmost circumspection.
12. The first question for consideration would be whether the
deceased died under unnatural circumstances ?
13. Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-12), who conducted the post-
mortem examination on the deceased, stated that on March 3,
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2020, Constable 428 Manoj Lakra presented the body of the
deceased, Jangli Yadav, for post-mortem examination. The
identifications were made by Mahatma, Ramsevak, and Mahesh.
The post-mortem was performed by Dr. Gupta on the same date.
The body of the deceased appeared fresh and was of normal
height and build. There was no noticeable odor. The neck was at
the 10th position and could rotate 180 degrees. Both feet were
bent forward, indicating paralysis. Blood was oozing from the
nose and mouth. The deceased had wounds on his feet, knees,
thighs, and soles, which were in a state of recovery. Swelling was
observed on the back of the head. A 1.5-inch wound on the left
ankle had been stitched. Upon opening the head, blood clots were
found in the brain. The cervix and ribs were pale and congested. A
white mass was present in both the right and left lungs. Blood was
found in both chambers of the heart and the large vessels. The
cervix, intestinal membranes, and pharynx were pale and
congested. The stomach and its contents contained clear fluid.
The small intestine and large intestine contained blood clots and
fecal matter, which were foul-smelling upon opening. The liver and
cervix appeared normal. The kidneys were small, while the
bladder was normal. Swelling and bone fractures were noted in
the neck due to an injury, and all of these injuries occurred before
death. On February 21, 2020, a vehicle accident victim was
brought to the emergency room of the Community Health Center
for treatment. The victim was subsequently referred for better
9
treatment and was transferred to RIMS Hospital, Ranchi, where
he died during treatment on March 2, 2020, at 7:00 p.m. In Dr.
Gupta’s opinion, the cause of death appeared to be neurogenic
shock and brain injury. The nature of the death could be either
homicidal or accidental. The deceased had died approximately 20
to 22 days prior to the trial.
14. PW-1, Smt. Anita Yadav, the complainant and daughter of the
deceased, stated that the accused, Mahatma Yadav, is her elder
brother. About one and a half years prior to the incident, she was
living with her husband and children in her maternal home at
Hariharpur village, while her in-laws resided in Vidyuli village. A
dead Sarai tree had fallen near her father’s barn, and she was
collecting and storing its wood inside the house along with her
family. During this time, the accused arrived in a pickup vehicle.
After parking and attempting to leave, he noticed their father,
Jangli Yadav, lying unconscious near the house with bleeding
injuries on his neck, buttocks, ribs, and other parts of the body.
The injured was taken in the accused’s vehicle to CHC
Ramanujganj for primary treatment and was later referred to
RIMS Hospital, Ranchi, where he remained under treatment for
10-12 days before dying on 02.03.2020. On 03.03.2020, PW-1
reported the death at Ramchandrapur Police Station (Ex.P-01),
leading to the registration of the FIR (Ex.P-02). A site map (Ex.P-
3) was also prepared. In her testimony, PW-1 denied that the
accused quarreled over the wood or intentionally hit the deceased
10
with the pickup. She admitted that she did not witness the
incident, as she was inside the house, and only saw her father
injured afterward. She acknowledged that her father had objected
to a quarrel and that the accused had spoken angrily, but she did
not see any collision. In cross-examination, PW-1 admitted there
was no dispute over the wood and that no report was filed on the
day of the incident. She further admitted that at the hospital, it was
stated that the deceased had suffered injuries due to a fall. The
accused assisted in taking the deceased to the hospital, paid
expenses, and initially reported the injury as accidental. She also
admitted that she did not mention any allegation of deliberate
assault in the initial report or FIR. Additionally, she stated that she
did not see the accused hitting the deceased and only suspected
that a vehicle might have caused the injuries. She admitted that
there was no apparent reason for the accused to intentionally
harm his father.
15. PW-2, Kumari Rinki Yadav, a child witness, stated that she knew
the accused, Mahatma Yadav, and described him as her maternal
uncle and the deceased as her maternal grandfather. The witness
stated that the incident occurred in 2020. Her maternal
grandfather, Jangli Yadav, died as a result of injuries sustained
when her maternal uncle, Mahatma Yadav, ran over him with a
pickup truck. The incident occurred in their barn, and she
witnessed it. A dry piece of wood from a Saikhua (Sarai) tree had
fallen near their house, leading to a dispute between her maternal
11
uncle, Mahatma Yadav, and her maternal grandfather, Jangli
Yadav. This dispute resulted in her maternal uncle, Mahatma
Yadav, hitting her maternal grandfather with the pickup truck,
which caused Jangli Yadav’s death during treatment. The police
interviewed her and recorded her statement. 15. During cross-
examination by the defense, the witness admitted that she did not
know the exact date of the incident and that her statement was
taken approximately 12 days after the incident. The witness
voluntarily stated that her statement was recorded after she
returned from Ranchi. When giving her statement to the police,
she had said, “There was dry wood from a Saikhua (Sarai) tree
lying near the house, over which a dispute had arisen between my
maternal uncle, the accused Mahatma Yadav, and my maternal
grandfather, the deceased Jangli Yadav. Due to this dispute, my
maternal uncle, Mahatma Yadav, attacked my maternal
grandfather, Jangli Yadav, with a pickup truck.” The witness also
accepted that her parents live in her maternal grandfather’s
house, and that the accused, Mahatma Yadav, had disputes with
her mother, Anita Yadav. The witness further admitted that the
accused Mahatma Yadav also had a dispute with her father,
Mahesh Yadav, over wood. The witness acknowledged that there
was no dispute between her maternal uncle and her maternal
grandfather over the wood. However, the witness denied seeing
her maternal grandfather being hit by the accused’s vehicle. She
also denied that she was telling the story of the incident based on
12
what others had told her. The witness denied that she was
recounting the story of Jangli Yadav being hit by the accused’s
pickup truck based on information provided by her parents.
16. Based on the evidence presented, the learned trial Court has
rightly concluded that the death of the deceased, Jangli Yadav,
was homicidal in nature. Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-12), who
conducted the post-mortem examination, provided crucial
testimony regarding the cause of death, identifying neurogenic
shock and brain injury as the primary factors. He also noted the
presence of significant pre-death injuries, including swelling and
fractures in the neck, which were consistent with an intentional
attack. The witness, PW-2, Kumari Rinki Yadav, corroborated this
finding by describing a violent incident in which her maternal
uncle, Mahatma Yadav, ran over her grandfather, Jangli Yadav,
with a pickup truck after a dispute over a piece of wood. Despite
some inconsistencies during cross-examination, the child
witness’s statement about the attack was clear in its assertion that
the death was a result of intentional harm caused by the accused.
The fact that the victim died from these injuries during treatment
further substantiates the homicidal nature of the act. The
circumstances, including the nature of the injuries and the
testimony regarding the dispute leading to the fatal act, support
the conclusion that the death was not accidental, but rather a
result of a deliberate and violent act by the accused. Thus, the
trial Court’s finding of homicidal death is justified by the medical
13
and testimonial evidence presented during the trial.
17. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering
their submissions, we are of the considered opinion that the
finding recorded by the trial Court that death of deceased Jangli
Yadav was homicidal in nature is the finding of fact based on
evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to
record. We hereby affirm that finding.
18. Now, the next question for consideration would be whether the
accused/appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in
question, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative
by relying upon the testimony of Dr. Sharad Kumar Gupta (PW-
12) and further relying upon the testimonies of eyewitness Rinki
Yadav (PW-2), grand daughter of the deceased.
19. Thus, on the basis of testimonies of aforesaid prosecution
witnesses, it is clear that it is the appellant herein who on the
fateful date and time has caused grievous injuries to the
deceased, due to which he died. As such, the learned trial Court
has rightly held that it is the appellant/accused who has caused
injuries over the body of the deceased and caused his death.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
20. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for
consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide
not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to
Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned
14
counsel for the appellant ?
21. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of the
deceased as already noticed are ‘the cause of death appeared to
be neurogenic shock and brain injury’ and was homicidal in
nature. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and
“murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides,
but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the
light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed
to be the circumstances.
22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of
Pepsu2 has made the following observations :
“Of course, we have to distinguish between motive,
intention and knowledge. Motive is something which
prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is
an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many
cases intention and knowledge merge into each other
and mean the same thing more or less and intention
can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating
line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin
but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote
different things. Even in some English decisions, the
three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led
to a certain amount of confusion.”
23. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the
1 (2012) 8 SCC 289
2 AIR 1956 SC 488
15
aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two
different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate
punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to
cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act
committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death
without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal
terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of
the circumstances to be taken into consideration while
determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence
would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of
the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge
that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held
guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this
background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code
namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being
a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act
to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would
disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and
such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the
said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300
IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that
particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was
sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to
be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
16
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.
State of Haryana3 has observed as under:-
“21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case, we are of the opinion that in the
absence of the existence of common object
Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the
offence of culpable homicide without premeditation
in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or
unusual manner and his case is covered by
Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is
punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The
finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid
appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable
under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held
guilty for the commission of offence of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder punishable
under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to
pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine,
he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for
one year.”
25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of
Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into
consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the
accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of
the IPC, which state as under :-
“23. These are some factors which are required to be
taken into consideration before awarding appropriate
3 (2002) 3 SCC 327
4 (2009) 15 SCC 635
17sentence to the accused. These factors are only
illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each
case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The
relevant factors are as under :
(a) Motive or previous enmity;
(b) Whether the incident had taken place on
the spur of the moment;
(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused
while inflicting the blow or injury;
(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously
or the victim died after several days;
(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;
(f) The age and general health condition of the
accused;
(g) Whether the injury was caused without
premeditation in a sudden fight;
(h) The nature and size of weapon used for
inflicting the injury and the force with which
the blow was inflicted;
(i) The criminal background and adverse
history of the accused;
(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death but the death was because of shock;
(k) Number of other criminal cases pending
against the accused;
(l) Incident occurred within the family members
or close relations;
(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused
after the incident.
Whether the accused had taken the
injured/the deceased to the hospital
immediately to ensure that he/she gets
proper medical treatment ?
18
These are some of the factors which can be
taken into consideration while granting an
appropriate sentence to the accused.
24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is
only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered
view, proper and appropriate sentence to the
accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the
court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure
that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in
other words, sentence should be according to the
gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant
factors which are required to be kept in view while
convicting and sentencing the accused.”
26. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their
Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge
that it is likely to cause death is established but without any
intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term
which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has
further been held that to make out an offence punishable under
Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the
death of the person in question and such death was caused by
the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is
likely to cause death.
27. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of
Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed
in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-
5 (2012) 8 SCC 450
6 (2017) 3 SCC 247
19“20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that
are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court
in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC
217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as
under :(SCC p. 220, para 7)
“7. To invoke this exception four
requirements must be satisfied, namely,
(I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no
premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a
heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had
not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. The cause of the
quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant
who offered the provocation or started the
assault. The number of wounds caused
during the occurrence is not a decisive
factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and
unpremeditated and the offender must
have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the
offender must not have taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in
the heat of the moment picks up a
weapon which is handy and causes
injuries, one of which proves fatal, he
would be entitled to the benefit of this
exception provided he has not acted
cruelly.”
21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC
590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the
proposition of law that under what circumstances
Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if
death is caused, it has been explained as under :
(SCC p. 596, para 9)
“9. …. The help of exception 4 can be
invoked if death is caused (a) without
premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner; and (d) the fight must have been
with the person killed. To bring a case
within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be
noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception
4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the
Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a
fight. Heat of passion requires that there
20must be no time for the passions to cool
down and in this case, the parties had
worked themselves into a fury on account
of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A
fight is a combat between two or more
persons whether with or without weapons.
It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and
whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts
of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that
there was a sudden quarrel and there was
no premeditation. It must further be shown
that the offender has not taken undue
advantage or acted in cruel or unusual
manner. The expression “undue
advantage” as used in the provisions
means “unfair advantage”.
28. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case
of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of
knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily
injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the
IPC.
29. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v.
State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which
should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4
to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:
“16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300
IPC shows that the following four ingredients are
required:
(i) There must be a sudden fight;
(ii) There was no premeditation;
7 (2019) 6 SCC 122
21
(iii) The act was committed in a heat of
passion; and
(iv) The offender had not taken any undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.”
30. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of
Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of
Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on
20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted
to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the
act as under:
“60. Few important principles of law discernible from
the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question,
what offence the accused could be said to have
committed, the true test is to find out the intention or
knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the
intention or knowledge was such as is described in
Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act
will be murder even though only a single injury was
caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’
comes and placing his revolver against the head of
‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously.
Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the
intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though
only single injury was caused. The case would,
therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of
Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’
sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the
latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left
chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left
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chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary
course of nature to cause death. There may be no
difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the
particular injury found to be caused and that the said
injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of
‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and
render him guilty of the offence of murder although
only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the
accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section
300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would
otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview
of murder, if the accused’s case attracts any one of
the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the
event of the case falling within any of those
exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of
Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is
such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300
of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of
Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within
Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the
intention or knowledge of the accused may be such
that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC,
may be attracted but not any of the clauses of
Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the
offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to
murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an
offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall
within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an
offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall
within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
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(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused
person falls within the first two clauses of cases of
culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the
IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section
304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is
punishable under the second part of Section 304. In
effect, therefore, the first part of this section would
apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the
second part would apply when there is no such
intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular
injury was intended, and objectively that injury was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section
300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be
murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following
classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one
or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is
covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii)
when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of
likelihood which is covered by the expression
‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is
generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause
death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of
Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with
the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but
without intention to cause death or an injury likely to
cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the
two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the
first part, the crime of murder is first established and
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the accused is then given the benefit of one of the
exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the
second part, the crime of murder is never established
at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an
accused guilty of the offence punishable under the
second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused
need not bring his case within one of the exceptions
to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is
distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of
happening are even or greater than its not
happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably
happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to
place itself in the situation of the accused and then
judge whether the accused had the knowledge that
by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide
(Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of
the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind
while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the
IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,
the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder
and those not amounting to murder would fall.
Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is
brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of
the IPC. But, even though none of the said five
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on
the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be
required under the law to bring the case under any of
the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain
the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to
discharge this onus in establishing any one of the
four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly
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to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out
and the case may be one of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder as described under Section 299
of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of
mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be
applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury
inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely
be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter
of inference to be drawn from the proved
circumstances of the case. The court must
necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon
used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury,
degree of force used in causing the injury, the
manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and
attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes
a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause
injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of
nature to cause death also makes a culpable
homicide a murder if death has actually been caused
and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be
inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or
injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused
results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a
general principle, can be drawn that the accused did
not have the intention to cause the death or that
particular injury which resulted in the death of the
victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty
intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be
determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused
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had the intention to cause death of any person or to
cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which
results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely
falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC
unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused
had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case
where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that
injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, the fact that the act is done without
premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the
circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or
unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury,
would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and
the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of
the IPC.”
31. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of
law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the
above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on the date of
the incident, while Smt. Anita Yadav (PW-1) was plastering
(coating) her parental house, the accused arrived there driving a
pickup vehicle. The accused began abusing her over the issue of
moving/storing firewood inside the house. At that time, the
deceased also came to the spot and tried to restrain the accused.
Thereupon, the accused started the pickup vehicle and
intentionally hit the deceased and drove the vehicle over him,
causing serious injuries, due to which the deceased died during
treatment. Though there was no motive or premeditation on the
27
part of the appellant to cause death of deceased, but by driving
the vehicle over the deceased, causing serious injuries he has
intention to cause death of deceased and by doing so, he must
have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would
likely to cause death of the deceased, as such, his case would fall
within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act
of the appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary
ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be
a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was
committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not
taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner.
32. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case
and also taking into consideration that at present appellant-
Mahatma Yadav was aged about 33 years at the time of incident,
and he is in jail since 04.03.2020 and he has already undergone
about 06 years of imprisonment, the conviction of the appellant
under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted to Section
304 Part-I of the IPC.
33. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of
the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section
304 Part-I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 10 years.
34. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated
hereinabove.
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35. It is stated that the appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the
remaining sentence as modified by this Court.
36. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along
with the original record of the case to the trial court concerned
forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send
a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail
where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the
same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail
the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an
appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of
High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court
Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Chandra