Madhya Pradesh High Court
Madhya Pradesh Poorv Kshetra Vidyut … vs Satish Kumar Kachhi on 10 July, 2026
Author: Anand Pathak
Bench: Anand Pathak
1 WA-1449-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND PATHAK
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE B. P. SHARMA
ON THE 10th OF JULY, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 616 of 2024
MADHYA PRADESH POORV KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN
COMPANY LTD. (MPPKVVCL) AND OTHERS
Versus
ARUNENDRA PRASAD MAURYA
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Khandekar - Advocate for the appellants/MPPKVV Com. Ltd.
Shri Vijay Raghav Singh - Advocate for the respondent.
WITH
WRIT APPEAL No. 1317 of 2024
MADHYA PRADESH POORV KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN
COMPANY AND OTHERS
Versus
BALENDRA PRATAP SINGH
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Khandekar - Advocate for the appellants/MPPKVV Com. Ltd.
Shri Ajeet Kumar Singh - Advocate for the respondent.
WRIT APPEAL No. 1449 of 2024
MADHYA PRADESH POORV KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN
COMPANY LTD AND OTHERS
Versus
SATISH KUMAR KACHHI
Appearance:
Shri Aditya Khandekar - Advocate for the appellants/MPPKVV Com. Ltd.
Shri Rajas Pohankar - Advocate for the respondent through video conferencing.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
2 WA-1449-2024
WRIT APPEAL No. 1724 of 2024
SHAILENDRA KUSHWAHA
Versus
MADHYA PRADESH PURVA KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN
COMPANY LTD. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Devendra Kumar Tripathi - Advocate for the appellant.
Shri Aditya Khandekar - Advocate for the respondents/MPPKVV Com. Ltd.
ORDER
Per: Justice B. P. Sharma
Since common questions of fact and law arise in this batch of writ
appeals, they were heard analogously and are being decided by this common
judgment. This order shall govern the disposal of all these appeals. For the
sake of convenience, facts stated in Writ Appeal No.616/2024 are taken into
consideration.
2. The appeals under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya
(Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 arise out of orders passed
by learned Single Judge whereby the writ petitions preferred by the
respondents-employees were allowed and the charge-sheets issued against
them were quashed on the ground that the officers issuing the charge-sheets
were merely holding current charge of the higher posts and were, therefore,
not competent to exercise disciplinary powers. Aggrieved by the said orders,
the Electricity Distribution Companies have preferred the present appeals.
3. The respondents are employees of the appellant – Electricity
Distribution Companies. Allegations of misconduct having been levelled
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
3 WA-1449-2024
against them, charge-sheets were issued proposing departmental enquiries
under the applicable service regulations. The charge-sheets were issued by
officers who, at the relevant time, were holding current charge of the posts of
Chief Engineer, Additional Chief Engineer or other higher disciplinary
authorities pursuant to orders issued under the Delegation of Powers of the
Company. Instead of participating in the disciplinary proceedings, the
respondents challenged the charge-sheets before learned Single Judge
contending that the officers issuing the same were not substantively
appointed to the higher posts and consequently lacked jurisdiction to initiate
disciplinary proceedings. The Companies (appellant herein) opposed the writ
petitions by asserting that the officers concerned had been entrusted with the
current charge along with full powers of the higher offices under the
Delegation of Powers and were therefore competent to discharge all
functions attached to those posts, including disciplinary functions. Learned
Single Judge, relying principally upon Full Bench decision of this Court in
Girija Shankar Shukla vs. SDO, Harda, AIR 1973 MP 104 , accepted the
contention of writ petitioners, held that officers merely holding current
charge could not exercise statutory disciplinary powers and consequently
quashed the charge-sheets. Hence, the present appeals.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that learned
Single Judge failed to appreciate the true scope of Delegation of Powers and
the settled legal position governing officers entrusted with current charge. It
is argued that appellant – Companies are public utility undertakings where
higher posts frequently remain vacant owing to transfers, promotions and
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
4 WA-1449-2024
retirements and in order to ensure continuity of administration, current
charge of such offices is entrusted to senior officers with full powers. Once
such officers are authorized to discharge the functions of the higher office,
no distinction can be drawn between administrative and disciplinary powers
unless the governing rules expressly provide otherwise. It is further
contended that issuance of a charge-sheet is merely the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings and does not determine the rights of the employee.
Consequently, interference at the stage of issuance of charge-sheet on a
technical objection relating to competence was wholly unwarranted.
5. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel appearing for
the Companies relied upon Gopalji Khanna vs. Allahabad Bank and others,
(1996) 3 SCC 538, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized the
competence of an officer placed in charge of office to discharge the functions
attached thereto. Reliance is also placed upon the Full Bench judgment of the
Madras High Court in A. Savariar vs. The Secretary, Tamil Nadu Public
Service Commission & Another, 2008 (4) CTC 753 , holding that an officer
holding current charge is competent to discharge statutory functions unless a
contrary intention appears from the governing statutory framework. The
appellants further relied upon P.S. Dhanwal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and
other (Writ Appeal No.575 of 2020) , submitting that the Division Bench
upheld the competence of an in-charge authority after examining the
statutory framework, and Mahendra Pratap Singh vs. Madhya Pradesh
Madhya Kshetra VidyutVitaran Company Ltd. and Others (Writ Appeal
No.1261 of 2024), wherein this Court upheld disciplinary proceedings
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
5 WA-1449-2024
initiated by an authority functioning under the applicable Delegation of
Powers. It is further contended that learned Single Judge misapplied the Full
Bench judgment in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra) , which arose in an entirely
different statutory context where no delegation or authorization existed
empowering the officer concerned to exercise the powers of the higher
office. It is also submitted that the interpretation adopted by learned Single
Judge would have serious administrative consequences by invalidating
innumerable administrative and disciplinary actions taken by officers
lawfully entrusted with current charge under the Delegation of Powers.
6. Supporting the judgment under appeal, learned counsel for the
respondents submitted that the controversy is one of jurisdiction and not of
administrative convenience. According to the respondents, disciplinary
powers flow from the applicable service rules and not from executive
instructions. The Delegation of Powers is merely an administrative
arrangement and cannot enlarge or substitute statutory authority. It is
contended that learned Single Judge correctly distinguished between an
officer functioning as In-charge of the Circle and one merely holding current
charge of the post and rightly concluded that the latter could not exercise
statutory disciplinary powers. Reliance is placed upon Girija Shankar Shukla
(supra), which, according to the respondents, continues to govern the field
and clearly lays down that statutory powers cannot ordinarily be exercised by
an officer merely holding current charge. Reliance is also placed upon Kiran
Narwariya v. State of M.P., 2013 SCC OnLine MP 8654 , submitting that the
competence of an officer holding current charge depends upon the governing
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
6 WA-1449-2024
statutory provisions. The respondents sought to distinguish Gopalji Khanna
(supra), A. Savariar (supra), P.S. Dhanwal (supra) a n d Mahendra Pratap
Singh (supra) on the ground that those decisions turned upon different
statutory frameworks or peculiar facts and, therefore, did not dilute the ratio
of Full Bench decision in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra) .
7. It is further contended by learned counsel for the respondents that the
service conditions of the employees are governed by the Madhya Pradesh
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 as adopted
by the Electricity Companies together with the statutory service regulations
applicable to the establishment. The disciplinary authority is specifically
identified under the relevant rules. Such authority derives its jurisdiction
from the statutory framework itself and not from administrative orders issued
from time to time. Consequently, unless the statute or statutory rules
expressly authorize an officer holding current charge to exercise disciplinary
powers, the same cannot be assumed merely because such officer has been
directed to discharge the current duties of the higher office.
8. It is further submitted that learned Single Judge has recorded detailed
and well-reasoned findings after examining the applicable Delegation of
Powers, the statutory rules and the judicial precedents cited before the Court.
The appellants have not demonstrated any patent error of law or perversity in
the conclusions reached by learned Single Judge. Merely because another
view is possible on interpretation of the Delegation of Powers does not
justify interference in intra-Court appeals. The respondents contend that the
judgment under appeal is fully consistent with the law laid down by the Full
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
7 WA-1449-2024
Bench of this Court and does not call for any interference.
9. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to the rival submissions
and have carefully perused the material available on record.
10. The issue is not whether the allegations against the respondents are
sustainable, but the principal question that arises for consideration before this
Court is whether an officer who has been entrusted with the current charge of
a higher post under the Delegation of Powers framed by the Company is
competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and issue charge-sheets in
respect of employees over whom such higher authority exercises disciplinary
jurisdiction or whether such statutory powers remain confined only to the
substantive holder of the office. Learned Single Judge proceeded primarily
on the basis of Full Bench judgment in Girija Shankar Shukla (supra) .
However, in our considered opinion, the said decision has to be understood
in the factual and statutory context in which it was rendered. The Full Bench
was dealing with a situation where there was no statutory or executive
authorization empowering the officer holding current charge to exercise the
powers attached to the higher office. The present cases stand on a different
footing. The appellant Companies have framed a comprehensive Delegation
of Powers under which officers entrusted with current charge are authorized
to exercise the powers attached to the higher office. Such entrustment is
neither casual nor informal but forms part of the administrative mechanism
devised to ensure continuity of governance in the functioning of Electricity
Distribution Companies.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
8 WA-1449-2024
11. The Delegation of power of M.P. Poorv Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran
Company Ltd. dealing with this issue in Part-A, Section – IV, Sr. No. 1,
reads as under:
“PART – A SECTION – IV
DISCIPLINARY ACTION
S. No. Name of Authority Limit
Powers
a) Powers of suspension and minor
penalty for all class III employees
(i) E.E. b) Full powers for class IV
employees
(ii) Addl CE/SE (in Full powers for class III / IV
charge of circle) employees under administrative
Control
a) Powers of Suspension and
minor penalty for class I officer of
(iii) Regional the rank of EE and equivalent
1 Punishment of ED/CE/CE (Stores) b) Full powers in respect of
establishment officers/officials up to the rank of
A.E. and equivalent class II officer
a) Full powers for class III & IV
employees posted in Corporate
office (Except JEs)
b) Full powers for all class II
(iv) Addl. Secy./HR officers and JEs posted in
Head Corporate office with approval of
MD
a) Full powers for Suspension and
minor penalty for class I officers
(v) M.D. of the rank of E.D./C.E. and
equivalent
b) Full powers for all officers /
officials below the rank of ED/CE
and equivalent.
(vi) Management Full powers
Committee
12. The Electricity Companies have framed a comprehensive Delegation
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
9 WA-1449-2024
of Powers, under which officers entrusted with the current charge of higher
offices have been specifically authorized to exercise the powers attached to
such offices. The entrustment of current charge in the present cases was not
an informal or casual administrative arrangement. Each officer was
specifically directed by the competent authority to hold the current charge of
the higher office together with the powers attached thereto. Such entrustment
formed part of the established administrative mechanism governing the
functioning of Electricity Distribution Companies.
13. The Delegation of Powers framed by the Company does not carve out
any such distinction. On the contrary, it entrusts the officers holding current
charge with the powers of the higher office. Once such entrustment is made
by the competent authority under the governing administrative framework,
the officer functions as the head of that office for all practical purposes
during the period he continues to hold charge. Unless the applicable statute
expressly prohibits exercise of a particular function by such officer, the
Court would not ordinarily read into the Delegation of Powers a restriction
which the rule-making authority itself has not incorporated.
14. It is well settled that the purpose behind entrusting current charge is to
ensure continuity of administration. Public institutions cannot remain
paralysed merely because substantive appointments to higher posts have not
immediately been made. Particularly in organizations dealing with essential
public services such as electricity distribution, the administrative machinery
is expected to function uninterruptedly. Vacancies occurring on account of
retirement, transfer or promotion cannot result in suspension of statutory or
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
10 WA-1449-2024
administrative functions. It is precisely for this reason that the competent
authority entrusts current charge of higher offices to senior officers until
regular appointments are made.
15. If the interpretation adopted by learned Single Judge is accepted in its
entirety, every administrative decision taken by an officer holding current
charge including grant of sanctions, approvals, administrative orders,
contractual decisions and disciplinary proceedings would become vulnerable
to challenge solely on the ground that the officer was not the substantive
incumbent of the post. Such an interpretation would render the entire
mechanism of current charge appointments practically unworkable and defeat
the very object for which such arrangements are made.
16. In Gopalji Khanna (supra) , the Hon’ble Apex Court was examining
the competence of an officer who had been placed in charge of the offices of
Chairman and Managing Director. Rejecting the challenge to his
competence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the officer was
discharging the functions of those offices and was therefore entitled to
perform all duties attached thereto. The emphasis laid by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court was not upon the substantive appointment of the officer but
upon the authority conferred upon him to function as the incumbent of that
office. Learned Single Judge distinguished Gopalji Khanna (supra) by
observing that the present cases involve exercise of statutory powers. In our
opinion, such distinction does not completely answer the ratio laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court itself recognized
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
11 WA-1449-2024
that the officer functioning in charge of the office was competent to
discharge the functions attached to that office. The judgment does not
support the proposition that every statutory function automatically stands
excluded merely because the officer is holding current charge.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has had the occasion to consider the
question whether a person holding the current charge of a higher post
competent to exercise the powers of the disciplinary authority is attached to
that post. The issue stands authoritatively settled by holding that an officer
entrusted with the current charge of a higher office is vested with all the
executive powers, duties and functions attached to that office during the
period of such entrustment. Consequently, any disciplinary action, including
the imposition of penalty by such officer in the capacity of the disciplinary
authority, is legally valid and cannot be faulted merely on the ground that the
officer was holding only the current charge of the higher post. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Gopalji Khanna (supra) has held as under:
“7. Shri Wadhwa while exercising the power of review was really
discharging the functions of Chairman and Managing Director as he was
then placed in charge of those of ices and was therefore entitled to
perform all the duties and functions of those of ices. He did not exercise
that power on the basis that itwas delegated to him. Therefore, the
decisions in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [(1953) 1 All ER
1113 : (1953) 2 WLR 995] , Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Asstt.
Electrical Engineer [(1979) 4 SCC 289 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 1] and
Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [(1989) 3 SCC
132 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 436] , relied upon by the learned counsel in
support of his contention that statutory power can be exercised by the
named authority only and cannot be further delegated, require no further
consideration. So also, Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union of
India [1991 Supp (2) SCC 733 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 115 : (1992) 19 ATCSignature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
12 WA-1449-2024
85] and State of Haryana v. S.M. Sharma [1993 Supp (3) SCC 252 : 1993
SCC (L&S) 1072 : (1993) 25 ATC 594] cited by the learned counsel have
no relevance. The question which arose for consideration in those cases
was whether an officer who substantively holds a lower post and is asked
to discharge the duties of a higher post can be considered as promoted to
that higher post. This Court held that entrustment of current duties charge
of a higher post does not amount to promotion and in such cases the
person continues to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges
the duties of higher post essentially as a stopgap arrangement.
8. It was next submitted that when a person is entrusted with charge
of current duties of a higher post, he can exercise only those powers and
perform those functions which are available to the person holding the
higher post under executive orders and not those which are conferred by
statutory provisions. In support of this submission the learned counsel
relied upon the decision of this Court in Ajaib Singh v. State of Punjab
[(1965) 2 SCR 845 : AIR 1965 SC 1619 : (1965) 2 Cri LJ 553] . In that
case what had happened was that the Additional District Magistrate,
Amritsar was invested with powers of a District Magistrate under Section
10(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was also put in charge
of the of ice of the District Magistrate Amritsar, who was transferred. No
order appointing him as a District Magistrate under Section 10(1) was
passed. While in charge of the office of the District Magistrate, he passed
an order of detention under the Defence of India Act and Rules, 1962.
That order was challenged on the ground that as the Additional District
Magistrate was not appointed as District Magistrate under Section 10(1)
he did not have the power to pass a detention order and, therefore, the
order passed by him was without any authority of law and liable to be set
aside. This Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Defence
of India Act and Rules, 1962 and the drastic nature of the power and the
consequences following from it, observed that the power of detention
could only be exercised by the State Government or an officer or
authority to whom it was delegated and that the said power could be
delegated to an officer or authority who was not lower in rank than the
District Magistrate. It was then held that even though the Additional
District Magistrate was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate
on there being a vacancy in the of ice of the District Magistrate, he was
still not the District Magistrate a s he was not appointed as such under
Section 10(1) of the Code and therefore, he had no power to pass theSignature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
13 WA-1449-2024
order of detention. Even though invested with the powers of a District
Magistrate he did not become an officer of the rank of a District
Magistrate. In this case we are not concerned with such a provision and
therefore are not required to consider whether Executive Director of the
Bank when entrusted with the charge of duties of the offices of Chairman
and Managing Director became an officer of the rank of Chairman and
Managing Director. Moreover the power of the employer to take
disciplinary action against his employee including the power to review an
order of penalty, has to be distinguished from the statutory power to
detain a person. Therefore, on the basis of this decision it cannot be held
that the Executive Director who was merely entrusted with the charge of
duties of the offices of Chairman and Managing Director could not have
exercised the power of reviewing the order of penalty passed by the
disciplinary authority.”
18. Support for this view is also available from the Full Bench judgment of
the Madras High Court in A. Savariar (supra). The Full Bench, after an
elaborate consideration of the earlier authorities including Gopalji Khanna
(supra), held that unless a contrary intention is expressed by the Government
through statutory provisions or executive instructions, an officer holding the
post in charge possesses the authority to discharge the statutory functions and
responsibilities attached to that office. The Full Bench expressly overruled
the contrary view adopted in earlier Division Bench decisions and
authoritatively recognized the competence of officers holding current charge.
The relevant para regarding the interpretation of the word “in-charge” is as
follows:
“7. Under such circumstances, unless contrary intention is expressed by
the Government either by way of a statutory provision or by way of an
executive instruction, a Government servant who holds the post as in-
charge has got power to discharge the statutory functions and
responsibilities of the said post.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
14 WA-1449-2024
8. Besides since already this issue has been covered by the judgment
of the Honourable Apex Court reported in 1996 A.I.R. S.C. 1729 as
referred above, we are of the opinion, the view of the Division reported in
1997 Writ L.R. 33 (C. Baskaran v. The District Collector, Trichy)
rendered in W.A.No.1054 of 1983 is not a correct law. Consequently, we
hold that an officer-in-charge of a post has got power to discharge the
powers and statutory functions of the said post.
9. Consequently, as far as the point of reference is concerned, we hold
that the Officer who is holding the post in-charge has got power to
discharge the powers and statutory functions of the said post. Registry is
directed to place the papers of the writ appeal before the appropriate
Bench for disposal.”
19. Learned Single Judge, while referring to A. Savariar (supra), appears
to have emphasized only the observations regarding statutory framework
without noticing the ultimate conclusion recorded by the Full Bench. The
ratio emerging from A. Savariar (supra)is that the competence of an officer
holding current charge has to be determined from the governing legal
framework. In the present case, the Delegation of Powers expressly
authorizes the officer to function as the incumbent of the higher office.
Therefore, the principle laid down in A. Savariar (supra) lends support to the
stand of the appellants rather than the respondents.
20. Equally significant is the recent Division Bench judgment of this Court
in Mahendra Pratap Singh (supra). The controversy therein also arose from
the issuance of a charge-sheet by an officer holding current charge. After
examining the original record, the Division Bench declined to interfere with
the disciplinary proceedings and upheld the competence of the authority
acting under the applicable Delegation of Powers. Although the facts of
every case is different, the principle emerging from the said judgment is that
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
15 WA-1449-2024
the validity of the charge-sheet has to be tested with reference to the
authority conferred under the governing administrative and statutory
framework and not merely with reference to the nomenclature “current
charge”.
21. The respondents have placed reliance upon Kiran Narwariya v. State
of M.P., 2013 SCC OnLine MP 8654 . In our opinion, the said judgment also
does not carry the matter any further. In that case, learned Single Judge
upheld the competence of the authority issuing the charge-sheet upon finding
that the officer concerned was substantively holding an equivalent post and
had additionally been entrusted with another charge. The judgment turned
upon its own facts and cannot be read as laying down an inflexible
proposition that every officer holding current charge is incompetent to
initiate disciplinary proceedings.
22. From a cumulative reading of all the aforesaid judgments, the legal
position which emerges is that no absolute proposition of law can be laid
down that an officer holding current charge is invariably incompetent to
discharge statutory functions attached to the higher office. The issue
necessarily depends upon the governing statutory provisions, the applicable
service rules and the Delegation of Powers under which such officer has
been entrusted with the higher office.
23. Another important aspect which deserves consideration is the nature of
the impugned proceedings. The charge-sheet merely initiates disciplinary
action. At that stage, the guilt of the delinquent employee remains to be
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
16 WA-1449-2024
determined after a regular enquiry conducted in accordance with the
principles of natural justice. No penalty is imposed by the mere issuance of a
charge-sheet. Therefore, even otherwise, learned Single Judge ought to have
exercised considerable restraint before interfering at the threshold,
particularly when the challenge rested solely upon the technical objection
relating to the competence of the authority issuing the charge-sheet.
24. Accordingly, this Court pass the following order.
(i) Writ Appeals preferred by Electricity Distribution Companies :-
The writ appeals (WA No.616/2024, WA No.1317/2024, WA
No.1449/2024) filed by the Electricity Distribution Companies succeed and
are accordingly allowed. The impugned orders passed by learned Single
Judge in respective petitions are set aside.
(ii) Writ Appeal preferred by the Employees :-
In view of the conclusions recorded hereinabove, the writ appeal (WA
No.1724/2024) preferred by the employees challenging the validity of the
disciplinary proceedings or raising identical issues regarding the competence
of the officers holding current charge are devoid of merit and is accordingly
dismissed.
No order as to costs.
(ANAND PATHAK) (B. P. SHARMA)
JUDGE JUDGE
@shish^
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ASHISH KUMAR
JAIN
Signing time: 8/4/2026
10:50:02 AM
