Delhi District Court
M/S Srishti Polychem Pvt.Ltd vs M/S Viyaan Melamine Industries And Ors on 5 May, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVENDER KUMAR JANGALA
DISTRICT JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT-01) NORTH
WEST DISTRICT, ROHINI COURTS, DELHI
CS (COMM)/378/19
CNR No. DLNW010100982019
M/S Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Director
Sh. Manoj Kumar Pansari
S/o Late Sh. S.P. Pansari
R/o GD-70, Pitampura Delhi 110082
Registered office at:
Dp-254 UGF, Vishakha Enclave, Pitampura,
Delhi-110034 ............Plaintiff
Versus
1. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries
Registered office:
S-10/2 Tie Balanagar, Telangana,
Hyderabad-500037
2. Mr. Navneet Aggarwal
S/o Rajesh Agarwal
Partner:
M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries
Registered office at:
S-10/2 Tie, Balanagar,
Telangana, Hyderabad-500037
3. Mr. Nehal Agarwal
W/o Navneet Agarwal
Partner:
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries
Registered office at:
S-10/2 Tie, Balanagar,
Telangana, Hyderabad-500037
.......Defendants
SUIT FOR RECOVERY OF RS.5,33,970/- (FIVE LAKH
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY)
ALONG WITH THE INTEREST @ 18% PER MONTH.
Date of institution : 22.10.2019
Date of final arguments : 16.04.2026
Date of judgment : 05.05.2026
JUDGEMENT
1. By way of present judgment, I shall adjudicate upon the suit
of plaintiff for recovery of Rs.5,33,970/- alongwith interest, filed
against the defendants.
2.1 Brief facts: The brief facts as averred in the plaint are that
the plaintiff “Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd.” is a company registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 having its registered office at
DP-254 under ground floor, Pitampura Delhi-110034. That the
plaintiff is the manufacturer and trader of melamine powder and is a
leading business entity in such kind of goods, having very good
reputation. The present suit is instituted by the plaintiff company
through its one of the director “Sh. Manoj Kumar Pansari” who is
stated to be managing day to day affair of the plaintiff company.
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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2.2 It is stated that the Defendant no.1 “M/s Viyaan
Melamine Industries” is a Partnership Firm, registered under the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932 and the defendant no.2 “Mr. Navneet
Agarwal” and defendant No. 3 “Mrs. Nehal Agarwal” are the
partners. It is stated that the defendant no.1 is a manufacturer of
melamine crockery and defendant No.2 is managing day to day
business transactions and also responsible for all the acts, deeds,
omission and commission of the partnership firm.
2.3 It is stated that the defendant No. 2 approached the
plaintiff at its Delhi office for the requirement of raw material for
their business. That the defendant No. 1 showed themselves as
highly ethical, having good reputation, business standing and
turnover, deceived the Plaintiff by giving assurance and promise that
they will make timely and full payment if the Plaintiff gives
discount and further assured to provide heavy lucrative business.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff had decided to supply the raw material to
the defendant No. 1. Thereafter, the defendant No. 1 started
purchasing melamine powder frequently.
2.4 It is stated that during the course of business, the
Defendant no. 1 had placed various orders to the Plaintiff which
were duly supplied by plaintiff with their invoices from Delhi and
payment of which was received in Delhi. That the plaintiff is also
maintaining the ledger books of defendant no. 1. It is stated that the
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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plaintiff supplied following goods as per the orders placed by the
defendant:-
Sr. Bill Date Amount
Bilty C-Form
No. no. No.
1. 253 18.02.2016 Rs.1,80,540/- 27058 361701185863334
2. 254 19.02.2016 Rs.1,80,540/- 27062 361701185863334
3. 256 02.03.2016 Rs.1,80,540/- 26925 361701185863334
4. 004 14.5.2016 Rs.76,500/- 4508 361701188605290
5. 007 25.05.2016 Rs.76,500/- 2809 361701188605290
6. 0034 10.08.2016 Rs.1,14,750/- 4899 361701182210510
2.5 It is stated that the defendants have duly acknowledged
the receipts the delivery of goods by issuing the aforesaid C forms.
That the said goods were supplied to the defendants by the Gill
Sandhu Transport with G.R. no 27062, 26925, 2809 and also by Air
Trans transport with G.R. no. 4899,4508 from Delhi. That the
defendants against the aforesaid invoices have issued the C form in
favour of plaintiff in lieu of goods supplied. It is stated that the
plaintiff supplied melamine powder of an amount of Rs.8,09,370/-
out of which an amount of Rs 2,75,400/- was paid by the defendants
through RTGS and an amount of Rs 5,33,970/- is due against
aforesaid bills.
2.6 It is stated that since February 2017, the plaintiff
approached to the defendants on multiple occasions to make the
payment but the defendants had never paid remaining balance of Rs
5,33,970/- and kept on lingering on one pretext or other. That the
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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plaintiff also issued the legal notice dated 18.12.2017 and after
receipt of notice, defendants in their reply dated 15.01.2018 have
simply refused any outstanding dues. That the defendants have
admitted the receiving the goods by issuing C forms and avail the
credit of sales tax. That defendants have not disclosed any details
regarding the payment made to the plaintiff in respect of the above
said bills.
2.7 It is stated that on 06.02.2019 the Plaintiff filed an
application for pre mediation litigation before the North West
District Legal Service Authority against the Defendant No. 1 and 2.
However, the Defendants did not pay any heed to the notice of the
mediation and not appeared despite of final notice and resultantly
non starter report dated 02.03.2019 was issued.
2.8 It is stated that the cause of action for filing the present
plaint arose when the plaintiff sent legal notice dated 18 12.2017.
That the cause of action further arose when the defendants requested
some more time after receipt of legal notice. That the cause of action
is still subsisting and continuing as the amount is still lying unpaid.
2.9 It is stated that the registered office of the plaintiff is
situated at DP-254, UGF Vishakha enclave Pitampura Delhi-34.
That the defendant placed the order and met with plaintiff at the
aforesaid office of the plaintiff. That the payment of other bills was
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made at Delhi and therefore, this court is having jurisdiction to
entertain and try the present suit.
2.10 With the aforesaid submissions, the plaintiff has
instituted the present suit seeking a decree for recovery of Rs.
5,33,970/- along with pendentelite and future interest @ 18% per
annum from the date of filing till realization. The plaintiff has also
prayed for directions to the defendants to furnish the bank guarantee
to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- and the cost of the suit.
3. Vide order dated 22.10.2019 the summons of the suit
were issued to the defendant. Thereafter repeated summons were
issued but the defendants could not be served by way of ordinary
process. Vide order dated 20.12.2022, the application under
order V Rule 20 CPC moved on behalf of plaintiff was allowed
and the defendants were directed to be served by way of
publication. The defendant were served through publication in
the newspaer ‘Andhra Prabha’ dated 26.05.2023. However,
despite service by way of publication, none appeared on behalf
of defendants and they were proceeded exparte vide order dated
17.07.2023 and the matter was fixed for exparte PE.
4. In support of case of plaintiff, Sh. Manoj Kumar
Pansari, AR of the plaintiff has examined himself as PW-1. The
PW-1 adduced his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A,
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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reiterating therein the contents of plaint and relied upon the
following documents:-
1. Copy of Certificate of Incorporation Ex. PW-1/1.
2. Copy of Resolution passed by Srishti Polychem Pvt.
Ltd. Dated 11.09.2019 Ex.PW1/2.
3. Copy of ledger account from 01.04.2015 till 31.03.2016
alongwith Certificate under Section 65 of Indian Evidence
Act, Ex.PW1/3 (Colly.).
4. Copy of receipt dated 21.05.2016 vide Serial No.2809
issued by Cargo Movers Pvt. Ltd. Ex.PW1/4.
5. Copy of receipt dated 19.02.2016 vide Serial No.27062
issued by Cargo Movers Pvt. Ltd. Ex.PW1/5.
6. Copy of receipt dated 02.03.2016 vide Serial No.26925
issued by Cargo Movers Pvt. Ltd. Ex.PW1/6.
7. Copy of receipt dated 02.03.2016 vide GR No.4508
issued by Air Trans Ex.PW1/7.
8. Copy of receipt dated 10.08.2016 vide GR No.4899
issued by Air Trans Ex.PW1/89.
9. Copy of C-Form dated 18.01.2017 Ex.PW1/9.
10. Copy of invoice dated 02.03.2016 vide serial no.256
Ex.PW1/10.
11. Copy of invoice dated 19.02.2016 vide serial no.256
Ex.PW1/11.
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12. Copy of invoice dated 18.02.2016 vide serial no.253
Ex.PW1/12.
13. Copy of invoice dated 25.05.2016 vide serial no.007
Ex.PW1/13.
14. Copy of invoice dated 14.05.2016 vide serial no.4
Ex.PW1/14.
15. Copy of invoice dated 10.08.2016 vide serial no.34
Ex.PW1/15.
16. Copy of Legal Notice dated 15.01.2018 Ex.PW1/16.
17. Copy of reply dated 15.01.2018 given by defendants to
the legal notice, Ex.PW1/17.
18. Copy of Mediation Application Form dated 06.02.2019
Ex.PW1/18.
19. Copy of Non-Starter Report dated 02.03.2019
Ex.PW1/19.
5. The testimony of the PW1/AR of the plaintiff remained
unrebutted and unchallenged as the defendant remained exparte
during the trial. No other witness was examined on behalf of
plaintiff and vide statement dated 13.03.2024, PE was closed.
6. I have already heard the arguments advanced by Sh.
Bhavya Jain, Ld. counsel for the plaintiff. It is argued by Ld.
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Counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff supplied goods to the
defendants and the defendants made payment on running account
basis. That the defendant issued form C and acknowledged their
liability towards the plaintiff. That the defendants made the payment
on 06.02.2017 through NEFT as is evident from the ledger account.
That the period of 25 days taken in pre institution mediation is also
liable to be excluded. That the defendants have failed to appear
despite service by way of publication and remained exparte during
the trial. That the testimony of PW1 Sh. Manoj Kumar Pansari has
gone unchallenged and unrebutted. That in view of unrebutted
testimony of PW1 and documents placed on record, the decree as
prayed may kindly be passed.
7. I have perused the entire record including the
pleadings, documents and oral testimony of PW1 Sh. Manoj Kumar
Pansari on record. As the defendants remained ex-parte, and have
not cross-examined the sole plaintiff witness PW-1, the Court shall
consider the testimony of witness and the documents, as they exist
being un-rebutted and un-challenged.
8. It is well settled law that even in the exparte suit or
where the defence of defendant is struck off, the plaintiff has to
stand on his own legs. The weakness of the defendant does not give
ipso facto right to the plaintiff to get the relief from the court of law.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble High
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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Court of Delhi titled as Harish Mansukhani vs. Ashok Jain
reported as 2009(109) DRJ (DB) wherein the Hon’ble High Court
has held that the plaintiff has to prove his own case in accordance
with the law and has to stand on his own legs. The Hon’ble Delhi
High Court in another judgment titled as Sunil Dang vs. RL Gupta
reported as CS(OS) 1617/2007 decided on 13.01.2009 has held that
on the contrary if the defendant is ex parte, the onus is high on the
plaintiff to prove its case and when the defendant is contesting the
matter, the fact, which are not disputed are deemed to be proved and
need not to be proved. Further when the defendant fails to appear,
there can be no admission and the plaintiff has to prove the entire
case in accordance with law.
9. It may be relevant now to consider the law pertaining to
discharge of burden of proof of the issues as relevant and applicable
to the Civil Jurisdiction. In the binding authority of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India, in M/s. Gian Chand & Brothers and
Another v. Rattan Lal@ Rattan Singh: [2013] 3 S.C.R. 601; it has
been laid down:-
1.3. It is well settled principle of law that a person
who asserts a particular fact is required to
affirmatively establish it. The burden of proving the
facts rests on the party who substantially asserts the
affirmative issues and not the party who denies it but
the said principle may not be universal in its
application and there may be an exception thereto.
10. The various aspects of proving the facts of a case and
exceptions, if any, have been duly considered by Hon’ble Supreme
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Court of India in Anil Rishi vs Gurbaksh Singh in Appeal (civil)
2413 of 2006 on 2 May, 2006, wherein the binding legal position
has been reinforced as under :-
“Pleading is not evidence, far less proof. Issues are
raised on the basis of the pleadings. Indisputably,
the relationship between the parties itself would be
an issue. The suit will fail if both the parties do not
adduce any evidence, in view of Section 102 of the
Evidence Act. Thus, ordinarily, the burden of proof
would be on the party who asserts the affirmative of
the issue and it rests, after evidence is gone into,
upon the party against whom, at the time the
question arises, judgment would be given, if no
further evidence were to be adduced by either side.”
It has been further laid down (supra) :-
“A distinction exists between a burden of proof and
onus of proof. The right to begin follows onus
probandi. It assumes importance in the early stage
of a case. The question of onus of proof has greater
force, where the question is which party is to begin.
Burden of proof is used in three ways : (i) to indicate
the duty of bringing forward evidence in support of a
proposition at the beginning or later; (ii) to make
that of establishing a proposition as against all
counter evidence; and (iii) an indiscriminate use in
which it may mean either or both of the others. The
elementary rule is Section 101 is inflexible. In terms
of Section 102 the initial onus is always on the
plaintiff and if he discharges that onus and makes
out a case which entitles him to a relief, the onus
shifts to the defendant to prove those circumstances,
if any, which would disentitle the plaintiff to the
same.”.
11. As per law of the land, the onus to prove is upon the
plaintiff and if the plaintiff discharges that onus and makes out a
case to entitle him to the relief asserted, in these circumstance, the
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onus shifts upon the defendant to prove such circumstances which
may disentitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed.
12. At the outset, the Court shall first take up the aspect of
Limitation which is a legal issue. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff
Association, decided on 29.08.2005,, reported as (2005) 7 SCC 510
discussed in detail the importance of limitation. The relevant portion
is provided as follows:
“Bar of limitation does not obstruct the execution. It bars the
remedy. (See V. Subba Rao and Ors. v. Secretary to Govt.
Panchayat Raj and Rural Development, Govt. of A.P. and
Ors. (1996 (7) SCC 626.) Rules of limitation are not meant to
destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties
do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair
the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of
limitation fixes a life-span for such legal remedy for the redress
of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted
time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer
causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So, a life-span must be
fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the
remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential
anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy.
It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to
litigation). The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept
alive for legislatively fixed period of time. (See N.
Balakrishanan v. M. Krishna Murthy (1998 (7) SCC 123).”
(Emphasis supplied in bold)
13. Thus, the law of limitation does not extinguish the
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underlying right, it merely restricts the enforceability of the remedy
through courts after the prescribed period. Its purpose is not to
defeat legitimate claims, but to ensure that parties act with
reasonable diligence and do not indulge in unnecessary delay. The
legal system provides remedies to redress injuries, but such
remedies cannot be kept open indefinitely. Thus, limitation law is
grounded in considerations of public policy, encapsulated in the
maxim interest republicae ut sit finis litium, meaning that it is in
the interest of the State that litigation must come to an end. The
legislative intent is to ensure that every legal remedy is pursued
within a fixed and reasonable time.
14. Coming back to the facts of the present case, the present suit
has been filed by the plaintiff against the defendants on 21.10.2019.
The last bill No. 0034, Ex. PW1/15 raised by the plaintiff bears date
10.08.2016. The Plaintiff has claimed that the present suit is within
the period of limitation as the limitation stands extended through
various C-forms issued by the defendants acknowledging their
liability towards the plaintiff on supply of goods under Section 18 of
the Limitation Act,
15. C-forms are statutory documents issued under the Central
Sales Tax Act, 1956 for the purpose of availing a concessional rate
of inter-State sales tax. A valid acknowledgment under Section 18 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 must be specific in the amount or liability
acknowledged. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in M/s. Airen
and Associates v. M/s. Sanmar Engineering Services Limited,
CS (Comm.) No.378/19 M/s Srishti Polychem Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Viyaan Melamine Industries & Ors.
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Civil Appeal No. 654/2015, decided on 24.07.2025, reported as
2025 LiveLaw (SC) 745, has authoritatively settled this position.
The Court held that there must be an acknowledgment of liability in
respect of the property or right in question and that an
acknowledgment extends limitation only for the liability that was
specifically acknowledged, not for new, additional, or time-barred
claims. The Court in Airen (supra) further relied upon J.C.
Budhraja v. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & Anr.,
(2008) 2 SCC 444, and held as under:
“21. ……. Again we may illustrate. If a house is constructed under the
item rate contract and the amount due in regard to work executed is Rs.
two lakhs and certain part-payments say aggregating to Rs.1,25,000/-
have been made and the contractor demands payment of the balance of
Rs.75,000/due towards the bill and the employer acknowledges liability,
that acknowledgement will be only in regard to the sum of Rs.75,000/-
which is due. If the contractor files a suit for recovery of the said
Rs.75,000/- due in regard to work done and also for recovery of
Rs.50,000/- as damages for breach by the employer and the said suit is
filed beyond three years from completion of work and submission of the
bill but within three years from the date of acknowledgement, the suit
will be saved from bar of limitation only in regard to the liability that
was acknowledged, namely, Rs.75,000/- and not in regard to the fresh or
additional claim of Rs.50,000/- which was not the subject-matter of
acknowledgement. What can be acknowledged is a present subsisting
liability. An acknowledgment made with reference to a liability,
cannot extend limitation for a time-barred liability or a claim that
was not made at the time of acknowledgment or some other liability
relating to other transactions. Any admission of jural relationship in
regard to the ascertained sum due or a pending claim, cannot be an
acknowledgement for a new additional claim for damages.
In the light of the aforestated settled legal position and given the fact
that there was no acknowledgment of the full amount claimed by the
appellant, in terms of the requirement prescribed in Section 18 of the
Act of 1963, the question of extending the period of limitation for the
entire suit claim of the appellant did not arise. ”
16. Applying the aforesaid binding legal position to the facts of
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the present case, the three C-forms on record are C-Form No.
361701182210510 reflecting an amount of Rs. 3,12,120/-, C-Form
No. 361701188605290 reflecting an amount of Rs. 3,93,210/-, and
C-Form No. 361701185863334 reflecting an amount of Rs.
12,69,900/-. Not one of these C-forms acknowledges the sum of Rs.
5,33,970/- as the outstanding amount due and payable by the
defendants to the plaintiff. The amounts reflected in each C-form
correspond to the total value of goods purchased under the
respective transactions for the purpose of availing concessional sales
tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, and do not constitute an
admission of any specific outstanding liability towards the plaintiff.
An acknowledgment under Section 18 must be referable to the very
liability in respect of which the suit is filed. Since none of the C-
forms acknowledges the suit claim of Rs. 5,33,970/- or any amount
proximate thereto as an outstanding dues, the C-forms cannot extend
the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act,
1963.
17. The plaintiff has also contended that a payment of Rs.
2,75,400/- was received through RTGS on 06.02.2017 and that this
constitutes a part-payment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act,
1963, extending limitation by three years from that date i.e. till
06.02.2020. However, this contention also cannot sustain. The
plaintiff has not produced any bank statement of either the plaintiff
or the defendant to establish that such NEFT/RTGS payment was
actually made and received. The only document relied upon is the
ledger account Ex. PW1/3 (Colly.), which is a self-generated,
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unilateral document maintained solely by the plaintiff. A ledger
account is not a substitute for bank statements and cannot, without
independent corroboration, establish actual payment. There is no
separate, independent proof of any NEFT transaction having taken
place. The testimony of PW-1 to this effect remains a bare assertion
unsupported by banking records.
18. The plaintiff has further argued that the period of 25 days
taken in pre-institution mediation proceedings before the North West
District Legal Service Authority from 06.02.2019 to 02.03.2019
(Non-Starter Report dated 02.03.2019, Ex. PW1/19) is liable to be
excluded from computation of limitation. Even after accepting this
exclusion entirely in the plaintiff’s favour, computing three years
from the date of the last bill i.e. 10.08.2016, the period of limitation
expired on 10.08.2019. The suit filed on 21.10.2019 remains beyond
the prescribed period even after such exclusion of 25 days.
Accordingly, the said exclusion does not assist the plaintiff.
In view of the foregoing reasons it is held that the present suit is
barred by law of limitation.
19. Even on the merits of the case, the plaintiff’s present suit is
liable to be dismissed. The plaintiff’s entire case rests upon the
invoices Ex. PW1/10 to Ex. PW1/15, ledger account Ex. PW1/3
(Colly.) along with certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, C-forms Ex. PW1/9, goods receipts Ex. PW1/4
to Ex. PW1/8, legal notice Ex. PW1/16 and its reply Ex. PW1/17,
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mediation application Ex. PW1/18 and Non-Starter Report Ex.
PW1/19, and the oral testimony of PW-1 Sh. Manoj Kumar Pansari
by way of affidavit Ex. PW1/A. As discussed above, it is well
settled that even in an ex-parte proceeding, the plaintiff has to stand
on his own legs. The weakness of the defendant does not ipso facto
entitle the plaintiff to a decree.
20. The plaintiff’s case rests entirely on his own testimony
and the documents produced by him. The present suit is for recovery
of excessive amount paid by the plaintiff to the defendant primarily
based upon the ledger account and invoices. At first, it is first
necessary to discuss Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(Section 28 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (hereinafter
referred to as “IEA” and “BSA” respectively)). Section 34 reads as
under:
“34. Entries in books of account, including those
maintained in an electronic form, when relevant.–
1[Entries in the books of account, including those maintained
in an electronic form], regularly kept in the course of
business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into
which the Court has to inquire, but such statements shall not
alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with
liability.”
21. Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes it clear
that entries in books of account regularly maintained by the plaintiff
is not a conclusive piece of evidence and is to be corroborated with
independent documentary evidence. In the absence of such
documents, an adverse inference must be drawn in accordance with
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the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
CBI v. VC Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India, (2017) 11
SCC 731 while reiterating the settled position of law as laid down in
V.C. Shukla (supra) held as under:
“279. It has further been laid down in V.C. Shukla as to the
value of entries in the books of account, that such statement
shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person
with liability, even if they are relevant and admissible, and
that they are only corroborative evidence. It has been held that
even then independent evidence is necessary as to
trustworthiness of those entries which is a requirement to
fasten the liability.”
22. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Jay Ambe Industries
Proprietor Shri Dinesh Kumar Bajranglal Somani Versus
Garnet Specialty Paper Ltd., decided on 02.02.2022, reported as
2022 LiveLaw (Guj) 18 discusses Section 34 IEA while taking help
from landmark judgments. The relevant portion of Jay Ambe
(supra) is reproduced below for easy reference:
“15) In Chandi Ram vs. Jamind Kanta Deka, reported in
AIR 1952 Assam 92, the Assam High Court held that if a
ledger is not supported by any Day-book or Roznama, it
would not fulfill the requirement of Section 34 of the
Evidence Act and cannot be regarded relevant under that
section. In the opinion of the Assam High Court there is no
daily opening or closing balance in the ledger accounts which
is maintained in some other books and ledger can be prepared
at any time. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as relevant
16) In Hira Meher vs. Birbal Prasad Agarwal, reported in
AIR 1958 Orissa 4, the Orissa High Court held that if the
plaintiff relies on the entries in his credit ledger which he
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himself has scribed out, the plaintiff does not assert that the
transaction on credit took place actually the credit register
cannot be relied upon because there will be no corroboration
of the entries made therein.
17) In Sohan Lal vs. Gulab Chand, reported in AIR 1966
Raj. 229, the Rajasthan High Court held that Bahi Khata is an
account book if maintained in regular course of business and
entries therein are not admissible if not supported by
corresponding entries on Rokam or Nagal Behi.
18) In Zehna Sorabji vs. Mirabella Hoter Col. (Pvt.) Ltd.,
reported in AIR 1981 Bom 446, the Bombay High Court
held that a ledger by itself cannot be a book of account of the
character contemplated by Section 34 of the Evidence Act
unless it is corroborated by the entries in the cash-book.
19) In Beni vs. Bisan Dayal, reported in AIR 1925 Nag.
445, the Nagpur High Court held that, the entries in the books
of account by itself are not sufficient to charge any person
with liability unless there is independent evidence of the
transaction to which the entries relate.
20) The proposition laid down in the above referred
authorities about the admissibility of ledger without the
corroborative evidence being led in support of the entries in
the ledger cannot be disputed. It is well settled that a ledger,
though an account book, has no evidentiary value unless the
entries made therein are proved by independent evidence
which, in other words, would mean that there must be
corroboration of entries which corroboration can be supplied
by proving the transaction or by proving the entries in the
Daily cash book or Roznama. Without corroboration, entries
in the ledger cannot be brought within the purview of Section
34 of the Evidence Act. In the instant case, it is, therefore, to
be seen, whether apart from the entries in the ledger, there
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was corroborative evidence in support of the entries in the
ledger. This matter would largely depend on the facts of each
case.”
23. The legal position emerging from judicial precedents is
that entries in books of account, do not automatically become
reliable evidence merely because they are maintained in the course
of business. A recurring concern highlighted by various High Courts
is the inherent nature of a ledger. A ledger is not a primary record of
transactions; rather, it is a secondary compilation derived from
original books like day-books, cash books, or roznama. Since it can
be written up at a later stage and does not necessarily reflect
contemporaneous entries, courts have treated it with caution. In the
absence of supporting primary records, a ledger loses its evidentiary
reliability. Mere bookkeeping cannot substitute proof of an actual
transaction. In other words, the existence of a debt or liability must
be independently established, and ledger entries can only support
and not create that proof.
24. The consistent thread running through all these decisions is
that corroboration is indispensable. Such corroboration may come in
different forms, where it may be oral testimony, documentary proof
of transactions or supporting entries in primary books of account.
Without this supporting evidence, ledger entries remain insufficient
to impose liability. Ultimately, the admissibility and evidentiary
value of ledger entries depend on the facts of each case. Courts
undertake a factual inquiry to determine whether there is adequate
independent evidence to support the entries. If such corroboration
exists, the ledger can be relied upon as supporting evidence; if not, it
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remains merely a self-serving document with limited legal value.
25. A careful perusal of the invoices Ex. PW1/10 to Ex. PW1/15
dated 18.02.2016, 19.02.2016, 02.03.2016, 14.05.2016, 25.05.2016,
and 10.08.2016 as well as the ledger account Ex. PW1/3 (Colly.)
relied upon by the plaintiff to establish the business transactions
between the parties and the outstanding balance of Rs. 5,33,970/- do
not help the plaintiff’s case in any way. The invoices and ledger
account have not been countersigned, stamped, or acknowledged via
seal by any representative of the defendants. There is no signature or
endorsement of the defendants on any of these invoices to evidence
that the defendants received and accepted the goods reflected
therein. Mere invocation of entries in the ledger account statement
without any bank account statement or any independent bank
witness as per Section 34 IEA does not create any entitlement in
favour of the Plaintiff. (See VC Shukla (Supra); Gopal Krishna
Ketkar v Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413; Mohinder
Kumar Gandhi vs. Praveen Kumar, 2025:DHC:8843-DB).
26. The plaintiff has further stated that the defendants made a
payment of Rs. 2,75,400/- through RTGS/NEFT on 06.02.2017.
However, no NEFT confirmation slip, bank account statement, or
any other independent banking document has been produced to
establish this payment. The only basis for this assertion is the ledger
account Ex. PW1/3 (Colly.) itself, which for reasons already
discussed is a unilateral document without independent
corroboration and cannot constitute proof of actual payment or
receipt of funds. The transport receipts Ex. PW1/4 to Ex. PW1/8
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issued by Cargo Movers Pvt. Ltd. and Air Trans establish dispatch
of certain consignments from Delhi but proof of dispatch is not
equivalent to proof of delivery and acceptance, and no proof of
actual delivery of the consignments at the premises of the defendant
which could have been acknowledged by countersigned invoices or
countersigned ledger has been placed on record.
27. It is further noted that no Statement of Truth of the plaintiff’s
director has been separately recorded in the prescribed format before
this Court. The plaint as well as its documents are not signed on
each and every page as per the mandatory provisions of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. While this cannot be a sole criteria of
a dismissal of the present suit as it is a settled position of law that
procedural law is a handmaiden of justice and procedural
technicalities should not be allowed to infringe upon substantive
rights of parties (See State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1
SCC 719; Manu Markande v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine Del
1763), it can be considered as a factor as to the conduct of the
plaintiff in proceeding with the present case.
28. In conclusion, the plaintiff has failed to prove the supply of
goods and the outstanding dues by way of cogent, independent, and
corroborated evidence. The invoices as well as ledger account are
not countersigned, no independent bank statements or bank
witnesses have been produced, and no independent corroboration of
any nature has been placed on record.
29. In view of the above, it is held that the plaintiff has
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failed to prove his case strictly on the basis of credible, independent,
and corroborated evidence. The unilateral nature of the documents
relied upon by the plaintiff, without supporting bank statements duly
proved as per law, renders the evidence insufficient. The plaintiff
has failed to prove his case by way of by preponderance of
probabilities. The suit of the plaintiff is also barred by law of
limitation. Resultantly, the plaintiff has failed both on the ground of
limitation as well as on merits.
30. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present suit
filed by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs.5,33,970/- along with
interest is hereby dismissed, being barred by limitation and also
for failure of the plaintiff to prove its claim. Plaintiff is left to
bear the cost of the suit. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
File be consigned to record room, after due completion.
Announced in the open Court today
on this 05th day of May, 2026
( Devender Kumar Jangala )
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01
North-West, Rohini, Delhi.
05.05.2026
Digitally signed
DEVENDER by DEVENDER
KUMAR
KUMAR JANGALA
JANGALA Date: 2026.05.06
16:37:18 +0530
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