Bangalore District Court
M/S Sankalana Chits Pvt Ltd vs Sheela Martis Alias Sheela Cynthia … on 7 April, 2026
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
KABC010231872024
IN THE COURT OF THE LIX ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS
JUDGE, BANGALORE CITY (CCH-60)
Dated this the 7th day of April, 2026.
PRESENT:
Sri Somashekara. A., B.A.L., LL.M.,
XV ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE
BANGALORE CITY.
C/c LIX ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE
BANGALORE CITY
Crl.A.No.1484/2024
APPELLANT/S: 1 M/S Sankalana Chits Pvt Ltd
A Company Registered under the
Companies Act
having its office at RSK Complex
No.42 and 45/1,
Opp Varalakshmi Nursing College
Havanur Extension,
Hesaragatta Main Road,
Nagasandra
Bengaluru
2 Sri.L.C.Manjunath
S/o Channaveeraia
Aged about 52 years
R/at No.208, LIC quarters
Near Post Office,
Judge Sign.
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
Madanayakanahalli,
Bengaluru
(By Sri. A.T.J. Advocate)
V/s
Complainant Mrs.Sheela Martis @ Sheela Cynthia Martis
W/o Ronald Martis
Aged about 50 years
R/at Ave maria
No.404, 5th Cross,
Tata Nagar
Bengaluru
(By Sri. N.K. Advocate)
JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed under Section 374 of Cr.P.C. assailing the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in C.C.
No.5756/2022 dated 09.08.2024 on the file of the VI Addl. Judge,
Court of Small Causes and Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru,
whereby the trial court convicted the accused for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and
sentenced them to pay fine of Rs.16,00,000/-, in default to undergo
simple imprisonment for three months.
Judge Sign.
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2. For the sake of convenience and consistency, the parties
are referred to as per their ranks before the trial court.
3. The complainant’s case before the trial court, in
substance, was that accused No.1 is a Private Limited Company
engaged in chit fund business and accused No.2 is its Director, looking
after the day-to-day affairs of accused No.1. It is the further case of the
complainant that accused No.2 was known to her husband, namely
Ronald Martis, and on account of such acquaintance, accused No.2
approached the complainant and her husband and induced the
complainant to invest in a chit fund of the value of Rs.10,50,000/-,
commenced in July 2018, for a period of 30 months.
4. According to the complainant, accused No.2 informed her
that she had to pay monthly subscriptions of Rs.35,000/- and made
available chit reference No. SCPL-10.5/A/17. Believing the
representations made by accused No.2 and keeping in view the
acquaintance between accused No.2 and her husband, the
complainant agreed to invest in the said chit and paid monthly
subscriptions from July 2018 till December 2020, i.e., till maturity of the
chit.
Judge Sign.
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5. It is further contended that on completion of the chit period
in December 2020, the accused became liable to pay the chit value of
Rs.10,50,000/- to the complainant. However, the accused failed to
repay the said amount. On repeated requests and demands, accused
No.2 executed a Deed of Undertaking dated 18.03.2021 in favour of
the complainant undertaking to pay the chit amount within six months
together with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 01.01.2021.
Even thereafter, the accused failed to honour the undertaking.
6. According to the complainant, towards part payment of the
amount due, the accused issued two cheques, namely: Cheque
No.000321 dated 02.12.2021 for Rs.4,50,000/- and Cheque
No.000320 dated 13.12.2021 for Rs.4,50,000/-.
7. Both cheques were drawn on Karur Vysya Bank,
Chikkabanavara Branch, Bengaluru. The complainant presented the
said cheques through her banker, namely Bank of Baroda,
Sahakarnagar Branch, Bengaluru, but both the cheques were
dishonoured on 12.01.2022 with the endorsement “Funds Insufficient”.
Judge Sign.
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8. Thereafter, the complainant got issued legal notice dated
20.01.2022. The notice sent to accused No.1 was returned with an
endorsement that there was no such office in the address, whereas the
notice sent to accused No.2 was duly served on 01.02.2022. Despite
service of notice, the accused failed to make payment. Hence, the
complainant filed the complaint under Section 200 of Cr.P.C. for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act. After presentation of the complaint, the trial court took cognizance,
recorded sworn statement, found prima facie material and registered
the case against the accused.
9. Before the trial court, the accused appeared through
counsel and were enlarged on bail. The substance of accusation was
recorded. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
10. In order to prove her case, the complainant examined
herself as PW-1 and got marked documents at Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.22. On
the side of the defence, accused No.2 examined himself as DW-1. No
documentary evidence was produced on behalf of the accused. After
hearing both parties and on appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, the learned trial Judge held that the accused had
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act and convicted them, sentencing them to pay fine of
Rs.16,00,000/-, with default sentence of simple imprisonment for three
months.
11. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and
order of sentence, the accused have preferred this appeal inter alia on
the following grounds that the impugned judgment is contrary to law,
facts, probabilities and evidence on record; that the trial court failed to
properly appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; that the
complainant failed to prove legally enforceable debt; that the
complainant had no financial capacity to invest such a huge amount in
the alleged chit; that the complainant did not produce chit agreement
or proper records to establish participation in the chit; that the cheques
in question were not issued towards discharge of any liability but were
misused by the complainant; that the cheques were allegedly issued
as security in connection with business dealings with the complainant’s
husband; that there are discrepancies in the handwriting and ink in the
cheques; that the complainant has not established place, date, time
and manner of payment of the alleged chit amounts; that no
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
independent witnesses to the alleged transaction were examined; that
the trial court wrongly drew presumptions under Sections 118 and 139
of the N.I. Act without there being proof of foundational facts; and that
the accused had rebutted the presumption by preponderance of
probabilities, but the trial court failed to appreciate the defence in the
right perspective. On these and other grounds, the accused prayed to
set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in
C.C. No.5756/2022 dated 09.08.2024 and to acquit them.
12. After registration of the appeal, notice was issued to the
respondent. The respondent appeared through counsel. The trial court
records were secured. The accused also filed written arguments
reiterating the grounds of appeal and contending that the impugned
cheques had been misused by the complainant and that there was no
legally enforceable debt in existence.
13. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/accused and
the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant. Perused the
entire trial court records, oral evidence, documentary evidence and the
impugned judgment. The following points that would arise for my
determination.
Judge Sign.
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1) Whether the complainant proves that the
cheques at Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.2 were issued by
the accused towards discharge of legally
enforceable debt or liability as alleged in the
complaint?
2) Whether the trial court is justified in holding that
the accused have committed the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act?
3) Whether the impugned judgment of conviction
and order of sentence calls for interference by
this appellate court?
4) What Order?
14. My answer to the above points are as under;
Point No.1: In the Affirmative.
Point No.2: In the Affirmative.
Point No.3: In the Negative.
Point No.4: As per final order, for the following:
REASONS
15. Point Nos.1 to 3: Since these points are interconnected
and arise out of the same set of facts, they are taken up together for
common discussion in order to avoid repetition.
Judge Sign.
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
16. At the outset, the rival contentions require this court to
examine whether the complainant established the foundational facts
necessary to attract Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
and, if so, whether the accused succeeded in rebutting the statutory
presumptions available under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.
17. It is the principal contention of the appellants/accused that
there was no chit transaction between the complainant and the
accused, that the complainant had no financial capacity to invest such
amounts, that there was no formal chit agreement, that the cheques
were not issued towards legally enforceable liability, and that the same
were misused by the complainant after having been issued to the
complainant’s husband in a different business context. On the other
hand, the complainant contends that she had in fact invested in the chit
conducted by accused No.1 through accused No.2, that the chit
matured in December 2020, that the accused acknowledged liability
under a deed of undertaking, and thereafter issued the dishonoured
cheques in part discharge of the amount due.
18. Before examining the factual matrix, it is necessary to
reiterate the settled legal position. Once execution of the cheque is
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Crl.A.No.1484/2024
admitted or proved, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139
of the Negotiable Instruments Act arise in favour of the complainant.
Section 139 specifically mandates that the court shall presume, unless
the contrary is proved, that the holder of the cheque received the same
for discharge of a debt or liability. In Rangappa v. Mohan, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has clearly held that the presumption under Section
139 includes the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability. In
Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee , it has been held that the
presumption is one of law and not a mere presumption of fact. In
Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further
clarified that although the accused can rebut the presumption on the
standard of preponderance of probabilities, the rebuttal must be
probable, acceptable and rooted in the materials on record; mere
suggestions, speculative pleas or bald explanations are insufficient.
Keeping the above legal principles in view, the evidence on record is to
be appreciated.
19. The complainant examined herself as PW-1. In her
evidence, she has consistently stated that accused No.2 approached
her and her husband, induced her to invest in the chit fund of accused
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No.1, that the chit value was Rs.10,50,000/-, that monthly installments
of Rs.35,000/- were agreed, and that she paid the same from July
2018 till December 2020. She further states that after maturity of the
chit, the accused failed to pay the matured amount and that accused
No.2 executed the undertaking dated 18.03.2021, promising to pay the
amount within six months with interest. She has also stated that when
the accused continued to default, the two cheques in question came to
be issued towards part payment, both of which were dishonoured for
“Funds Insufficient”.
20. To substantiate her case, she has relied on the cheques,
endorsements, legal notice, postal records, deed of undertaking, chit-
related documents, receipts and bank extracts. The documentary chain
thus relied upon by the complainant is not of an isolated or singular
character; rather, it is a continuous chain showing the original chit
transaction, its maturity, acknowledgment of liability by undertaking,
subsequent issue of cheques and dishonour thereof.
21. The defence seriously attacked the complainant’s case on
the ground that no formal chit agreement is produced. It is true that the
complainant has not produced a formal agreement in the nature
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contemplated under the Chit Funds Act. It is also true that in her cross-
examination, she has admitted that she does not know the names of
other members in the chit and that she was introduced to accused
No.2 through her husband. But these factors, by themselves, do not
demolish the complainant’s case. The real test is whether the version
of the complainant on the core transaction is supported by surrounding
circumstances and whether the defence version appears probable
enough to rebut the statutory presumption.
22. In the case on hand, the most significant circumstance is
that accused No.2, examined as DW-1, has not denied that the
cheques belong to his account. He has also not denied his signature
on the cheques. In fact, the record clearly shows that the defence is
not one of total denial of signature, but one of misuse of security
cheques. Once signature on the cheques is admitted, the burden shifts
heavily on the accused to probabilise the defence of misuse.
23. The defence version, as emerging from the evidence of
DW-1, is that accused No.2 knew the complainant’s husband through
earlier employment and that there were ready-made garment or cloth
business transactions between them. According to DW-1, the cheques
Judge Sign.
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were issued only as security in respect of such business dealings with
the complainant’s husband and were later misused by the complainant.
This defence has to be tested on the touchstone of probability.
24. On a careful scrutiny, the said defence does not inspire
confidence for several reasons. Firstly, if really the cheques were
issued as security in relation to cloth business dealings with the
complainant’s husband, there ought to have been at least some
documentary trace of such business. No invoice, no ledger, no account
extract, no delivery challan, no written acknowledgment, no
correspondence, no business record and no bank transaction
statement has been produced by the accused. A person carrying on a
cloth or ready-made garment business would ordinarily maintain some
documentary record. The complete absence of any such document
makes the defence version bald and unsubstantiated.
25. Secondly, though the accused contended that the
cheques were blank cheques and were misused, no prompt action
appears to have been taken by the accused. No reply notice was
issued denying liability. No police complaint was lodged alleging
misuse of the cheques. No stop payment instruction was shown to
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have been issued. No civil or criminal action was initiated against the
complainant or her husband for alleged misuse. This silence on the
part of the accused is a weighty circumstance. A prudent person
whose signed blank cheques are allegedly misused to foist a criminal
case would not remain passive.
26. Thirdly, the defence has relied upon the alleged
differences in ink and handwriting in the cheques. This contention also
does not advance the case of the accused. It is well settled that mere
difference in ink, handwriting or the fact that the contents of the cheque
are filled up by somebody other than the drawer is not by itself
sufficient to invalidate the cheque or rebut the statutory presumption,
so long as signature is admitted. The law does not require that all
entries in the cheque must be in the handwriting of the drawer. Once
the accused admits that the signed cheques emanated from his
account, the burden remains on him to show in what circumstances
they were issued and how they came to be misused. That burden is
not discharged by merely pointing to different ink or handwriting.
27. Fourthly, the defence of lack of financial capacity of the
complainant also does not merit acceptance in the peculiar facts of this
Judge Sign.
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case. This is not a simple hand loan case resting only on oral
assertion. Here, the complainant’s case is one of investment in a chit
for a defined period with monthly installments, followed by bank
transfers and undertaking by the accused. The bank extracts produced
by the complainant assume great significance. From the materials
discussed in Point No.1 and the evidence extracted from the trial
record, it is seen that several entries in Ex.P.16 to Ex.P.18 showing
transfer of amounts from the complainant’s account to the accused
side were specifically put to DW-1. To those entries, DW-1 did not
issue categorical denial. On the contrary, he stated that such amounts
“may have come”. That answer is destructive of the defence of total
falsity.
28. When specific entries such as amounts transferred on
different dates from 2018 to 2021 were put to DW-1, the natural
response, if the complainant had no such dealings, would have been to
deny receipt altogether and produce contrary bank statements. But
DW-1 did not produce his bank statement. Instead, he admitted in
substance that such amounts might have been received. This
admission is not trivial. It corroborates the complainant’s case that
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monies were in fact flowing from her to the accused side. Another
highly material circumstance is the admission of DW-1 that “Sankalana
Chits” belongs to them/their concern, though he attempted to deny that
the amounts received were toward chit transaction. Once the identity of
the concern and receipt of monies are not firmly denied, the
complainant’s documentary evidence gains strength.
29. The defence next contended that the complainant has not
established the place, date and time of every installment and that no
independent witness to the chit transaction is examined. In the facts of
the present case, such contention cannot be accepted as fatal. Chit
transactions of the nature pleaded by the complainant are usually
between the subscriber and the chit concern; they are not necessarily
witnessed by independent outsiders on each occasion. More
importantly, where there are documentary indications like receipts, chit
reference, passbook entries, undertaking and bank transfers, the non-
examination of an independent witness does not destroy the
complainant’s case. Section 138 proceedings are not to be treated as if
the complainant must prove each installment by examining separate
witnesses, especially once the statutory presumptions come into play.
Judge Sign.
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30. The Deed of Undertaking dated 18.03.2021 also assumes
considerable significance. According to the complainant, after maturity
of the chit and failure of payment, accused No.2 executed the
undertaking agreeing to pay the amount within six months with 18%
interest from 01.01.2021. The defence has attacked this document
also as fabricated, but again, except oral denial, no positive material is
placed to show fabrication. If accused No.2 had truly never undertaken
any such liability, it was open to him to challenge the document by
suitable evidence, opinion or surrounding circumstances. No such
effort is seen.
31. It is also important to note that the complainant’s case is
not that the two cheques represent the full chit amount. Her case is
that the two cheques for Rs.4,50,000/- each were issued towards part
payment of the amount due. This explanation fits into the larger
narrative of the undertaking and delayed repayment. Therefore, the
argument that the complainant must explain every rupee of the original
chit amount in order to maintain prosecution on the dishonoured
cheques is misconceived. The subject matter of prosecution is the
dishonour of the two cheques admittedly signed by the accused,
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issued in part discharge of liability. Once that liability is probabilised
and the cheques are dishonoured, Section 138 stands attracted.
32. The evidence of DW-1 also suffers from internal
inconsistencies. In one breath, he speaks of company structure,
directors and connection with the concern; in another breath, he
attempts to distance himself from the business. He admits
acquaintance with the complainant’s husband and business dealings,
but fails to state clearly the period, extent, settlement or record of such
dealings. He claims payments were made “part by part” in cash, but is
unable to state when, how much, or in whose presence. Such vague
and evasive testimony cannot be elevated to the level of a probable
defence.
33. The appellants have repeatedly urged that the prosecution
must prove the case beyond all reasonable doubt and that reverse
burden cannot operate unless the complainant proves the entire
transaction independently. There cannot be any quarrel with the
proposition that criminal liability must ultimately rest on proof. But in
cheque dishonour cases, the statutory scheme specifically modifies the
evidentiary burden once execution of cheque is admitted. The doctrine
Judge Sign.
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of reverse burden in Sections 118 and 139 is not an exception
invented by courts; it is built into the statute itself. Therefore, once the
accused admits signature and account, the complainant is entitled to
the statutory presumption and the accused must rebut it by probable
material. In the present case, the accused has failed to do so.
34. The submissions that the complainant’s complaint
averments and oral evidence are allegedly at variance are also not
made out from record in any substantial manner. The broad structure
of the complainant’s case remains consistent throughout: investment in
chit, maturity in December 2020, undertaking in March 2021, issue of
two cheques, dishonour, notice and failure to pay. Minor omissions or
imperfect details do not corrode the substratum of the prosecution.
35. The compliance of statutory requirements under Section
138 is also clearly established. The cheques were presented within
time. They were dishonoured for “Funds Insufficient”. Notice was
issued within limitation. Service on accused No.2 is proved. Despite
service, there was no payment. The complaint was filed within the
prescribed period. Hence, all ingredients of Section 138 stand fulfilled.
Judge Sign.
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36. On cumulative appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence, this court is satisfied that the trial court has rightly
appreciated the evidence and rightly concluded that the accused failed
to rebut the statutory presumption. The complainant has established
the existence of legally enforceable liability far beyond the threshold
required in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The
defence of security cheque and misuse remains a mere plea
unsupported by acceptable evidence.
37. The following circumstances assume decisive importance
in this case the cheques belong to the account of the accused and
signatures thereon are admitted. The complainant has produced not
merely the cheques and dishonour memos, but also supporting
documents like undertaking, receipts and bank extracts. Specific bank
entries from the complainant to the accused side were confronted to
DW-1 and not categorically denied. DW-1 admitted the identity of
Sankalana Chits as their concern. No document whatsoever is
produced to support the alleged cloth business security-cheque theory.
No reply notice, stop payment instruction or complaint of misuse was
issued by the accused. The defence evidence is evasive, inconsistent
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and lacking in particulars. Statutory presumptions under Sections 118
and 139 remain unrebutted.
38. Therefore, I am of the firm opinion that the trial court was
fully justified in holding that the accused had issued the cheques
towards discharge of legally enforceable liability and that upon
dishonour and failure to comply with notice, they committed the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
39. For the very same reasons, this court holds that the
learned trial Judge was correct in convicting the accused for the
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act. There is no perversity, illegality, misreading of evidence or
miscarriage of justice in the reasoning adopted by the trial court. The
conviction recorded is based on sound appreciation of evidence and
settled legal principles.
40. Thus, upon a complete and independent re-appreciation of
the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record, this
appellate court is fully satisfied that the complainant has established all
the mandatory ingredients constituting the offence punishable under
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Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The evidence placed by
the complainant is not only legally sufficient to attract the statutory
presumptions available under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, but is
also materially corroborated by the surrounding circumstances,
including the admitted signatures on the cheques, the documentary
record relating to the underlying transaction, the dishonour memos, the
statutory notice, and the failure of the accused to make payment in
spite of due service of notice. On the contrary, the defence set up by
the accused that the cheques were issued as blank security cheques
in connection with some independent business dealings with the
complainant’s husband remains a mere explanation unsupported by
any acceptable documentary evidence, contemporaneous conduct, or
convincing probabilities. The accused, though examined as DW-1, has
not placed such cogent and probable material as would create a
serious dent in the complainant’s case or probabilise non-existence of
legally enforceable liability. The statutory presumptions, therefore,
remain intact and unrebutted.
41. This court further finds that the learned trial Judge has
appreciated the evidence on record in its proper perspective, has
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assigned sound, logical and legally sustainable reasons, and has
reached a conclusion that is fully supported by the evidence and the
settled principles governing prosecutions under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. No perversity, illegality, misreading of
evidence, or miscarriage of justice is demonstrated so as to warrant
appellate interference. The grounds urged in the appeal are found to
be either unsupported by the record or insufficient in law to displace
the well-reasoned findings recorded by the trial court. Therefore, this
court records its final judicial satisfaction that the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial court are just,
proper, and in accordance with law, and the same deserve to be
confirmed in toto.
42. So far as interference by this appellate court is concerned,
it is settled that unless the findings of the trial court are shown to be
perverse, wholly unreasonable, contrary to record or based on
misapplication of law, the appellate court would not lightly upset a
reasoned judgment of conviction. In the case on hand, the grounds
urged in the appeal are substantially a repetition of the defence already
taken before the trial court. On re-appreciation of the entire record, this
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court finds no valid ground to interfere. The findings recorded by the
trial court are supported by the evidence available on record.
43. As regards sentence also, the trial court has imposed a
fine of Rs.16,00,000/- in respect of dishonour of two cheques
aggregating to Rs.9,00,000/- arising out of a matured chit liability.
Having regard to the nature of transaction, lapse of time, admitted
undertaking, and object of Section 138 proceedings being
compensatory in substantial measure, the sentence cannot be said to
be excessive or illegal. The default sentence of three months simple
imprisonment is also within legal bounds. Thus, even on sentence, no
interference is called for. Accordingly, I answer Point No.1 and 2 are in
the Affirmative and Point No.3 in the Negative.
44. Point No.4: In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 to 3, the
appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed by confirming
the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the trial
court. Hence, I proceed to pass the following:
Judge Sign.
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ORDER
The criminal appeal filed under Section 374 of
Cr.P.C. by the appellants/accused is hereby
dismissed.
Consequently, the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence dated 09.08.2024 passed in C.C.
No.5756/2022 on the file of the VI Addl. Judge,
Court of Small Causes and Addl. Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Bengaluru, is hereby confirmed.
The appellants/accused are directed to appear
before the trial court to deposit the fine amount,
failing which the trial court shall take steps in
accordance with law to enforce the sentence.
Office is directed to transmit the Trial Court
Records along with a copy of this judgment to the trial
court forthwith.
(Dictated to the Typist on Computer, then corrected, signed and pronounced
by me in open court on this the 7th day of April, 2026.)(Somashekara A.)
XV Addl. C.C. & Sessions Judge,
BANGALORE CITY.
C/c LIX Addl. C.C. & Sessions Judge,
BANGALORE CITY.
Judge Sign.
