Jharkhand High Court
M/S. Samman Foundation Having Its … vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The … on 3 August, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:22906-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 5716 of 2026
M/s. Samman Foundation having its registered office at 2/30, SBI
Colony, Khazpura, New Jagdeo Path, P.O. & P.S.- Bailey Road,
Patna though its Director- Health Care, Sri Sumit Basu, son of Shri
Swapan Kumar Basu, resident of 3C, Kailasha Apartments, South
Office Para, Doranda, Ranchi
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Additional Chief Secretary,
Department of Health, Medical Education, and Family Welfare,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
2. The Secretary, Department of Finance, Government of Jhar-
khand, Ranchi
3. The Mission Director, Jharkhand Rural Health Mission Society
(JRHMS), National Health Mission, Government of Jharkhand,
having its office at GVI Campus, P.O.-Namkum, P.S.- Namkum,
District- Ranchi .... ... Respondents
-----
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
-----
For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mrs. Prerna Jhunjhunwala, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Vibhor Mayank, A.C. to A.G.
-----
Order No. 02 Dated: 03.08.2026
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. On their request and with their consent, this petition is
taken up for final disposal.
3. This petition concerns tender notice dated 01.06.2026
issued by the Mission Director, Jharkhand Rural Health
Mission Society (JRHMS), National Health Mission (NHM) (3rd
respondent) for selection of a service provider to operate
Emergency Medical Ambulance Services (EMAS) and to
integrate 108 Call Centres across the State of Jharkhand.
4. The petitioner’s consortium was earlier selected as a service
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provider under Request for Proposal (RFP) dated
16.08.2024, and a formal agreement dated 27.01.2025 was
also executed with the petitioner’s consortium for
implementation, operation and maintenance of EMAS in the
State of Jharkhand. The contract period was five years.
5. However, vide order dated 25.05.2026, the above contract
with the petitioner’s consortium was terminated. This
termination was challenged by the petitioner’s consortium by
filing W.P.(C) No. 3990 of 2026. Since no interim relief was
granted in the said writ petition, the respondents issued the
impugned tender on 01.06.2026.
6. The petitioner filed I.A. No. 7402 of 2026 in the pending
W.P.(C) No. 3990 of 2026 seeking a stay of further
proceedings pursuant to the impugned tender dated
01.06.2026. This I.A. was dismissed on 16.06.2026,
observing that no case was made out for grant of ad-interim
relief and the petitioner could always participate in the
tender, since at least prima facie, the termination notice
dated 25.05.2026 did not operate as some bar or blacklisted
the petitioner from participating in future tenders.
7. The petitioner preferred S.L.P (C) No. 22600 of 2026 before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court to challenge the order dated
16.06.2026 by which interim relief was denied to the
petitioner’s consortium. By order dated 06.07.2026, this
S.L.P was dismissed as withdrawn, reserving the petitioner’s
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rights to challenge the tender conditions.
8. On 24.07.2026, the 3rd respondent issued a corrigendum,
inter alia, deleting the word “terminated” from Clause 2.1.11
as if to suggest that the termination of the earlier contract
did not per se operate as a bar to the petitioner participating
in the tender process pursuant to the impugned Tender
Notice dated 01.06.2026. However, it is the case of the
petitioner that Clause 2.1.12 debars or blacklists the
petitioner from participating in the fresh tender, on account
of the termination of the earlier tender.
9. Therefore, the petitioner, by instituting this petition, and
armed with the liberty granted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, has instituted the present writ petition to challenge
the following tender conditions in the impugned tender
dated 01.06.2026: –
(a) Clause 2.1.12 to the extent it debars any
service provider who, in the last three
years, has had a contract terminated by
any public entity for breach, or has been
expelled from any project, or has had a
judicial/arbitral award of penalty against
it;
(b) Clause 2.2.1(a) which requires the
applicant to be a “single entity” only; and
(c) Clause 8, Schedule A, Annexure 1, Table
1 which requires the single entity to have
a minimum annual financial turnover of
Rs.168 crores in the last three financial
years from similar services.
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10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that earlier the respondents had stated that the
termination notice dated 25.05.2026 will not have the effect
of either debarring or blacklisting the petitioner. Clause
2.1.12 now debars or blacklist the petitioner based upon the
termination notice dated 25.05.2026, so he submitted that
such debarring/blacklisting is ex-facie illegal, arbitrary and
unconstitutional.
11. Mr. Indrajit Sinha submitted that the requirement of an
applicant being only a single entity and not a joint venture
or consortium is also ex-facie arbitrary and violates Articles
14 and 19 of the Constitution. He submitted that all this
while joint ventures/consortiums were permitted to
participate in the tender process. He submitted that there
was no reason or material to now restrict participation only
by a single entity. He submitted that there was no nexus
between this requirement and effective performance of the
contract to provide services related to EMAS. He submitted
that imposition of such an over-restrictive condition violates
the law laid down in Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2119.
12. Mr. Indrajit Sinha finally submitted that in the earlier
tenders, minimum annual financial turnover for providing
about 500 ambulances was Rs.90 crores. Now, the minimum
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annual financial turnover for providing 400 ambulances has
been disproportionately increased to Rs.168 crores. He
submitted that such increase is manifestly arbitrary and
vitiated by legal mala fides.
13. Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that there are only about eight
agencies that provide ambulance services in the entire
country. He further submitted that almost five of these
service providers would be eliminated due to this over-
restrictive and harsh condition. He therefore submitted that
this condition has been introduced only to favour certain
service providers and, to that extent, is vitiated by legal
mala fides.
14. For all the above reasons, Mr Indrajit Sinha submitted that
the impugned conditions may be struck down and the
petitioner be permitted to participate in the tender process
scheduled on 14.08.2026.
15. Mr Vibhor Mayank, learned AC to AG, submitted that there
was no absolute bar to the petitioner participating in the
tender process on account of Clause 2.1.12. He submitted
that the bar would operate only in certain specified
situations. Further, if the petitioner claimed that the
disqualification was not on account of the four specified
reasons, the petitioner had liberty to represent to the
authority seeking a waiver. He submitted that no such
representation was ever made by the petitioner and
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therefore the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge
Clause 2.1.12. Mr Mayank submitted that, even otherwise,
there is nothing arbitrary in Clause 2.1.12, because the
government cannot be forced to appoint a service provider
in any of the four circumstances referred to in the proviso to
Clause 2.1.12.
16. Mr Vibhor Mayank submitted that there was nothing
arbitrary or unconstitutional about restricting participation to
a single entity. He further submitted that the government
learnt from past experience and the difficulties encountered
in dealing with a consortium or joint venture in the provision
of emergency services. Therefore, he submitted that there
was no violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
17. Mr. Vibhor Mayank submitted that even the requirement of
annual financial turnover was after assessing the experience
in the past contracts. He submitted that even otherwise, the
State must be given greater latitude when formulating the
terms of the tender and judicial interference must be
minimal. He submitted that there was no mala fides involved
and the pleadings in this regard are sketchy and vague.
18. Mr. Vibhor Mayank submitted that the decision in the case of
Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra) does not apply
and he relied upon several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court concerning the scope of interference with tender
conditions.
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19. For all the above reasons, Mr Vibhor Mayank submitted that
this petition may be dismissed.
20. The rival contentions now fall for our determination.
21. At the outset, we must refer to certain decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court delineating the scope of judicial
review of tender conditions. It is a settled position that the
scope is very limited.
22. In the case of Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, (1994)
6 SCC 651, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while cautioning a
general restraint in interfering with tender matters, held that
the terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to
judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the
realm of contract. Further, the government must have
freedom of contract, which, in other words, implies fair play
in the joints as a necessary concomitant for an
administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere
or quasi-administrative sphere. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the court does not have expertise to correct an
administrative decision. If a review of an administrative
decision is permitted, it would amount to the court
substituting its own decision without the necessary
expertise, which itself may be fallible. Therefore, the terms
of invitation to tender are generally not open to judicial
scrutiny because invitation to tender is essentially in the
realm of the contract.
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23. In Directorate of Education & Others. Vs. Educomp
Datamatics Ltd. and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 19, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the terms of the invitation
to tender are generally not open to judicial scrutiny, as they
fall within the realm of contract. Further, the government
must have a free hand in setting the terms of the tender. It
must have reasonable play in its joints, a necessary
concomitant for an administrative body in an administrative
sphere. It is for the authority to set the terms of the tender,
and courts would not interfere with the terms of the tender
notice unless they were shown to be arbitrary,
discriminatory, or actuated by malice.
24. In Educomp Datamatics Ltd. (supra), the requirement
for a minimum turnover of Rs.20 crores for a contract
involving the supply of hardware assessed at Rs.40-50
crores was rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
establishing the principle that the turnover criterion is
generally calibrated to actual operational capacity, not
merely to government payments.
25. In the case of Michigan Rubber (India) Limited Vs.
State of Karnataka and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 216, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there is a large
discretion available to the tendering authority to set the
tender conditions/eligibility criteria in the tender. On the
ground that some other term would have been fairer, wiser
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or more logical, it is not for the court to interfere.
26. The above legal position was reiterated in the case of Maa
Binda Express Carrier and Another Vs. North-East
Frontier Railway and Others, (2014) 3 SCC 760, in
which it was held that the award of a contract is essentially
a commercial transaction that must be determined on the
basis of considerations relevant to that commercial decision.
This implies that the terms on which tenders are invited are
not open to judicial scrutiny unless it is found that they have
been tailor-made to benefit any particular tenderer or class
of tenderers.
27. In the case of Uflex Limited Vs. Government of Tamil
Nadu and Others, (2022) 1 SCC 165, one of the
challenges concerned the status of participating entities. In
that context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there
was no requirement that all and sundry should be permitted
to participate in tenders. In fact, in every tender there are
certain qualifying parameters, whether it be technology or
turnover. The Court cannot sit in judgment on what turnover
should be required for an entity to participate.
28. In the case of Airport Authority of India Vs. Centre for
Aviation Policy, Safety & Research (CAPSR) & Others,
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1334, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated that the terms and conditions of the invitation to
tender are within the domain of the tenderer/tender making
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authority and are not open to judicial scrutiny being in the
realm of contract, unless they are arbitrary, discriminatory or
mala fides.
29. In Airport Authority of India (supra), the challenge was
inter alia to the minimum annual turnover criteria and the
experience criteria. In that context, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that it was for the AAI to decide its own terms
and fix the eligibility criteria. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
reaffirmed the law laid down in Michigan Rubber (India)
Limited (supra), in which it was observed that the
Government and their undertakings must have a free hand
in setting the terms of the tender, and only if it is arbitrary,
discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias would the
courts interfere. The courts cannot interfere with the terms
of the tender prescribed the Government because it feels
that some other terms in the tender would have been fair,
wiser or logical.
30. Now, the challenges raised by the petitioner will have to be
examined keeping in mind the limited scope of interference
with the tender conditions formulated by the Government or
its agencies.
31. Insofar as the first challenge is concerned, there is no point
in deciding the same unless the petitioner is in a position to
succeed in its challenges to Clause 2.2.1(a), which provides
that an applicant must be a single entity only and the clause
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which provides for a minimum annual financial turnover of
Rs.168 crores, which, the petitioner has admitted, it does
not have.
32. In any event, the challenge to Clause 2.1.12 need not be
decided because this clause permits the petitioner to
represent to the authority for seeking a waiver, in case the
applicant claims that its disqualification arising on account of
any cause or event specified in Clause 2.1.12 is such that it
does not reflect, (a) any malfeasance on its part in relation
to such cause or event; (b) any willful default or patent
breach of the material terms of the relevant contract; (c)
any fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in relation to such
contract; or (d) any rescinding or abandoning of such
contract.
33. There are no pleadings about the petitioner’s claim that its
disqualification does not reflect any of the four situations
referred to above. In any event, the petitioner has
admittedly not made any representation to the authority
seeking a waiver.
34. Though we do not wish to finally pronounce on the validity
of the condition in clause 2.1.12, we cannot completely
discount Mr. Vibhor Mayank’s submissions that the
government cannot be forced to deal with a party that has
willfully defaulted or is complicit to any fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation or has abandoned the contract. He
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pointed out that this was a contract to provide emergency
services and therefore, there was nothing wrong in the
government learning from its experience and being
equipped to provide better emergency services.
35. In any event, as noted earlier, even interfering with such a
tender condition would not entitle the petitioner to
participate in the tender process unless the petitioner
succeeded in convincing this Court that a case has been
made out to interfere with the remaining two conditions
challenged in this petition.
36. As regards Clause 2.2.1, which requires an applicant to be a
single entity, again, we are not satisfied that such a
condition is vitiated by any legal mala fides or actuated by
malice. There are no pleadings worth the name to sustain
such allegations.
37. In any event, if the government, after learning from its past
experience, is of the bona fide opinion that dealing with the
single entity, in matters of providing emergency services, is
a better option than having to deal with a joint venture or
consortium, we cannot substitute our own opinion and say
that such a condition is manifestly arbitrary or
discriminatory. There is no discrimination involved because
all tenderers are being treated equally.
38. In the case of Uflex Limited (supra), one of the
challenges concerned the condition which allowed only
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limited companies and LLPs to participate in the tender
process. The Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the challenge
by holding that all and sundry cannot be permitted to
participate in matters of this nature. In fact, in every tender
there are certain qualifying parameters, whether it be
technology or turnover. The Court cannot sit in judgment on
what turnover should be required for an entity to participate.
An entity that was only a partnership firm cannot insist that
it should be allowed to participate when the tender condition
permitted only limited companies and LLPs to participate.
39. Accordingly, we are not convinced that any case has been
made out to strike down Clause 2.2.1(a) on the ground that
it violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Given
the limited scope of judicial review in such matters, no case
is made out to interfere with Clause 2.2.1(a).
40. Similarly, in the clause relating to minimum annual financial
turnover of Rs.168 crores, we are satisfied that no case
whatsoever has been made out to warrant interference. The
allegations about such condition being made to favour only
three entities are nowhere substantiated or even properly
pleaded. The introduction of such a condition is clearly
within the realm of a contract and judicial review is
therefore minimal.
41. In the decisions referred to above, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has rejected the challenges to the turnover criteria.
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The requirement of minimum annual financial turnover has a
nexus with the contract or the services to be provided. No
case of actual or legal mala fides has been made out.
42. In this case, the petitioner has not claimed that it is a single
entity but has rather suggested that it is a consortium. In
any event, the petitioner has not claimed that, as a single
entity, its annual financial turnover is Rs.168 crores. Rather,
it is the petitioner’s case that, as a consortium, its annual
turnover is Rs.125 crores or thereabouts. Admittedly,
therefore, the petitioner does not fulfil the criteria that
enable the applicant to participate in the tender process. As
discussed earlier, no case is made out by the petitioner to
strike down the requirement that an applicant be a single
entity and the criterion of minimum financial turnover of
Rs.168 crores.
43. The decision in Vinishma Technologies Pvt. Ltd.
(supra), is distinguishable. In that case, the challenge was
to the condition which prevented the bidders who had not
supplied Sports Kits to the State of Chhattisgarh or the
agency of the State of Chhattisgarh in the last three
financial years. In the context of such a requirement and in
the absence of any nexus being shown with supplies only to
the State of Chhattisgarh or its agencies, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that the impugned condition was
violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution. The
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Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that such a restricted
condition excluded competent suppliers from outside the
State and discouraged wider participation, thereby fostering
cartelization. The facts in the present case are not
comparable, and such an issue is not even involved in the
present case.
44. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are satisfied that
there is no case made out by the petitioner for grant of any
reliefs in this petition. Accordingly, we dismiss this petition
without any order as to costs.
(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
August 03, 2026
Manish/Ritesh
A.F.R.
Uploaded on 06.08.2026
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