Uttarakhand High Court
M/S Radhika Furniture @Radha Devi vs The Commissioner on 17 July, 2026
UKHC010076452025
Reserved
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND
AT NAINITAL
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA
AND
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHASH UPADHYAY
WRIT PETITION (M/B) NO. 317 OF 2025
M/s Radhika Furniture @Radha Devi .....Petitioner.
Versus
The Commissioner, State Goods and Services Tax & others
....Respondents.
With
Writ Petition (M/S) No.716 of 2024
Writ Petition (M/B) No.36 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.53 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.54 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.61 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.62 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/S) No.86 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.92 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.94 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.119 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.122 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.175 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.262 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.325 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.338 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.339 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.348 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.349 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.360 of 2025
2
Writ Petition (M/B) No.363 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.384 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.396 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.403 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.414 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.465 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.466 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.468 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.485 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.488 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.491 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.535 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.537 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.538 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.539 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.553 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.596 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.619 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.659 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.743 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.763 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.804 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.858 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.874 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.882 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.889 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.908 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.913 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.924 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.959 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.1033 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.1034 of 2025
Writ Petition (M/B) No.1081 of 2025
3
Writ Petition (M/B) No.82 of 2026
Writ Petition (M/B) No.113 of 2026
Writ Petition (M/B) No.122 of 2026
Writ Petition (M/B) No.123 of 2026
Writ Petition (M/B) No.161 of 2026
Counsel for the Petitioners : Ms. Seema Dhingra Bakshi, Mr.
Pradeep Singh Rawat, Mr.
Mahendra Singh Rawat, Mr. Lalit
Mohan Pant, Mr. Rohit Arora, Mr.
Shubhang Dobhal, Mr. Suryakant
Maithani, Mr. Tarun Pande, Mr.
S.K. Posti, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. Ashutosh
Posti, Mr. Eshan Sachdeva, Mr.
Mukesh Kumar Kapruwan, Mr.
Hemant Singh and Mr. Pooran
Lal, Mr. Kishore Rai, Mr.
Rituperna Joshi, Mr. Yogesh
Pacholia, Mr. Ms. Sukhwani
Singh, Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma,
Mr. Hemant Singh Mahra, Mr.
Ketan Joshi, Mr. Aditya Singh,
Ms. Prabha Naithani, Mr. Sagar
Kothari, Mr. C.K. Sharma, Mr.
Tejas Agarrwal, Mr. Pavan Kumar
Nath and Mr. Pankaj Tiwari,
learned counsels.
Counsel for the State : Ms. Puja Banga, learned Standing
Counsel.
Counsel for the CGST Department : Mr. Shobhit Saharia, learned
counsel.
Order Reserved on:25.03.2026
Order Delivered on:17.07.2026
A.F.R. (Approved for Reporting)
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
(per Hon’ble The Chief Justice Mr. Manoj Kumar Gupta)
1. In the present batch of writ petitions, a common
question of law arises as to whether an appeal under Section
107 of the Central/ State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
4
(for short “the CGST/ SGST Act”) can be entertained beyond
the prescribed period of three months and the further
condonable period of one month by invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as “the
2. As the factual matrix of each case is different and
the controversy centres around the aforesaid pure question of
law, namely, whether the writ Court, in exercise of its power
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may examine
the challenge notwithstanding the dismissal of appeal as
barred by limitation, we have, with consent of counsel for the
parties, proceeded to hear and decide the said question at the
threshold before examining the facts of the individual cases.
3. Section 107 of the Act, which provides for the
statutory remedy of appeal before the Appellate Authority,
reads as follows:-
“Section 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority:-
(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this
Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal
to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months
from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to
such person.
(2) The Commissioner may, on his own motion, or upon request from
the Commissioner of State tax or the Commissioner of Union territory
tax, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an
adjudicating authority has passed any decision or order under this
Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act, for the purpose of satisfying himself as
to the legality or propriety of the said decision or order and may, by
order, direct any officer subordinate to him to apply to the Appellate
5Authority within six months from the date of communication of the
said decision or order for the determination of such points arising out
of the said decision or order as may be specified by the
Commissioner in his order.
(3) Where, in pursuance of an order under sub-section (2), the
authorised officer makes an application to the Appellate Authority,
such application shall be dealt with by the Appellate Authority as if it
were an appeal made against the decision or order of the
adjudicating authority and such authorised officer were an appellant
and the provisions of this Act relating to appeals shall apply to such
application.
(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting
the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six
months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a
further period of one month.
(5) Every appeal under this section shall be in such form and shall be
verified in such manner as may be prescribed.
(6) No appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1), unless the
appellant has paid-
(a) in full, such part of the amount of tax, interest, fine, fee
and penalty arising from the impugned order, as is admitted
by him; and
(b) a sum equal to ten per cent. of the remaining amount of
tax in dispute arising from the said order, 1[subject to a
maximum of 3[twenty] crore rupees], in relation to which the
appeal has been filed.
[Provided that in case of any order demanding penalty without
involving demand of any tax, no appeal shall be filed against such
order unless a sum equal to ten per cent. of the said penalty has
been paid by the appellant.]
(7) Where the appellant has paid the amount under sub-section (6),
the recovery proceedings for the balance amount shall be deemed to
be stayed.
(8) The Appellate Authority shall give an opportunity to the appellant
of being heard.
(9) The Appellate Authority may, if sufficient cause is shown at any
stage of hearing of an appeal, grant time to the parties or any of
them and adjourn the hearing of the appeal for reasons to be
recorded in writing:
Provided that no such adjournment shall be granted more than
three times to a party during hearing of the appeal.
(10) The Appellate Authority may, at the time of hearing of an
appeal, allow an appellant to add any ground of appeal not specified
in the grounds of appeal, if it is satisfied that the omission of that
ground from the grounds of appeal was not wilful or unreasonable.
6
(11) The Appellate Authority shall, after making such further inquiry
as may be necessary, pass such order, as it thinks just and proper,
confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed
against but shall not refer the case back to the adjudicating authority
that passed the said decision or order:
Provided that an order enhancing any fee or penalty or fine in lieu of
confiscation or confiscating goods of greater value or reducing the
amount of refund or input tax credit shall not be passed unless the
appellant has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause
against the proposed order:
Provided further that where the Appellate Authority is of the opinion
that any tax has not been paid or short-paid or erroneously refunded,
or where input tax credit has been wrongly availed or utilised, no
order requiring the appellant to pay such tax or input tax credit shall
be passed unless the appellant is given notice to show cause against
the proposed order and the order is passed within the time limit
specified under section 73 or section 74 4[or section 74A].
(12) The order of the Appellate Authority disposing of the appeal
shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the
decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.
(13) The Appellate Authority shall, where it is possible to do so, hear
and decide every appeal within a period of one year from the date on
which it is filed:
Provided that where the issuance of order is stayed by an order of a
court or Tribunal, the period of such stay shall be excluded in
computing the period of one year.
(14) On disposal of the appeal, the Appellate Authority shall
communicate the order passed by it to the appellant, respondent and
to the adjudicating authority.
(15) A copy of the order passed by the Appellate Authority shall also
be sent to the jurisdictional Commissioner or the authority
designated by him in this behalf and the jurisdictional Commissioner
of State tax or Commissioner of Union Territory Tax or an authority
designated by him in this behalf.
(16) Every order passed under this section shall, subject to the
provisions of section 108 or section 113 or section 117 or section
118 be final and binding on the parties.”
4. The principle submission advanced on behalf of the
Revenue is that the CGST/ SGST Acts are special statutes
which prescribe not only a specific period of limitation for
preferring an appeal but also a maximum period upto which
delay may be condoned upon sufficient cause being shown.
7
Consequently, by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act, the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands
impliedly excluded.
5. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as under:-
“29. Savings:-
(1)…..
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed
by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such
period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law.”
6. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
“Atlantis Intelligence Ltd. vs. Union of India & others”,
neutral citation No. 2025:AHC:135383-DB, after considering
the scheme of Section 107 of the CGST Act and Section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act, held that the legislative scheme
underlying Section 107 manifests an implied exclusion of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act beyond the period expressly
provided under Section 107(4) of the Act. The relevant
observations are extracted below:-
“3. Upon perusal of the record, it is clear that the impugned order
was passed on January 31, 2025, while the writ petition was filed on July 3,
2025. It is to be noted that Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services
Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’), provides for a statutory
appeal against the order passed under Section 74 of the Act. The period
prescribed therein is three months. By way of sub-section (4) to Section
107 of the Act, if sufficient cause is shown, the period may be extended for
a month. As the Act provides for a specific period for filing of appeal and
also provides for an extended period, if sufficient cause is shown for
condoning the delay in filing of the appeal, Section 29(2) of the Limitation
8Act, 1963 would be applicable. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as
under:
“29. Savings.–
(1) …..
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed
by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such
period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as,
and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law. (3) Save as otherwise provided in any law for the
time being in force with respect to marriage and divorce, nothing in
this Act shall apply to any suit or other proceeding under any such
law. (4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition of “easement”
in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in the territories to which
the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (5 of 1882), may for the time being
extend.”
Ergo, Section 29(2) clearly excludes the application of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for the purpose of condonation of delay in special statutes.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. A similar view was taken by the Allahabad High
Court in “Garg Enterprises vs. State of U.P. & others“,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine All 2583, wherein it has been
observed as follows:-
“7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-
contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism
and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite
law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended
to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the
limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing
sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. The Delhi High Court has taken same view in “M/s
Addichem Speciality LLP vs. Special Commissioner- I,
Department of Trade & Taxes and another”, W.P.(C)
9
14279/2024, decided on 07.02.2025. After considering a
catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, the Court held
that where the Legislation has prescribed a specific period for
filing appeal and also an extended period for condoning the
delay, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands
excluded. The relevant observations are extracted below:-
“65. Section 107(4) firstly prescribes a general time frame within
which an appeal may be preferred. Once that period has elapsed, it
stipulates that the appeal may be instituted within a further period of one
month. The provision thus prescribes an additional period of one month
within which an appeal may be instituted. That section however stops at that
and does not allude to aspects such as sufficient cause or other similar
factors which may have prevailed and led to the appeal not being lodged
within the time prescribed. The provision thus clearly excludes the general
principles which the law recognises as relevant for the purposes of
condonation of delay. It is this facet of Section 107(4) which appears to
have weighed upon various High Courts to hold that the said provision
excludes the principles underlying Section 5 and other provisions concerned
with condonation contained in the Limitation Act. It is this facet which
triggers Section 29 of the Limitation Act and results in the exclusion of the
other provisions governing condonation contained in that statute.
69. In summary, the power to condone delay caused in pursuing a
statutory remedy would always be dependent upon the statutory provision
that governs. The right to seek condonation of delay and invoke the
discretionary power inhering in an appellate authority would depend upon
whether the statute creates a special and independent regime with respect
to limitation or leaves an avenue open for the appellant to invoke the
general provisions of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of delay. The
facility to seek condonation can be resorted provided the legislation does not
construct an independent regime with respect to an appeal being preferred.
Once it is found that the legislation incorporates a provision which creates a
special period of limitation and proscribes the same being entertained after a
terminal date, the general provisions of the Limitation Act would cease to
apply.
70. In view of the forgoing discussion, as it is evident that each of
the appeals was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation provided
by Sections 107 (1) and 107 (4) of the CGST Act, the aforesaid writ petitions
lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)
10
9. A similar view has been taken by the Chhattisgarh
High Court in “Nandan Steels & Power Ltd. vs. State of
Chhattisgarh“, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Chh 1428,
wherein it was observed that while the Legislature has
consciously conferred a limited power to condone delay, it did
not intend the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to
apply to proceedings under the CGST Act. The Court further
held that the absence of expression “but not thereafter” in
Section 107(4) does not dilute its mandatory nature.
10. The aforesaid decisions have substantially relied
upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in “Singh
Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur & others“, reported in (2008) 3 SCC 70,
wherein Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, providing
for appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) against any
decision or order passed under the Act by the Central Excise
Officer, fell for consideration. The said provision provided for
a specific period of limitation for filing appeal, which was 60
days from the date of communication of the decision or order
to the person aggrieved, and an extended period of limitation
of 30 days, upon sufficient cause being shown. Interpreting
the provision, the Supreme Court held that once the
Legislature had provided a specific period of limitation for
preferring appeal and also a time-frame to the extent of
which delay could be condoned, the appellate authority, being
11
a creature of statute, has no jurisdiction to condone delay
beyond the period expressly permitted by the statute.
11. The Supreme Court further rejected the contention
that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court or the
plenary power of the Supreme Court could be invoked to
condone the delay on sufficient cause being shown, as it
would defeat the legislative intent and render the limitation
provision nugatory. The declaration of law on the said point
in Paragraph Nos.8 to 10 is as follows:-
“8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal
being creatures of Statute are vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay
beyond the permissible period provided under the Statute. The period upto
which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It
was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963
(in short “the Limitation Act“) can be availed for condonation of delay. The
first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be
preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the
decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal
within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within
a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the
appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30
days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal.
The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear
that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be
presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the
position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to
entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry
of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there
is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner
and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no
power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days period.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant has emphasized on certain
decisions, more particularly, I.T.C. case (supra) to contend that the High
Court and this Court in appropriate cases condoned the delay on sufficient
cause being shown.
10. Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various
statutes. It essentially means as adequate or enough. There cannot be any
straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting the explanation furnished for
delay caused in taking steps. In the instant case, the explanation offered for
the abnormal delay of nearly 20 months is that the appellant concern was
practically closed after 1998 and it was only opened for some short period.
From the application for condonation of delay, it appears that the appellant
has categorically accepted that on receipt of order the same was
immediately handed over to the consultant for filing an appeal. If that is so,
the plea that because of lack of experience in business there was delay does
not stand to be reason. I.T.C. case (supra) was rendered taking note of the
peculiar background facts of the case. In that case there was no law
declared by this Court that even though the Statute prescribed a particular
period of limitation, this Court can direct condonation. That would render a
specific provision providing for limitation rather otiose. In any event, the
causes shown for condonation have no acceptable value. In that view of the
12matter, the appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct. There will be
no order as to costs.”
12. The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme
Court in “Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise
vs. Hongo India Pvt. Ltd.“, reported in (2009) 5 SCC
791, while considering the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act to proceedings under Section 35-H of the
Excise Act. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the
Central Excise Act and reiterated that the applicability of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be gathered from the
legislative scheme of the special enactment and that an
express exclusion is not necessary, where a special statute
prescribes a complete code governing limitation and
circumscribes the extent to which delay can be condoned.
13. It is noteworthy that Section 35-H of the Excise
Act, which was interpreted, only provides for a particular
period of limitation, i.e. 180 days and there is no other clause
for condoning the delay, nor any specific provision excluding
the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is as
follows:-
“35-H. Application to High Court:- (1) The Commissioner of Central
Excise or the other party may, within one hundred and eighty days of the date
upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35-C passed
before the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other
things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of
duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment), by
application in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is made
by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees, apply to the High Court to
direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law
arising from such order of the Tribunal.”
13
14. One of the contentions advanced on behalf of the
aggrieved person was that in absence of any express
provision excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act would apply and the High Court had the power to
entertain the reference even after 180 days. The contention
regarding necessity of express exclusion of the provisions of
the Limitation Act in the special statute was repelled
observing that the same is not necessary. It was held that
such exclusion may equally arise by necessary implication
from the scheme of the special enactment, the nature of
remedy provided, the limitation prescribed and the extent to
which the Legislation has chosen to confer the power of
condonation. The relevant observations are as follows:-
“15. We have already pointed out that in the case of appeal to the
Commissioner, Section 35 provides 60 days time and in addition to the
same, Commissioner has power to condone the delay up to 30 days, if
sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35B provides 90 days’ time for
filing appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables
the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number of
days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 35EE which provides 90
days time for filing revision by the Central Government and, proviso to the
same enables the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further
period of 90 days, if sufficient cause is shown, whereas in the case of appeal
to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference to the High Court
under Section 35-H of the Act, total period of 180 days has been provided
for availing the remedy of appeal and the reference. However, there is no
further clause empowering the High Court to condone the delay after the
period of 180 days.
18. The learned Additional Solicitor General relying on the judgment
of this Court in Union of India vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8
SCC 470 contended that in the absence of specific exclusion of the
Limitation Act in the Central Excise Act, in lieu of Section 29(2) of the
14
Limitation Act, Section 5 of the same is applicable even in the case of
reference application to the High Court.
32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B,
35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to
the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of
communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used
in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the
appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to
30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for
preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by
showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete
exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after
expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days.
33. Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to
the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the
legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively, on the other
hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of
180 days has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and the other
party to avail the same. We are of the view that the legislature provided
sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which
is more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision.
34. Though, an argument was raised based on Section 29 of the
Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted what
we have to determine is whether the provisions of this section are expressly
excluded in the case of reference to High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the words “expressly excluded”
would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the
operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of
the special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature of the
remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete Code by itself which alone should govern the several matters
provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear
that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the
provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the
special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the
Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the
court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions
or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude
their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of
the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of
the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to
filing of reference application to the High Court.
36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the
conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a
15
reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under Section
5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it is the duty of the court to
respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation
cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.
37. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court
has no power to condone the delay in filing the “reference application” filed
by the Commissioner under unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed
the reference on the ground of limitation.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. The doctrine of implied exclusion without specific
reference to any provision of the Limitation Act, relied up by
the Supreme Court in Hongo India (supra), has been
consistently followed by the Supreme Court in large number
of its other decisions.
16. In Patel Brothers vs. State of Assam & others,
reported in (2017) 2 SCC 350, the Supreme Court
considered the question of applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act to revision petition filed under Section 81 of the
Assam Value Added Tax Act, 2003, which provided a
limitation of 60 days from the date of notice of the decision
and is silent about the power to condone the delay if revision
is filed beyond the prescribed period. However, the Supreme
Court took into consideration Section 84 of the said Act which
made applicable only the provisions of Sections 4 and 12 of
the Limitation Act and held that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act would stand excluded by necessary implication. The
Supreme Court while repelling the argument based on “no
express exclusion” placed reliance on the doctrine of implied
16
exclusion laid down in its earlier judgment in Hukumdev
Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain, reported in (1974) 2 SCC
133. The relevant extract from the judgment is as follows:-
“19. The argument predicated on ‘no express exclusion’ loses its
force having regard to the principle of law enshrined in Hukumdev Narain
Yadav. Therein, the Court made following observations while examining
whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions of
the Representation of the People Act or not:
“17. … but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special
law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy
provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a
complete code by itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant
provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are
necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be
called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view,
even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions
of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it
would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to
what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the
subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation.”
20. Thus, the approach which is to be adopted by the Court in such
cases is to examine the provisions of special law to arrive at a conclusion as
to whether there was legislative intent to exclude the operation of Limitation
Act. In the instant case, we find that Section 84 of the VAT Act made
only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings
under the VAT Act. The apparent legislative intent, which can be clearly
evinced, is to exclude other provisions, including Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. Section 29(2) stipulates that in the absence of any express provision in
a special law, provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would
apply. If the intention of the legislature was to make Section 5, or for that
matter, other provisions of the Limitation Act applicable to the proceedings
under the VAT Act, there was no necessity to make specific provision like
Section 84 thereby making only Sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act
applicable to such proceedings, inasmuch as these two Sections would also
have become applicable by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. It
is, thus, clear that the Legislature intended only Sections 4 and 12 of the
Limitation Act, out of Sections 4 to 24 of the said Act, applicable under
the VAT Act thereby excluding the applicability of the other provisions.
21. The judgment in Mangu Ram would not come to the aid of the
appellant as the Court found that there was no provision under Cr.P.C. from
which legislative intent to exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be
discerned and, therefore, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act was taken aid
17
of. Similar situation prevailed in Anshuman Shukla’s case. On the contrary,
in the instant case, a scrutiny of the scheme of VAT Act goes to show that it
is a complete code not only laying down the forum but also prescribing the
time- limit within which each forum would be competent to entertain the
appeal or revision. The underlying object of the Act appears to be not only to
shorten the length of the proceedings initiated under the different provisions
contained therein, but also to ensure finality of the decision made
thereunder. The fact that the period of limitation described therein has been
equally made applicable to the assessee as well as the revenue lends ample
credence to such a conclusion. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the
application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a proceeding
under Section 81(1) of the VAT Act stands excluded by necessary
implication, by virtue of the language employed in Section 84.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. Before we advert to the precedents cited on behalf
of the petitioners, we would like to refer to one more
judgment in the case of “Union of India vs. Popular
Construction Co. Ltd.“, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 470
cited on behalf of the Revenue on the same issue in the
context of objection under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Though, it has been held that after
the expiry of the limitation prescribed for filing objection
under Section 34 of the Act, the same was to be rejected as
barred by limitation and benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act cannot be extended, the said judgment can well be
distinguished on the ground of pre-emptive nature of the
language “and not thereafter” used in the statute. For the
said reason, we do not feel it expedient to deal with it in any
further detail.
18. We now proceed to deal with the judgments cited
on behalf of the petitioners in support of the contention that
18
delay is condonable while filing appeal under Section 107(4)
of the Act by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. A heavy reliance was placed on behalf of the
petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court in “M.P.
Steel Corporation vs. Commissioner of Central Excise“,
reported in (2015) 7 SCC 58. The question therein was
whether the period spent bonafidely in pursuing remedy
before an incompetent forum was liable to be excluded by
applying the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
while computing limitation for filing appeal under Section 128
of the Customs Act before the Appellate Tribunal.
20. The Supreme Court held that though the Limitation
Act, strictly speaking, may not apply proprio vigore to
proceedings before statutory tribunals, the equitable principle
embodied in Section 14, being a principle which advances the
cause of justice, would nevertheless apply. These
observations (in paragraph No.38) are as follows:-
“38. We have already held that the Limitation Act including Section
14 would not apply to appeals filed before a quasi-judicial tribunal such as
the Collector (Appeals) mentioned in Section 128 of the Customs Act.
However, this does not conclude the issue. There is authority for the
proposition that even where Section 14 may not apply, the principles on
which Section 14 is based, being principles which advance the cause of
justice, would nevertheless apply.”
21. The Supreme Court while accepting the contention
that Section 128 of the Customs Act is a complete code by
itself, which necessarily excludes the application of Section 14
19
of the Limitation Act, however, for purposes of extending the
benefit of the principles laid down in Section 14 made
distinction between condonation of delay under Section 5
of the Limitation Act and exclusion of the time consumed in
prosecuting proceedings bonafidely before a wrong forum. It
has thus been held as under:-
“42. However, it remains to consider whether Shri Sanghi is right in
stating that Section 128 is a complete code by itself which necessarily
excludes the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. For this
proposition he relied strongly on Parson Tools which has been discussed
hereinabove. As has already been stated, Parson Tools was a judgment
which turned on the three features mentioned in the said case. Unlike the
U.P. Sales Tax Act, there is no provision in the Customs Act which enables a
party to invoke suo moto the appellate power and grant relief to a person
who institutes an appeal out of time in an appropriate case. Also, Section 10
of the U.P. Sales Tax Act dealt with the filing of a revision petition after a
first appeal had already been rejected, and not to a case of a first appeal as
provided under Section 128 of the Customs Act. Another feature, which is of
direct relevance in this case, is that for revision petitions filed under the U.P.
Sales Tax Act a sufficiently long period of 18 months had been given beyond
which it was the policy of the legislature not to extend limitation any further.
This aspect of Parson Tools has been explained in Consolidated Engineering
in some detail by both the main judgment as well as the concurring
judgment. In the latter judgment, it has been pointed out that there is a
vital distinction between extending time and condoning delay. Like Section
34 of the Arbitration Act, Section 128 of the Customs Act is a Section which
lays down that delay cannot be condoned beyond a certain period.
Like Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, Section 128 of the Customs Act does
not lay down a long period. In these circumstances, to infer exclusion
of Section 14 or the principles contained in Section 14 would be unduly
harsh and would not advance the cause of justice. It must not be forgotten
as is pointed out in the concurring judgment in Consolidated Engineering
that:
54. “…. Even when there is cause to apply Section 14, the limitation
period continues to be three months and not more, but in computing
the limitation period of three months for the application
under Section 34(1) of the AC Act, the time during which the
applicant was prosecuting such application before the wrong court is
excluded, provided the proceeding in the wrong court was prosecuted
bona fide, with due diligence. Western Builders [(2006) 6 SCC 239]
therefore lays down the correct legal position.”
20
43. Merely because Parson Tools also dealt with a provision in a tax
statute does not make the ratio of the said decision apply to a completely
differently worded tax statute with a much shorter period of limitation –
Section 128 of the Customs Act. Also, the principle of Section 14 would
apply not merely in condoning delay within the outer period prescribed for
condonation but would apply de hors such period for the reason pointed out
in Consolidated Engineering above, being the difference between exclusion
of a certain period altogether under Section 14 principles and condoning
delay. As has been pointed out in the said judgment, when a certain period
is excluded by applying the principles contained in Section 14, there is no
delay to be attributed to the appellant and the limitation period provided by
the concerned statute continues to be the stated period and not more than
the stated period. We conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section
14 which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would
certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are
bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a
decision on the merits of the case.”
(emphasis supplied)
22. The Supreme Court has, itself, drawn distinction
between condonation of delay and exclusion of time. Thus,
the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M.P. Steel
Corporation would not apply for deciding the issue as to
whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the
appeal filed under Section 107(4) of the Act.
23. A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in
the case of “J. Kumaradasan Nair vs. Iric Sohan“,
reported in (2009) 12 SCC 175 with regard to the
applicability of provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
in a revision petition filed before the High Court arising out of
orders passed in an execution case arising out of a decree
passed in a civil matter. The said judgment, in our
considered opinion, which arises out of civil proceedings and
is based on construction of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
21
where the period of limitation is not extended, but only the
period consumed in pursuing the remedy before a wrong
forum is excluded, would also be of no help to the petitioners.
24. The other judgment, on which also, heavy reliance
has been placed on behalf of the petitioners, is in the case of
“Superintending Engineer/ Dehar Power House Circle
Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and
another vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/
Assessing Authority“, reported in (2020) 17 SCC 692. In
the said case, question arose before the Supreme Court as to
whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be applied for
condoning the delay in filing revision under Section 48 of the
H.P. Value Added Tax Act, 2005, which provided for the
limitation of 90 days. The High court took the view that the
delay cannot be condoned by applying Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The view taken by the High Court has been
held to be unsustainable and the benefit of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act was extended to the appellants.
25. A careful reading of the aforesaid judgment reveals
that the conclusion reached therein turned entirely upon the
scheme of the State Legislation. The Court noticed that the
Act contained provisions conferring vide suo motu power of
revision upon the Commissioner and in such case a much
larger period of limitation of five years and, viewed as a
22
whole, did not manifest any legislative intent to exclude
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court itself
distinguished Hongo India and Patel Brothers on the
ground that those judgments were rendered in the context of
materially different statutory schemes. This is evident from
the conclusions drawn in the concluding part of the judgment,
which are as follows:-
“28. In the light of the decisions as mentioned earlier, when we
examine the scheme of the Act of 2005, the provisions contained in section
45 provides for an appeal from every original order passed under the Act or
the Rules made thereunder. Subsection (4) of section 45 provides appeal to
be filed within 60 days, or such more extended period as the appellate
authority may allow, for reasons to be recorded in writing. Thus, because of
the provisions contained in section 45(4), the principles of section 5 would
apply to an appeal before the appellate authority, which otherwise in the
absence of specific provision would not have applied to authority. The
revision is provided to the Commissioner suo motu under the provisions of
section 46(1), and the period provided is 5 years for suo motu exercise of
revisional power. However, the tribunal has the power to entertain
application within 60 days from the date of communication of the order.
When we consider the provisions of section 48, revision is provided to the
High Court, and an aggrieved person may within 90 days of
the communication of such order, file a revision. Section 48(1) nowhere
expressly excludes the applicability of provisions of the Limitation Act. The
provisions of section 5 are applicable to Section 48 as they are not expressly
excluded by the provisions under the Act of 2005. More so, in view of the
provisions in section 45(4), which makes provisions to condone the delay
like the Limitation Act, conferring power upon an authority also to condone
delay. Further, suo motu revision has also been provided under section 46.
In section 48, there is no express exclusion. Because of the scheme of the
Act, it cannot be inferred that by implication, the provisions of section 5 of
the Limitation Act are excluded. Provisions contained in section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act would be attracted as there is no express exclusion or by
implication, in view of the provisions of the Act of 2005. We hold that by
virtue of the provisions contained in section 29(2), provisions of section 5 of
the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings under Section 48 of the 2005
Act.
29. The High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in Patel
Brothers (supra) in the context of the Assam VAT Act in which the
abovementioned provision of section 84 made the difference, which makes
specific provision that only sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act are
23applicable. Consequently, it follows that other provisions are not
applicable. The decision in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also turned
on the scheme of the Excise Act. The scheme of the Excise Act is materially
different than that of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act. Thus, the decision
in Hongo India Private Limited (supra) also cannot be said to be applicable
to interpret the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act. As the revision under the Act of
2005 lies to the High Court, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act
are applicable, and there is no express exclusion of the provisions of section
5 and as per section 29(2), unless a special law expressly excludes the
provision, sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are applicable. When we
consider the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, it is apparent
that its scheme is not ousting the provisions of the Limitation Act from its
ken which makes principles of section 5 applicable even to an authority in
the matter of filing an appeal but for the said provision the authority would
not have the power to condone the delay. By implication also, it is apparent
that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act have not been ousted;
they have the play for condoning the limitation under Section 48 of the Act
of 2005. Suo motu provision of revisional power is also provided to the
Commissioner within 5 years. Thus, the intendment is not to exclude
the Limitation Act. We condone the delay in filing of revision.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. The next judgment relied up on behalf of the
petitioners is in “ITC Ltd. and another vs. Union of India
& others“, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 610, wherein the High
Court had dismissed the writ petition on the ground of
availability of remedy of appeal under Section 35 of the
Central Excise Act. The Supreme Court, after considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, permitted the
appellant to file appeal and observed that if the appeal is filed
within one month from the date of order, the same would be
heard and decided on merits.
27. In our considered opinion, the said judgment of the
Supreme Court, being on peculiar facts and circumstances of
the said case, cannot be held to lay down any binding
24
precedent that appeal filed beyond the prescribed period of
limitation are entertainable with the aid of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
28. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the
petitioners on the judgment of the Patna High Court in “M/s
Micro Zone vs. Union of India & others”, reported in
2024 (4) TMI 756. In the said case, the appeal filed under
a taxing statute, beyond the limitation prescribed, was held
to be within time under a special procedure prescribed by the
Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs by a notification
dated 02.11.2023. The said judgment, therefore, also does
not advance the case of the petitioners.
29. In another judgment of Orissa High Court in “M/s
Swati Samantray vs. The Additional Commissioner of
State Tax (Appeal), CT and GST, Cuttack and another,
reported in 2024 (2) TMI 186, the benefit of same
notification was extended in directing the appeal to be
decided on merits and, therefore, the same is also not of any
relevance.
30. Similarly, the judgments of the Bombay High Court
in “SPCX Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra (2025) 27
Centax 278 (Bom.); Esquire Electronics vs. State of
Maharashtra & others; The Deputy Commissioner of
State Tax (Appeals), Mumbai, The Assistant
25
Commissioner of State Tax, Mandvi, Mumbai, 2025 (9)
TMI 1048″, issuing different directions to decide appeals
were on peculiar facts without examining any issue of
limitation and, therefore, would not be applicable.
31. The principle emerging from the aforesaid
authorities is that the applicability of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act cannot be determined by adopting any
universal formula. The answer necessarily depends upon the
language employed by the Legislature, the scheme of the
special enactment, the nature of the remedy created and the
legislative intent which can be gathered therefrom. The mere
absence of an express exclusion is not conclusive, equally,
the mere prescription of a period of limitation coupled with a
limited power of condonation does not conclude the enquiry.
The Court must ascertain whether, upon a holistic reading of
the statute, the Legislature intended to exclude the operation
of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act.
32. Counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted
that the controversy now stands concluded by the recent
judgment of the Supreme Court in “Deputy Commissioner
and Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. S.V. Global Mill
Ltd.“, reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 171. It is a case
wherein a two Judge bench of the Supreme Court held that in
an appeal to High Court against the judgment and decree of
26
the Authority under Section 74 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, the provision of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable and, thus,
the High Court had the power to condone the delay in filing
such an appeal beyond the period prescribed under Section
74 of the said Act.
33. While arriving at the said conclusion, the Supreme
Court had examined the object of the Act 2013, the nature of
rights created in favour of the land owners in respect of
compensation for compulsory acquisition of the land, the
character of the proceedings before the Reference Authority,
and the appellate jurisdiction exercised by the High Court.
The Court also noticed that Section 103 of the 2013 Act
expressly provides that the provisions of the Act are in
addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the
time being in force.
34. In order to appreciate the ratio decidendi of the
aforesaid judgment, it would be appropriate to examine, in
some detail, the provisions of the Act, 2013, which were
taken into account by the Supreme Court in coming to the
conclusion. The Act, 2013 is a beneficial and welfare oriented
enactment intended to ensure that the persons deprived of
their property by compulsory acquisition receive fair
27
compensation together with adequate rehabilitation and
resettlement benefits. The provisions of the Act, 2013,
therefore, require a liberal and purposive construction so as
to advance the legislative object rather than defeat it on
technical considerations.
35. The Supreme Court further noticed that
proceedings under the 2013 Act are essentially compensatory
in nature and that the right of appeal provided under Section
74 constitutes an important safeguard against erroneous
determination of compensation. Keeping in view the
aforesaid object of the legislation, the Court held that, unless
the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act is
excluded expressly or by necessary implication, Section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act would attract the provisions of Section 5,
thereby empowering the High Court to condone delay in
appropriate case.
36. Another significant consideration which weighed
with the Supreme Court was that the 2013 Act does not
contain any provision expressly excluding the applicability of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. On the contrary,
Section 103 expressly provides that the provisions of the Act
are in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for
the time being in force. In such circumstances, the provision
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was held to be applicable.
28
37. It would be advantageous to reproduce in extenso
few paragraphs from the judgment where the said aspects
have been dealt with:-
“74. We have dealt with the provisions contained in both
the enactments in extenso already. We have also dealt with the
principles of law. Upon such analysis, we reiterate that the
2013 Act is a unique piece of legislation. The Collector is given
two different and distinct roles up to a certain stage of the
acquisition process. The first role is to facilitate the acquisition
on behalf of the Government, and the other is with respect to
the determination of the compensation. For both these roles,
there is no question of application of any provisions of the 1963
Act, as the Collector either acts as a statutory authority on the
executive side or as a quasi- judicial authority while
determining the compensation or as an authority dealing with
rights having civil consequences while making a reference. In
all these three acts, there is no role that is exclusively judicial.
As we have already discussed, only when the issue of
compensation is decided by the Authority, who is a legally
trained person entitled to exercise the powers of a Civil Court,
followed by the declaration of an award deemed to be a decree,
does an out-and-out judicial forum enter the picture. The
proceedings before him are original in nature, with two parties
appearing before him, of which even the Collector is a party,
since it is his award that is under challenge. There is a reason
why the Authority is expected to exercise an element of fair
play by following the principles of natural justice which would
otherwise inhere in a party before it. It is only the Court that is
given the inherent power of formulating its own procedure
when it is not provided under the statute. Thus, the reference
made by the Collector to the Authority, which is akin to the
institution of a suit before a Civil Court, does not attract the
application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. However, an
application filed during the pendency of the reference, being
akin to an application filed during the pendency of a suit, would
attract the application of Section 5 of the 1963 Act. For
example, when a party to a reference dies, and an application
for bringing the legal representatives on record is filed
belatedly, Section 5 of the 1963 Act would have to be pressed
into service. Such a situation might also arise in appellate
proceedings. To that extent, there is no bar.
75. Section 74 of the 2013 Act provides for a first appeal,
both, on facts and on law. This appellate proceeding before the
High Court is nothing but a continuation of the original
proceedings before the Authority. As already discussed earlier,
Section 74 provides a period of 60 days for filing an appeal
before the High Court, with an additional period of 60 days as
per the proviso. The proviso does not extend the period of
limitation, but merely brings a delayed filing within the ambit of
the main provision. Being a mere proviso, it cannot be
interpreted to mean an extension of the period of limitation.
76. Thus, Section 74, along with its proviso, deals with
only one period of limitation, which is 60 days. The proviso
29merely facilitates an appellant to file the appeal within a further
period of 60 days which, in effect, brings the same within the
fold of the initial 60 days. This provision, as a whole, does not
involve an exercise of the power conferred to the Court
under Section 5 of the 1963 Act. However, we must note that
the 2013 Act does not take away from its purview the
application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act. We do not find
any express exclusion contained in Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that
the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application
of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview.
77. As Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not exclude the
application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act, a limited
interpretation of Section 5 of the 1963 Act alone cannot be
given. What applies to exclusion shall apply to extension as
well. In our considered view, the High Court, while exercising
the power under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, is certainly entitled
to draw its power from the sources available under the 1963
Act. We cannot introduce words that are not available in
Section 74 through an imaginary interpretation in holding the
existence of an express exclusion. It is a conscious decision
made by the Legislature, and its knowledge must be inferred
and implied. Thus, we are inclined to hold that there is not
much difference between the main provision contained in
Section 74(1) and its proviso. There is only one period
mentioned for filing the appeal, meaning thereby that the other
one mentioned under the proviso gets subsumed within the
period provided under Section 74(1).
78. Furthermore, the intention of Section 103 of the 2013
Act is also to be seen, which clarifies that it is in addition to and
not in derogation of the existing laws. It facilitates adequate
borrowing from other enactments. In fact, the completeness of
the 2013 Act comes from such borrowing, including from the
1963 Act. Any interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013 Act,
barring the application of other enactments which would include
the 1963 Act, would make Section 103 of the 2013 Act
redundant and otiose. When the Legislature introduces a
provision, there can be no interpretation in ignorance of it.
Such an ignorant interpretation would also be dangerous, as it
would amount to striking down the very provision itself even
without a challenge.
79. Thus, we hold that the 1963 Act applies to the 2013
Act. Any interpretation to the contrary would result in a
situation as if both Section 29(2) of the 1963 Act and Section
103 of the 2013 Act have vanished from the respective
statutes, which is wholly impermissible in law. We must also
remain conscious that any interpretation having the impact of
destroying a right in seeking an adjudication on merits, should
be eschewed unless it appears so on the very face of it. Even
when two interpretations are possible, the one that facilitates
the filing of an appeal must be approved.
80. Having understood Section 74 of the 2013 Act, we are
inclined to hold that the issue being determination of just, fair
and adequate compensation by the First Appellate Court having
the trappings of the original one and keeping in mind the object
and the intent of the enactment which Courts are duty-bound to
give effect to rather than indulging in its destruction, a liberal
approach has to be adopted, both, when dealing with a case
30coming under the proviso or on an application of Section 5 of
the 1963 Act.
81. Thus, we have no hesitation in setting aside the
impugned judgments rendered by the High Courts which have
held that Section 5 of the 1963 Act has no application to
Section 74 of the 2013 Act, particularly in view of the fact that
the period of limitation provided under Section 74 must be read
into the Schedule by the invocation of Section 3 of the 1963
Act.”
38. The ratio of the aforesaid judgment, in our opinion,
has to be understood in the backdrop of the statutory scheme
of the 2013 Act. The Supreme Court was interpreting the
provisions of a beneficial legislation enacted to secure just
and fair compensation to land owners whose property is
compulsorily acquired. The interpretation adopted by the
court was guided by the object of advancing the remedy
provided under the Act and ensuring that the substantive
rights were not defeated on technical considerations relating
to limitation.
39. The CGST Act, on the other hand, stands on an
entirely different footing. It is a fiscal statute, constituting a
self-contained code governing levy, assessment, recovery and
appellate remedies under the GST regimes. The provision
relating to limitation under Section 107 is an integral part of
the statutory framework intended to ensure certainty, finality
and expeditious adjudication of tax disputes. The nature,
object and legislative scheme of the GST Act are materially
different from those of the Act 2013. The limitation
prescribed under Section 107 forms an integral part of the
31
appellate remedy itself and cannot be enlarged by resort to
Section 5 of the Limitation Act in absence of any statutory
indication permitting such enlargement. In fact, the Supreme
Court itself was conscious of the aforesaid distinguishing
features and, therefore, the judgment cited before it in
relation to various taxing statutes and other legislations were
distinguished. While drawing the said distinction, the
Supreme Court has itself observed that a statute involving
financial implications stands on a totally different footing. It
is apposite to quote Paragraph nos.91 and 92 from the
judgment where the said distinction has been drawn:-
“91. In the other judgments relied upon by the parties, this
Court was dealing with different enactments such as the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Customs
Act, 1962, the Electricity Act, 2003, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016, the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, the
Special Courts (Trial of Offences relating to transaction in Securities)
Act, 1992, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and even
the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
92. These enactments travel on totally different fields involving
different parties, different mechanisms and different authorities. In
some cases, the appeals were preferred before the statutory
authorities for distinct reliefs under the respective enactments. In
many of them, this Court was concerned with statutory rights, and
the respective statutes being dealt with did not contain any provision
as contained in Section 103 of the 2013 Act. A statute involving
financial implications and, in some cases, a penalty, also stands on a
totally different footing. There, the issue would be one of action
taken, while we are concerned with the entitlement of a party.”
40. Therefore, unless the Supreme Court expressly
overrules or distinguishes the fiscal precedents in the cases of
Singh Enterprises, Hongo India Pvt. Ltd. and S.V.
Global Mill Ltd., the decision in S.V. Global Mill Ltd. cannot
be understood as altering the principles governing the
interpretation of a fiscal statute as the present one.
32
41. In view of the above, we are of the considered
opinion that the judgment in S.V. Global Mill Ltd. (supra)
would also be of no help to the petitioners.
42. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, we hold
that the Appellate Authority, under Section 107 of the CGST/
UKGST Act has no jurisdiction to entertain appeals beyond
the period prescribed under Section 107(1) read with Section
107(4), and the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act
stands excluded by necessary implication.
43. Learned counsel for the Revenue also contended
that the Commissioner (Appeals), while deciding appeals
under Section 107(4) of the Act, is not a ‘civil court’ and that
the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act apply only to
a court in the strict sense, as distinguished from a Tribunal or
quasi-judicial authority. It was, therefore, submitted that the
provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would even
otherwise also not apply.
44. Since, however, we have already held, upon an
examination of the scheme of the CGST/ UKGST Act, that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply, therefore, we
do not consider it necessary to examine the said submission
and leave it open for being considered in an appropriate case.
33
45. Having answered the question of law, we direct the
office to list the writ petitions next week for consideration of
the factual matrix of each individual case to find out whether
writ jurisdiction should be invoked to examine the validity of
the original order, although, the appeals have been dismissed
on ground of limitation.
(MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, C.J.)
(SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.)
Dated: 17th July, 2026
NISHANT
