Calcutta High Court
M/S. R.S.H.S Impex Private Limited vs Union Of India And Others on 21 May, 2026
Author: Ravi Krishan Kapur
Bench: Ravi Krishan Kapur
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
ORIGINAL SIDE
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur
WPO/97/2026
M/S. R.S.H.S IMPEX PRIVATE LIMITED
VS
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
For the petitioner : Mr. Pranit Bag, Advocate
Mr. Pradeep Jewrajka, Advocate
Ms. Pooja Jewrajka, Advocate
Mr. Ayush Singhania, Advocate
Mr. Rahul Poddar, Advocate.
For the respondent bank : Mr. Probal Mukherjee, Senior Advocate
Ms. Deblina Lahiri, Advocate
Mr. Mrinmoy Chatterjee, Advocate
For the Union of India : Mr. Rajesh Kumar Shah, Advocate
Heard on : 13.05.2026
Judgment on : 21.05.2026
Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.:
1. The grievance of the petitioner is directed against the respondent, State Bank
of India in not issuing a Sale Certificate in favour of the petitioner in terms of
the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. In the alternative, the
petitioner seeks refund of the money paid as sale consideration alongwith
interest in respect of an auction sale conducted by the respondent bank.
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2. Briefly, the respondent, State Bank of India had initiated an auction sale in
respect of a property situated at 19B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata, West
Bengal-700071. The auction sale had been necessitated primarily in view of
the original borrower, T.M Exports Private Limited, having defaulted in the
repayment of loan taken from the respondent bank. The sale was conducted
by the respondent bank, in respect of two commercial spaces, one being a
super built-up area of 1565.75 sq.ft. on the ground floor of 19B, Shakespeare
Sarani, Kolkata-700071 and the other being a super built-up area of about
1569.92 sq.ft. on the ground floor of 19B, Shakespeare Sarani, Kolkata-
700071. The reserve price for each of the properties was Rs.3 crores
respectively. Ultimately, the petitioner was adjudged as the successful
bidder for the properties and a sum of Rs.11,41,00,000/- was paid by the
petitioner as consideration.
3. Subsequently, by an order dated 3 February, 2023, the Debts Recovery
Tribunal, Kolkata had in a proceeding being SA No.17 of 2023 granted an
interim order restraining issuance of the sale certificate in respect of the
above auction. The physical possession in respect of the auction properties
were handed over to the respondent bank by the Shakespeare Sarani Police
Station in terms of an order passed by this Court in CAN No.1 of 2022 in WP
No.19879 of 2022.
4. It is contended by the respondent bank that the draft sale certificate was
sent through an e-mail in favour of the petitioner with a request to the
petitioner to take physical possession of the secured asset. Despite several
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requests, the petitioner refused to take possession of the same.
Nevertheless, since the sale certificate had not been finally issued, the
petitioner was unable to take physical possession and requested for further
time. In this background, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the
respondent bank has failed to act in terms of the above request and has not
adhered to the mandate of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2022 (SARFAESI Act) and
the Rules framed thereunder. Hence, this writ petition. In support of such
contention, the petitioner relies on the decision in Celir Llp -vs.- Bafna Motors
(Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.[(2024) 2 SCC 1].
5. On behalf of the respondent bank, it is submitted that the petitioner has
failed to exhaust its efficacious alternative statutory remedy under the
SARFAESI Act, 2002. The main proceeding being SA No.7 of 2023 is pending
before the Learned Debts Recovery Tribunal-1, Kolkata, wherein the
petitioner has also been added as a party respondent on 21 June, 2024. All
steps culminating in the auction sale have been duly complied with by both
the parties. However, in view of an application filed at the behest of one of
the guarantors-cum-mortgagors, M/s. Westwind Marketing Private Limited,
an order dated 3 February, 2023 has been passed by the Learned Debts
Recovery Tribunal whereby the respondent bank had been directed not to
issue the sale certificate. The interim order passed by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal restraining the respondent bank from issuing the sale certificate
has been extended from time to time since 24 March, 2023. It is also
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contended that the respondent bank has no objection in issuing the sale
certificate but has been unable to issue the same in view of the interim order
passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The decision cited in Celir Llp -vs.-
Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(Supra) is inapplicable and inapposite.
In such circumstances, there is no ground to interfere in this writ petition
and the same should be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy.
6. The core of the argument of the petitioner is based on the decision in Celir
Llp -vs.- Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(Supra), wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court had held as follows:
110. We summarise our final conclusion as under:
110.1. The High Court was not justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution more particularly when the borrowers had already
availed the alternative remedy available to them under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi
Act.
110.2. The confirmation of sale by the Bank under Rule 9(2) of the 2002 Rules
invests the successful auction-purchaser with a vested right to obtain a certificate
of sale of the immovable property in the form given in Appendix V to the Rules i.e.
in accordance with Rule 9(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002.
110.3. In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the Sarfaesi Act, the
right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or
transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption
did not stand terminated on the date of the auction-sale of the secured asset itself
and remained alive till the transfer was completed in favour of the auction-
purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the
secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the Sarfaesi
Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands
extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public
auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules. In effect, the right of redemption
available to the borrower under the present statutory regime is drastically
curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under
Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the
secured asset in favour of the auction-purchaser.
110.4. The Bank after having confirmed the sale under Rule 9(2) of the 2002
Rules could not have withheld the sale certificate under Rule 9(6) of the 2002
Rules, and entered into a private arrangement with a borrower.
110.5. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution could not have applied
equitable considerations to overreach the outcome contemplated by the statutory
auction process prescribed under the Sarfaesi Act.
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7. The decision in Celir Llp -vs.- Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.(Supra) is
distinguishable and inapplicable to the facts of this case. In the said
decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India had reversed the order of the
High Court and arrived at a finding that after confirmation of the sale in
terms of Rule 9(2) of 2002 Rules, there was no reason as to why the
respondent bank had withheld issuance of the sale certificate under Rule
9(6) of the 2002 Rules. It was also held that the successful auction
purchaser had a vested right to obtain the sale certificate and the High Court
in exercising Article 226 could not have applied any equitable consideration
to overreach the outcome contemplated by the statutory auction process
prescribed under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
8. On the contrary, in the present case, the bank has been unable the issue the
sale certificate only on the ground that there is an order of restraint passed
by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. There is no other impediment in issuing the
sale certificate. The petitioner is a party to such proceedings. The
proceedings are still pending. In view of the above, there is no exceptional
reason as to why this Court should bypass the alternative statutory
mechanism under the SARFAESI 2002. In Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab
National Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 626 it has been held as follows:
32. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati
Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] this Court had the occasion to
examine in detail the provisions of the Sarfaesi Act and the question regarding invocation
of the extraordinary power under Articles 226/227 in challenging the actions taken under
the Sarfaesi Act. Their Lordships gave a note of caution while dealing with the writ filed
to challenge the actions taken under the Sarfaesi Act and made the following pertinent
observations which, in our view, squarely apply to the case on hand: (SCC p. 143, paras
42-45)
6“42. There is another reason why the impugned order [Satyawati Tondon v. State of U.P.,
2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible
grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14,
then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The
expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold,
not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by
the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate
Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are
required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the
remedies available to an aggrieved person under the Sarfaesi Act are both expeditious
and effective.
43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will
ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour
in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the
dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the
petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the
High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State
Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not
only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage
constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved
person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing
remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies
available under the relevant statute.
44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred
upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs
including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by
Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on
exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-
imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view
while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and
not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should
entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order
ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing
application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed
mechanism for redressal of his grievance.”
9. Similarly, in State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85, it
has been held as follows:
3. The Sarfaesi Act is a complete code by itself, providing for expeditious recovery of dues
arising out of loans granted by financial institutions, the remedy of appeal by the
aggrieved under Section 17 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, followed by a right to
appeal before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18. The High Court ought not to have
entertained the writ petition in view of the adequate alternate statutory remedies
available to the respondent. The interim order was passed on the very first date, without
an opportunity to the appellant to file a reply. Reliance was placed on United Bank of
India v. Satyawati Tondon [United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260] and Sri Siddeshwara Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal [Sri Siddeshwara
Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 638] . The writ petition
7ought to have been dismissed at the threshold on the ground of maintainability. The
Division Bench erred in declining to interfere with the same.
5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is loath to interfere with an
interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special
circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the court. In the
present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226
is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in
accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available,
except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed in CIT v. Chhabil
Dass Agarwal [CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603] , as follows: (SCC p. 611,
para 15)
“15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule
of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with
the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when
an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the
proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case [Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes,
AIR 1964 SC 1419] , Titaghur Paper Mills case [Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of
Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 131] and other similar judgments that the
High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective
alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the
action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of
grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for
redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation.”
10. The petitioner has participated in the auction process with full knowledge of
the pending litigations which were disclosed in the sale notice. The petitioner
has also been impleaded as a party to the proceedings before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal. This is not a case where the respondent bank has failed
to issue the sale certificate on its own volition. There is no arbitrariness,
malafides or violation of any statutory duty of the respondent bank. On the
contrary, there is an order of restraint passed by the Debts Recovery
Tribunal prohibiting the respondent bank from issuing the sale certificate. In
view of the efficacious statutory alternative remedy available to the petitioner,
it would be appropriate for the petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery
Tribunal. This would also avoid any conflicting judicial decisions. To this
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extent, the prayer of the petitioner that they are no longer interested in the
sale and only seek refund of the entire consideration alongwith interest also
cannot be entertained by this Court.
11. For the above reasons, WPO/97/2026 is dismissed.
12. Liberty is granted to the petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal
in accordance with law for seeking appropriate reliefs, it is made clear that
there has been no adjudication on the merits of the case and the the Debts
Recovery Tribunal is directed to consider the same in accordance with law
and without being influenced by any observation or finding in this order.
(Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.)
