Patna High Court – Orders
M/S Naturals Dairy (P) Ltd. vs The Union Of India on 11 May, 2026
Author: A. Abhishek Reddy
Bench: A. Abhishek Reddy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.5965 of 2026
======================================================
M/s Naturals Dairy (P) Ltd. a company registered under the Companies Act,
1956 having its registered office at Plot No.- NS-11, Patliputra Industrial
Area, 1st Plot at BIADA Gate No.5, Town and District Patna through its
authorised representative Sri Hemant Kumar Das, aged about 59 years, son of
Late Awadhesh Kumar Das, Resident of 504, White House, Block-A, Budha
Marg, P.S. Kotwali, Town and District Patna, Bihar.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy, Government of India, New Delhi.
2. The Secretary, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of
India, New Delhi.
3. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited (IREDA), 3rd
Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi- 110066
through its Chairman and Managing Director.
4. The Chairman and Managing Director, Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency Limited (IREDA), 3rd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan,
Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi- 110066.
5. The Executive Director (Legal Department), Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency Limited (IREDA), 3rd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan,
Bhikaji Cama Place, New Delhi- 110066.
6. The Director Finance-cum-CFO, Indian Renewable Energy Development
Agency Limited (IREDA), 3rd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi- 110066.
7. The General Manager (Projects), Indian Renewable Energy Development
Agency Limited (IREDA), 3rd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan, Bhikaji Cama
Place, New Delhi- 110066.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Singh, Sr. Adv.
: Mr. Nikhil Kumar Agrawal, Adv.
For UOI : Mr. Apurva Kumar, CGC
For Respondent Nos.3to7: Mr. Prashant Kumar, Adv.
: Mr. Nishant Kumar, Adv.
: Mr. Shashank Shekhar, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Additional Solicitor General
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. ABHISHEK REDDY
ORAL ORDER
5 11-05-2026
Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
The present writ petition has been filed for the
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following relief(s):-
“i. To issue an appropriate writ (s)/
order (s)/ direction(s) in the nature of Mandamus
commanding the Respondent IREDA to forthwith
release the balance sanctioned loan amount as per
Sanction Letter No. TS-40/28/2024-
IREDA/4733/2024 dated 26.06.2024 and Loan
Agreement dated 28.06.2024, to enable the
Petitioner to complete and commission the Project
within the stipulated deadline of 25.05.2026.
ii. To issue and appropriate
writ/order/direction in the nature of Certiorari
quashing and setting aside the Show Cause Notice
dated 17.03.2026. issued by Respondent IREDA
(Ref. TS-40/28/2024-IREDA/7255) as being
arbitrary, unreasonable, based on erroneous
premises, and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India;
iii. To issue and appropriate writ(s)/
order(s)/ direction(s) in the nature of Mandamus
declaring that the perfection of charge on
17.10.2025. was a lawful modification of a pre-
existing charge in favour of Respondent IREDA
(originally created on 27.08.2024), did not
constitute any breach of Conditions Precedent,
misrepresentation or suppression of facts, and does
not constitute an Event of Default under the Loan
Agreement dated 28.06.2024.
iv. To issue and appropriate writ(s)/
order(s)/ direction(s) in the name of Mandamus
directing the Respondent IREDA to maintain the
status quo and refrain from declaring an Event of
Default, invoking any security, recalling the loan, or
taking any coercive or adverse action against the
Petitioner, its promoters, or its assets pending the
disposal of this Writ Petition.
v. To any other relief(s) that the
Petitioner is entitled to in the facts and
circumstances of the case. ”
2. At the outset, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 herein i.e., Indian Renewable
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Energy Development Agency Limited (IREDA) has objected to
the very maintainability of the present writ petition on the
ground of territorial jurisdiction. An application named as
“Preliminary Objections” on behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 to
7 has also been filed.
3. Having regard to the above, the objections with
regard to the maintainability of CWJC is taken up first for
consideration.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent Nos. 3 to 7 submits that the IREDA is a specialized
finance institution and the petitioner has approached the said
institution for grant of term loan of Rs. 122.75 crores towards
the project. The loan was sanctioned vide letter No. TS-
40/28/2024-IREDA/4733/2024 dated 26.06.2024 for
establishment of 100 KLPD Grain Based Thermal Plant at
village Panapur, Tehsil Motipur, District Muzaffarpur, Bihar.
Learned counsel submits that the agreement for sanction of the
loan was entered between the parties at New Delhi, the loan
amount was advanced at New Delhi, the re-payment of the loan
to the IREDA was to be made at New Delhi and as per the
Article VII of the loan agreement dated 28.06.2024, the Civil
Courts/ Tribunals in Delhi/ New Delhi alone shall have
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jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other legal proceedings
arising out of this agreement. Therefore, it is submitted that the
present CWJC before this court is not maintainable. Learned
counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to Article VII of the
agreement entered between the petitioner and the IREDA in
support of his submissions. Further, it is submitted that the
petitioner has consciously entered into the loan agreement dated
28.06.2024 with the respondents and he is bound by the terms
and conditions of the said agreement. That the petitioner having
entered into the loan agreement and subjected himself to the
jurisdiction of the courts in Delhi/ New Delhi cannot file the
present CWJC before the Patna High Court. That the present
writ petition is misconceived and filing of the writ petition in
this Hon’ble High Court amounts to forum shopping and is an
abuse of the process of law. Learned counsel submits that
merely because the unit is set up in the State of Bihar, this Court
does not have jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-IREDA has
relied on the following judgments in support of his case and
prayed for dismissing the present writ petition.
“i. In the case of Rakesh Kumar Verma Vs. HDFC Bank Ltd.
reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 752.
ii. In the case of Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs. Indian Oil
Patna High Court CWJC No.5965 of 2026(5) dt.11-05-2026
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6. Per contra, the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the writ petitioner has vehemently opposed the
submissions made by the counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 7.
Learned senior counsel has stated that the entire cause of action
in this particular case has arisen in the State of Bihar, that the
petitioner is resident of Bihar, the necessary permissions are
granted in Bihar, that the subject land of BIADA is allotted in
Bihar, that the factory in question is located in the State of Bihar
and, therefore, this Court has got territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the present writ petition. Learned senior counsel has
stated that the respondent authority has sanctioned the loan of
Rs. 122.75 crores vide letter dated 26.06.2024, entered into loan
agreement on 28.06.2024 and, thereafter, a charge was created
on the properties belonging to the petitioner’s company on
27.08.2024. That subsequently on 29.08.2024, a deed of
guarantee was also executed between the parties and, the charge
on the property was registered with Ministry of Company
Affairs (MCA). Further, it is stated that the IOM in favor of the
respondent-IREDA was executed on 29.09.2025 and the
modification of the charge was done on 17.10.2025. That there
is absolutely no 3rd party encumbrance or interest on the subject
properties on which a charge has been created in favor of
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IREDA way back on 28.07.2024. Learned senior counsel has
stated that out of Rs. 122.75 crores total loan sanctioned, the
respondents have already disbursed a loan amount of Rs. 110
crores and the balance loan amount of approximately Rs. 12.5
crores is being withheld solely on the basis of some
misinterpretation and misapprehension of the respondents.
Learned senior counsel has brought to the notice of the Court
the show cause notice dated 17.03.2026 issued by the
respondent-IREDA, and has stated that the authority on the
premise that the petitioner has suppressed the order of Calcutta
High Court dated 13.04.2025 and gone ahead with the
modification of the charge on 17.10.2025. Learned senior
counsel has stated that the order of the Calcutta High Court was
under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, that initially the same
was granted on 13.04.2025 and was subsequently vacated on
20.05.2025 and thereafter, an injunction granted by the said
High court on 20.08.2025, which was also subsequently
vacated. That subsequently the arbitration proceedings were
initiated before by an arbitrator. That though an order was
passed initially by the arbitration, the same was subsequently
withdrawn by the learned arbitrator vide order dated 23.03.2026.
Learned senior counsel has submitted that the lis which was
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pending before the Calcutta High Court and before the arbitrator
is between the petitioner and another company by the name of
Repower Renewable Energy Limited and therefore, the said
order was not binding on the respondent-IREDA. It is submitted
that the impugned notice is without any legal basis and based on
misinterpretation of the orders passed by the Calcutta High
Court and that of the arbitrator. That the modification of the
charge on 17.10.2025 is in continuation of the earlier charge
created in favor of the respondent-IREDA and the order of the
Calcutta High Court dated 13.04.2025 does not in any manner
create an embargo or create any legal impediment on the
petitioner from going ahead with the modification of the charge
on 17.10.2025. Further, it is stated that as on date, there is
absolutely no embargo/ charge on the properties mortgaged/
charged with the IREDA and therefore, the authority may be
directed to release the balance loan amount to the petitioner so
as to enable him to complete the project and start commercial
production. Learned senior counsel has submitted that more
than 90% of the work is completed and in case the balance loan
amount is not disbursed, the petitioner will not be in a position
to install the necessary equipment and pay various vendors. It is
further submitted that in case there is any delay in disbursement
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on the balance loan amount, the entire project will get derailed
which will not only result in escalation of costs but will also
lead to payment of additional penal interest and declaring the
unit as NPA. Learned senior counsel has relied on the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra
Chess Association vs. Union of India and others reported in
2019 SCC OnLine SC 932 in support of his case.
7. In order to resolve the issue, it is necessary to
extract the relevant portion of the loan agreement entered
between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 3 to 7, more
specifically, Article VII of the agreement which reads as under;
“ARTICLE – VII
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT/PLACE
OF DISBURSEMENT OF LOAN BY IREDA AND
REPAYMENT BY BORROWER ETC.
1) This Agreement shall become binding on the
Borrower and IREDA on and from the date first above written
and after both IREDA and Borrower have executed the same. It
shall be in force till all the monies due and payable under this
Agreement are fully paid off.
II) The loan will be advanced by IREDA to the
Borrower and repaid by the Borrower to IREDA at New Delhi
and Civil Courts/Tribunals in Delhi/ New Delhi alone shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other legal proceedings
arising out of this Agreement.”
8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-IREDA has laid emphasis on the above article and
submitted that the present CWJC is not maintainable before this
High Court.
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9. Though the counsel for the IREDA has relied on
the judgments in the case of Rakesh Kumar Verma Vs. HDFC
Bank Ltd. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 752 and in the
case of Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs. Indian Oil
Corporation Limited reported in 2013 4 SCC (Civ) 157 in
support of his case, it is to be noted that the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Verma
Vs. HDFC Bank Ltd. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 752
pertains to service law and emanating from this Hon’ble High
Court in a Civil Revision. The other citation relied by the
respondent-IREDA, 2013 SCC OnLine SC 564 in the case of
Swastik Gases Private Limited Vs. Indian Oil Corporation
Limited is under the Arbitration Act. Therefore, this Court is of
the opinion that the said two judgments relied by the
respondent-IREDA are not applicable to the facts of the present
case.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India and others
reported in 2020 13 SCC 285 while dealing with the powers of
the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has held as under;
“10 Parties cannot by agreement confer
jurisdiction on a court which lacks the jurisdiction
to adjudicate. But where several courts would have
Patna High Court CWJC No.5965 of 2026(5) dt.11-05-2026
10/18jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the dispute,
they can stipulate that a suit be brought exclusively
before one of the several courts, to the exclusion of
the others. Clause 21 does not oust the jurisdiction
of all courts. Rather, the Appellant and the second
Respondent have agreed to submit suits or legal
actions to the courts at Chennai. So long as the
courts at Chennai have proper jurisdiction over a
dispute involving the Appellant and the second
Respondent, Clause 21 is not in violation of the
principle set out in A B C Laminart. However, the
decision in A B C Laminart was made in the context
of an original suit and the jurisdiction of an
ordinary civil court. The present case is materially
different. The Appellant approached the Bombay
High Court under Article 226. The second
Respondent seeks to rely on Clause 21 to oust the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Bombay.
13. The role of the High Court under the
Constitution is crucial to ensuring the rule of law
throughout its territorial jurisdiction. In order to
achieve these transcendental goals, the powers of
the High Court under its writ jurisdiction are
necessarily broad. They are conferred in aid of
justice. This Court has repeatedly held that no
limitation can be placed on the powers of the High
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In A V
Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v
Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani8 a Constitution
Bench of this Court held that the nature of power
exercised by the High Court under its writ
jurisdiction is inherently dependent on the threat to
the rule of law arising in the case before it:
“”10…We need only add that the
broad lines of the general principles on
which the court should act having been
clearly laid down, their application to the
facts of each particular case must
necessarily be dependent on a variety of
individual facts which must govern the
proper exercise of the discretion of the
Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-
eminently one of discretion, it is not possible
or even if it were, it would not be desirable
to lay down inflexible Rules which should be
Patna High Court CWJC No.5965 of 2026(5) dt.11-05-2026
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comes up before the court.
14. While the powers the High Court
may exercise under its writ jurisdiction are not
subject to strict legal principles, two clear
principles emerge with respect to when a High
Court’s writ jurisdiction may be engaged. First, the
decision of the High Court to entertain or not
entertain a particular action under its writ
jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary.
Secondly, limitations placed on the court’s decision
to exercise or refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction
are selfimposed. It is a well settled principle that the
writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be
completely excluded by statute. If a High Court is
tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the
rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must
necessarily have the power to examine any case
before it and make a determination of whether or
not its writ jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review
under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic
structure of the Constitution.
19. This argument of the second
Respondent is misconceived. The existence of an
alternate remedy, whether adequate or not, does not
alter the fundamentally discretionary nature of the
High Court’s writ jurisdiction and therefore does not
create an absolute legal bar on the exercise of the
writ jurisdiction by a High Court. The decision
whether or not to entertain an action under its writ
jurisdiction remains a decision to be taken by the
High Court on an examination of the facts and
circumstances of a particular case
22. The mere existence of alternate
forums where the aggrieved party may secure relief
does not create a legal bar on a High Court to
exercise its writ jurisdiction. It is a factor to be
taken into consideration by the High Court amongst
several factors. Thus, the mere fact that the High
Court at Madras is capable of granting adequate
relief to the Appellant does not create a legal bar on
the Bombay High Court exercising its writ
jurisdiction in the present matter.
26. In the present case, the Bombay
High Court has relied solely on Clause 21 of the
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12/18Constitution and Bye Laws to hold that its own writ
jurisdiction is ousted. The Bombay High Court has
failed to examine the case holistically and make a
considered determination as to whether or not it
should, in its discretion, exercise its powers under
Article 226. The scrutiny to be applied to every writ
petition under Article 226 by the High Court is a
crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the
Constitution in the relevant territorial jurisdiction.
It is not open to a High Court to abdicate this
responsibility merely due to the existence of a
privately negotiated document ousting its
jurisdiction”
11. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
M/S. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd vs Union Of India And Anr
reported in 2004 6 SCC 254 has held as under;
“12. This Court in Oil & Natural Gas
Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu and Ors. (1994
(4) SCC 711) held that the question as to whether
the court has a territorial jurisdiction to entertain a
writ petition, must be arrived at on the basis of
averments made in the petition, the truth or
otherwise thereof being immaterial.
16. In Union of India v. Adani Exports
Ltd., [(2002) 1 SCC 567] it was held that in order to
confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a
writ petition it must disclose that the integral facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause so as to empower the court to
decide the dispute and the entire or a part of it arose
within its jurisdiction.
18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition
must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can
be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do
with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give
rise to a cause of action which would confer
jurisdiction on the court.
25. When a part of the cause of action
arises within one or the other High Court, it will be
for the petitioner to choose his forum.
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27. When an order, however, is passed
by a court or tribunal or an executive authority
whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise,
a part of cause of action arises at that place.
30. We must, however, remind ourselves
that even if a small part of cause of action arises
within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court,
the same by itself may not be considered to be a
determinative factor compelling the High Court to
decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the
Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum
conveniens.”
12. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd.,
reported in (2023) 7 SCC 791 has held as under;
“14. While dealing with an objection as
to lack of territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition on the ground that the cause of action has
not arisen within its jurisdiction, a High Court
essentially has to arrive at a conclusion on the basis
of the averments made in the petition memo treating
the contents as true and correct.
15. The constitutional mandate of clause
(2) is that the “cause of action”, referred to therein,
must at least arise in part within the territories in
relation to which the High Court exercises
jurisdiction when writ powers conferred by clause
(1) are proposed to be exercised, notwithstanding
that the seat of the Government or authority or the
residence of the person is not within those
territories.
16. However, in the context of a writ
petition, what would constitute such “cause of
action” is the material facts which are imperative
for the writ petitioner to plead and prove to obtain
relief as claimed.
17. Determination of the question as to
whether the facts pleaded constitute a part of the
cause of action, sufficient to attract clause (2) of
Patna High Court CWJC No.5965 of 2026(5) dt.11-05-2026
14/18Article 226 of the Constitution, would necessarily
involve an exercise by the High Court to ascertain
that the facts, as pleaded, constitute a material,
essential or integral part of the cause of action…It,
therefore, follows that the party invoking the writ
jurisdiction has to disclose that the integral facts
pleaded in support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause empowering the High Court to
decide the dispute and that, at least, a part of the
cause of action to move the High Court arose within
its jurisdiction. Such pleaded facts must have a
nexus with the subject-matter of challenge based on
which the prayer can be granted. Those facts which
are not relevant or germane for grant of the prayer
would not give rise to a cause of action conferring
jurisdiction on the court.
21. Assuming that a slender part of the
cause of action did arise within the State of Sikkim,
the concept of forum conveniens ought to have been
considered by the High Court. As held by this Court
in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and
Ambica Industries v. CCE, even if a small part of the
cause of action arises within the territorial
jurisdiction of a High Court, the same by itself could
not have been a determinative factor compelling the
High Court to keep the writ petitions alive against
the appellant to decide the matter qua the impugned
notification, on merit.”
13. Having regard to the law laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned cases, this
Court is of the prima facie opinion that the powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed merely
because, the parties have entered into an agreement and there is
a clause which excludes the jurisdiction of other courts except
the Delhi and New Delhi Civil Courts/ Tribunals. Further, it is to
be noted that the said clause only states that except the Civil
Court and Tribunal of Delhi and New Delhi, the other Courts do
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not have jurisdiction to entertain any suit, however, it does not
in any manner curtail the powers of the other High Courts. This
court is of the opinion that cause of action in the present writ
petition emanates from the State of Bihar, as the petitioner is a
resident of Bihar, the unit is situated in the State of Bihar, land is
allotted in Bihar etc. etc. and therefore, the contention of the
respondent-IREDA that the writ is not maintainable is not
correct.
14. Having regard to the same, this Court is of the
opinion that the present CWJC filed by the petitioner is
maintainable in this High Court under Article 226.
15. That insofar as the main prayer sought for in the
present writ petition is concerned, this Court is of the opinion
that the said prayer cannot be granted as the petitioner is seeking
a direction to the respondent financial institution for disbursal of
the balance loan amounts due to him. This Court is of the
opinion that a mandamus cannot be issued to any financial
institutions to grant a loan, disburse a loan, grant any OTS or
give any direction which may have any kind of financial
implications on the said financial institution. When, how, how
much and what manner a loan has to be given, how much is to
be disbursed, what timeline is to be followed, fixation of the
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repayment schedules, granting of OTS, declaration of the loan
as NPA are within the exclusive domain of the Bank expertise
and it is akeen to a policy decision. Usually the Banks follow a
set rules or guidelines issued by their own Bank or that of the
RBI. The role or interference by the Courts in such manner is
very minimal and mainly confined to any arbitrary action done
contrary to the set rules or guidelines.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena cases has
time and again held that the High Court exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not
interfere with the decisions taken by the financial institutions
which will have any financial implication on the said institution.
Therefore, this Court is not inclined to grant the relief sought for
in the present writ petition.
17. However, it is to be noted that the respondent-
IREDA should practically take into consideration the fact that it
has sanctioned nearly Rs. 122.75 crores to the petitioner’s unit
and disbursed Rs. 110 crores to the petitioner and only the
balance amount of approximately Rs. 10.5 crores needs to be
disbursed. At this stage, it would not be prudent for any
institution to stop the disbursal solely on the misapprehension
that the petitioner has suppressed the order of the Hon’ble High
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Court of Calcutta date 13.04.2025 and executed the
modification of charge on 17.10.2025. This Court after going
through the entire record is of the opinion that there is
absolutely no embargo/ charge on the properties which have
already been charged to the respondent-IREDA and which was
only perfected by way of a modification of charge on
17.10.2025. Neither the order of the Calcutta High Court nor the
subsequent orders of the arbitrator are in existence as on date
and there is no third party injunction/ charge on the properties
which have already been mortgaged to the respondent institution
way back on 27.08.2024. Therefore, the allegation that the
petitioner has suppressed the order passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and arbitrator are completely misconceived and
misplaced.
18. Having regard to the same, this Court is of the
opinion that the respondent-IREDA should reconsider the entire
issue in a proper prospective and take a suitable decision duly
taking into account that 90% of the loan amount has already
been disbursed, that the unit is more than 90% complete, that
the unit is at an advanced stage of completion and will shortly
go into the commercial production etc. etc. Otherwise, it would
be risking the very project and also the loan amounts which
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have already been disbursed. Further, it is to be noted that the
present project is of national importance in view of the current
crisis that the country is going through due to the ongoing Iran
war. The dependence on the ethanol blending of the fuel would
not only save precious foreign currency, conserve fuel but
augment the profits of the oil companies. It is hoped that the
IREDA will take a pragmatic and practical view of the entire
issue and take a suitable decision in the interest of all the
stakeholder including that of IREDA itself. This case should not
turnout to be a classic proverbial case of “Killing the goose that
lays the golden eggs”.
19. With the above direction, the present writ petition
stands disposed of.
20. All pending I.As., if any, are deemed to have been
disposed of.
(A. Abhishek Reddy, J)
Ayush/-
U
