Telangana High Court
M/S. Duet India Hotels (Hyderabad) Pvt … vs Southern Power Distribution Company Of … on 16 July, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
The Hon'ble The Chief Justice Sri Aparesh Kumar Singh
and
The Hon'ble Sri Justice G.M.Mohiuddin
Writ Appeal No.706 of 2026
Dated: 16.07.2026
Between:
M/s. Duet India Hotels (Hyderabad) Pvt. Limited
A company registered under Companies Act, 2013
Having its office at Survey No.27/1 to 27/4 Adjacent Del,
Nanakramguda, Gachibowli, Hyderabad,
Rep. By its Authorised Signatory Mr. Elezar Prakash Pilli
S/o. Pilli Rajendra Prasad
... Appellant
AND
Southern Power Distribution Company of Telangana State Limited,
Represented by its Superintending Engineer (Operation Circle North),
Mint Compound, Hyderabad and another
... Respondents
JUDGMENT:
Heard Mr. V. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
Mr. Srikanth Hariharan, learned counsel for the appellant/writ
petitioner and Mr. N. Sreedhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for
Telangana State Southern Power Distribution Company Limited
(TGSPDCL), appearing for the respondents.
2. By the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2026 rendered in
W.P.No.3757 of 2026, the learned writ Court has dismissed the Writ
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Petition on the finding that there is no illegality in the impugned
demand notice dated 20.08.2025 issued upon the appellant levying an
amount of Rs.2,86,94,175/- (Rs.95,27,524/- principal amount +
Rs.1,91,66,651/- surcharge) and to pay the same within 15 days from
the date of issue of the letter, failing which supply to HT service of the
appellant would be disconnected without further notice.
3. Earlier, the appellant had approached the writ Court in
W.P.No.21683 of 2014 against a demand notice charging three times
the normal tariff for non-production of Occupancy Certificate (OC)
issued by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC).
The learned writ Court vide interim order dated 05.08.2014 directed the
respondent-company not to collect any penal charges in respect of the
electricity connection bearing No.RRN-2669 of the appellant.
However, the respondent-company was not precluded from collecting
regular electricity charges every month. The said Writ Petition was
closed finally by order dated 06.02.2020 recording the submissions of
the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-company that in view
of the interim order passed on 05.08.2014, no further orders are
required to be passed in the Writ Petition. The order dated 06.02.2020
is extracted hereunder:
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“When the matter is taken up for hearing, learned Standing
Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that in view of the interim
order passed on 05.08.2014, no further orders are required to be passed in
this writ petition.
By recording the submission made by the learned Standing
Counsel appearing for the respondents, the writ petition is closed. No order
as to costs.”
4. The respondent-company thereafter has proceeded to issue the
demand notice dated 20.08.2025, which is the subject matter of the
instant W.P.No.3757 of 2026. The respondent-company justified the
demand inter alia on the following grounds:
i) That the penal charges were levied three times the normal tariff for
non-production of OC by the appellant for a period of seven months
from April, 2014 to October, 2014.
ii) That the impugned demand is based upon G.O.Ms.No.86 dated
03.03.2006, issued in terms of Section 108 of the Electricity Act,
2003, which provides that the State Commission shall be guided by
such directions in matters of policy involving public interest as the
State Government may give to it in writing.
iii) That the present Writ Petition is barred by res judicata as
W.P.No.21683 of 2014, wherein similar demand notice impugned by
the appellant was closed without setting aside the said demand
notice. Therefore, the respondent-company was justified in issuing
the demand notice by levying penal charges three times the normal
tariff for the period for which the appellant has failed to produce the
OC from the GHMC.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, on the other
hand, has drawn the attention of this Court to the observations made by
the learned writ Court in the case of another assessee in W.P.No.32906
of 2014 by judgment dated 05.11.2014, wherein a similar challenge to
demand of electricity consumption charges at three times the normal
electricity charges was raised on the ground that the petitioner therein
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has not secured OC from the GHMC. He submits that the writ Court
had held that so long as the licensee under the provisions of the
Electricity Act, 2003, does not amend its supply regulations/conditions
in tune with the Government policy qua levy and collection of tariff
higher than that prescribed under its Regulations, such levy cannot be
legally sustained. Being a licensee, it cannot charge its consumers
higher tariff than what is prescribed by the tariff regulations, approved
by the Regulatory Commission. The learned writ Court had however
before closing the case also observed that power distribution licensee
can insist upon obtaining OC, which is mandatory under Section 455 of
the GHMC Act, 1955 and if the assessee fails to produce such
certificate, it shall be free to disconnect the power supply to him and
terminate the power supply agreement. The respondent-company is also
free to refuse release of power supply to other similarly situated
consumers if they failed to produce OCs within a stipulated time. It is
submitted that this judgment delivered in the case of another assessee
on similar circumstances against the respondent-company binds the
respondent-company and cannot be treated as in personam. It is further
submitted that closure of W.P.No.21683 of 2014 on the submissions of
the learned Standing Counsel for respondent-company would not
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operate as res judicata. None of the issues raised in the said Writ
Petition were decided by the learned writ Court on the submissions of
the respondent-company. Therefore, on issuance of fresh demand
notice, the present Writ Petition has been filed on the ground that the
respondent-company cannot charge penal tariff three times the normal
tariff for the period for which OC could not be produced by the
appellant. Learned writ Court had therefore committed serious error in
not granting relief to the appellant. In support of his submissions on the
issue of res judicata, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a
decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Delhi Development
Authority v. Corporation Bank and others1.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered the
facts and circumstances and the previous proceedings, as also the order
passed in W.P.No.32906 of 2014 by the learned writ Court in similar
circumstances.
7. In the first place, we are of the view that closure of
W.P.No.21683 of 2014 does not operate as res judicata for the
appellant to maintain the present Writ Petition. A plain reading of the
order dated 06.02.2020 passed in W.P.No.21683 of 2014 would show
1
AIR 2025 SC 4583
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that the Writ Petition was closed on the submission of the learned
Standing Counsel for the respondent-company that in view of the
interim order passed on 05.08.2014, no further orders were required to
be passed in the Writ Petition. The impugned demand though was not
quashed, but an impression could be gathered that in view of the
interim order, the respondent-company was not inclined to press for
recovery of penal charges on non-production of OC for a certain period.
In the absence of any determination on the legality of the penal charges
based upon G.O.Ms.No.86 dated 03.03.2006, the challenge to the
impugned demand could not be refused on the principles of res
judicata.
8. In order to appreciate whether the writ petition suffered on
grounds of res judicata, we may also extract Section 11 of CPC which
reads as under:
“Res judicata.- No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the
matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and
substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or
between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating
under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent
suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised,
and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.”
The object of the principles of res judicata as contained in
Section 11 of CPC is to uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment,
as to the points decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in
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every subsequent suit between the same parties. The doctrine of res
judicata is conceived not only in larger public interest which requires
that all litigation must, sooner than later come to an end but is also
founded on equity, justice and good conscience [See Swamy
Atmananda versus Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC
51]. Paragraphs 26 to 28 of the said judgment are extracted hereunder:
“26. The object and purport of the principle of res judicata as
contended in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to
uphold the rule of conclusiveness of judgment, as to the points
decided earlier of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, in every
subsequent suit between the same parties. Once the matter which
was the subject matter of lis stood determined by a competent
court, no party thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a
subsequent litigation. Such a rule was brought into the statute-
book with a view to bring the litigation to an end so that the other
side may not be put to harassment.
27. The principle of res judicata envisages that a judgment of a
court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create
a bar as regards a plea, between the same parties in some other
matter in another court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh
the very point that was determined in the earlier judgment.
28. The doctrine of res judicata is conceived not only in larger
public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than
later, come to an end but is also founded on equity justice and
good conscience.”
9. The principles of res judicata envisages that a judgment of court
of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon a point would create a bar as
regards a plea, between the same parties in some other matter in another
court, where the said plea seeks to raise afresh the very point that was
determined in the earlier judgment. Issues of fact finally determined
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between the parties by a court of competent jurisdiction operate as res
judicata when the same issue comes directly in question in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties. Principles of res judicata apply
in different stages of the same proceedings as between two stages in the
same litigation so that if an issue has been decided at an earlier stage
against a party, it cannot be allowed to be re-agitated by him at a
subsequent stage in the same suit or proceeding. [See Bhanu Kumar
Jain versus Archana Kumar, (2005) 1 SCC 787] Paragraphs 18, 19,
30 to 32 of the same are extracted hereunder:―
“18. It is now well settled that principles of res judicata apply in
different stages of the same proceedings. (See Satyadhyan
Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [AIR 1960 SC 941 : (1960) 3 SCR
590] and Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh [(1987) 1 SCC
727])
19. In Y.B. Patil [(1976) 4 SCC 66] it was held: (SCC p. 68, para
4)
“4. … It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be
invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get
attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order
made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding
at the subsequent stage of that proceeding.”
30. Res judicata debars a court from exercising its jurisdiction to
determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties
whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party.
If such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped
from raising the same in the latter proceeding. The doctrine of res
judicata creates a different kind of estoppel viz. estoppel by
accord.
31. In a case of this nature, however, the doctrine of “issue
estoppel” as also “cause of action estoppels” may arise. In
Thoday Lord Diplock held: (All ER p. 352 B-D)
“……. ’cause of action estoppel’, is that which prevents a party
to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the
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existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence
of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in
previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was
determined to exist i.e. judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged
in the judgment…….. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful
plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estoppel per rem
judicatam”.
32. The said dicta was followed in Barber v. Staffordshire County
Council (1996) 2 All ER 748 (CA). A cause of action estoppel
arises where in two different proceedings identical issues are
raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same
parties shall be dealt with similarly as was done in the previous
proceedings. In such an event the bar is absolute in relation to all
points decided save and except allegation of fraud and collusion.
[See C.(A Minor) v. Hackney London Borough Council,
(1996) 1 All ER 973 : (1996) 1 WLR 789 (CA)].”
10. Therefore, Section 11 of CPC provides that no Court shall try
any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue
has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the
same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them
claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such
subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently
raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
Constructive res judicata which flows out of Explanation IV of Section
11 of CPC deals with grounds of attack and defence which ought to
have been raised but not raised.
11. It is not in dispute that the Electricity Regulatory Commission
has not amended the tariff order to provide collection of higher tariff
than what is prescribed under its regulations on the ground of non-
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production of OC, which is a mandatory requirement under Section 455
of the GHMC Act and would entitle the respondent-company to refuse
power supply or even to disconnect the power supply and terminate the
agreement in respect of an assessee, who fails to produce it within the
stipulated time. Beyond that, if the tariff regulations do not provide for
levying penal charges three times the normal charges for non-
production of OC, such a levy would be without any authority of law.
The learned writ Court has been guided by the order dated 06.02.2020,
passed in W.P.No.21683 of 2014, which in our opinion, did not
determine the issue of legality of levy of penal charges three times the
normal charges. As such, the Writ Petition could not have been held to
be not maintainable on ground of res judicata.
12. In view of the findings recorded hereinabove that mere issuance
of G.O.Ms.No.86 dated 03.03.2006 by the Government, even if
considered to be a policy decision, could not be enforced by the
respondent-company without any corresponding amendment in the
tariff regulations/tariff order by the Electricity Regulatory Commission.
The appellant has obtained the OC on 07.11.2014. However, for a
period of seven months prior to that, the levy of penal charges three
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times the normal tariff raised by the impugned demand could not be
sustained in the eye of law.
13. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order dated 07.07.2026
passed by the learned writ Court in W.P.No.3757 of 2026 is set aside
and the impugned demand notice dated 20.08.2025 is quashed.
14. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is allowed. No costs.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
____________________________
APARESH KUMAR SINGH, CJ
___________________
G.M.MOHIUDDIN, J
Date: 16.07.2026
MD
