Delhi District Court
M/S Amazon Distributors (P) Ltd vs Parveen on 8 June, 2026
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PRAVEEN VS. M/S AMAZON DISTRIBUTORS (P) LTD.
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. 110/2025 &
Criminal Appeal No. 486/2025
In the matter of :-
M/s Amazon Distributors (P) Ltd.
143, Patparganj Industrial Area, Delhi,
through its Authorized Representative
Sh. Bajrang Singh Shekhawat
......Complainant
.....Appellant in CA 110/2025
.....Respondent in CA 486/2025
(represented by Ld. Counsel Ms. Shrishti Talwar, Sh.
Rakesh Kumar, Sh. Ravindra Pal and Ms. Pratima Maharaj)
Versus
Praveen
S/o Sh. Rishi Prakash
R/o 94/1, 1st Floor,
Than Singh Nagar, Anand Parvat,
New Delhi-110005
......Accused/Convict
.....Respondent in CA 110/2025
.....Appellant in CA 486/2025
(represented by Ld. Counsel Sh. H.M. Gauracharya)
IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 110/2025 U/s 415 BNSS
Date of institution : 19.04.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 26.05.2026
Date of Judgment : 08.06.2026
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IN CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 486/2025 U/s 415 BNSS
Date of institution : 06.10.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 26.05.2026
Date of Judgment : 08.06.2026
COMMON JUDGMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The law of negotiable instruments, at its heart, is a law about
reliability. It is built on the premise that a signed cheque, delivered from
one hand to another, carries with it the implicit promise of a solvent
drawer: I stand behind this instrument; when presented, it will be
honoured. That promise, when broken, is not merely a financial
disappointment — it is a breach of the social compact of commerce.
Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was introduced
precisely to address this breach, to place behind the humble cheque
the coercive weight of criminal sanction, and to say to the world of
commerce: the word of a drawer, made tangible in paper and ink and
the stamp of a bank, shall not be lightly repudiated.
1.2. But the genius of Chapter XVII — and particularly of Section 138
NI Act — lies not only in its penal provisions. It lies equally in its
architecture of presumptions. Section 118(a) NI Act presumes, until the
contrary is proved, that every negotiable instrument was made for
consideration. Section 139 NI Act presumes, unless the contrary is
proved, that the holder of the cheque received it for the discharge of any
debt or other liability. These presumptions are not soft suggestions that
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a court may apply at will — they are mandatory, peremptory, and
operate as soon as the execution of the cheque by the accused is
established. They represent Parliament’s considered judgment, upon
decades of experience, that the issuance of a cheque is virtually never
an innocent act, and that he who issues one and then dishonours it must
explain himself.
1.3. The case before this Court is, at its most fundamental, a case about
a man who chose not to explain himself. Not coherently. Not on oath.
Not with any evidence. Not by confronting the documentary evidence
against him. Instead, the accused chose to put forward a story — by
turns fanciful, self-contradictory, and chronologically impossible —
while simultaneously declining to enter the witness box to swear to it.
He chose to press his counsel to attack the complainant’s inability to
produce invoices, while ignoring the colossal elephant in the room: his
own handwritten, witnessed, exhibited, and unchallenged admission
letter, Exhibit CW1/5, in which he told his employer, in unambiguous
terms, that he had committed a fraud and that the seventeen cheques —
drawn from his own accounts and from his wife’s account — were being
issued to discharge that admitted liability.
1.4. Before this Court have come two cross-appeals — one filed by the
complainant Ms. Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd. challenging the order
on sentence dated 22.01.2025, and the other by the convict-accused Sh.
Parveen challenging the judgment of conviction dated 18.12.2024 —
both arising from proceedings in Complaint Case under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, tried by Ld. JMFC NI Act-01,
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PHC, New Delhi. For the reasons set out at length hereinafter, both
appeals are dismissed, subject to a specific modification of the trial
court’s direction on concurrency of in-default imprisonments, which
this Court is constrained to hold is legally untenable and must be
corrected
2. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
2.1. Ms. Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter “the complainant
company”) is a private limited company incorporated under the
Companies Act and engaged in the distribution of products of Kellogg’s
and P&G. The accused, Sh. Parveen, was admittedly employed by the
complainant company as a Sales Executive with effect from 06.10.2018
at a monthly salary of Rs. 14,559/-. His appointment letter is exhibited
as Ex. CW1/4 (OSR), and the accused himself admitted this document
when his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded. His job
description was clear and limited: to get orders from customers, ensure
delivery of booked goods to customers, collect payment from
customers, and deposit payments with the complainant company. This
is the admitted backdrop against which the fraud unfolded.
2.2. The modus operandi of the fraud. According to the case of the
complainant — which is substantially admitted in the confession of the
accused himself — the accused, in league with co-employees Ms.
Megha, Mr. Rajeev Saini, Mr. Anil Goel, and Mr. Chintu Giri, embarked
on a systematic scheme of fraud. The scheme operated in interlocking
steps:
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A) Step 1: The accused would book fictitious orders in the names of
different customers — orders that no customer had in fact placed.
B) Step 2: Pursuant to these fictitious orders, the complainant company
would generate invoices and dispatch goods, which the accused
would divert to his own godown rather than deliver to the customers.
C) Step 3: To create the appearance of legitimate delivery, the accused
would affix forged rubber stamps of the customers on the invoices
of delivered goods — stamps he had procured or fabricated —
thereby making it appear that the goods had been received by the
customers.
D) Step 4: When the fictitious credit period expired and the complainant
company expected to receive cheques from the ostensible customers,
the accused would produce his own personal cheques and his wife
Smt. Sushma’s cheques, bearing the forged stamps of the customers
on their reverse, thus substituting himself and his wife for the
customers in the chain of payment.
2.3. By this scheme, the accused defalcated from the complainant
company a total sum of Rs. 22,24,019/-. More significantly — and this
is the fact upon which this judgment shall return repeatedly — the
accused himself, in his own handwriting, in the admission letter dated
07.07.2019 (Exhibit CW1/5), acknowledged that he had cheated a sum
of Rs. 23,64,091/-, out of which goods worth Rs. 2,23,000/- were
recovered.
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2.4. In partial discharge of the aforesaid admitted liability, the accused
issued cheque bearing No. 000033, dated 08.07.2019, for a sum of
Rs. 93,273/- (Rupees Ninety Three Thousand Two Hundred and
Seventy-Three only) drawn on Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd., 51/1, D.B.
Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-110005, in favour of the
complainant company (Ex. CW1/6). When this cheque was presented
for encashment at Citi Bank, DLF Capital Point, Baba Kharak Singh
Marg, New Delhi, it was returned dishonoured vide cheque return
memo dated 16.07.2019 (Ex. CW1/7) with the unambiguous remark:
“Funds Insufficient.”
2.5. Upon dishonour, the complainant company issued a legal demand
notice under Section 138 NI Act (Ex. CW1/9 (Colly)), which was duly
served upon the accused. The postal receipts and courier receipts stand
as Ex. CW1/10 (Colly). The accused, in his statement under Section
251 Cr.P.C. as well as in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement, admitted
that his address was correctly mentioned in the notice. No payment was
made within the statutory period of fifteen days from service of the
notice. Consequently, the complainant company filed a complaint under
Section 138 NI Act.
2.6. The gravity of the present case is best appreciated in its full context.
The complainant company filed a total of 17 complaint cases under
Section 138 NI Act against the accused Sh. Parveen and his wife Smt.
Sushma in connection with 17 dishonoured cheques aggregating to
approximately Rs. 22 lacs. The cheques were drawn both from accounts
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held in the name of Sh. Parveen and from accounts in the name of his
wife, Smt. Sushma.
3. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
3.1. Pre-summoning stage: The complaint was filed before the competent
Magistrate supported by a pre-summoning affidavit of Sh. Bajrang
Singh Shekhawat, Finance Manager and Authorised Representative
(AR) of the complainant company. Upon prima facie consideration of
the pre-summoning evidence, the accused was summoned.
3.2. Notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. — 23.01.2023: Upon the
appearance of the accused, notice under Section 251 Cr.P.C. was served
upon him on 23.01.2023. The accused pleaded not guilty and stated his
defence in the following terms:
“The cheque in question belongs to me and bears my signatures. No other
particular on the cheque in question has been filled by me. It was issued as a
blank signed security cheque in favour of the complainant company when I
was appointed as sales executive of the complainant company. My task was
to pick up the order from the market/shopkeepers and deliver the same to the
complainant. I had duly complied with the same and given all the
orders/goods to the complainant company and hence, I do not owe any
liability towards them. The fact of dishonour of the cheque is within my
knowledge. I did not receive the legal demand notice, however, my address
has been correctly mentioned therein. The complainant company has also kept
my Activa scooty with them as security which they are not releasing despite
repeated requests.”
This statement at the Section 251 stage is important for several reasons
that this Court shall address in detail. It is the first formal articulation
of the defence of the accused, and it shall be compared carefully with
his subsequent statements and with the documentary evidence on
record.
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3.3. Admission and Denial under Section 294 Cr.P.C. — 23.01.2023: On
the same date, admission and denial of documents under Section 294
Cr.P.C. was conducted. The accused made the following statement:
“Without prejudice to my other defence and contentions which can be raised
during the course of trial and other proceedings, I do not dispute the
genuineness and correctness of the cheque in question and bank return memo.
Rest of the documents are denied. I further have no objection if the witnesses
at serial no. 2 & 3 are dropped as a witness from the list of witnesses.”
Three things are of critical evidentiary significance in this statement:
A) The accused admitted the cheque (Ex. CW1/6) and bank return
memo (Ex. CW1/7). This admission triggers the mandatory statutory
presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act.
B) The accused denied “rest of the documents” — which would include
Ex. CW1/5, the admission letter. However, this denial was without
prejudice and before the examination-in-chief. Crucially, when Ex.
CW1/5 was later produced in original before the court and tendered
in evidence by CW-1, no objection to its exhibition was raised by
the defence. The document was duly exhibited as Ex. CW1/5 (OSR)
— and the denial at the Section 294 stage, without any subsequent
challenge to its exhibition, is of no avail to the accused.
C) The accused raised no suggestion whatsoever — at this stage or at
any subsequent stage during the cross-examination of CW-1 — that
Ex. CW1/5 was signed under coercion.
3.4. Examination-in-chief of CW-1: The AR of the complainant
company, Sh. Bajrang Singh Shekhawat, Finance Manager, appeared
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before the court and tendered his post-summoning evidence by way of
affidavit (Ex. CW1/X). He relied upon the following documents:
A) Complaint — Ex. CW1/Y.
B) Certificate of Incorporation — Ex. CW1/1 (OSR).
C) Board Resolution/Minutes of Meeting — Ex. CW1/2.
D) Copy of DL of AR — Ex. CW1/3 (OSR).
E) Appointment letter of accused — Ex. CW1/4 (OSR)(Colly).
F) Admission letter dated 07.07.2019 — Ex. CW1/5 (OSR).
[PIVOTAL DOCUMENT]
G) Original cheque — Ex. CW1/6.
H) Bank return memo — Ex. CW1/7.
I) Police complaints — de-exhibited, Mark CW1/8 (Colly).
J) Legal demand notice — Ex. CW1/9 (Colly).
K) Postal/courier receipts — Ex. CW1/10 (Colly).
L) Tracking report — de-exhibited, Mark CW1/11.
It must be noted, and noted with emphasis, that Ex. CW1/5 — the
admission letter dated 07.07.2019 — was produced in original before
the court, was duly exhibited, and no objection to its exhibition was
raised by the defence counsel Sh. H.M. Gauracharya, who was present
throughout.
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3.5. Cross-examination of CW-1: The cross-examination of Sh. Bajrang
Singh Shekhawat commenced on 03.08.2023 and was conducted
extensively by Ld. Counsel for the accused, Sh. H.M. Gauracharya. The
following material admissions were elicited and the following positions
were put:
A) The AR admitted: “No allegedly fake invoice/order is on record.”
[He immediately volunteered: “It is wrong to suggest that no fake
invoice/order is on record as the accused never placed such an order
against which a fake invoice was generated.”]
B) The AR admitted: “It is correct that the fake invoices have been
mentioned while filing the GST return.” He was then asked to
produce the GST return records but stated he would need to check
and revert.
C) The AR stated: “We maintain the records of our salesman. Our
company used to take written orders from the customers and the
goods were supplied thereafter. We have not received written
purchase order from the accused.” He then explained that orders
were placed through an invoice diary and processed online.
D) The AR admitted: “We do not maintain specific stock/inventory
register regarding the accused.”
E) The AR admitted: “We had maintained separate ledger qua the
accused.”
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F) When asked to tell the particular invoice against which the cheque
in question was issued, the AR replied: “I cannot tell. I will have to
check the record and revert back on the NDOH.”
G) When asked to produce relevant invoices, the AR stated he could
check and revert on the NDOH.
H) The cross-examination was then deferred for want of GST return
records and invoices.
This Court pauses here to note, most emphatically, that throughout
the entire cross-examination of 03.08.2023 — despite the extensive
and vigorous questioning — not a single question was put to CW-1
regarding Exhibit CW1/5. Not a word. Not an oblique reference. Not
a suggestion that this document was obtained by keeping the accused
in the office till midnight. Not a suggestion that it was signed under
coercion or pressure. The entire cross-examination was directed
elsewhere.
3.6. On the Second date of cross-examination of CW-1 — 16.09.2023,
the following material evidence emerged:
A) “It is correct that the payment against the goods delivered is made
after the delivery.”
B) “There is no register/record maintained by the complainant
company for the goods delivered on day to day basis.”
C) “It is correct that no details regarding the particular invoice against
which the cheque in question has been disclosed in the complaint.”
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D) “The complainant company had duly verified the stamp on the
cheque in question with the concerned firm which had intimated us
that the said stamps were fake.” [When asked for the names of the
employees of those firms, he stated he would need to check the
record.]
E) “The invoices have been generated in the name of concerned firms
whose stamps are affixed on each cheque in question.”
F) “I could not produce the GST return record and invoices against
the cheque in question as the office of the complainant company is
in the process of relocation.”
G) “The Activa two-wheeler (DL-6SAU-6094 Majestic brown colour)
owned by the accused was left by him in the premises of the
complainant company and is still parked there. (Vol. Accused
never came to take back his vehicle.)”
H) “Within 2-3 days of coming to know about the fraud committed by
the accused, we had lodged a complaint at PS Dwarka.”
Again, and this Court emphasises it for the second time: throughout
the entire cross-examination of 16.09.2023, there is not a single
question to CW-1 about Exhibit CW1/5. Not one.
3.7. CW-1 was recalled a third time for his cross examination and the
following material admissions/denials were recorded:
A) The AR admitted that a complaint bearing DD No. 46B dated
11.07.2019 was filed by him on behalf of the complainant company
against the accused.
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B) “It is wrong to suggest that the complaint was filed by me without
any ground or sufficient cause.”
C) “It is wrong to suggest that when the accused was kept on
employment, the complainant company had got a separate account
opened in the name of the accused and has taken cheques drawn on
the same account with the promise that when the accused will
leave the employment, the cheques will be returned back to him.”
D) “It is wrong to suggest that the accused has honestly rendered his
service to the complainant company.”
E) “It is correct that the scooty (Honda Activa) of the accused is lying
within the complainant’s custody at Uttam Nagar Branch. (Vol. The
accused has never come to take over the possession of the said
vehicle.)”
F) “It is wrong to suggest that the complainant company has misused
the cheque in question against the accused.”
G) “It is wrong to suggest that I am deposing falsely.”
The evidence of CW-1 was thereafter closed on 19.07.2024.
And again, for the third time, there is not one question, not one
suggestion, not one challenge to Exhibit CW1/5. The entire cross-
examination, spread over three dates spanning almost a year, is
utterly silent on the most important document in the case.
3.8. Statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. read with Section 281 Cr.P.C.
— 18.09.2024: All the incriminating evidence was put to the accused
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and he was asked to explain it. His statement, recorded without oath, is
of extraordinary importance and must be reproduced in material part:
“I was the Sales Executive of the complainant company. I admit my
appointment letter which is Ex.CW1/4. My duties were only to get orders
from the customers. My duties did not include delivery of goods and
collection of payment.
The cheque in question belongs to me and bears my signature. No other
particular apart from the signatures have been filled by me. It was issued as
a blank signed security cheque at the inception of business relationship
between the parties with a promise that the cheques will be returned back to
me at the end of the business relationship. I do not owe any liability to the
tune of the cheque amount towards the complainant. The fact of dishonour
of the cheque is within my knowledge. I did not receive the legal demand
notice, however, my address mentioned therein is correct.
Ex.CW1/5 was written by me under coercion and pressure imposed by the
complainant. I was made to stay back in the office of the complainant till 12
in the night. I was also made to sign on some blank papers.
Q2. Do you wish to lead DE? Ans. No.”
3.9. No defence evidence led: After the closure of the complainant’s
evidence, the accused was given the opportunity to lead defence
evidence. He declined. He did not enter the witness box. He did not
produce a single document. He did not summon a single witness. The
case was posted for final arguments.
3.10. Final Arguments and Judgment: Final arguments were heard and
vide judgment dated 18.12.2024, the Ld. Trial Court convicted Sh.
Parveen under Section 138 NI Act. The matter was then posted for
arguments on sentence. Vide order on sentence dated 22.01.2025, the
Ld. Trial Court directed the accused to pay a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh and Twenty Thousand only) to the complainant as
compensation within 90 days under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., with default
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imprisonment of 04 months, directed to run concurrently across all 16
connected cases.
4. THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON SENTENCE
4.1. The Conviction — Judgment dated 18.12.2024
A) The Ld. Trial Court set out the six essential ingredients of Section
138 NI Act with precision: (1) drawing of the cheque by the accused;
(2) the cheque being drawn on an account maintained by the
accused; (3) issuance of the cheque for discharge of a legally
enforceable debt or liability; (4) presentment for encashment; (5)
dishonour with the relevant endorsement; and (6) failure to pay
within 15 days of service of a legal demand notice.
B) The Ld. Trial Court noted the admission of signatures by the
accused, which automatically triggered the presumptions under
Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act, citing Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar,
(2019) 4 SCC 197.
C) After a comprehensive analysis of all evidence, the Ld. Trial Court,
in a key finding at para 30 of the judgment, observed:
“There is nothing placed on record by the accused to show as to how
several cheques almost 17 in number were given as security cheques to
the complainant. Further there is nothing proved by accused to rebut that
the alleged cheating/fraud was not committed by the accused. The
accused has also failed to examine persons mentioned by the
complainant as co-conspirators in order to prove his case. The accused
has also not put on record anything to show that he has complained
about the alleged misuse of the cheque in question by the complainant.
With regard to the admission letter which is Ex CW1/5, the accused has
only made a vague assertion that it was signed by him under coercion
and undue pressure of the complainant but he has failed to lead any
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cogent evidence as to why he remained silent and not made any
complaint after such conduct of the complainant.”
D) At para 31, the Ld. Trial Court recorded its conclusion:
“The entire defence of the accused is nothing but a set of bald, vague
and self-contradictory assertions put together which are unsubstantiated
by any cogent or reliable evidence. His oral assertions stand rebutted by
documentary evidence brought forth on behalf of the complainant.”
E) At para 32-33, the Ld. Trial Court concluded:
“Consequently, this court has come to an irresistible conclusion that
the accused has failed to rebut the mandatory presumptions as per law
and tilt the scales in his favour, even on a scale of preponderance of
probabilities, while the complainant has clearly succeeded in proving
his case beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
this court finds the accused Parveen S/o Sh. Rishi Prakash guilty of the
offence under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and
convicts him accordingly.”
4.2. The Order on Sentence — 22.01.2025
A) Vide order on sentence dated 22.01.2025, after hearing arguments
from both sides, the Ld. Trial Court imposed a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh and Twenty Thousand only) to be paid to the
complainant as compensation within 90 days under Section 357(3)
Cr.P.C., relying upon R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260; Meters
& Instruments Pvt. Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, (2018) 1 SCC 560; and P.
Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258. No
substantive imprisonment was imposed. Default imprisonment of 04
months was prescribed, with the direction that the same shall run
concurrently in all 16 connected cases.
B) Against this judgment and order on sentence, both the present
appeals have been filed.
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5. THE TWO CROSS-APPEALS
As this Court has already noted, two appeals stand before it — both
directed against the aforesaid judgment and order on sentence — one by
each party. The complainant says the punishment is too lenient and the
conviction too mild in its consequences. The convict says the conviction
itself is wrong. This Court takes them up seriatim.
6. APPLICATIONS FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY — ALLOWED IN
BOTH APPEALS
6.1. The limitation period for filing a criminal appeal under Section 415
BNSS (corresponding to Section 374 Cr.P.C.) is 30 days from the date
of the order appealed against. Both appeals have been filed with a delay
for which applications under Section 430 BNSS have been preferred.
6.2. The complainant’s application for condonation of delay explains that
the certified copy of the order was applied for on 15.02.2025 and was
delivered on 27.02.2025. The period from the date of application for the
certified copy to its delivery is therefore liable to be excluded under the
relevant provisions of limitation law, and the residual delay, if any, is
minimal and explicable.
6.3. As regards the accused’s appeal, the delay is similarly explainable in
the context of obtaining legal advice and a certified copy of the order.
6.4. It is settled law that in criminal matters, courts must adopt a justice-
oriented approach to the question of condonation of delay. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC
123, reiterated that refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
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matter being thrown out at the very threshold, causing injustice to the
parties. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107,
the principle was stated as follows: “The purpose of providing a
period of limitation is to compel the applicant to seek remedy without
delay. It was never intended that the court, while being just to the
successful party, should be unjust to the party who has not been able
to approach the court on account of some difficulty.” The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further held that ordinarily, a mistake of counsel or party
ought not to be visited upon the litigant.
6.5. In the present case, this Court finds sufficient cause for the delay in
both appeals. The applications for condonation of delay in both appeals
are accordingly allowed. The delay is condoned and both appeals are
admitted for hearing on merits.
7. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 110/2025 — THE COMPLAINANT’S
APPEAL — ITS PARTIAL MAINTAINABILITY AND MERITS
7.1. The Prayer and the Scope of the Complainant’s Appeal
The prayer in the complainant’s appeal is specific: it seeks setting aside
of the order on sentence dated 22.01.2025 and prays that the accused be
punished “with rigorous maximum imprisonment as provided for the
offence and double of the cheque amount.” The complainant’s grounds
of appeal can be summarised as:
A) The accused is a habitual offender, convicted in all 16 connected
cases, and no imprisonment has been awarded.
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B) The deterrent purpose of Section 138 NI Act demands imprisonment
for a person who has orchestrated such a large-scale systematic
fraud.
C) The direction for concurrent running of in-default imprisonment is
against the provisions of Section 31 Cr.P.C., as the cases are separate
trials.
D) If the accused chooses to undergo 04 months of default
imprisonment rather than pay the fine in all 16 cases, the appellant
would suffer irreparable loss.
E) The prayer for maximum rigorous imprisonment is thus the core of
the appeal.
7.2. The Legal Framework — Section 372 Cr.P.C. / Section 413 BNSS
A) The question of maintainability is the threshold that must be crossed
before merits can be examined. Section 372 Cr.P.C. provides that no
appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court
except as provided for by the Code. The proviso to Section 372, as
also the corresponding proviso to Section 413 BNSS, reads:
“Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against
any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a
lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation.”
B) The three grounds upon which a victim may appeal are thus
exhaustively specified:
i. acquittal of the accused;
ii. conviction for a lesser offence; and
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iii. imposition of inadequate compensation.
C) The right to challenge inadequate substantive sentence — i.e.,
imprisonment — is conspicuously absent from this list. This absence
is deliberate. The Legislature has vested the power to seek
enhancement of sentence in the State Government, exercisable under
Section 377 Cr.P.C. (Section 419 BNSS). The victim has no such
right.
7.3. The Authoritative Position of Law
A) The Hon’ble Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, in Pravinder
Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11508
decided on 27.11.2019, categorically held that an appeal by the
victim under Section 372 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable if it challenges
the order on sentence on the ground that it imposes inadequate
punishment (as distinct from inadequate compensation).
B) The Hon’ble Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, as affirmed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parvinder Kansal v. State of NCT of
Delhi, AIR 2020 SC 4044, settled the law definitively. The relevant
observations are to the effect that:
i. The proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. grants the victim a narrow,
defined right of appeal.
ii. The three grounds in the proviso are exhaustive.
iii. Challenging the inadequacy of punishment/sentence falls outside
the victim’s right of appeal under Section 372.
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iv. The State’s right to seek enhancement of sentence under Section
377 Cr.P.C. is distinct from, and cannot be substituted for, the
victim’s right under Section 372.
C) The corresponding provision under BNSS, Section 413, reproduces
the same proviso verbatim. The legal position is therefore equally
applicable under the BNSS.
D) Decision on Maintainability — and the Exceptional Maintainability
as to Compensation
i. Applying the above-stated position of law, this Court holds that
the appeal filed by the complainant is NOT MAINTAINABLE to
the extent it seeks enhancement of substantive sentence or
imposition of rigorous imprisonment. The prayer as framed —
seeking “rigorous maximum imprisonment” — falls squarely
outside the three grounds enumerated in the proviso to Section
372 Cr.P.C./Section 413 BNSS.
ii. However, the appeal is MAINTAINABLE to the limited extent it
may be construed as challenging the adequacy of compensation.
The proviso expressly and unambiguously preserves the right of
the victim to appeal against “imposition of inadequate
compensation.” In a Section 138 NI Act case, the fine imposed
under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. as compensation is precisely the
kind of “compensation” that the proviso contemplates.
iii. To this limited extent, the appeal is entertainable. The question is
whether the compensation awarded is inadequate.
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E) On the Merits of Compensation — No Interference Warranted
i. The Ld. Trial Court imposed compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/-
(Rupees One Lakh and Twenty Thousand only) in the present
case, relating to a cheque of Rs. 93,273/-. The compensation of
Rs. 1.20 lakhs is within the range of reason.
ii. The object of compensation under Section 357 Cr.P.C. is
restitution — to make the complainant whole insofar as possible.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC
260, underscored that the primary purpose of Section 138 NI Act
is restitutive and compensatory. In Meters & Instruments Pvt.
Ltd. v. Kanchan Mehta, (2018) 1 SCC 560, the Court further
reinforced the compensatory dimension, holding that the object
is to compensate the payee.
iii. The complainant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed — it is not
maintainable insofar as it seeks enhancement of substantive
sentence, and on the question of adequacy of compensation, this
Court finds no ground to interfere with the Ld. Trial Court’s order.
7.4. Illegality Of Concurrent In-Default Imprisonment
A) Before proceeding to consider the accused’s appeal, this Court is
constrained to take up a specific and fundamental illegality in the
order on sentence that must be corrected irrespective of the outcome
of the appeals. This is a matter of law that goes to the correctness of
the order, and this Court’s appellate jurisdiction necessarily
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encompasses the correction of such legal errors, whether or not
specifically raised by the parties.
B) The Ld. Trial Court, in its order on sentence dated 22.01.2025, after
imposing a fine, directed:
“…in default of payment of the above stated fine, convict shall undergo
simple imprisonment for 04 months. The default imprisonment shall
run concurrently in CC No. 7589/2019, 12769/2019, 12770/2019,
12898/2019, 12899/2019, 12917/2019, 12918/2019, 12919/2019,
13119/2019, 13120/2019, 13121/2019, 13122/2019, 13123/2019,
13124/2019, 14643/2019, 14644/2019.”
C) The Error: The direction that in-default imprisonments shall run
concurrently across 16 separate and distinct cases is contrary to law.
The provisions governing concurrency of sentences — Section 427
Cr.P.C. (Section 468 BNSS) — apply to substantive sentences of
imprisonment awarded upon conviction. In-default imprisonment
for non-payment of fine is an entirely distinct creature of law,
governed by Section 64 IPC (Section 63 BNS). It is not a substantive
sentence; it is a coercive mechanism, a statutory whip that comes
into play only upon the accused’s failure to pay the specific fine in a
specific case.
D) The Rationale: The logic is inescapable. Suppose the accused is
convicted in 16 cases and a fine is imposed in each. Upon non-
payment of each fine, he is liable to undergo default imprisonment
in each case. If the in-default imprisonments are permitted to run
concurrently, then by undergoing a single period of 04 months, the
accused simultaneously “satisfies” all 16 defaults — but the fines in
15 out of 16 cases remain entirely unpaid. The complainant, who is
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entitled to compensation in each of those 15 cases, receives nothing.
The provision for fine/compensation in 15 cases becomes a dead
letter. This is manifestly absurd, contrary to the legislative intent of
Section 138 NI Act, and cannot be what the law contemplates.
E) The Legal Position: The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held
in unequivocal terms that imprisonment in default of payment of fine
cannot be directed to run concurrently because such default
sentences are not substantive sentences for the purpose of Section
427 Cr.P.C. Each in-default imprisonment is the enforcement
consequence of a distinct unpaid fine in a distinct case. The
satisfaction of one does not, and legally cannot, satisfy the others.
F) It is pertinent to also note Ground (vi) of the complainant’s appeal,
which specifically raised this issue:
“The Ld. Trial Court has punished the accused in case of default of
payment of ordered amount for a period of 4 months and that too to run
concurrently in all 16 cases which is against the provisions of Section 31
of Cr.P.C which specifically dealt with: ‘Sentence in cases of conviction
of several offences at one trial’.”
G) The complainant’s counsel has correctly identified the error in the
approach adopted in the impugned order. Section 31 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 6 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) applies only when an
accused is convicted of two or more offences at one trial. In the
present matter, there were 16 separate complaint cases that were
tried separately. Consequently, Section 31 Cr.P.C. / Section 6 BNSS
has no application even to the substantive sentences, much less to
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the sentences of imprisonment imposed in default of payment of
fine.
H) Even in a case where multiple offences are tried together in a single
trial, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively settled the legal
position that sentences of imprisonment in default of payment of fine
cannot be directed to run concurrently. The principle enunciated in
Sharad Hiru Kolambe v. State of Maharashtra 2018 INSC 852,
squarely applies. The relevant portions of the said judgment are
reproduced below for ready reference:
“…We make it clear that the direction regarding concurrent running of
sentence shall be limited to the substantive sentence only. The sentence
which the Appellant has been directed to undergo in default of
payment of fine/compensation shall not be affected by this direction. We
do so because the provisions of Section 427 Code of Criminal Procedure
do not, in our opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running of
the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in default of payment
of fine/compensation.”
I) From paragraph 13 of the judgment:
“If the term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is a penalty
which a person incurs on account of non-payment of fine and is not a
sentence in strict sense, imposition of such default sentence is
completely different and qualitatively distinct from a substantive
sentence. … Theoretically, if the default sentences awarded in respect of
imposition of fine in connection with two or more offences are to be
clubbed or directed to run concurrently, there would not be any occasion
for the persons so sentenced to deposit the fine in respect of the second
or further offences. It would effectively mean imposition of one single
or combined sentence of fine. Such an exercise would render the very
idea of imposition of fine with a deterrent stipulation while awarding
sentence in default of payment of fine to be meaningless. … It is
precisely for this reason that unlike Sections 31 and 427 of the Code,
which specifically empower the concerned court to direct concurrent
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running of substantive sentences, Section 64 of the Indian Penal Code
does not stipulate such discretion. The language of said Section 64 rather
mandates that the sentence awarded for non-payment of fine
‘imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he
may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a
commutation of a sentence’. Similar is the intent in Sections 30, 428 and
429(2) of the Code as discussed above. The rigour of the provisions is
such that even if a person gets the benefit of commutation of a sentence,
the sentence in default of payment of fine shall be in excess or in
addition.”
J) The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the rigour of the
statutory provisions (Sections 64 IPC, 30, 428 and 429(2) Cr.P.C.) is
such that the default sentence is required to be undergone in excess
of or in addition to the substantive sentence. The Full Bench decision
of the Madras High Court in Donatus Tony Ikwanusi v. The
Investigating Officer, NCB, (2013) 1 MWN (Cr.) 175 (FB), holding
that there cannot be concurrent running of more than one default
sentence, was also approved.
K) In view of the settled position of law laid down in Sharad Hiru
Kolambe (supra), the sentences of imprisonment in default of
payment of fine imposed in each of the 16 separate complaint cases
shall run consecutively. The aggregate period of such default
imprisonment shall be the sum total of the default periods awarded
in respect of each individual case. No direction for concurrent
running of the default sentences is legally permissible.
L) Modification: Accordingly, the direction of the Ld. Trial Court that
the in-default imprisonment of 04 months shall run concurrently in
all 16 connected cases is SET ASIDE AND MODIFIED. The in-
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default imprisonment of 04 months in each case shall run
CONSECUTIVELY and not concurrently. Each in-default
imprisonment of 04 months is referable to the non-payment of the
specific fine in its respective case, and shall be served out separately,
one after the other. If the fine in any case is paid, the corresponding
in-default imprisonment for that case is discharged. But the in-
default imprisonment in one case cannot discharge the obligation to
pay the fine — and thus cannot discharge the in-default
imprisonment — in any other case.
8. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 486/2025 — THE ACCUSED’S APPEAL —
DISMISSED ON MERITS
8.1. Standard of Review in Appellate Proceedings
A) Before marshalling the evidence, this Court notes the settled position
on the scope of appellate review. An appellate court does not hear
the matter de novo. It examines whether the trial court has: (a)
correctly identified the applicable law; (b) correctly appreciated the
evidence; (c) drawn correct inferences from admitted or proved
facts; and (d) arrived at a conclusion that is not perverse or against
the weight of evidence. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007)
4 SCC 415, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that while the
appellate court has full power to review the evidence, it must bear in
mind that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the
witnesses, and should not interfere with findings merely because it
would have weighed the evidence differently.
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B) Applying this standard, this Court has carefully reviewed the entire
evidence and finds the conclusion of the Ld. Trial Court to be not
only correct but compelling and irresistible. If anything, the
evidence against the accused is stronger and more decisive than the
trial court’s restrained language suggests.
8.2. The Marshalling Of Evidence
This Court now proceeds to marshal all the evidence — for and against
the accused — systematically, before returning a finding.
A) Evidence for the Prosecution (Complainant)
i. Exhibit CW1/4 — Appointment Letter: The appointment letter of
the accused as Sales Executive of the complainant company is
exhibited as Ex. CW1/4 (OSR). The accused himself admitted
this document in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement: “I admit my
appointment letter which is Ex.CW1/4.” This establishes beyond
doubt the employment relationship and the fiduciary duties
imposed upon the accused.
ii. Exhibit CW1/5 — The Admission Letter dated 07.07.2019 —
The Cornerstone
(a) This is the document upon which this judgment, and the entire
prosecution case, substantially rests. It deserves the most
careful attention.
(b) Ex. CW1/5 is a letter dated 07.07.2019 — exactly a day before
the cheque in the present case (dated 08.07.2019) was issued.
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In this letter, written in the handwriting of the accused, signed
before witnesses, the accused admitted that:
ï‚· He had committed a fraud upon the complainant company;
ï‚· He was liable to pay the amount specified therein;
(c) The juridical status of Ex. CW1/5: Five distinct legal
propositions converge to establish the unimpeachable status
of this document:
ï‚· Produced in original: The document was produced in
original (OSR) before the court. There is therefore no
question of it being a copy or fabrication.
ï‚· No objection to exhibition: When Ex. CW1/5 was tendered
in evidence and exhibited by CW-1 on 03.08.2023, the
defence raised no objection to its exhibition. A document
produced in original before a court and exhibited without
any objection is proved both as to its existence and its
contents.
ï‚· No challenge in cross-examination: The entire cross-
examination of CW-1 — spanning three dates (03.08.2023,
16.09.2023, and 19.07.2024) and running to several pages
of court record — does not contain a single question,
suggestion, or challenge relating to Ex. CW1/5. This
silence is thunderous. Under the Rule in Browne v. Dunn
(1893) 6 R 67 (HL), as applied consistently by Indian
courts including in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Mukesh, (2017)
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6 SCC 1, and Rajendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2011) 15
SCC 312, a party who intends to contradict a witness or
challenge the genuineness of a document put in evidence
by that witness must put that challenge to the witness in
cross-examination. The failure to do so is equivalent to an
acceptance of the document and its contents. The accused’s
failure to suggest to CW-1 that Ex. CW1/5 was obtained
by coercion is thus a binding concession that no such
coercion occurred.
ï‚· Coercion plea — first raised in Section 313 Cr.P.C.
statement: The accused raised the plea of coercion in
relation to Ex. CW1/5 for the first and only time in his
Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement recorded on 18.09.2024 —
that is, after the entire evidence had been recorded, after
the cross-examination had concluded, and after the
prosecution had been irreversibly deprived of any
opportunity to address, challenge, or rebut this specific
claim. A plea of coercion that surfaces for the first time in
a Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement, with no antecedent
suggestion to the prosecution witness, no complaint filed,
no FIR lodged, and no contemporaneous correspondence,
is entitled to no weight. Section 313 Cr.P.C. provides an
opportunity to the accused to explain circumstances that
appear against him — not to introduce new theories of
defence that were never put to the prosecution witnesses.
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ï‚· Accused never entered the witness box: Not only did the
accused fail to challenge the coercion claim during cross-
examination of CW-1, he also never chose to enter the
witness box and state on oath that the document was signed
under coercion. A plea of coercion in respect of a signed
document — with the seriousness of the allegation
(detention till midnight, forced signatures on blank papers)
— is not a plea that can survive without being sworn to.
The accused, by declining to enter the witness box despite
a specific invitation to do so (Q2 of the Section 313
statement, to which he answered “No”), effectively chose
not to testify to the very facts upon which his entire
defence rested. An unsworn assertion in a Section 313
statement, without corroboration of any kind, without any
complaint, without any evidence of detention, is entitled to
no evidentiary weight.
iii. Exhibit CW1/6 — The Original Cheque: The original cheque
bearing No. 000033, dated 08.07.2019, for Rs. 93,273/-, drawn
on Kotak Mahindra Bank, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, stands
exhibited as Ex. CW1/6. The accused admitted the genuineness
and correctness of the cheque in his Section 294 Cr.P.C.
statement. He further admitted in his Section 313 Cr.P.C.
statement: “The cheque in question belongs to me and bears my
signature.” The execution of the cheque is thus not in dispute.
Upon this admission, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and
139 NI Act operate with full force.
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iv. Exhibit CW1/7 — Bank Return Memo: The bank return memo,
endorsing the reason for dishonour as “Payment stopped by
drawer,” is exhibited as Ex. CW1/7. The accused admitted its
genuineness at the Section 294 Cr.P.C. stage. The fact and reason
of dishonour are thus admitted.
v. Exhibits CW1/9 and CW1/10 — Demand Notice and Service:
The legal demand notice (Ex. CW1/9 (Colly)) was issued and
served upon the accused. The postal and courier receipts are Ex.
CW1/10 (Colly). The tracking report (Mark CW1/11) confirms
service. In his Section 251 Cr.P.C. statement as well as in his
Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement, the accused admitted: “I did not
receive the legal demand notice, however, my address mentioned
therein is correct.” Upon this admission of the correctness of the
address, the presumption of due service under Section 114 of the
Indian Evidence Act (Section 117 BSA) and Section 27 of the
General Clauses Act operates automatically. The Ld. Trial Court
correctly invoked this presumption, relying upon C.C. Alavi Haji
v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555.
vi. The Evidence of CW-1 on the Fraud and the 17 Cheques: CW-1,
Sh. Bajrang Singh Shekhawat, testified about the nature of the
fraud, the admission by the accused, the issuance of 17 cheques,
and the subsequent dishonour. His evidence was tested in cross-
examination over three dates. While the defence succeeded in
eliciting certain admissions — particularly regarding the non-
production of invoices and GST records — the central narrative
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of the fraud, the admission letter, and the dishonoured cheques
remained unchallenged and unshaken.
B) The Defence Case
The defence of the accused rests on four principal pillars. This Court
examines each in turn.
i. Point One: The Blank Signed Security Cheque Theory: The
accused’s primary defence, articulated consistently from the
Section 251 notice stage through the Section 313 statement, is
that all 17 cheques — including the cheque from his wife’s
account — were blank signed security cheques given at the
inception of the employment relationship. This defence is
demolished by the following reasoning:
(a) First, the theory is commercially implausible. An employer
does not, in the ordinary course of any FMCG distribution
business, demand 17 advance security cheques from a newly
appointed Sales Executive drawing Rs. 14,559/- per month —
cheques drawn not only from the employee’s own accounts
but also from the account of his wife. No rational business
practice supports this claim. The accused’s account, if true,
would make his employer extraordinarily unusual in the
landscape of commercial employment.
(b) Second, the theory is chronologically impossible. Security
cheques are given before any liability arises — as a
prospective guarantee. Here, the cheques were given after the
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fraud was already discovered (the DD/complaint to PS
Dwarka was filed on 11.07.2019; Ex. CW1/5 is dated
07.07.2019). The accused’s own admission letter Ex. CW1/5,
dated 07.07.2019, establishes that the cheques were issued
after he admitted the fraud and as instruments for discharging
that specific, known, admitted liability. You cannot give a
security cheque in discharge of a liability that has already been
admitted in writing. The very concept of a security cheque
presupposes a future, contingent liability, not a past and
admitted one.
(c) Third, the specific amounts destroy the theory. If 17 cheques
were blank security cheques, their amounts would be
indeterminate at the time of signing. Yet each of the 17
cheques bears a specific amount — a different amount,
corresponding to a different component of the overall liability
as acknowledged in Ex. CW1/5. The specificity of amounts,
across 17 cheques, is perfectly consistent with the
complainant’s case (that the cheques were issued in discharge
of specific heads of liability) and utterly inconsistent with the
defence theory (that they were blank cheques filled later at the
complainant’s discretion).
(d) Fourth, the accused never complained about misuse. If the
accused genuinely believed that blank signed cheques had
been misused — that his employer had filled in amounts
without authority — the natural, expected, and indeed
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imperative response would be to file a complaint with the
police, approach a magistrate, or at the very least write a letter
of protest. The accused did none of these things. He filed no
complaint. He wrote no letter. He made no protest. This total
silence over an extended period is wholly inconsistent with
the conduct of a person who has been defrauded, and wholly
consistent with the conduct of a person who knows that the
cheques were given for a legitimate purpose — the discharge
of an admitted liability.
ii. Point Two: The Coercion Plea Regarding Ex. CW1/5: The
accused claims that Ex. CW1/5 — the admission letter — was
written under coercion, with him being kept in the office till
midnight and made to sign blank papers. This plea fails on every
conceivable ground:
(a) First, it was never put to CW-1. As this Court has already
noted at length, the entire cross-examination of CW-1 over
three dates is entirely silent on any suggestion of coercion in
relation to Ex. CW1/5. This is not a minor omission. It is a
deliberate strategic choice that must be held against the
accused under the Rule in Browne v. Dunn.
(b) Second, it surfaces only in the Section 313 statement. The plea
first appears on 18.09.2024 — after the evidence is closed,
after CW-1 has been examined and cross-examined over three
dates, and when no further evidentiary inquiry is possible. The
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timing of this plea reveals its true character: it is a litigation
afterthought, not a genuine claim of fact.
(c) Third, it is never sworn to. Despite specifically being asked
whether he wishes to lead defence evidence (Q2 of Section
313), the accused answered: “No.” He declined to enter the
witness box and depose on oath about the coercion. He
declined to summon even a single witness to corroborate the
claim. A plea of coercion, never sworn to, never corroborated,
never even put to the prosecution witness, and raised for the
first time after the evidence is closed, is entitled to be rejected
as an afterthought.
(d) Fourth, no complaint was ever filed. The accused claims he
was kept in the office till midnight. If true, this would
constitute criminal intimidation, wrongful confinement, or
extortion. Yet the accused never filed a police complaint about
this incident. He never approached a magistrate. He never
even mentioned it in his Section 251 Cr.P.C. statement of
23.01.2023 — which was his first formal articulation of his
defence. The coercion plea, if it had any truth to it, would have
been the centrepiece of his defence from day one. Instead, it
appears — fully formed, suddenly and conveniently — only
in the Section 313 statement.
(e) Fifth, the document was produced and exhibited without
objection. Even if the coercion plea had merit, the failure to
object to the exhibition of Ex. CW1/5 — when it was
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produced in original before the court and marked as an exhibit
— operates as a binding procedural concession. An objection
to the exhibition of a document is the appropriate procedural
vehicle for challenging its authenticity or the circumstances
of its execution. The defence chose not to exercise this right.
iii. Point Three: The Attack on Invoices and GST Records
(a) The defence invested enormous effort in establishing that the
complainant failed to produce invoices, orders, delivery
challans, or GST records to prove the underlying transaction.
The admissions elicited from CW-1 in cross-examination on
all three dates — that no invoice was placed on record, that
the specific invoice against the cheque could not be
immediately identified, that GST records could not be
produced on account of office relocation — were pressed
vigorously by the defence.
(b) This attack, however, is directed at the wrong target. The
requirement to prove the underlying debt or liability through
invoices and business records arises in a case where the
complainant relies solely on the commercial transaction to
establish the existence of the debt. In such a case, the absence
of documentary evidence of the underlying transaction is a
legitimate weapon in the defence armoury.
(c) But this is emphatically not such a case. In this case, the debt
is not proved through invoices. The debt is proved through the
accused’s own admission in Ex. CW1/5. He admitted the
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fraud. He admitted the liability. He admitted the amount. He
issued cheques to discharge that admitted liability. No invoice
is needed to prove what the debtor himself has admitted. Ex.
CW1/5 is a standalone admission, independent of any invoice
chain, and it makes the absence of invoices legally irrelevant.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that an
admission by the accused himself of the debt is the highest
form of proof, not requiring corroboration: see Rangappa v.
Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.
(d) The defence strategy — formidable in its execution, persistent
in its pursuit — ultimately amounts to this: because the
complainant cannot produce invoices, the cheques must have
been blank security cheques. But this syllogism breaks down
completely when Ex. CW1/5 is placed alongside it. The
accused’s own hand has already told us why the cheques were
given. No invoice can add to or subtract from what the
accused himself wrote.
iv. Point Four: The Honda Activa Scooter
(a) The accused repeatedly raised, and the defence counsel
pressed home in cross-examination, the fact that the accused’s
Honda Activa scooter (DL-6SAU-6094, Majestic brown
colour) is in the custody of the complainant company at its
Uttam Nagar Branch. CW-1, in his cross-examination on
16.09.2023, admitted: “The Activa two-wheeler
(DL-6SAU-6094 Majestic brown colour) owned by the
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accused was left by him in the premises of the complainant
company and is still parked there. (Vol. Accused never came
to take back his vehicle.)” In the final round of cross-
examination on 19.07.2024, CW-1 again confirmed: “It is
correct that the scooty (Honda Activa) of the accused is
lying within the complainant’s custody at Uttam Nagar
Branch. (Vol. The accused has never come to take over the
possession of the said vehicle.)”
(b) The defence advances this fact as evidence of two things: first,
that the complainant wrongfully retained the scooter as
leverage against the accused; and second, that the accused was
effectively trapped or threatened, which explains the signing
of Ex. CW1/5 and the issuance of the cheques.
(c) This argument fails on multiple fronts:
ï‚· First, the scooter’s retention is legally irrelevant. A Section
138 NI Act case turns on four established facts —
execution of the cheque, dishonour, demand notice, and
failure to pay. None of these four facts is displaced,
qualified, or negated by the retention of a scooter. The
jurisdiction of the court in a cheque dishonour case is
limited to examining these four facts and the presumptions
arising therefrom. It is not a forum for adjudicating
competing grievances between employer and employee
about motor vehicles.
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ï‚· Second, the scooter’s abandonment actually corroborates
the prosecution case. The accused claims he left because
he was threatened and trapped. Yet a man who truly felt
trapped and wronged would, at the very first opportunity,
reclaim his property, file a complaint, and fight back. What
did the accused do? He left his scooter behind. He never
came back for it. He never wrote a letter demanding its
return. He never filed a police complaint about its
wrongful retention. The abandonment of the scooter —
like the failure to complain about the coercion, like the
silence for years — is the conduct of a man who knows
that the ground beneath him is the ground of guilt, and who
therefore does not dare to draw attention to himself by
asserting rights that would invite further scrutiny.
ï‚· Third, no legal nexus between the scooter and the cheques.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
complainant wrongfully retained the scooter — which
CW-1 specifically denied — the accused’s remedy lay in a
civil suit or a criminal complaint. The retention of a scooter
does not — legally, equitably, or morally — entitle or
compel the accused to issue 17 dishonoured cheques.
These are entirely separate transactions. The law does not
permit self-help or self-set-off in this form. The accused
cannot say: “You kept my scooter, therefore I need not pay
the 17 cheques.” That is not a defence known to law.
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C) The Standard of Proof and its Satisfaction
i. Once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumptions
under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act arise mandatorily. It is trite
that these are rebuttable presumptions, but their rebuttal requires
the accused to prove, on a preponderance of probabilities, the
existence of a probable defence. The standard is not beyond
reasonable doubt — it is the civil standard — but it still requires
evidence, not mere assertion.
ii. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the standard with
precision. In Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441, it
was held that the accused must raise a probable defence — either
through the evidence of the complainant or through independent
evidence — sufficient to create a doubt in the mind of the court.
In Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy
Development Agency Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 458, the Court
explained that the accused’s denial and the mere raising of a plea,
without any supporting evidence, is insufficient to rebut the
statutory presumption. In Sunil Todi v. State of Gujarat, (2021)
SCC OnLine SC 1174, and Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand,
(2021) SCC OnLine SC 1002, the Court reiterated that a bald
assertion of “security cheque” without corroborative evidence
does not discharge the onus on the accused.
iii. Applying this standard to the present case, the accused has
produced:
(a) No defence witnesses.
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(b) No defence documents.
(c) No complaint or FIR about coercion.
(d) No correspondence protesting the opening of accounts or
misuse of cheques. No steps taken to recover the scooter.
(e) No challenge to Ex. CW1/5 in the cross-examination of
CW-1.
iv. Against this absolute evidential void, the prosecution has
produced:
(a) The admitted execution of the cheque.
(b) The admitted dishonour of the cheque.
(c) The service of the demand notice (address admitted to be
correct).
(d) The exhibited and unchallenged admission letter Ex. CW1/5
— the accused’s own confession of fraud and liability.
(e) The admitted appointment letter Ex. CW1/4 establishing the
employment relationship.
(f) The oral testimony of CW-1, Sh. Bajrang Singh Shekhawat,
which remained unshaken on all material points, particularly
Ex CW-1/5.
v. The scales are not merely tilted against the accused. They are
weighted with the anchor of his own handwriting in Ex. CW1/5.
8.3. The Specific Grounds Of Appeal — Dealt With Seriatim
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A) The impugned judgment is based on conjecture and surmise: This
ground is rejected. The Ld. Trial Court’s findings are based squarely
on admitted facts (the cheque, the dishonour, the address on the
notice), exhibited documents (Ex. CW1/5), and the failure of the
accused to rebut the statutory presumptions. There is no conjecture.
The conclusion flows inevitably from the evidence.
B) The trial court failed to appreciate facts and submissions: This
ground is rejected. The trial court’s judgment at paras 30-33
demonstrates a careful appreciation of the evidence, including
specifically addressing the defence of security cheque and the claim
regarding Ex. CW1/5.
C) Contradictions in the AR’s evidence — record maintenance
i. The defence points to an alleged contradiction between the AR’s
statement on 03.08.2023 (“We maintain the records of our
salesman”) and his admission on 16.09.2023 (“There is no
register/record maintained by the complainant company for the
goods delivered on day to day basis”).
ii. This is not a material contradiction. CW-1 explained that while
individual records of each salesman and the amounts collected by
them were maintained (in ledgers), no day-to-day physical
delivery register for goods dispatched by each salesman was
maintained. These are not inconsistent positions — one relates to
financial account records, the other to physical delivery logs.
More fundamentally, as already discussed, the absence of
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delivery records is legally irrelevant in the face of Ex. CW1/5.
This ground is rejected.
D) No action against other alleged co-conspirators: The fact that the
accused’s co-conspirators — Ms. Megha, Mr. Rajeev Saini, Mr. Anil
Goel, Mr. Chintu Giri — have not been prosecuted does not
constitute a defence for the accused. The prosecution of one accused
is not contingent upon the prosecution of all. The question before
this Court is whether the evidence against Sh. Parveen establishes
his guilt. It does, overwhelmingly. The fate of others who may have
escaped prosecution is irrelevant. This ground is rejected.
E) Payment is made after delivery; how could amounts be filled in 17
cheques? : The argument is that since payment was made after
delivery, and since 17 deliveries were allegedly unpaid, one would
expect the complainant to have stopped credit after the first default.
This argument actually destroys itself: the very fact that 17 cheques
are involved shows that the complainant was being systematically
deceived by being given cheques bearing customer stamps on their
reverse, making it appear that the payments were being made by
customers. The complainant had no reason to stop credit as long as
the cheques appeared to come from customers. The mechanism of
the fraud — as explained in the complaint and in the evidence of
CW-1 — precisely accounts for why 17 transactions were completed
before the fraud was discovered. This ground is rejected.
F) The complainant has not proved his case beyond reasonable doubt:
As discussed exhaustively above, the prosecution has proved all
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essential ingredients of Section 138 NI Act beyond reasonable
doubt. The statutory presumptions operate upon the admission of
signatures on the cheque and have not been rebutted. This ground is
rejected.
G) The accused did his job dedicatedly; the company hatched a
conspiracy; all passbooks and cheque books were in the company’s
custody: The claim that the accused surrendered all his passbooks
and cheque books to the company — and that the company opened
five accounts in his name and his wife’s name — is a claim made
only in the appeal memorandum and in the Section 313 statement. It
was never suggested to CW-1 in cross-examination with any
specificity. CW-1 specifically denied it: “It is wrong to suggest that
when the accused was kept on employment, the complainant
company had got a separate account opened in the name of the
accused and has taken cheques drawn on the same account with the
promise that when the accused will leave the employment, the
cheques will be returned back to him.” Moreover, the claim that an
FMCG distribution company would open four separate bank
accounts in the name of a Sales Executive and one in the name of
his wife, obtain signed cheque books, and then fraudulently use them
— all without any complaint from the accused — defies belief. This
ground is rejected.
H) Complainant failed to take action against traders whose stamps were
affixed: The failure to take action against the traders (whose stamps
were forged) is not a defence available to the person who forged the
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stamps. The accused was the one who affixed the fake customer
stamps on the invoices and on the reverse of the cheques. The failure
of the complainant to pursue those customers separately does not
assist the accused. This ground is rejected.
I) No documentary evidence of fraud or cheque filling: As established
in detail above, the documentary evidence of the fraud is Ex. CW1/5
— the accused’s own signed admission, produced in original,
exhibited without objection, and unchallenged in cross-examination.
This ground is rejected.
J) Violation of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act: This ground,
relating to cash transactions above Rs. 20,000/-, has no application
to cheque transactions. Section 269SS IT Act applies to taking or
accepting loans or deposits in cash. The present case involves
cheques — negotiable instruments — and Section 269SS has no
bearing whatsoever on the issuance of cheques. This ground is
rejected as misconceived.
K) Amounts in 17 cheques are suspicious; complainant failed to
produce Sales Tax records: As established above, the specific
amounts in the cheques are actually corroborated by Ex. CW1/5 —
they correspond to the admitted liability. The failure to produce Sales
Tax records is irrelevant in the face of the accused’s own admission.
This ground is rejected.
L) The trial court should have taken a lenient view: This ground goes
to sentence, not conviction. The conviction having been upheld for
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the reasons stated above, this ground requires no separate
adjudication at the conviction stage. This ground is rejected.
M) General grounds — judgment ignores submissions; overlooked
blank signed cheque books; legal infirmity; irreparable loss: These
are omnibus grounds that add nothing specific to the analysis. They
have been addressed in the course of the detailed examination above.
All such grounds are rejected.
8.4. Finding On Conviction — Unassailable And Confirmed
A) Having marshalled and examined all the evidence in this case —
prosecution and defence — this Court arrives at the following
categorical findings:
i. The accused Sh. Parveen was a Sales Executive of the
complainant company from 06.10.2018. This is admitted.
ii. He drew cheque No. 000033 dated 08.07.2019 for Rs. 93,273/-
on Kotak Mahindra Bank (Ex. CW1/6). This is admitted.
iii. The cheque was presented and dishonoured on 25.06.2019 for
“Payment stopped by drawer” (Ex. CW1/7). This is admitted.
iv. The legal demand notice was issued and served, the accused’s
address being admitted to be correct. Presumption of service
operates under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act and
Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, as held in C.C. Alavi Haji
v. Palapetty Muhammed, (2007) 6 SCC 555.
v. No payment was made within the statutory period of fifteen days.
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vi. Upon admission of signatures, the mandatory presumptions
under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act stood triggered, as held in
Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197.
vii. Exhibit CW1/5 — the admission letter dated 07.07.2019,
produced in original, exhibited without objection, unchallenged
in cross-examination, and never sworn to by the accused to have
been signed under coercion — establishes affirmatively and
conclusively that the cheque was issued in discharge of a legally
enforceable debt and liability, namely the liability arising from
the accused’s own admitted fraud of Rs. 23,64,091/-.
viii. The defence of “blank signed security cheque” is demolished
by the chronology of events, the specific amounts on the cheques,
the existence of Ex. CW1/5, and the accused’s total failure to take
any action consistent with the conduct of a person whose blank
cheques were misused.
ix. The defence of “coercion in signing Ex. CW1/5” is demolished
by its first-time appearance in the Section 313 statement, the
complete absence of any challenge to CW-1 in cross-
examination, the failure to file any complaint, and the accused’s
refusal to enter the witness box to swear to this claim.
x. The accused has utterly and completely failed to rebut the
statutory presumptions even on the lower standard of
preponderance of probabilities, as required by Sampelly
Satyanarayana Rao, (2016) 10 SCC 458 and Sunil Todi v. State
of Gujarat, (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1174.
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B) The finding of the Ld. Trial Court that “the accused has failed to
rebut the mandatory presumptions as per law and tilt the scales in
his favour, even on a scale of preponderance of probabilities, while
the complainant has clearly succeeded in proving his case beyond
reasonable doubt” is not only correct — it is the only conclusion that
the evidence permits.
C) The conviction of Sh. Parveen under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, as recorded vide judgment dated 18.12.2024,
is CONFIRMED AND UPHELD.
8.5. Order On Sentence — Confirmed (Subject To Modification On In-
Default Imprisonment)
A) The Ld. Trial Court, vide order on sentence dated 22.01.2025,
imposed a fine of Rs. 1,20,000/- as compensation within 90 days
under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., with default imprisonment of 04
months. No substantive sentence of imprisonment was imposed. The
convict’s counsel submitted at the sentencing stage that the accused
suffers from poor economic condition, that his old parents, wife, and
two minor children are dependent upon him, and that he is the sole
breadwinner of the family. The complainant’s counsel urged
maximum imprisonment and maximum fine.
B) The maximum sentence prescribed under Section 138 NI Act (as
amended) is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque,
or both. The imposition of only a fine (compensation) without
substantive imprisonment is a sentencing option expressly available
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to the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion in favour of
compensation — particularly given the primacy of the compensatory
and restitutive object of Section 138 NI Act — cannot be said to be
perverse. As the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in R. Vijayan v. Baby,
(2012) 1 SCC 260, and reiterated in P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers
Ispat Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 258, the purpose of Section 138 NI Act
is primarily to compensate the victim, and an order of compensation
is consistent with this object.
C) The compensation awarded in the present case, in respect of a
cheque amount, is not disproportionate. The order on sentence dated
22.01.2025 is confirmed and upheld, subject to the modification
regarding the concurrency of in-default imprisonments as directed
in paragraph 8 above.
8.6. CONCLUSIONS AND OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
A) On the Applications for Condonation of Delay: The applications for
condonation of delay in both appeals are ALLOWED. The delay in
both appeals is condoned.
B) On the Complainant’s Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 110/2025 —
Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd. vs. Parveen):
i. The appeal is NOT MAINTAINABLE to the extent it seeks
enhancement of substantive sentence or imposition of rigorous
imprisonment, as the right of the victim-complainant under the
proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C./Section 413 BNSS does not
extend to challenging the adequacy of punishment. The appeal is
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maintainable only to the extent it challenges the adequacy of
compensation.
ii. On the merits of compensation, this Court finds no ground to
interfere with the award of compensation. The complainant’s
appeal is dismissed.
C) On the Accused’s Appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 486/2025 —
Parveen vs. Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd.):
i. The conviction of Sh. Parveen under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as recorded vide the judgment
dated 18.12.2024 by Ms. Poonam Singh, Ld. JMFC NI Act-01,
PHC, New Delhi, in Complaint Case No. 12898/2019 (and all 15
connected cases), is CONFIRMED AND UPHELD.
ii. The order on sentence dated 22.01.2025 is CONFIRMED AND
UPHELD, subject to the specific modification at Directive D
below.
iii. The accused’s appeal is dismissed on merits.
D) Modification of the In-Default Imprisonment Direction:
i. The direction in the order on sentence dated 22.01.2025 that “the
default imprisonment shall run concurrently in CC Nos.
7589/2019, 12769/2019, 12770/2019, 12898/2019, 12899/2019,
12917/2019, 12918/2019, 12919/2019, 13119/2019,
13120/2019, 13121/2019, 13122/2019, 13123/2019,
13124/2019, 14643/2019, and 14644/2019” is hereby SET
ASIDE AND MODIFIED.
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ii. The in-default imprisonment of 04 months in each of the
aforesaid cases shall run CONSECUTIVELY and not
concurrently. Each in-default imprisonment is the enforcement
consequence of non-payment of the specific fine so imposed in
its respective case, and the satisfaction of the default
imprisonment in one case shall not be deemed to satisfy the in-
default imprisonment in any other case.
E) Payment Direction: The accused Sh. Parveen shall pay the
fine/compensation to the complainant M/s. Amazon Distributors
Pvt. Ltd. within 90 days from the date of this judgment. In default of
payment in any case, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment
for 04 months in that case, such in-default imprisonment to run
consecutively across all cases as directed above. In case of non-
payment, the fine shall also be recoverable under Section 421 Cr.P.C.
/ Section 461 BNSS.
F) Return of Record: The trial court record, be returned forthwith to the
court of Ld. JMFC NI Act-01, PHC, New Delhi.
G) Both Criminal Appeal No. 110/2025 (Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd.
vs. Parveen) and Criminal Appeal No. 486/2025 (Parveen vs.
Amazon Distributors Pvt. Ltd.) are disposed of in the above terms.
H) Copy of this order be sent to Ld. JMFC (NI Act)-01, Patiala House
Courts, New Delhi for information.
I) Copy of this order be given dasti to the parties on charges.
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M/S AMAZON DISTRIBUTORS (P) LTD. VS. PRAVEEN
&
DLND010082822025
CA 486/2025
PRAVEEN VS. M/S AMAZON DISTRIBUTORS (P) LTD.
J) File be consigned to Record Room.
SAURABH Digitally signed
Announced in the open Court PARTAP
by SAURABH
PARTAP SINGH
LALER
on 08th of June 2026 SINGH
LALER
Date: 2026.06.08
17:20:25 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts
Delhi/08.06.2026
