Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
M D Urban Co Bank Ltd vs Judge Industrial Tribunal And Anr … on 16 March, 2026
[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 751/2017
Managing Director, The Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, Panch
Batti, M.I. Road, Jaipur Now Fingrowth Co-operative Bank Ltd.
----Appellant
Versus
1. The Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur
2. Apex Organisation Of Rajasthan Co-operative Sector
Employees Union, Nehru Bazar, Jaipur
----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. A.K. Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Madhav Dadhich
For Respondent(s) : Mr. K.C. Chandel (Self), present in
person
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN
Judgment
REPORTABLE
16/03/2026
1. Instant DB Special Appeal under Rule 134 of the Rajasthan
High Court Rules, 1952 has been filed by the appellant,
(hereinafter referred to as “the employer”), aggrieved from
the judgment dated 10.03.2017 passed in SB Civil Writ
Petition No.1959/2006, titled as “Managing Director, Urban
Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Judge, Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur”.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the Respondent No.2, an
Organization of Rajasthan Cooperative Sector Employees
Union submitted a demand charter to the employer on
18.02.1982 and after that services of the some of the
members of Union were terminated and they were
discontinued by present appellant from 01.09.1982. A
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dispute was raised and after failure in conciliation, a
reference was made by the State Government under Section
10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act of 1947”), as under:
“Whether the action of the employer Managing
Director, Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, Nehru
Bazar, in terminating the services of 30 workmen
mentioned in the list was justified and correct, and
if not, what relief they were entitled to?”
3. A statement of claim was filed by the respondent union on
behalf of 15 out of 30 workmen in respect of whom the
dispute was raised. Five other workmen had filed separate
statement of claims. A reply was filed by the appellant
employer.
4. The Industrial Tribunal answered the reference on
01.04.1991 by holding that the termination order was legal
and justified and the termination order did not fall within the
definition of retrenchment and was covered under Section
2(oo)(bb) of the Act of 1947.
5. One of the workmen, Trilok Chand, separately challenged his
termination and an award was passed in his favour on
22.08.1989 by the Industrial Tribunal, thus declaring
termination as unfair and illegal.
6. Two separate writ petitions were filed, firstly S.B. CWP
No.3956/1991 by the workmen against the award dated
01.04.1991, and secondly S.B. CWP No.3048/1990 by the
employer against the award in favour of Trilok Chand dated
22.08.1989.
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7. A Coordinate Bench of this Court allowed both the writ
petitions on 22.04.1994 and set aside the awards dated
01.04.1991 and 22.08.1989 and remitted the matter back to
the Industrial Tribunal to decide the same afresh.
8. The Tribunal, while reconsidering the reference, decided the
same on 16.10.1995 and passed an award against the
workmen. Respondent No.2 again filed S.B. CWP
No.3698/1996 against the said award and, vide judgment
dated 05.01.1999, a Coordinate Bench of this Court again
set aside the award dated 16.10.1995 and remanded the
matter back to the Tribunal.
9. A D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.123/1995 was preferred by
the employer bank and the same was decided on 24.11.2003
observing that some of the issues were not dealt with by the
learned Single Judge.
10. Thereafter, SB Civil Review No.30/2004 was preferred by the
appellant employer bank, which was dismissed on
27.01.2005. Finally, the award dated 19.07.2005 was passed
by the Industrial Tribunal in following manner:
“izca/kd] vjcu dksvkWijsfVo cSad fy0] usg: cktkj
t;iqj }kjk Jfedx.k loZJh v’kksd dqekj tSu] cnzh
izlkn ‘kekZ] jes’k ikjhd] Hkxoku lgk; xqIrk] osn izdk’k
lSuh] jke jru xqIrk] jes’k pan lSuh] Hkqous’k dqekj tSu]
fcV~By ukFk ‘kekZ] fcjtw flag] pUnz izdk’k lkSxkuh]
vfuy dqekj tSu] jrus’k ok”.ksZ;] gfjfd’ku dqekor]
v’kksd eqnxy] dSyk’k dqekj pansy] ,oa jkts’k ‘kekZ] 1
dqy 171 dh lsok,a fnukad 1-9-82 ls lekIr fd;k tkuk
mfpr ,oa oS/k ugha gSaA ;s lHkh 17 Jfed fiNys leLr(Uploaded on 01/04/2026 at 02:28:47 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB] (4 of 24) [SAW-751/2017]osru ,oa vU; ykHk lfgr ,oa lsok dh fujUrjrk lfgr
iqu% lsok esa fu;ksftr fd;s tkus ds vf/kdkjh gSaA vU;
lHkh Jfedx.k ds laca/k esa uks fMLI;wV vokMZ ikfjr fd;k
tkrk gSA”
11. In view of award, termination of 17 workmen was declared
as unfair and illegal and they were reinstated with back
wages and continuity of service. Against the said award, the
bank employer appellant herein, preferred S.B. CWP
No.1959/2006, which was dismissed on 10.03.2017 with
cost of ₹50,000/- to be paid by the employer bank and be
distributed equally to the workmen who are members of the
respondent union.
12. The instant SAW has been preferred and the same is being
considered on merits.
13. Learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
employer bank submitted that on two occasions a reference
was decided in favour of the appellant bank, but after the
remand by this Hon’ble Court a fresh award in favour of
workmen was passed by the Tribunal. He further submitted
that the Tribunal in its findings has clearly held that the
appellant bank (employer) has complied with the mandatory
provisions of Section 25F of the Act of 1947 and adequate
compensation legally admissible to the workmen has been
paid by the bank. He further submitted that the services of
the workmen were dispensed with as the contract to collect
the amount for water and electricity bills on behalf of PHED
and RACB was terminated.
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14. He further submitted that these workmen were employed on
a specific work and their duty was to collect amount
themselves or engage some other person for collection of
the amount towards electricity and water bills as per the
contract with PHED and RSEB. He also submitted that these
workmen were not employees of the bank, rather they were
engaged for a specific work and the work of PHED and RSEB
having come to an end, therefore the appellant employer
was left with no option except to terminate and discontinue
the services of said workmen.
15. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that as and when
the appellant bank initiated the process of fresh recruitment,
these workmen were also given an opportunity to re-apply
for engagement with the bank, but except three persons no
other person approached the bank for re-engagement. He
further submitted that no case has been set up to show
termination of service in violation of any statutory provision
rather the Tribunal has made out a case to show that a
seniority list was not maintained by the petitioner and the
principle of “last come first go” was not followed.
16. Learned Senior Advocate also submitted that no positive
evidence was led by the respondent union or any of the
workmen regarding non-compliance of the provisions of
Sections 25H, 25G or 25N, but still the Tribunal has drawn a
conclusion only on the ground that the appellant failed to
submit documents to justify its defence. He further
submitted that the Tribunal has drawn conclusions without
any evidence and the findings are perverse in nature. He
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further submitted that the writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India was filed to show the perversity and
illegality committed by the Industrial Tribunal while passing
an award dated 19.07.2005.
17. Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that even
assuming breach of some of the provisions of the Act of
1947, the workmen are not automatically entitled to
reinstatement. He also submitted that the dispute pertains
to the year 1982 and the award in favour of the workmen
was passed on 19.07.2005, but prior to the said award two
awards dated 01.04.1991 and 16.10.1995 were passed
against the respondent workmen and the termination order
was found legally justified. He also submitted that even
assuming the entire facts, the bank has offered
compensation of ₹3,60,000/- to each of the workmen, and
the bank is not in a position to reinstate any of the
workmen. He further submitted that all the workmen have
already attained the age of superannuation and till date they
were not reinstated pursuant to the award dated
19.07.2005. At last, he submitted that the workmen had
rendered their services for a shorter duration and that too on
contractual basis on a specific project of collection of billing
amounts of RSEB and PHED, therefore the order of
reinstatement is contrary to the settled proposition of law.
18. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by the representative of
Respondent No.2 Union and submitted that the grounds
raised by the appellant bank are already considered by
Hon’ble Single Judge Bench and same were answered with
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support of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He
further submitted that the workmen had rendered services
of three years and more. He also submitted that the
workmen raised the dispute in 1982 but, due to delay in
disposal of litigation, the award was finalized on 19.07.2005,
wherein the termination of services was specifically declared
as unfair and illegal. He also submitted that after termination
of the services of the workmen, the appellant bank engaged
several persons and not afforded any opportunity to the
respondent workmen, which was considered by the Tribunal
and also by the learned Hon’ble Single Bench. He further
submitted that the workmen had prayed for reinstatement
and now they are waiting for realization of the fruits of the
award.
19. The representative of Union also referred to the scope of
interference by the High Court and submitted that once an
award is passed and the same is upheld by a detailed and
reasoned order by Hon’ble Single Judge Bench, then there is
no scope of interference in the Special Appeal. He also
referred to the non-compliance of Sections 25G and 25H of
the Act of 1947 and submitted that violation is an admitted
fact before the Tribunal and the same cannot be re-agitated
before this Hon’ble Court. The representative of the Union
further rejected the proposal of the learned Senior Advocate
for grant of lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
He also submitted that when an award is passed in favour of
workmen and there is no legal ground to challenge the
award, then the S.A.W. is liable to be dismissed. He also
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submitted that despite the award dated 19.07.2005, the
appellant bank has not complied with the award in letter and
spirit. He further submitted that even after dismissal of the
writ petition the appellant has not reinstated the workmen.
He also referred to the affidavits filed by the workmen and
submitted that they have already rejected the proposal of
lump sum compensation of ₹3,60,000/- offered to them and
also observed in order dated 25.04.2017.
20. Heard learned Senior Counsel for the appellant bank
(employer) and the representative of the Union representing
all the workmen.
21. Admittedly, the termination or discontinuation was made on
01.09.1982 and for the first time the award of reinstatement
was passed on 19.07.2005 by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur.
The award dated 19.07.2005 clearly indicates that the
appellant bank had complied with the provisions of Section
25F of the Industrial Disputes Act while discontinuing the
services of 30 workmen. The Tribunal has found that the
appellant employer has not complied with the provisions of
Sections 25G, 25N or 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.
22. The defence of the appellant bank is that the workmen were
engaged on contractual basis for collection of water and
electricity bills as the appellant was having a government
contract with RSEB and PHED, which came to an end,
leading to discontinuation of services of workmen.
23. Sections 25G, 25H and 25N of the Act of 1947 are
reproduced as under:
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[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB] (9 of 24) [SAW-751/2017]25G. Procedure for retrenchment
Where any workman in an industrial
establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be
retrenched and he belongs to a particular
category of workmen in that establishment, in
the absence of any agreement between the
employer and the workman in this behalf, the
employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman
who was the last person to be employed in that
category, unless for reasons to be recorded the
employer retrenches any other workman.
25H. Re-employment of retrenched
workmen
– Where any workmen are retrenched, and the
employer proposes to take into his employ any
persons, he shall, in such manner as may be
prescribed, give an opportunity [to the
retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to
offer themselves for re-employment, and such
retrenched workmen] [ Substituted by Act 36 of
1964, Section 16, for certain words (w.e.f.
19.12.1964).] who offer themselves for re-
employment shall have preference over other
persons.
25N. [Conditions precedent to
retrenchment of workmen. [Substituted by
Act 49 of 1984, Section 5, for Section 25-N
(w.e.f. 18.8.1984).]]
(1) No workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies,
who has been in continuous service for not less
than one year under an employer shall be
retrenched by that employer until,
-(a)the workman has been given three months
‘notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has
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expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of
such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
and
(b)the prior permission of the appropriate
Government or such authority as may be
specified by that Government by notification in
the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section
referred to as the specified authority) has been
obtained on an application made in this behalf.
(2) An application for permission under sub-
section (1) shall be made by the employer in
the prescribed manner stating clearly the
reasons for the intended retrenchment and a
copy of such application shall also be served
simultaneously on the workmen concerned in
the prescribed manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under
sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate
Government or the specified authority, after
making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after
giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard
to the employer, the workmen concerned and
the person interested in such retrenchment,
may, having regard to the genuineness and
adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the workmen and all
other relevant factors, by order and for reasons
to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to
grant such permission and a copy of such order
shall be communicated to the employer and the
workmen.
(4) Where an application for permission has
been made under sub-section (1) and the
appropriate Government or the specified
authority does not communicate the order
granting or refusing to grant permission to the
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employer within a period of sixty days from the
date on which such application is made, the
permission applied for shall be deemed to have
been granted on the expiration of the said
period of sixty days.
(5) An order of the appropriate Government or
the specified authority granting or refusing to
grant permission shall, subject to the provisions
of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all
the parties concerned and shall remain in force
for one year from the date of such order.
(6) The appropriate Government or the
specified authority may, either on its own
motion or on the application made by the
employer or any workman, review its order
granting or refusing to grant permission under
sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the
case may be, cause it to be referred, to a
Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where a reference has been made
to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall
pass an award within a period of thirty days
from the date of such reference.
(7) Where no application for permission under
sub-section (1) is made, or where the
permission for any retrenchment has been
refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to
be illegal from the date on which the notice of
retrenchment was given to the workman and
the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits
under any law for the time being in force as if
no notice had been given to him.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
foregoing provisions of this section, the
appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied
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[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB] (12 of 24) [SAW-751/2017]accident in the establishment or death of the
employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by
order, direct that the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall not apply in relation to such
establishment for such period as may be
specified in the order.
(9) Where permission for retrenchment has
been granted under sub-section (3) or where
permission for retrenchment is deemed to be
granted under sub-section (4), every workman
who is employed in that establishment
immediately before the date of application for
permission under this section shall be entitled to
receive, at the time of retrenchment,
compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days ‘average pay for every completed
year or continuous service or any part thereof in
excess of six months.]
24. In the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that the workman is required to
plead and prove that while effecting retrenchment, the
employer violated the rule of “last come first go” without any
tangible reason so as to show violation of Section 25G of the
Act of 1947. The issue was also considered by the learned
Single Judge in light of the judgment in the case of General
Manager, State Bank of India v. Rakesh Kumar Tiwari,
(2006) 1 SCC 530, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that Section 25G deals with a situation where retrenchment
is assumed to be validly made. In such circumstances, if the
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employer wishes to re-employ any employee, he must offer
the retrenched employee preference over others.
25. Section 25H provides for re-employment of retrenched
workmen. In the case of The Barara Cooperative
Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. vs.
Workman Pratap Singh reported as (2019) 2 SCC 743,
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that to bring a case under
Section 25H, the workman is required to prove that he was a
retrenched employee of the employer and secondly that the
employer has decided to fill up the vacancies accrued in their
organization.
26. The learned Single Judge has referred the judgment in the
case of General Manager, State Bank of India v. Rakesh
Kumar Tiwari (supra) and State Bank of Bikaner and
Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma, AIRONLINE 2006 SC
274 and observed that after closure of the work of collection
of electricity and water bills, the employer is not justified in
retrenching or discontinuing the services of the workmen
when there is no process for selection and appointment of
employees for such or different works.
27. Section 25N only provides conditions precedent to
retrenchment of workmen. The Section itself provides its
applicability upon certain establishments fulfilling the
conditions as prescribed therein. With regard to Rajasthan,
amendments were made by the Rajasthan Act No.8 of 1984,
which came into effect on 14.04.1984. Later, the Central Act
was amended by Central Act No.49 of 1984 with effect from
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18.08.1984. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that Section
25N of the Act of 1947 is not applicable to their organization.
28. The learned Single Judge cumulatively examined the non-
compliance of statutory provisions under the Industrial
Disputes Act. No specific reference was made regarding non-
compliance of Section 25N though on behalf of the Union it
was submitted that more than 100 workmen are performing
duties under the umbrella of the appellant bank. The
Tribunal has also found that the admission by the employer
bank clearly shows that they have not complied with the
provisions of Section 25N of the Act of 1947 and only on the
basis of admission non-compliance of the provision was
found proved against the appellant bank.
29. It is settled law that an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court is
bound by the terms of reference and can adjudicate only the
dispute referred to it under the Act of 1947. The limitation
upon adjudication is that it cannot adjudicate a dispute
which has not been referred. Thus, the Industrial Tribunal is
bound by the reference and cannot decide any dispute which
has not been referred to it. In the case of Pottery Mazdoor
Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. and Another,
1979 AIR 1356, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the
Industrial Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go beyond the
reference and it cannot adjudicate upon issues which have
not been referred.
30. The terms of reference dated 15.02.1983 indicate that a
reference was made to decide the issue as to whether the
termination of services of 30 workmen was legal and
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justified, and if not, what relief the workmen were entitled
to. The statement of claim submitted by the Union also
indicates that, by adopting unfair labour practice, the
services of the workmen were terminated. At the time of
termination neither one month’s notice, salary in lieu
thereof, nor retrenchment compensation, was paid. In the
entire statement of claim, breach of the provisions under
Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was specifically
pleaded.
31. Initially, when the award dated 01.04.1991 was passed and
writ petition No.3956/1991 was decided along with writ
petition No.3048/1990 by a Coordinate Bench of this Court
on 22.04.1994, certain issues were framed by the Presiding
Officer of the Industrial Tribunal, which included non-
compliance of Sections 25F, 25G and 25N. A specific issue
was also framed with regard to Section 25H and violation of
Sections 33(1) and 33(2) of the Act of 1947. In the aforesaid
circumstances, we are considering the present S.A.W.
32. Now comes the question about the challenge to the grounds
and the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India
while challenging the award passed by the Labour Court-
cum-Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
does not prescribe any statutory appeal from any award,
therefore, the only remedy lies in filing a writ petition under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The
chequered history of the dispute clearly indicates that on
multiple occasions writ petitions were filed by both the
parties and decided by this Court.
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33. The learned Single Judge, considering the scope of Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in dealing with the
award, has referred the judgment in the case of Sadhana
Lodh Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd., reported in
(2003) 3 SCC 524, wherein it was observed as under:
“7. The supervisory jurisdiction
conferred on the High Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution is
confined only to see whether an inferior
court or tribunal has proceeded within
its parameters and not to correct an
error apparent on the face of the record,
much less of an error of law. In
exercising the supervisory power under
Article 227 of the Constitution, the High
Court does not act as an appellate court
or the tribunal. It is also not permissible
to a High Court on a petition filed under
Article 227 of the Constitution to review
or reweigh the evidence upon which the
inferior court or tribunal purports to
have passed the order or to correct
errors of law in the decision.”
34. Further, in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State
Warehousing Corporation (supra), Hon’ble Judges of the
Bench passed separate judgments and the same were
referred by the learned Single Judge, wherein it was also
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held that the Court has a duty to interpret the statute so as
to advance the statutory goal and not to frustrate the same.
35. In the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR
1964 SC 477, it was held that a writ of certiorari can only
be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction where a court or
tribunal acts with material irregularity or in violation of law,
but not for the purpose of re-appreciation of evidence or
acting as a court of appeal.
36. In the case of Indian Overseas Bank v. IOB Staff
Canteen Workers’ Union, (2000) 4 SCC 245, Anoop
Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public Health Division
No.1, Panipat (Haryana), (2010) 5 SCC 497 and Pepsi
Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishn Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC
270, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while construing
the award or order of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal,
the High Court has to first conclude that the award or order
is based on no evidence or is perverse. The High Court
cannot proceed to re-appreciate the evidence under Articles
226 or 227 of the Constitution of India unless an error of law
apparent on the face of record is shown. An error of fact,
however grave it may appear to be, cannot be corrected by
way of writ.
37. In the case of General Manager, ONGC, Silchar versus
ONGC Contractual Union, reported as (2008) 12 SCC
275, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“We have examined the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel. This Court has held time and again
that the High Court had the authority to enquire as to
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[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB] (18 of 24) [SAW-751/2017]whether a finding arrived at by the Tribunal was based
on evidence and to correct an error apparent on the
face of the record. The observations in Trambak Rubber
Industries Ltd.’s case (2003) 6 SCC 416) are to this
effect and it has been highlighted that the High Court
would be fully justified in interfering with an Award of
an Industrial Court on account of a patent illegality. In
Seema Ghosh’s case ((2006) 7 SCC 722), this Court
observed that the High Court’s interference under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with an Award
of the Labour Court was justified as the Award had
been rendered contrary to the law laid down by this
Court and as a measure of “misplaced sympathy”, and
was thus perverse. The other judgments cited by Mr.
Dave lay down similar principles and need not be dealt
with individually. It will be seen therefore that the
interference would be limited to a few cases and as
already noted above, in the case of a patent illegality
or perversity. On the contrary, Mr. Sanyal’s reliance on
Sadhu Ram’s case (AIR 1984 SC 1467) is more
appropriate to the circumstances herein. It has been
observed as under:
“The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is truly wide but, for that
very reason, it has to be exercised with great
circumspection. It is not for the High Court to
constitute itself into an appellate court over
tribunals constituted under special legislations to
resolve disputes of a kind qualitatively different
from ordinary civil disputes and to re-adjudicate(Uploaded on 01/04/2026 at 02:28:47 PM)
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[2026:RJ-JP:11027-DB] (19 of 24) [SAW-751/2017]upon questions of fact decided by those
tribunals. That the questions decided pertain to
jurisdictional facts does not entitle the High
Court to interfere with the findings on
jurisdictional facts which the Tribunal is well
competent to decide. Where the circumstances
indicate that the Tribunal has snatched at
jurisdiction, the High Court may be justified in
interfering. But where the tribunal gets
jurisdiction only if a reference is made and it is
therefore impossible ever to say that the
Tribunal has clutched at jurisdiction, we do not
think that it was proper for the High Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the Labour
Court and hold that the workman had raised no
demand with the management”.
We are therefore of the opinion that in the light of
the facts that have come on record we find no
perversity or patent illegality in the Award of the
Industrial Tribunal and on the contrary must
appreciate that it has minutely examined the
evidence in arriving at its decision. In this view of
the matter, it was inappropriate for the Learned
Single Judge to have re- appraised the evidence
and come to a different conclusion.”
38. Aforementioned provisions clearly indicate that the
supervisory jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India or the writ jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India is confined only to see that the
Tribunal or the Court has acted contrary to the legal
provisions or the material placed on record. The scope is not
to re-appreciate the facts, therefore, learned Single Judge
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has rightly appreciated the legal position and also the award
passed by the Industrial Tribunal as there is no perversity or
illegality in the award dated 19.07.2005 to the extent that
termination of seventeen workmen on 01.09.1982 was illegal
and not justified.
39. Now comes the second part, namely reinstatement or lump
sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Admittedly, the
termination order was effected from 01.09.1982 and the
reference was made on 15.09.1983. The Industrial Tribunal
has considered the termination order on three occasions
Whereas on two occasions it has been held that the
termination order was in accordance with the provisions of
law. The material on record also indicates that the workmen
were contractual employees and after 1982 they have not
worked in the appellant bank.
40. During pendency of the litigation before this Court, the
workmen were given wages under Section 17B of the Act of
1947. During pendency of the present SAW, an offer was
made to the workmen for settlement of the dispute on
payment of lump sum compensation of ₹3,60,000/-, but the
same was not accepted by the workmen and the same has
been noticed in the order sheet dated 24.05.2017.
41. In the case of Rajasthan Development Corporation v.
Gitam Singh, (2013) 5 SCC 136, it was held that in cases
of holding termination invalid, reinstatement is not natural
consequences. The grant of a relief of reinstatement is not
an automatic consequence, where the termination is
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declared as bad and contrary to provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act.
42. In case of Management, Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd.
Vs. Ghanshyam Sharma reported in (2018) 18 SCC 80
following ratio in case of Gitam Singh (supra), it was held
that the court should consider the duration of service, nature
of employment and time lapsed since termination, while
considering issue of reinstatement of workman.
43. In the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v.
Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that even if the order of termination is found to be
violative of the provisions of the Act of 1947, reinstatement
with full back wages is not automatic and monetary
compensation may be granted instead. In the said case, the
period of engagement was very short and the Court has
closed the dispute by awarding compensation in lieu of
reinstatement.
44. In the case of State of Uttarakhand v. Raj Kumar,
(2019) 14 SCC 353 and Ranveer Singh v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR Online 2021 SC 794, it was held that delay
affects the chances of reinstatement and in every matter
reinstatement is not the only remedy, and the Court may
award suitable compensation.
45. A Division Bench of this Court has also considered an
identical issue in the case of Director, Tiger Project,
Sariska v. Industrial Tribunal, Alwar & Another, D.B.
Special Appeal (Writ) No.406/2018 and while deciding a
bunch of petitions observed that during the intervening
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period of 25-30 years or more, the workmen would have
already settled in their lives and it would not be appropriate
to reinstate them after such lapse of time. Instead, a
formula for grant of compensation was devised and it was
observed that the interest of justice would be served if
compensation is calculated at the rate of ₹1,00,000/- for
service of one year, ₹1,50,000/- for two years, ₹2,50,000/-
for service of three years and ₹3,00,000/- for more than
three years of service.
46. In the case of Amit Kumar Dubey v. M.P.P.K.V.V. Co.
Ltd. and Anr.: Civil Appeal No.1198/2025 (Arising out
of SLP (Civil) No.20902/2024, judgment dated
29.01.2025), Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering an
issue where the individuals had worked for about three
years, instead of reinstatement granted compensation to
them.
47. In case of Magan Lal Vs. Manager, Instrumentation Ltd.
Kota: DB SAW No.735/2023, a Division Bench of this
Court while considering an appeal preferred against
judgment passed by learned Single Judge whereby learned
Single Judge has enhanced amount of lump sum
compensation from ₹2,00,000/- to ₹5,00,000/- has
dismissed the appeal after considering the judgment in case
of Amit Kumar Dubey Vs. M.P.P.K.K.V. Co. Ltd. and Anr.
(supra).
48. The dispute is of the year 1982 and the reference was made
in 1983, whereas an award finally passed in favour of the
workmen only on 19.07.2005. Earlier, on two occasions the
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award was passed against these workmen, except award in
the case of Trilok Chand, which was also set aside, and now
workmen have attained age of superannuation, therefore,
there are no chances of reinstatement. During the pendency
of the litigation, the benefit under Section 17B of the Act of
1947 was already extended to the workmen.
49. Thus, considering overall circumstances, this is not a fit case
wherein reinstatement can be ordered as an automatic
consequence after declaration of termination order as unfair
and illegal. This is not a case wherein reinstatement can be
justified. The ideal situation would be to award lump sum
compensation to the workmen.
50. The length of service is an admitted fact before the Tribunal
hence, it is appropriate to award lump sum compensation of
₹5,00,000/- to each of the workmen irrespective of their
length of service. The compensation shall be paid by the
appellant bank within a period of 60 days, failing which they
are liable to pay interest on the delayed payment.
51. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the Special
Appeal Writ is partly allowed and the award of Industrial
Tribunal dated 19.07.2005, as upheld by the judgment dated
10.03.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge, is modified
to the extent that instead of reinstatement with back wages,
each of the workmen shall be entitled to a lump sum
compensation of ₹5,00,000/- from the appellant bank
(employer). The rest of the award is upheld. The appellant
bank is directed to make payment directly into the bank
account of the workmen within a period of 60 days, failing
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which they are entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from appellant bank.
52. Accordingly, the Special Appeal Writ and the miscellaneous
application, if any, stand disposed of.
53. No order as to costs.
(ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J
PREETI VALECHA /52
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