Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Lrs Of Sunny vs The Union Of India on 29 April, 2026
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6974/2025
Lrs Of Sunny, S/o Shri Kishan Lal Ji, Smt. Kusum W/o Late Shri
Sunny, Aged 53 Years, R/o Mahadev Colony, Kabir Nagar,
Soorsagar Road, Jodhpur, Rajasthan (All Lrs Of Applicant Sunny).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The Union Of India, Through The Secretary, Ministry Of
Communication And It, Department Of Posts, Government
Of India, Sanchar Bhawan, New Delhi.
2. The Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Jaipur,
Rajasthan.
3. The Post Master General, Rajasthan Western Region,
Jodhpur 342001.
4. The Senior Superintendent Of Post Offices, Jodhpur
Division, Jodhpur 342001.
5. The Sub Post Master (Spm), Office Of S.p.m.,
Shastrinagar, Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Satya Prakash Sharma
Mr. Abhimanyu Khatri
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vaibhav Bhansali for
Mr. B.P. Bohra, Sr. CGSC
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Judgment
Reportable
15/04/2026
(As per Hon'ble Sandeep Shah J.)
1. Date of conclusion of arguments 15.04.2026
2. Date on which judgment was reserved 15.04.2026
3. Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced: Full Judgment
4. Date of pronouncement 29.04.2026
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1. The present writ petition has been filed by the legal
representative - Smt. Kusum, wife of deceased employee Sunny
against the order dated 30.07.2024 passed by learned Central
Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur in O.A. No. 71/2019: 'LRs of
Applicant: Smt. Kusum w/o Late Sunny vs. Union of India' and
Ors., by which, learned Tribunal has dismissed the O.A. and
declined the request of regularization of service and grant of
regular pay scale to the original applicant-deceased Sunny.
Factual Matrix:-
2. Brief facts of the case are as following: -
2.1 The original applicant Sunny had joined the office of Sub Post
Office, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur on 03.09.1984 as part-time casual
labour in the capacity of sweeper. His salary was being paid from
contingency fund, with the following time to time pay rise
mentioned in the petition: initially Rs. 27/- per day, then enhanced
to Rs. 380/-, in the year 1999 he was being paid 755/- per month,
which was enhanced to 4835/- per month, which was further
enhanced in the year 2013 to Rs. 6365/- per month and in the
month of October, 2015 he was being paid at the rate of Rs.
11,076/- per month.
2.2 The original applicant had worked at the said office until his
death i.e. 24.01.2020. The original applicant had made a request
to respondent authority vide representation dated 10.04.2017 to
enhance his wages as per O.M. dated 22.01.2015 issued by
Government of India. The original applicant had claimed that he
has also made request to the respondent authorities to consider
regularization of his service as he had been working since 1984
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and even employees, who were appointed later than him, were
also given the same benefits.
2.3 Aggrieved by the inaction of the respondent authorities, the
original applicant preferred an O.A. No. 71/2019 before the CAT,
Jodhpur seeking regularization of service on the ground of his
long-time service as well as claiming parity with Vijesh Kumar,
another part-time employee, at Sub Post Office Kacheri, Jodhpur,
who had been granted the status of full time employee with
regular pay scale by the learned Tribunal. In Vijesh Kumar's case,
he had filed O.A. No. 125/2005 praying for grant of status of full-
time temporary employee and the learned Tribunal had allowed
the same vide order dated 15.02.2006. He thereafter filed O.A.
seeking regularization which came to be allowed vide order dated
18.09.2008. The respondent authorities challenged the order
dated 18.09.2008 before this court in DB Civil Writ Petition No.
11217/2009, and this court affirmed the order dated 18.09.2008.
When the respondent authorities did not comply with the order
dated 18.09.2008 passed by the learned Tribunal, Vijesh Kumar
preferred a contempt petition, and during the pendency of the
contempt petition, Vijesh Kumar's service was regularised at the
post of MTS (Group-C) vide order dated 22.03.2011.
Consequently, the contempt petition of Vijesh Kumar was disposed
of vide order dated 29.04.2011.
2.4 The O.A. No. 71/2019 of the present applicant was dismissed
by learned Tribunal vide order dated 23.09.2019 on the grounds of
delay and his case being distinguishable from the Vijesh Kumar.
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2.5 The order dated 23.09.2019 was challenged before this
Court in DB Civil Writ Petition No. 141/2020 and this Court vide
judgment dated 02.11.2022 remanded the matter to the learned
Tribunal for consideration of O.A. No.71/2019 afresh on merits.
This Court specifically held that dismissal of claim on the ground
of delay was not justified and observed that the case in hand was
a case of continuous cause of action. The matter was thus
remanded to the learned Central Administrative Tribunal for
consideration of the case on merits afresh in accordance with law.
During the pendency of DB Civil Writ Petition No. 141/2020,
applicant expired on 24.01.2020 and subsequently, his wife was
taken on record as legal representative of the applicant.
2.6 In compliance of judgment dated 02.11.2022 passed by this
court, the learned Tribunal heard the matter afresh and dismissed
vide order dated 30.07.2024 on ground of delay as well on finding
that the applicant's case cannot be equated with the case of Vijesh
Kumar, as the appointment of Vijesh Kumar was approved under
25% vacancies of casual labour for year 2009 as per the revised
Recruitment Rules, 2010 and the Scheme of Casual Labour (Grant
of Temporary Status and Regularization) Scheme, 1991, was
squarely applicable to Vijesh Kumar. Hence, the present petition.
Arguments of the learned counsel for the Petitioner: -
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
impugned order dated 30.07.2024 passed by the learned Tribunal
is erroneous in the eyes of law as the deceased employee Sunny
was eligible to receive the claimed benefits of regular pay scale
and regularization of his service by sheer longevity of his service
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i.e more than 35 years. He submitted that the ground of delay
was overruled by this Court in order dated 02.11.2022 while
following the judgment of M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India,
reported in 1995 (5) SCC 628 and holding that the case of the
applicant is not of one time action rather, the claim for
regularization and pay parity on the basis of the principle of 'Equal
pay for equal work' gave rise to a fresh cause of action each
month in favour of the applicant.
3.1. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Tribunal has
erred in coming to the conclusion that the original applicant was
sleeping over his rights by not claiming the benefits on time. He
submitted that during applicant's service, several pay rise were
given to him, but they hardly justified the actual work performed
by the applicant and when the applicant actually approached
respondent authority, with representation dated 10.04.2017, to
convert his status from part time to full time and making his
payment in regular pay scale in terms of O.M. dated 22.01.2015
issued by Government of India, respondent authority kept silent
and did not respond to the said representation.
3.2. Learned counsel further submitted that learned Tribunal has
committed grave error in distinguishing the applicant's claim on
ground of parity with Vijesh Kumar based on the principles of
equity and fairness, and making strange observation that
applicant should have approached immediately after Vijesh Kumar
succeeded in his claim.
3.3 Learned counsel also pointed out that the learned Tribunal
has not just ignored the fact of long dedicated service of applicant,
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but also overlooked his continuous effort of approaching the
respondent authorities with his grievances as also the fact that the
respondent authorities had shown total apathy towards applicant
by not considering his representation, which was contrary to the
settled norms of administrative jurisprudence.
3.4. Learned counsel also submitted that the issue of applicant
being minor at the time of appointment cannot be permitted to be
raised in applicant's case, as the same was not raised in the reply
filed by respondent authorities in both the original applications
before the learned Tribunal and in the case of Vijesh Kumar,
despite the ground of minor age being raised, he was granted the
relief by the learned Tribunal.
3.5. Learned counsel further submitted that whenever an
employee is kept for long years of service as daily wager against a
permanent post and discharges similar duties like a regular
employee, then he is entitled to be paid regular pay scale of the
post and the same view was taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of Punjab vs. Jagjit Singh, reported in (2017) 1 SCC
148 and it was further held that even a daily wager is entitled for
minimum of pay scale irrespective of mode of appointment.
3.6. Learned counsel further submitted that there was a specific
averment made before the learned Tribunal with regard to the
original applicant being appointed under the respondent-
Department at Sub Post Office of Shastri Nagar on 03.09.1984,
and thereafter continuously working till the date of his death
under the respondent-Department at the same place. He further
submitted that the above-mentioned averments were never
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disputed by the respondent-Department in their reply filed before
the learned Tribunal and rather, in the reply, they had admitted
that the applicant was working under them for years together
however, the only averment made was that he was working as
part-time casual labour and that the wages were being paid from
the contingency fund. He thus submits, that the averment made
before this Court for the first time with regard to applicant
working under the respondent-Department since the year 1999 is
totally unjustified and without any basis whatsoever.
3.7. Learned counsel relied on the following judgments to support
his contentions, claiming regularization:-
Jaggo vs. Union of India, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3826, Shripal vs Nagar Nimal Ghaziabad, reported in 2025
INSC 144, Nihal Singh & Ors vs. State of Punjab & Ors,
reported in AIR 2013 SC 3547, Bhola Nath vs The State of
Jharkhand & Ors., reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 129,
Dharam Singh & Ors vs. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1735.
Arguments of the learned counsel for the Respondents: -
4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the
learned Tribunal's order dated 30.07.2024 is passed after
thoroughly considering the documents available on record and
learned Tribunal acted in full compliance with the remand order
dated 02.11.2022 passed by this Court. He further submitted that
the applicant did not produce sufficient documentary evidence of
applying for converting his status of part time to full time, that's
why his claim was rejected by learned Tribunal as well the
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applicant never gave reasons for the long delay in filing original
applications before the learned Tribunal.
4.1. Learned counsel submitted regarding applicant's
representation dated 10.04.2017, that it was not considered
because the applicant has joined service in 1999 and that is why
his case could not be brought under the ambit of Casual Labour
(Grant of Temporary Status and Regularization) Scheme, 1991 as
the cut-off date in the said Scheme was 07.06.1988. No
appointment letter exists in applicant's case and in the name of
appointment letter he has only produced a payment voucher of
the year 1999. He further submitted that the applicant was, hired
as a part time employee for limited duration of work each day at
Sub Post Office, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur. The applicant was not
working on any civil post or fixed post or sanctioned post at the
Sub Post Office, Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur and because of the
temporary requirements of the post, the applicant's case was not
at all fit for consideration for regularization, even his payment was
made from contingency fund, which was allotted by the concerned
department to manage extra expenses of the Sub Post Office of
Shastri Nagar, Jodhpur.
4.2. Learned counsel countered the original applicant's claim of
parity with Vijesh Kumar's case, while submitting that the learned
Tribunal had also given a correct finding upon the above
mentioned aspect in the applicant's case and had rightly
distinguished his case from Vijesh Kumar's case, not just once but
twice. The applicant had joined services in 1999 as per records
available, whereas Vijesh Kumar joined services on 1983. Vijesh
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Kumar had claimed status of full time employee while relying upon
the circular dated 08.04.1991 named as Casual Labour (Grant of
Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991, whereas,
applicant in the present matter did not claim any such benefits
until 2017. Even then applicant was only relying upon parity with
Vijesh Kumar, which was far from any kind of similarity. Vijesh
kumar's regularization order was sanctioned because of order of
the learned Tribunal, which was affirmed by this Court, whereas,
the applicant was not able to satisfy the learned Tribunal as well
as this Court for granting a favourable order of identical kind in his
favour.
4.3. Unfortunately, the original applicant passed away during the
pendency of this litigation, and after his death, the surviving cause
of action in this matter, itself ceased to exist, therefore, the claim
of applicant's family should be rejected. There remains no
benefits, which can be given to his family. The claimed pension
benefits by the legal representative - wife of the applicant cannot
be entertained as the applicant in his life time, served as part time
employee and no liability can be now created upon the respondent
department to pay pensionary benefits by any relevant laws.
4.4. The claim of applicant belonging to economically weaker
section and strained financial situation, does not create any
liability towards respondent authorities. He had waived his rights
and has been guilty of forfeiting his rights through inaction, as he
had accepted the situation by not approaching the concerned
authorities for long period of time.
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4.5. Learned counsel also drew attention of this Court towards
affidavit filed in the year of 2019, where the age of the applicant
was mentioned as 50 years, which means, he was born on 1969,
accordingly making the age of applicant 15 years only is the year
1984. Thus, even if applicant's statement is considered true, then
he will be considered as minor at the time of joining, therefore, as
per the settled principles of Contract law, any contract executed
by minor is void ab initio.
4.6. Learned counsel relied on the following judgments to support
his contentions:
State of U.P. & Ors. vs Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors.,
reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 and State of Orissa & Anr. vs
Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 436.
Analysis & Reasoning: -
5. This Court has given careful consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for both the sides and perused the
material available on record.
6. This Court, in earlier round of litigation, vide order dated
02.11.2022 had already overruled the ground of delay in terms of
M.R. Gupta (supra) and remanded back the matter for its
consideration on merits. Learned Tribunal has thereafter dismissed
the said application vide order dated 30.07.2024 while holding
that the case of the original applicant is not on the same footing
or similar with the case of Vijesh Kumar.
7. The original applicant has filed two documents apart from
representation dated 10.04.2017, one is of dated 26.10.1990
(Annexure-1 of O.A.) and in the second document, date is not
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mentioned (Annexure-1 of O.A.). These documents fortified the
fact that the original applicant has approached multiple times with
his grievances and continuously served at the same office. Not
only this, the applicant has further filed an additional affidavit
before this Court also along with certain documents being the
representations filed by the applicant before the respondent for
grant of pay scale and regular status. The representations are
dated 22.08.1995, 04.10.2000 and 20.05.2015. The respondents
have not disputed the factum of filing of such representations.
8. Thus, the averment made with regard to original applicant
not pursing his matter even post passing of order by the learned
Tribunal in case of Vijesh Kumar is without any basis. The above-
mentioned documents as well as the documents placed before the
learned Tribunal fortify the fact of the original applicant pursuing
the case since long, initially for grant of pay scale and thereafter
for regularization and grant of status of permanent employee.
Thus, the finding given by the learned Tribunal with regard to
original applicant not pursuing the case till the year 2019 and
directly for the first time filing the O.A. in the year 2019 is without
any basis.
9. The original applicant's claim of parity with Vijesh Kumar's
case was not fairly dealt with by the learned Tribunal as both the
employees had joined the service during the year 1983 & 1984
respectively, had performed the similar nature of work at different
branches, but of the same department (Department of Posts,
Govt. of India), and they had approached respective authorities
with representations, multiple times citing the same grievances.
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Just because, the original applicant has not approached the
learned Tribunal immediately when Vijesh Kumar was granted
benefits, the principles of equality and fairness do not diminish.
The objection of being minor at the time of appointment was
considered in the case of Vijesh Kumar also and negated at the
threshold by the learned Tribunal and this Court also. Therefore, it
should not become a valid ground to reject the original applicant's
claim as well.
10. Furthermore, there is substance in the argument of the
learned counsel for the original applicant with regard to parity of
the case of Vijesh Kumar with the case of original applicant
inasmuch as Vijesh Kumar was appointed in the year 1983 and
was also appointed as a part-time employee and posted at Post
Office, Kacheri. He was also engaged as a Sweeper and thereafter,
he filed an O.A. wherein direction was issued to treat him as a full-
time casual labour rather than part-time casual labour. The
respondents negated the claim by way of order dated 09.01.2007
while observing that he was working at the Kacheri Post Office just
for 2 hours and 25 minutes each day and therefore, status of full-
time casual labour could not be granted.
11. Above-mentioned order was subsequently withdrawn and he
was granted status of regular employee post passing of fresh
order by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal which was
upheld by this Court vide order dated 17.12.2009. The
respondents had thereafter passed the order dated 22.03.2011
granting Vijesh Kumar the status of a regular employee on the
post of MTS (Group-C) and a consequential order was passed on
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25.07.2011. The documents available on record clearly reveal that
as far as the petitioner is concerned, he was appointed in the year
1984 and had been working continuously under the respondent-
Department since then. His wages were increased by the
respondent-Department on representations filed by him and the
nature of work was identical and he was discharging the duties as
a full-time employee. The case of the original applicant cannot be
distinguished with that of Vijesh Kumar as while granting the
benefit of circular issued by respondent-Department themselves,
the same benefit was applicable to the original applicant also.
12. Simply because the petitioner had not filed an earlier O.A.
seeking the status of a full-time employee would make no
difference whatsoever, more particularly, in view of the fact that
identical relief was granted to similarly situated Vijesh Kumar and
thereafter he was regularized. The original applicant by way of the
O.A. in question had prayed for grant of same benefits as granted
to Vijesh Kumar and the respondents were not able to point out
distinction between services rendered by the original applicant and
Vijesh Kumar. Learned Tribunal was thus apparently at fault in not
granting the same benefit to the original applicant more
particularly when the averment made by the original applicant
with regard to discharging duties full-time and working since the
year 1984 have not been disputed by the respondents themselves
in their reply filed before the learned Tribunal. Rather in the reply
to the present writ petition the respondents have tried to make
out an entirely different case while emphasizing that the original
applicant was appointed in the year 1999, whereas the documents
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available on record show that the averments made are without
any substance and just an afterthought with a view to deny the
benefits to the original applicant which have been granted to
Vijesh Kumar.
13. As far as the issue of regularization is concerned, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court and this Court as well, have given catena of
rulings as to when services of a part time, contractual, daily-
wager, or casual employee are entitled to be regularized with
consequential benefits of regular pay scale and other benefits.
14. In the matters of regularization, the Courts have consistently
balanced the need for fair recruitment processes vis-a-vis the
prevention and exploitation of employees through indefinite
temporariness of service. The foundational ruling remains the
Constitution Bench decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka
vs. Uma Devi, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1. This judgment
aimed to curb backdoor entries and has also issued guidelines as
to when regularization orders should be passed.
15. In Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has observed as under: -
"10. Having given careful consideration to the submissions
advanced and the material on record, we find that the appellants'
long and uninterrupted service, for periods extending well beyond
ten years, cannot be brushed aside merely by labelling their
initial appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of
their employment must be considered in the light of their
sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work, and the
fact that no evidence suggests their entry was through any illegal
or surreptitious route.
***
20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi (supra)
does not intend to penalize employees who have rendered long
years of service fulfilling ongoing and necessary functions of the
State or its instrumentalities. The said judgment sought to
prevent backdoor entries and illegal appointments that
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circumvent constitutional requirements. However, where
appointments were not illegal but possibly “irregular,” and where
employees had served continuously against the backdrop of
sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need for a fair
and humane resolution becomes paramount. Prolonged,
continuous, and unblemished service performing tasks inherently
required on a regular basis can, over the time, transform what
was initially ad-hoc or temporary into a scenario demanding fair
regularization. In a recent judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar
v. Union of India, it was held that held that procedural formalities
cannot be used to deny regularization of service to an employee
whose appointment was termed “temporary” but has performed
the same duties as performed by the regular employee over a
considerable period in the capacity of the regular employee. The
relevant paras of this judgment have been reproduced below:
“6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) by the
High Court does not fit squarely with the facts at hand, given
the specific circumstances under which the appellants were
employed and have continued their service. The reliance on
procedural formalities at the outset cannot be used to
perpetually deny substantive rights that have accrued over a
considerable period through continuous service. Their
promotion was based on a specific notification for vacancies
and a subsequent circular, followed by a selection process
involving written tests and interviews, which distinguishes their
case from the appointments through back door entry as
discussed in the case of Uma Devi (supra).
7. The judgment in the case Uma Devi (supra) also
distinguished between “irregular” and “illegal” appointments
underscoring the importance of considering certain
appointments even if were not made strictly in accordance with
the prescribed Rules and Procedure, cannot be said to have
been made illegally if they had followed the procedures of
regular appointments such as conduct of written examinations
or interviews as in the present case…”
21. The High Court placed undue emphasis on the initial label of
the appellants’ engagements and the outsourcing decision taken
after their dismissal. Courts must look beyond the surface labels
and consider the realities of employment : continuous, long-term
service, indispensable duties, and absence of any mala fide or
illegalities in their appointments. In that light, refusing
regularization simply because their original terms did not explicitly
state so, or because an outsourcing policy was belatedly
introduced, would be contrary to principles of fairness and equity.
22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as
exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that
adversely affects workers’ rights and job security. In the private
sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in
precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack
of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have
been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour
standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the
principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater
responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices.
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When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary
contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in
the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can
erode public trust in governmental operations.
23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is
a founding member, has consistently advocated for employment
stability and the fair treatment of workers. The ILO’s Multinational
Enterprises Declaration encourages companies to provide stable
employment and to observe obligations concerning employment
stability and social security. It emphasizes that enterprises should
assume a leading role in promoting employment security,
particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate
long-term unemployment.
24. The landmark judgment of the United State in the case of
Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation serves as a pertinent example
from the private sector, illustrating the consequences of
misclassifying employees to circumvent providing benefits. In this
case, Microsoft classified certain workers as independent
contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these
workers were, in fact, common-law employees and were entitled
to the same benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that
large Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring
temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of
avoiding payment of employee benefits, thereby increasing their
profits. This judgment underscores the principle that the nature of
the work performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker,
should determine employment status and the corresponding rights
and benefits. It highlights the judiciary’s role in rectifying such
misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair
treatment.
25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees,
particularly in government institutions, often face multifaceted
forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary
contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs,
they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term
obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in
several ways:
• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for work
that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an
institution are often labeled as “temporary” or “contractual,” even
when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such
misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and
benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing
identical tasks.
• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently
dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case.
This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and
subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of
the quality or duration of their service.
• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary employees often find
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (17 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]promotions, or incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in
their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their
regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally
significant.
• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions increasingly
resort to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees,
effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another.
This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also
demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer
regular employment.
• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees
are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident
fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure
spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their
families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness,
retirement, or unforeseen circumstances.
26. While the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) sought to curtail the
practice of backdoor entries and ensure appointments adhered to
constitutional principles, it is regrettable that its principles are
often misinterpreted or misapplied to deny legitimate claims of
long-serving employees. This judgment aimed to distinguish
between “illegal” and “irregular” appointments. It categorically
held that employees in irregular appointments, who were engaged
in duly sanctioned posts and had served continuously for more
than ten years, should be considered for regularization as a one-
time measure. However, the laudable intent of the judgment is
being subverted when institutions rely on its dicta to
indiscriminately reject the claims of employees, even in cases
where their appointments are not illegal, but merely lack
adherence to procedural formalities. Government departments
often cite the judgment in Uma Devi (supra) to argue that no
vested right to regularization exists for temporary employees,
overlooking the judgment’s explicit acknowledgment of cases
where regularization is appropriate. This selective application
distorts the judgment’s spirit and purpose, effectively weaponizing
it against employees who have rendered indispensable services
over decades.
27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative
for government departments to lead by example in providing fair
and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis
for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to
the organization’s functioning, not only contravenes international
labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal
challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair
employment practices, government institutions can reduce the
burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold
the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to
embody. This approach aligns with international standards and
sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby
contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the
country.”
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (18 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharam Singh & Ors vs.
State of U.P. & Anr. (supra) has observed as under:-
“11. Furthermore, it must be clarified that the reliance placed by
the High Court on Umadevi (Supra) to non-suit the appellants is
misplaced. Unlike Umadevi (Supra), the challenge before us is
not an invitation to bypass the constitutional scheme of public
employment. It is a challenge to the State’s arbitrary refusals to
sanction posts despite the employer’s own acknowledgement of
need and decades of continuous reliance on the very workforce.
On the other hand, Umadevi (Supra) draws a distinction between
illegal appointments and irregular engagements and does not
endorse the perpetuation of precarious employment where the
work itself is permanent and the State has failed, for years, to
put its house in order. Recent decisions of this Court in Jaggo v.
Union of India and in Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad have
emphatically cautioned that Umadevi (Supra) cannot be deployed
as a shield to justify exploitation through long-term “ad hocism”,
the use of outsourcing as a proxy, or the denial of basic parity
where identical duties are exacted over extended periods. The
principles articulated therein apply with full force to the present
case. The relevant paras from Shripal (supra) have been
reproduced hereunder:
“14. The Respondent Employer places reliance on Umadevi
(supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary employees
cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence of statutory
rules providing such absorption. However, as frequently
reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between appointments
that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,” the latter being
eligible for regularization if they meet certain conditions. More
importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify
exploitative engagements persisting for years without the
Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. Given the record
which shows no true contractor-based arrangement and a
consistent need for permanent horticultural staff the alleged
asserted ban on fresh recruitment, though real, cannot justify
indefinite daily-wage status or continued unfair practices.
15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously
rendered their services over several years, sometimes
spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls were
not produced in full, the Employer’s failure to furnish such
records-despite directions to do so-allows an adverse inference
under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian labour law
strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage or contractual
engagements in circumstances where the work is permanent in
nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil ongoing
municipal requirements year after year cannot be dismissed
summarily as dispensable, particularly in the absence of a
genuine contractor agreement………
***
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (19 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the
State (here referring to both the Union and the State
governments) is not a mere market participant but a
constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs
of those who perform the most basic and recurring public
functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year,
the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned
strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of
regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in
public administration and offends the promise of equal
protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public
policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason
and the duty to organise work on lawful lines.
18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism”
thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments
must keep and produce accurate establishment registers,
muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must
explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious engagement
over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If
“constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives
were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated
differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14,
16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human
consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is
a constitutional discipline that should inform every decision
affecting those who keep public offices running.”
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, recently in Bhola Nath vs The
State of Jharkhand & Ors., (supra) has held as under:-
“State as model employer: –
11. At the outset, we find it necessary to express our disapproval of
the manner in which the High Court has approached the present lis.
The controversy before the Court was not one of mere acquiescence or
implied waiver of rights. The High Court, in our view, has proceeded on
a mechanical application of precedents without engaging with the core
constitutional issues involved, thereby reducing the dispute to one of
acceptance of contractual terms, divorced from its larger constitutional
context.
11.1. This Court has consistently held that the State, being a model
employer, is saddled with a heightened obligation in the discharge of
its functions. A model employer is expected to act with high probity,
fairness and candour, and bears a social responsibility to treat its
employees in a manner that preserves their dignity. The State cannot
be permitted to exploit its employees or to take advantage of their
vulnerability, helplessness or unequal bargaining position.
11.2. It therefore follows that the State is required to exercise
heightened caution in its role as an employer, the constitutional
mandate casting upon it a strict obligation to act as a model employer,
an obligation from which no exception can be countenanced.
Fundamental Rights and their waiver:
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (20 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]11.3. In the present case, the appellants were appointed by the
respondent-State against sanctioned posts of Junior Engineers
(Agriculture), with the engagement being described from the inception
as contractual in nature. The terms and conditions governing the
engagement stipulated that the appointment would be for an initial
period of one year, extendable thereafter subject to satisfactory
performance.
11.4. The respondent-State accordingly granted extensions to the
appellants from time to time until the year 2023, when it was
expressly clarified that the extension being granted would be the last.
It was thereafter that the appellants approached the High Court by
filing writ petitions seeking a writ of mandamus directing the State to
regularize their services.
11.5. The consistent case of the appellants has been that the
respondent-State’s refusal to grant regularization is arbitrary and
therefore warrants judicial interference. Article 14 of the Constitution
casts a negative obligation upon the State to treat all persons equally,
and arbitrariness, being antithetical to the equality principle, is
proscribed as violative of Article 14.
11.6. The Constitution Bench in Basheshar Nath v. Comm. Income
Tax, long ago clarified that fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution are incapable of waiver. Consequently, if the action of the
respondent-State is found to be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution, the mere fact that the appellants’ engagement was
governed by contractual terms and conditions cannot be construed as
a waiver of their fundamental rights.
Unconscionable Agreements- Contract between Lion and Lamb:
12. In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly,
this Court acknowledged the increasing imbalance in the bargaining
power of contracting parties. The Court held thus: –
“89. . . . We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges are
bound by their oath to “uphold the Constitution and the laws”. The
Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country
social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees
to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the
laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part
of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to
secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of
the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the
courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike
down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and
unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who
are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive
list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different
situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only
attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle
will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of
the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting
parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of
circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will
apply to situations in which the weaker party is in aposition in which
he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (21 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice,
but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a
prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the
contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause
in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will
not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is
equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both
parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial
transaction. In today’s complex world of giant corporations with their
vast infrastructural organizations and with the State through its
instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of
industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result
in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing
wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases
can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must
judge each case on its own facts and circumstances.”
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, the Court has held that the Constitution obliges courts to
advance social and economic justice and to give effect to the equality
mandate under Article 14. Consequently, courts will neither enforce nor
hesitate to invalidate contracts, or contractual clauses, that are unfair
or unreasonable when entered into between parties with unequal
bargaining power.
12.1. Relying on the aforesaid reasoning, another two-Judge Bench in
Pani Ram v. Union of India, reiterated that the guarantee of equality
under Article 14 extends even to situations where a person has no
meaningful choice but to accept imposed contractual terms, however
unfair or unreasonable they may be. Applying this principle to the facts
before it, the Court observed thus: –
“23. As held by this Court, a right to equality guaranteed
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India would also apply
to a man who has no choice or rather no meaningful choice,
but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted
line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of
rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable
and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules
may be. We find that the said observations rightly apply to
the facts of the present case. Can it be said that the mighty
Union of India and an ordinary soldier, who having fought for
the country and retired from Regular Army, seeking re-
employment in the Territorial Army, have an equal bargaining
power. We are therefore of the considered view that the
reliance placed on the said document would also be of no
assistance to the case of the respondents.”
(emphasis laid)
Therefore, it is clear that Courts are empowered to invalidate
unconscionable elements of a contract where the parties lack the ability
to exercise any real or meaningful choice in negotiating its terms. In
the present case, the appellants were left with no alternative but to
accept the conditions unilaterally prescribed by the respondent-State in
order to secure their livelihood and sustain a source of income. It would
be entirely unrealistic to assume that, in such circumstances, an
employee seeking temporary employment could meaningfully negotiate
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (22 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
or assert a position against the overwhelming might of the State
machinery.
12.2. At this juncture, the analogy of apples and oranges serves as a
useful reminder that certain relationships are inherently incapable of
being assessed on an equal plane. A contract between the State and an
employee stands on a similar footing. The State, in such a relationship,
assumes the role of a metaphorical lion, endowed with overwhelming
authority, resources and bargaining strength, whereas the employee,
who is yet an aspirant, is reduced to the position of a metaphorical
lamb, possessing little real negotiating power. To suggest parity
between the two, i.e. the lion and the lamb, would be to ignore the
stark imbalance that defines the relationship.
12.3. Therefore, where a lion contracts with a lamb, the inequality is
not incidental but structural, and it is precisely this disproportion that
calls for judicial sensitivity. In such situations, the conscience of
Constitutional Courts must inevitably tilt in favour of protecting the
lamb. We have no hesitation in holding that Constitutional Courts are
duty-bound to act to safeguard those who are vulnerable to
exploitation, so that employees are not compelled to meekly submit to
the demands of a vastly dominant contracting party like the State, but
are instead assured that constitutional protections will intervene to
prevent such exploitation.
Legitimate Expectation of the employees: –
13. Another facet requiring consideration in the case of contractual
employees, such as the present appellants, is the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. Where employees have continued to discharge their duties
on contractual posts for a considerable length of time, as in the present
case, it is but natural that a legitimate expectation arises that the State
would, at some stage, recognize their long and continuous service. It is
in this belief, bolstered by repeated extensions granted by the
Executive, that such employees continue in service and refrain from
seeking alternative employment, notwithstanding the contractual
nature of their engagement. At this juncture, it is thus apposite to
advert to the principles governing the doctrine of legitimate
expectation as enunciated by this Court in Army Welfare Education
Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, wherein it was held as follows: –
“63. A reading of the aforesaid decisions brings forth the following
features regarding the doctrine of legitimate expectation:
63.1. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right
as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation;
63.2. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from
an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or
custom followed by an authority in its dealings;
…
63.5. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of
public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken
only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates
from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis.
…
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (23 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
64. The aforesaid features, although not exhaustive in
nature, are sufficient to help us in deciding the applicability of
the doctrine of legitimate expectation to the facts of the case
at hand. It is clear that legitimate expectation,
jurisprudentially, was a device created in order to maintain a
check on arbitrariness in State action. It does not extend to and
cannot govern the operation of contracts between private parties,
wherein the doctrine of promissory estoppel holds the field.”
(emphasis laid)
It is, therefore, not difficult to comprehend the expectation with which
such contractual employees continue in the service of the State. The
repeated conduct of the employer-State in expressing confidence in
their performance and consistently granting monetary upgrades &
tenure extensions reasonably nurtures an expectation that their long
and continuous service would receive further recognition.
13.1. Another Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi,
cautioned that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot ordinarily
be extended to persons whose appointments are temporary, casual or
contractual in nature. The relevant extract of the judgment reads as
follows: –
“47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets
engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the
engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised
by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the
consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or
contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the
theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the
post when an appointment to the post could be made only by
following a proper procedure for selection and in cases
concerned, in consultation with the Public Service
Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation
cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual
or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has
held out any promise while engaging these persons either to
continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The
State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also
obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief
of being made permanent in the post.” (emphasis laid)
However, this Court in Umadevi (supra) clarified that the bar against
invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies only to
those temporary, contractual or casual employees whose engagement
was not preceded by a proper selection process in accordance with the
extant rules. Consequently, where such engagement is made after
following a due and lawful selection procedure, there is no absolute bar
in law preventing such employees from invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.
Limits on Perpetual Contractual Engagements:
13.2. In the present case, the respondent-State had engaged the
services of the appellants on sanctioned posts since the year 2012. It
was only towards the end of the year 2022 that the respondents
communicated that no further extension of the appellants’ engagement
was likely to be granted.
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (24 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
13.3. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid action is not only
vitiated by arbitrariness but is also in clear derogation of the equality
principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The respondent-
State initially engaged the appellants in their youth to discharge public
duties and functions. Having rendered long and dedicated service, the
appellants cannot now be left to fend for themselves, particularly when
the employment opportunities that may have been available to them a
decade ago are no longer accessible owing to age constraints.
13.4. We are unable to discern any rational basis for the respondent-
State’s decision to discontinue the appellants after nearly ten years of
continuous service.We are conscious that the symbiotic-relationship
between the appellants and the respondent-State was mutually
beneficial, the State derived the advantage of the appellants’
experience and institutional familiarity, while the appellants remained
in public service. In such circumstances, any departure from a long-
standing practice of renewal, particularly one that frustrates the
legitimate expectation of the employees, ought to be supported by
cogent reasons recorded in a speaking order.
13.5. Such a decision must necessarily be a conscious and reasoned
one. An employee who has satisfactorily discharged his duties over
several years and has been granted repeated extensions cannot,
overnight, be treated as surplus or undesirable. We are unable to
accept the justification advanced by the respondents as the obligation
of the State, as a model employer, extends to fair treatment of its
employees irrespective of whether their engagement is contractual or
regular.
13.6. This Court has, on several occasions, deprecated the practice
adopted by States of engaging employees under the nominal labels of
“part-time”, “contractual” or “temporary” in perpetuity and thereby
exploiting them by not regularizing their positions. In Jaggo v. Union of
India, this Court underscored that government-departments must lead
by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, and evolved the
test of examining whether the duties performed by such temporary
employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of the
organization.
13.7. In Shripal v. Nagar Nigam and Vinod Kumar v. Union of India,
this Court cautioned against a mechanical and blind reliance on
Umadevi (supra) to deny regularization to temporary employees in
the absence of statutory rules. It was held that Umadevi (supra)
cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative engagements
continued for years without undertaking regular recruitment. The Court
further clarified that Umadevi itself draws a distinction between
appointments that are “illegal” and those that are merely “irregular”,
the latter being amenable to regularization upon fulfilment of the
prescribed conditions.
13.8. In Dharam Singh v. State of U.P., this Court strongly deprecated
the culture of ” ad-hocism” adopted by States in their capacity as
employers. The Court criticised the practice of outsourcing or
informalizing recruitment as a means to evade regular employment
obligations, observing that such measures perpetuate precarious
working conditions while circumventing fair and lawful engagement
practices.
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (25 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
13.9. The State must remain conscious that part-time employees, such
as the appellants, constitute an integral part of the edifice upon which
the machinery of the State continues to function. They are not merely
ancillary to the system, but form essential components thereof. The
equality mandate of our Constitution, therefore, requires that their
service be reciprocated in a manner free from arbitrariness, ensuring
that decisions of the State affecting the careers and livelihood of such
part-time and contractual employees are guided by fairness and
reason.
13.10. In the aforesaid backdrop, we are unable to persuade ourselves
to accept the respondent-State’s contention that the mere contractual
nomenclature of the appellants’ engagement denudes them of
constitutional protection. The State, having availed of the appellants’
services on sanctioned posts for over a decade pursuant to a due
process of selection and having consistently acknowledged their
satisfactory performance, cannot, in the absence of cogent reasons or
a speaking decision, abruptly discontinue such engagement by taking
refuge behind formal contractual clauses. Such action is manifestly
arbitrary, inconsistent with the obligation of the State to act as a model
employer, and fails to withstand scrutiny under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
FINAL CONCLUSION:
14. In light of our discussion, in the foregoing paragraphs, we
summarize our conclusions as follows:
I. The respondent-State was not justified in continuing the appellants
on sanctioned vacant posts for over a decade under the nomenclature
of contractual engagement and thereafter denying them consideration
for regularization.
II. Abrupt discontinuance of such long-standing engagement solely on
the basis of contractual nomenclature, without either recording cogent
reasons or passing a speaking order, is manifestly arbitrary and
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
III. Contractual stipulations purporting to bar claims for regularization
cannot override constitutional guarantees. Acceptance of contractual
terms does not amount to waiver of fundamental rights, and
contractual stipulations cannot immunize arbitrary State action from
constitutional scrutiny.
IV. The State, as a model employer, cannot rely on contractual labels
or mechanical application of Umadevi (supra) to justify prolonged ad-
hocism or to discard long-serving employees in a manner inconsistent
with fairness, dignity and constitutional governance.
V. In view of the foregoing discussion, we direct the respondent-State
to forthwith regularize the services of all the appellants against the
sanctioned posts to which they were initially appointed. The appellants
shall be entitled to all consequential service benefits accruing from the
date of this judgment.”
18. The above referred judgments form a notable evolving
jurisprudence that builds on with cautions against mechanical
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (26 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]application of the Constitution Bench decision in Uma Devi
(supra). These judgments represent a push against the culture of
‘ad-hocism’ and precarious employment in the public sector.
19. These principles are governed by Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India. When an employee has served for more than
10 years and his request for regularization is arbitrarily denied or
his service discontinued without any cogent reasons or speaking
order, then it is ‘manifestly arbitrary’ which violates Article 14 of
Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharam
Singh (supra) and Bhola Nath (supra) reaffirmed that the
arguments of procedural formalities, financial constraints and lack
of sanctioned post cannot be a basis to deny the regularization
where the State has extracted regular labour under the label of
temporariness. State’s duty prevails as a ‘Model Employer’ under
the ambit of Article 14 and when an employee have rendered long
and satisfactory service on the same post, he is entitled for
regularization rather than continuing as temporary or ad-hoc.
20. In Bhola Nath (supra), the Hon’ble supreme Court while
citing Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi
& Rajasthan and Anr., reported in AIR 1959 SC 149, reiterated
that fundamental rights guaranteed under the Article 14 of
Constitution of India are incapable of waiver. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court further held that approach of deciding these disputes of
regularization, citing mere acquiescence or waiver of rights, is
reducing the dispute to one of acceptance of contractual terms
and is thus, divorced from its larger constitutional context.
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (27 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
21. In the present petition, the arguments of learned counsel for
the respondents regarding no sanctioned post existing and original
applicant’s salary being paid from contingency fund is of no use as
the fact of continuous service of original applicant established that
there was a vacant post and the respondent authorities were
extracting work from him by paying him tuppence under the guise
of part time employment status. The nature of the work of the
original applicant was perennial in nature and nobody else was
working on the post of Sweeper, thus, the existence of the
permanent sanctioned post can be inferred from the facts of the
present case as also the work of sweeping and cleaning being of
nature of full time work.
22. The argument made by the learned counsel for the
respondents, as also observed by the learned Tribunal, with regard
to converting the status of the deceased original applicant from
part-time to full-time casual labour does not arise post his death is
noted to be rejected. By the widest stretch of imagination, can
such an averment cannot be accepted as it is not supported by
any legal principle emphasizing the fact that post death of an
employee the status cannot be changed. Rather, the Division
Bench of this Court while deciding D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.141/2020 vide its order dated 02.11.2022, in the first round of
the litigation qua the original applicant, has observed that post his
death his wife has already been taken on record and directed the
respondents to consider the issue of regularization. The Court was
conscious of the fact that post his death also, the right to sue
survives in favour of his wife and the relief prayed for can be
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[2026:RJ-JD:17883-DB] (28 of 28) [CW-6974/2025]
granted. Even otherwise, as observed by the learned Division
Bench, the case in hand was a case of continuous cause of action.
In that case, the death of the deceased would make no difference
whatsoever as the benefits accruing from the order can be reaped
by the legal representatives of the deceased.
23. Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The
impugned order dated 30.07.2024 passed in O.A.
No.71/2019 :”Lrs of Applicant: Smt. Kusum w/o Late Sunny vs.
Union of India” is quashed and set aside.
24. In light of the above discussion, it is directed that the original
applicant is entitled for grant of same relief as has been granted to
Vijesh Kumar from the same date that is from 25.07.2011. The
services of the original applicant shall be regularized on the post
of MTS (Group-C) w.e.f. 25.07.2011 and all consequential benefits
including pensionary (if applicable) and other benefit shall be paid
by the respondents to the original applicant within a period of
three months from today.
25. No order as to cost.
26. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed off.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
27-charul/-
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