Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Liyakat Ali Khan S/O Shree Shokat Ali … vs State Of Rajasthan on 8 July, 2026
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S.B. Civil Review Petition No. 66/2019
URN: WRW / 81U / 2019
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4793/2017
Dinesh Chourasiya S/o Sh. Jagdish Narayan Chourasiya, Aged
About 51 Years, Resident Of Raghunath Puri, Taktha, Tonk,
Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department Of
Urban Development And Housing, Government, Secretariat,
Jaipur, (Raj.)
2. Court Of Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Assistant Engineer, Tonk
(Raj.)
----Respondents
Connected With
(2) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13319/2021
URN: CW / 29386U / 2021
1. Liyakat Ali Khan S/o Shree Shokat Ali Khan, Aged About 65
Years, Resident Of Bada Kua Devli, Ward No 17, Tonk,
District Tonk.
2. Firoz Khan Son Of Mohamad Fayaj, Aged About 35 Years,
Resident Of Nayako Ka Mohalla, Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And
District Tonk.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary Urban
Development And Housing Department, Government Of
Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Dy. Secretary (Administration), Urban Development And
Housing Department, Secretariat, Jaipur.
3. Authorized Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Rajasthan
Housing Board, Janpath, Jaipur.
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Its Commissioner, Jyoti
Nagar, Jaipur.
----Respondents
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(3) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4179/2025
URN: CW / 10605U / 2025
1. Fayyaz Kha Son Of Shri Mohammad Iliyas Khan, Aged About
66 Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Mohalla, Tal Katora, Tonk
(Raj.)
2. Munna Miya Alias Aizaz Son Of Shri Iliyas Khan, Aged About
58 Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Mohalla, Tal Katora, Tonk
(Raj.)
3. Aasiya Wife Of Shri Gulzar, Aged About 48 Years, Resident
Of Nayako Ka Mohalla, Tal Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
4. Nadeem Miya Son Of Shri Mehboob Khan, Aged About 28
Years, Resident Of Talab Ke Andar, Talk Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
5. Farman Son Of Shri Gulzar, Aged About 21 Years, Resident
Of Shivaji Nagar, Kampu, Tonk (Raj.)
6. Bibi Alias Jamila Wife Of Shri Kalu Khan, Aged About 60
Years, Resident Of Maholla Tal Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
7. Mukhtar Son Of Shri Iliyas Khan, Aged About 55 Years,
Resident Of Sohrab Khan Ki Haveli Ke Pass, Mohallah Talk
Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
8. Muskan Wife Of Shri Wahid, Daughter Of Shri Gulzar, Aged
About 29 Years, Resident Of Ward No. 18, Taj Colony, Tonk
(Raj.)
9. Mustak Son Of Iliyas, Aged About 56 Years, Resident Of
Shivaji Nagar, Kampu, Tonk (Raj.)
10. Rayis Miya Alias Raees, Son Of Shri Mehboob Khan, Aged
About 48 Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Kuan, Tal Katora,
Ward No. 16, Tonk (Raj.)
11. Roman Son Of Shri Gulzar, Aged About 15 Years, Resident
Of Mev Nagar, Deoli Road, Jagdamba Chatrawas Ke Samne,
Tonk (Raj.) (Minor) Through Gulzar Khan
12. Sofiya Daughter Of Shri Gulzar, Aged About 13 Years,
Resident Of Mev Nagar, Deoli Road, Jagdamba Chatrawas Ke
Samne, Tonk (Raj.) (Minor) Through Gulzar Khan
13. Gulzar Khan Son Of Shri Mohammad Iliyas Khan, Aged
About 66 Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Mohalla, Tal Katora,
Tonk (Raj.)
14. Shahzad Khan Son Of Shri Iliyas Khan, Aged About 60
Years, Resident Of Shivaji Nagar, Kampu, Tonk (Raj.)
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15. Habib Alias Habib Mehboob Son Of Shri Mehboob Khan,
Aged About 41 Years, Resident Of Tal Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
Petitioner No. 1 To 14 Are The Khatedar In Khasra No. 62,
65, 67 And 88 In The Village Sevarampura, District-Tonk
(Raj.) Area About 5 Bhiga And 01 Biswa, 4 Bhiga And 19
Biswa, 1 Bhiga And 13 Biswa, And 5 Bibha And 11 Biswa.
(Khata No. 35 New, Khata No. 26 Old)
16. Mehboob Khan Son Of Shri Jahur Khan, Aged About 60
Years, Resident Of Talab Ke Andar, Talk Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
(4) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4209/2025
URN: CW / 10655U / 2025
Mohammad Shafik Alias Nagin Son Of Shri Najeer Mohammad,
Aged About 65 Years, (Khatedar-Khasra No. 68) Resident Of
Nayabo Ka Mahola, Tal Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
(5) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7566/2025
URN: CW / 17487U / 2025
1. Bibi Alias Jamila Wife Of Late Shri Kalu Khan, Aged About
70 Years, Resident Of Maholla Tal Katora, Tonk (Raj.)
2. Mehboob Kha Son Of Jahur Kha, Aged About 99 Years,
Resident Of Talab Ke Andar, Talkatora, Tonk (Raj.) Both
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Khatedar Khasra No. 63, 64 And 66
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Chief Secretary Secretariat,
Jaipur (Raj.)
2. State Of Rajasthan Through Principal Secretary, Department
Of Urban Development And Housing Government,
Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
(6) S. B. Review Petition No. 70/2019
URN: WRW / 85U / 2019
In
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4792/2017
Manish Gotwal S/o Dinesh Bairwa, Aged About 31 Years, Resident
Of Dhanna Talai, Tonk, Rajasthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department Of
Urban Development And Housing Government, Secretariat,
Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Court Of Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur, Rajasthan
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Assistant Engineer, Tonk
(Raj.)
----Respondents
(7) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14081/2021
URN: CW / 30957U / 2021
1. Shahzad Khan S/o Late Ilyaz Khan, Aged About 57 Years,
Resident Of Shivaji Nagar Kampu, Tonk Rajasthan
2. Munna Miyan S/o Late Ilyaz Khan, Aged About 55 Years,
Resident Of Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And District Tonk
Rajasthan.
3. Jameela @ Bibi W/o Kalu Khan, Aged About 67 Years,
Resident Of Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And District Tonk
Rajasthan.
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4. Fayyaz Khan S/o Late Mohamad Ilyaz, Aged About 63 Years,
Resident Of , Nayko Ka Mohalla, Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And
District Tonk Rajasthan
5. Mukhtar S/o Late Ilyas Khan, Aged About 51 Years,
Resident Of Shorab Khan Ke Haveli Ke Paas, Mohalla
Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And District Tonk Rajasthan
6. Mushtak S/o Late Ilyaz Khan, Aged About 52 Years,
Resident Of Shivaji Nagar Kampu, Tonk Rajasthan
7. Mehboob Kha S/o Zahoor Khan, Aged About 66 Years,
Resident Of Talab Ke Andar, Talkatora, Tonk, Tehsil And
District Tonk Rajasthan
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary, Urban
Department And Housing Department , Govt. Of Rajasthan,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Dy. Secretary (Administration), Urban Department And
Housing Department, Secretariat, Jaipur.
3. Authorized Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Rajasthan,
Jaipur, Rajasthan Housing Board, Janpath, Jaipur.
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Its Commissioner, Jyoti
Nagar, Jaipur.
----Respondents
(8) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 283/2022
URN: CW / 596U / 2022
1. Abdul Gani S/o Gulab Khan, Aged About 53 Years, Resident
Of Village Lamba, Tonk Rajasthan
2. Faisal S/o Fayyaj, R/o Plot No 115 And 118, Jyotinagar
Nagar, Sevakrampura, Tonk. Rajasthan.
3. Moinuddin S/o Sirajuddin, R/o Plot No.104 Jyotinagar Nagar,
Sevakrampura, Tonk. Rajasthan.
4. Jaswant Singh Naruka S/o Samudr Singh Naruka, R/o Plot
No 100, Jyotinagar Nagar, Sevakrampura, Tonk. Rajasthan.
5. Om Prakash Sahoo S/o Jagdish Narayan, R/o Plot No.102,
Jyotinagar Nagar, Sevakrampura, Tonk. Rajasthan.
6. Asha Ram Gurjar S/o Shyonarayan Gurjar, R/o Main Bazar
Banjari, Fuleta, Bajari, Tonk
----Petitioners
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Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary, Urban
Department And Housing Department , Govt. Of Rajasthan,
Secretariat, Jaipur.
2. Dy. Secretary (Administration), Urban Department And
Housing Department, Secretariat, Jaipur.
3. Authorized Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Rajasthan,
Jaipur, Rajasthan Housing Board, Janpath, Jaipur.
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Its Commissioner, Jyoti
Nagar, Jaipur.
----Respondents
(9) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3344/2022
URN: CW / 6396U / 2022
Ram Kishan Gothwal S/o. Chandalal Gothwal, Aged About 46 Years,
Resident Of 26-A, Gopi Nagar, Near Sanganer Railway Station, 80
Feet Road, Sanganer, Jaipur District Jaipur (Raj.)
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department Of
Urban Development And Housing Government, Secretariat,
Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Court Of Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Assistant Engineer, Tonk
(Raj.)
----Respondents
(10) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15970/2022
URN: CW / 32166U / 2022
Petitioner:-
Rajesh Nayak S/o Sh. Lakshmi Narayan Nayak, Aged About 40
Years, R/o Talkatora Tonk Rajasthan
Versus
Respondents:-
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary Department Of
Urban Development And Housing Govt. Secretariat Jaipur
Rajasthan
2. Court Of Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing Rajasthan Housing Board Jaipur Rajasthan
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3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Assistant Engineer Tonk
(11) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17693/2022
URN: CW / 35709U / 2022
1. Kailashi Devi Sahu W/o Sarwan Lal Sahu, Aged About 60
Years, Resident Of Plot No 98 A Shastri Nagar Tonk At
Presnt Plot No. 182 Jyoti Nagar, Devli Road Tonk Rajasthan.
2. Shikhar Chand Jain Son Of Puran Mal Jain, Resident Of E 7
Adarsh Nagar Tonk Road, Tonk At Present Plot No. 7 And
236 Jyoti Nagar, Devli Road Tonk Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary Urban
Improvement Department, Govt. Of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
2. Dy. Secretary (Administration), Urban Improvement
Department Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Secretariat,
Jaipur.
3. Authorized Officer, Urban Improvement And Housing Board
Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur, At Present Office Rajasthan
Housing Board, Janpath, Jaipur.
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Its Chairman, Jaipur.
----Respondents
(12) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7297/2024
URN: CW / 14978U / 2024
1. Anita Devi W/o Shri Sanjay Kumar Jain,
2. Smt. Munni Devi W/o Nandlal Ji Jain,
Both Resident Of Adarsh Nagar, Tonk (Raj.) Through Their
Power Of Attorney Holder Sanjay Jain S/o Shri Nand Lal
Jain, Aged 44 Years, Resident Of Adarsh Nagar, Tonk (Raj.)
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through The Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
2. Court Of Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
3. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Assistant Engineer, Tonk
(Raj.).
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----Respondents
(13) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4176/2025
URN: CW / 10599U / 2025
1. Firoz Khan Son Of Shri Mohammad Iliyas, Aged About 41
Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Mahollah, Tal Katora, Tonk
(Raj.)
2. Faisal Khan Son Of Shri Mohammad Iliyas, Aged About 27
Years, Resident Of Nayako Ka Mahollah, Tal Katora, Tonk
(Raj.) (Khatedar Khasra No. 126, Village- Sevarampura,
Tonk (Raj.)
----Petitioners
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.).
2. Special Officer, Department Of Urban Development And
Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Rajasthan Housing Board Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
(14) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7565/2025
URN: CW / 17483U / 2025
Shri Suraj Mal Sahu Son Of Shri Rameshwar Sahu, Aged About 57
Years, Resident Of Rameshvar Halwai, Panch Batti, Tonk, (Raj.)
304001
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Chief Secretary, State Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Land Acquisition Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
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(15) S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7567/2025
URN: CW / 17489U / 2025
Prakash Sahu Son Of Shri Suraj Mal Sahu, Resident Of Rameshvar
Halwai, Panch Batti, Tonk, (Raj.) 304001
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Chief Secretary, State Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,
Department Of Urban Development And Housing
Government, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.)
3. Land Acquisition Officer, Department Of Urban Development
And Housing, Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur (Raj.)
4. Rajasthan Housing Board, Through Secretary, Tonk (Raj.)
----Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Ashok Bansal Advocate.
Mr. Pallav Choudhary Advocate.
Mr. Ayush Bansal Advocate.
Mr. Sameer Sharma Advocate.
Mr. Aditya Joshi Advocate.
Mr. Puneet Garg Advocate.
Ms. Meera Bai Advocate.
Mr. Vikas Kabra Advocate.
Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain Advocate.
For Respondents : Ajay Shukla Advocate with Mr. Shivam
Sharma Advocate, Mr. Raghav Sharma
Advocate, Ms. Jyoti Sharma Advocate.
Mr. Tanmay Jain Advocate.
Mr. V.D. Gathala Additional Government
Counsel with Mr. Umesh Chaudhary
Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA
Judgment
REPORTABLE
08/07/2026
1. By way of filing the above writ petitions, the petitioners
have challenged Notifications dated 12.10.2011, Declaration dated
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15.04.2013 and Award dated 01.03.2017 issued under Section 4, 6
and 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 respectively and have
prayed for quashing the entire acquisition proceedings along with the
award.
2. As regards, S.B. Civil Review Petitions No. 66/2019 and
70/2019 are concerned, the same have been filed by the petitioners
with a prayer to recall and review orders dated 19.07.2017 passed
by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, whereby writ petitions filed
by the petitioners challenging acquisition proceedings and award
were dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the review petitioners
submitted that feeling aggrieved by the orders passed by the Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court, the review petitioners preferred D.B.
Special Appeals Writ No. 1160/2017 and 1168/2017 before the
Division Bench of this Court. Above Special Appeals were dismissed
vide order dated 02.11.2018, whereby liberty was granted to the
review petitioners to file application before the learned Single Judge
and it was also observed that in the event of filing such applications,
the Single Judge shall decide the same as per law. Hence, the above
review petitions have been filed by the review petitioners.
3. Since the facts, cause of action and grievances in all the
above cases are almost similar, and the all the petitions have arisen
out of the same acquisition proceedings, therefore, with the consent
of the parties, they were heard together and are being decided by
this common judgment.
4. The facts, in brief, are that the State Government initiated
acquisition proceedings in respect of land measuring 599 Bighas and
11 Biswas under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act of 1894') for the purpose of
establishing residential housing scheme of the Rajasthan Housing
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Board. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was
issued on 12.10.2011, proposing acquisition of the aforesaid land for
a public purpose. The said notification was published in the Official
Gazette on 14.10.2011 and was thereafter, published in two
newspapers on 29.01.2012 in compliance with the statutory
requirements. Subsequently, public notices of the substance of
notification were issued to the affected allottees/landholders on
04.05.2012. Thus, last date of publication of notification under
Section 4 was 04.05.2012.
5. Thereafter, after considering objections of the land
owners, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted report under Section
5A of the Act of 1894 to the State Government. After satisfying with
the public purpose, the State Government issued a declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 on 15.04.2013 in respect of the
acquisition of the aforesaid land. The declaration under Section 6 of
the Act of 1894 was subsequently published in the newspapers
namely Dainik Navjyoti and Samachar Jagat on 10.02.2015.
Following the declaration, the public notice was issued on
10.03.2015, which was the last date of publication of declaration
under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Further, public notices under
Section 9(1) of the Act of 1894 were issued on 23.03.2015. Notices
under Section 9(3) of the Act of 1894 were thereafter served upon
the affected allottees on 29.10.2015. Simultaneously, the
landholders were also afforded an option, in terms of the prevailing
Government policy, to opt for allotment of developed land in lieu of
monetary compensation.
6. It is not in dispute that though acquisition proceedings
had commenced under the Act of 1894, however, no award had been
passed prior to 01.01.2014, i.e., the date on which the Right to Fair
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Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the Act of 2013') came into
force. Ultimately, the award came to be passed on 01.03.2017,
purportedly under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 read with Section 24
of the Act of 2013.
7. The grievance of the petitioners is that the award dated
01.03.2017 was passed long after the expiry of the period prescribed
under the law. According to the petitioners, once no award had been
made before 01.01.2014, the proceedings became governed by
Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 and in view of Section 25
thereof, the award was required to be passed within a period of one
year from the commencement of the Act of 2013. Since the award
was passed only on 01.03.2017, i.e., more than three years after the
enforcement of the Act of 2013 and nearly four years after issuance
of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, the petitioners
contend that the acquisition proceedings stood vitiated and could not
have culminated in a valid award.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in
cases falling under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, the limitation
for making the award is governed by Section 25 of the Act of 2013
and not by Section 11A of the repealed Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioners emphasised that in
view of Section 25 of the Act of 2013, the District Collector was
required to make the award within a period of twelve months from
the commencement of the Act of 2013. Since the award was
ultimately passed on 01.03.2017, i.e., more than three years after
01.01.2014, the same is ex-facie beyond the period prescribed under
law and is, therefore, unsustainable. It is submitted that once the
statutory period prescribed for making the award had expired, the
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acquisition proceedings could not lawfully culminate in an award and
the impugned award deserves to be declared void and non est in the
eye of law.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioners strongly placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The
Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,
Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs.
Mahesh & Others, (2022) 2 SCC 772 and submitted that the
issue is no longer res integra and stands conclusively settled by the
above judgment.
11. It is also argued that the respondents have failed to point
out any statutory exclusion of time or any interim order passed by a
competent court which could justify extension of the period
prescribed under Section 25 of the Act of 2013. In the absence of
any such legally recognized exclusion, the award having been passed
after the expiry of the mandatory period prescribed by law is
rendered invalid and unenforceable.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that
although impugned award was passed on 01.03.2017, yet till this
date, neither monetary compensation has been paid to the
Khatedars, nor the same has been deposited with the competent
authority. That apart, possession of land in question is still with the
petitioners and has not been taken so far by the respondents. Thus,
the land in dispute has not yet vested with the respondents.
13. While adopting all the arguments of counsel for the writ
petitioners, learned counsel for the review petitioners in Review
Petitions No. 66/2019 and 70/2019 submitted that since the there
was an error apparent on the face of record in earlier orders dated
19.07.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge to dismiss the writ
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petitions in limine, as instead of examining the award and
proceedings at the touchstone of Section 24(1)(a) read with Section
25 of the Act of 2013, learned Single Judge relied upon Section 11A
of the Act of 1894 to dismiss the writ petitions. Under these
circumstances, reiterating the above arguments, learned counsel for
the review petitioners also prayed for allowing the review petitions as
well as writ petitions filed by them.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
opposed the writ petitions and submitted that the acquisition
proceedings were initiated much prior to the enactment of the Act of
2013 and substantial steps had already been undertaken under the
provisions of the Act of 1894. It is submitted that notifications under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 were duly issued and published
and thereafter, notices under Sections 9(1) and 9(3) were also
served upon the affected landholders. According to the respondents,
the acquisition proceedings were pursued continuously and
substantially complied with the statutory requirements.
15. Learned counsel contended that the acquisition in
question pertains to a large tract of land involving numerous
landholders and allottees and, therefore, considerable administrative
exercise was required before finalisation of the award. It is submitted
that notices were issued to all concerned persons and they were also
afforded an opportunity to opt for developed land in lieu of
compensation in accordance with the applicable Government policy.
Consequently, the time consumed in completion of the acquisition
process cannot, by itself, be construed to invalidate the proceedings.
16. It is further submitted that the object of Section 24 of the
Act of 2013 is to save and continue pending acquisition proceedings
and not to frustrate acquisitions undertaken for public purposes.
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According to the respondents, the award dated 01.03.2017 was
passed after following the prescribed procedure and after considering
the rights and claims of all affected persons. The acquisition having
substantially progressed and the award having already been made,
interference at this stage would seriously prejudice the public
purpose for which the land was acquired.
17. On the aforesaid premises, learned counsel prayed for
dismissal of the review petitions as also writ petitions and submits
that the award dated 01.03.2017 and the consequential acquisition
proceedings do not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of
its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon
perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the
controversy involved in the present case lies in a narrow compass.
The foundational facts are not in dispute. The acquisition proceedings
were initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
by issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 on
12.10.2011, followed by declaration under Section 6 on 15.04.2013.
It is equally undisputed that no award had been passed till
01.01.2014, the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force. The
award ultimately came to be passed on 01.03.2017.
19. The principal issue, therefore, which arises for
consideration is as to whether the award dated 01.03.2017 could
legally have been passed after commencement of the Act of 2013
and whether the same satisfies the mandate of Section 24(1)(a)
read with Section 25 of the Act of 2013.
20. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be
apposite to reproduce Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013:
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (16 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894
shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)–
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land
Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this
Act relating to the determination of compensation shall
apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made,
then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions
of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not
been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in
case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the
said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the
land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid
the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the
proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with
the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not
been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under
section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
21. A plain reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no
manner of doubt that where no award under Section 11 of the Act of
1894 had been passed before commencement of the Act of 2013, the
proceedings survive, but thereafter they become subject to the
regime contemplated under the Act of 2013.
22. Section 25 of the Act of 2013 reads thus:
“25. Period within which an award shall be made.-The
Collector shall make an award within a period of twelve months
from the date of publication of the declaration under section 19
and if no award is made within that period, the entire
proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that the appropriate Government shall have the
power to extend the period of twelve months if in its opinion,
circumstances exist justifying the same:
Provided further that any such decision to extend the
period shall be recorded in writing and the same shall be
notified and be uploaded on the website of the authority
concerned.”
23. This Court finds that in the present case land acquisition
proceedings were initiated under the Act of 1894, however, no award
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (17 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]
was passed as on 01.01.2014, i.e., the date on which the of 2013
Act came into force. After examining the scheme of the repealed Act
of 1894 vis-à-vis the provisions of the 2013 of Act, it becomes clear
that Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 is a transitional provision
intended to facilitate the migration of pending acquisition
proceedings from the old enactment to the new legislative
framework. Although such proceedings do not lapse merely because
an award had not been passed prior to 01.01.2014, once the matter
falls within the ambit of Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013, yet all
subsequent stages of acquisition are required to be governed by the
provisions of the 2013 Act.
24. In view of above, the question arises as to whether the
limitation prescribed under Section 11A of the Act of 1894, which
required the making of an award within two years from the date of
publication of the declaration under Section 6, would continue to
apply after the repeal of the 1894 Act.
25. Meticulous examination of the scheme of the Act of 2013
as well as the repealed Act of 1894, it becomes clear that Section
11A of the Act of 1894, being a provision of the repealed enactment,
cannot survive independently unless expressly saved by the
subsequent legislation. In view of the scheme of Section 24 and the
repeal and saving provisions contained in Section 114 of the Act of
2013, it becomes clear that there is no legislative indication
preserving the applicability of Section 11A of the Act of 1894 in
respect of proceedings governed by Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of
2013. Consequently, the limitation prescribed under Section 11A of
the Act of 1894 stands eclipsed and the matter is thereafter
governed exclusively by the provisions of the 2013 Act.
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (18 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]
26. It also deserves notice that the period for making the
award in such cases is governed by Section 25 of the 2013 Act,
which mandates that the Collector shall make an award within a
period of twelve months. The said period of twelve months would
commence from 01.01.2014 because Section 25 itself became
operative only upon the enforcement of the 2013 Act. Any
interpretation permitting continued application of Section 11A of the
repealed Act of 1894 would defeat the legislative intent underlying
Section 24 and would create an anomalous situation whereby a
repealed statute would continue to regulate substantive aspects of
proceedings intended to be governed by the new enactment.
27. Thus, it becomes abundantly clear that Section 24(1)(a)
of the Act of 2013 constitutes a self-contained transitional
mechanism and that once a case falls within its ambit, the rights and
obligations of the parties, including the limitation for making the
award, must be determined with reference to the provisions of the
Act of 2013. Notably repeal of the Act of 1894 was not merely formal
in nature, but represented a conscious legislative shift to a new
acquisition regime providing enhanced safeguards and benefits to
landowners. Therefore, pending proceedings saved under Section
24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 are required to be carried forward in
accordance with the framework of the 2013 Act.
28. Thus, even if the respondents are granted the benefit of
the entire period contemplated under Section 25 of the Act of 2013,
the award ought to have been passed on or before 31.12.2014,
unless the respondents are able to demonstrate existence of any
legally permissible exclusion of time.
29. Significantly, no material has been placed on record by
the respondents to show that the operation of the acquisition
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (19 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]
proceedings was stayed by any competent court or that there existed
any statutory impediment preventing the passing of the award
during the relevant period. No order excluding any period from
computation of limitation has been brought to the notice of this
Court. In absence thereof, the respondents cannot seek extension of
a mandatory statutory timeline by administrative explanations or
procedural difficulties.
30. The contention advanced on behalf of the respondents
that substantial steps had already been undertaken under the Act of
1894 and that the acquisition was intended to serve a public
purpose, cannot override an express statutory mandate. It is settled
law that where a statute prescribes that a particular act is to be
performed within a specified period, the authorities exercising
statutory powers are bound by such prescription. Public purpose,
however laudable, cannot authorise continuation of proceedings in
derogation of a legislative command.
31. It is settled preposition of law, land acquisition laws are
expropriatory in nature and when such statute creates a power and
simultaneously prescribes the manner and period within which such
power is to be exercised, the authority must act strictly within four
corners of the statute. Any other interpretation would render the
statutory limitation otiose and defeat the legislative intent.
32. This Court is also unable to accept the submission that the
award dated 01.03.2017 deserves to be sustained on the ground of
substantial compliance. The Act of 2013 was enacted to provide a
more transparent, fair and rights-oriented acquisition regime. The
timelines incorporated therein are not mere procedural formalities
but constitute substantive safeguards intended to protect landowners
from indefinite uncertainty and prolonged acquisition proceedings.
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33. Furthermore, the statement made on behalf of the
petitioners that although award was passed on 01.03.2013, yet till
this date, neither compensation awarded therein has been paid to
the land owners, nor has been deposited with the competent
authority as well as the statement that possession of the land in
question has not been taken so far and is still lying with the
petitioners, has not been controverted or disputed by the
respondents in any manner. Hence, in view of above, conclusive
position arises that till date land in question has not vested with the
respondents.
34. Viewed from another angle, acceptance of the
respondents’ contention would virtually amount to permitting the
authorities to keep acquisition proceedings pending for an indefinite
duration despite the legislative mandate to conclude the process
within a specified time frame. Such an interpretation would be
contrary to the object and spirit of the Act of 2013 and would directly
run counter to the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
The Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara,
Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation vs.
Mahesh & Others (supra). In the above judgment, it has been
held as under:
“17. Dealing with the interplay of vested rights and
retrospective application of statutes, Indore Development
Authority (LAPSE-5 J.) v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129 refers
to several decisions to draw a distinction between “rights” and
“procedure”, to observe that the question of extent of
retrospectivity would also depend upon the degree of
unfairness it causes to the parties. Thus, if the limitation period
is shortened but the claimant has time to sue before the expiry
of the shortened period, then notwithstanding that he is likely
to be statutorily barred if he does not sue within the shortened
period, retrospectivity may be given effect to. We add that
when the law extends the limitation period, benefit of extended
period applies to proceedings to be initiated that are not time-
barred. Per contra, if the limitation period is extended after the
shorter limitation period has already expired, which could have
been an absolute defence for the party sued, then it may not
be fair to deprive the party sued of the accrued right of
claiming such defence. Further, absence of express limiting
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (21 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]words is not to be used as a basis for implying retrospective
operation as this would be reverse of the true presumption.
However, presumption in favour of retrospectivity may be
necessary when distinct implications typically arise in the
context of the statute which repeals a previous statute, and
would leave a “lacuna” if the new statute were not construed as
having retrospective effect. A statute which is prospective in its
direct operation cannot be called as retrospective because a
part of the requisites for its action is drawn from time
antecedent to its passing. Another cardinal principle of
interpretation is that a construction which results in
unreasonably harsh and absurd results must be avoided. These
dictums being relevant would help us resolve and answer the
question in issue.
18. In para 295 of Indore Development Authority (LAPSE-5 J.)
v. Manoharlal, the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act
operates prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act
effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with
Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved
under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award.
Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to
determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would
apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue
under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not
been repealed. Our interpretation of Section 24(1) of the 2013
Act respectfully follows this precedent.
19. Clearly, Section 11-A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the
2013 Act prescribe two different periods of limitation with
adverse consequences, as on failure to make the award the
acquisition proceedings lapse. The choice is between Section
11-A of the 1894 Act and Section 25 of the 2013 Act. [In para
33 below we have rejected the State’s alternative argument
that the legislature has not prescribed any period for making of
an award under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. See also para
32.] Absence of precise words or express declaration would not
inhibit us from interpreting and exercising the right choice,
keeping in view the language as also the object and purpose of
clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. In other words, we
have to give effect and meaning to the underlying intention of
Parliament in the words “all the provisions relating to
determination of compensation” under the 2013 Act.
20. We begin by examining the phrasing of clause (a) to
Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. We would prefer to read the
words “all the provisions relating to determination of
compensation” in Section 24(1)(a) as including the period of
limitation specified in Section 25 of the 2013 Act. To elaborate,
the word “all” and the expression “relating to” used in Section
25 are required to be given a wide meaning to ensnare the
legislative intent. The expressions “relating to” or “in relation
to” are words of comprehensiveness which may have a direct
as well as indirect significance depending on the context. [State
Wakf Board v. Abdul Azeez Sahib, 1966 SCC OnLine Mad 80]
21. Similarly, interpreting Section 129-C of the Customs Act,
1962, this Court while giving the phrase “in relation to” a
narrower meaning of direct and proximate relationship to the
rate of duty and to the value of goods for purpose of
assessment, did observe that ordinarily the phrase “in relation
to” is of a wider import. Navin Chemicals Mfg. & Trading Co.
Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320 Several cases
assigning a wider import to the expression “relating to”, in view
of the contextual background, find reference in Gujarat Urja
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (22 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta , (2021) 7 SCC 209. In
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC
679, this Court held that the term “in relation to”, when used in
the context of arbitration clause, is of widest amplitude and
content.
22. In Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain v. Eknath Vithal Ogale, (1995)
2 SCC 665 the expression “relating to” in the context of the
Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 has been held to be
comprehensive in nature that would take in its sweep all types
of suits and proceedings which are concerned with recovery of
possession. Broad and wider interpretation was again preferred
in Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC
299, observing that the expression “in relation to” is a very
broad expression which presupposes another subject-matter. In
Doypack Systems (P) Ltd.v. Union of India, in the context of
Section 3 of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd.
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1986, the
expression “relating to” was held to mean “bring into
association or connection with”. Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299, para 50 The words are
comprehensive and might have both direct as well as indirect
significance. The decision in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v.
Amit Gupta refers to Corpus Juris Secundum, wherein the
expression “relating to” has been held to be equivalent to or
synonymous with as to “concerning with” and “pertaining to”. It
has been observed that the expression “pertaining to” is an
expression of expansion and not of contraction.
23. The expression “relating to” when used in legislation
normally refers to “stand in some relation, to have bearing or
concern, to pertain, to refer, to bring into association with or
connection with”. [ See judgment of Mitter, J. (para 308) in
Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India, (1971) 1 SCC
85.] Therefore, the expression “relating to” when used in
legislation has to be construed to give effect to the legislative
intent when required and necessary by giving an expansive and
wider meaning. Given this trend in interpretation, the words “all
the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of
compensation” must not be imputed a restricted understanding
of the word “relating” only to the substantial provisions on
calculation of compensation, that is, Sections 26 to 30 of the
2013 Act. Rather, the expression should be given an expansive
meaning so as to include the provision on limitation period for
calculation of compensation, that is, Section 25 of the 2013
Act.
24. Law of limitation is generally regarded as procedural as its
object is not to create any right but prescribe periods within
which legal proceedings should be instituted for enforcement of
rights or adjudication orders should be passed. Statutes of
limitation, therefore, have retrospective effect insofar as they
apply to all legal proceedings brought after they come into
force. However, the laws relating to limitation have been held
to be prospective in the sense that they do not have the effect
of reviving the right of action which is already barred on the
date of their coming into operation, nor do they have the effect
of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date. In this
sense, the limitation provisions can be procedural in the
context of one set of facts and substantive in the context of a
different set of facts. Therefore, unless the language of the
provision dealing with period of limitation clearly manifests, in
express terms or by necessary implication, a contrary intention
divesting vested rights, such provision is to be construed as
prospective. In the context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (23 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]2013 Act, it is to be stated that the said clause would apply
only if the period for making of an award had not ended and
time was available as on 1-1-2014. Where and if the period for
making of the award had already lapsed before 1-1-2014,
clause (a) to Section 24(1) would not apply so as to deprive
and deny the vested rights which have already accrued in
favour of the landowners. The present case is not of divesting
of vested rights of the landowners on enactment of the 2013
Act.
29. Given the object and purpose behind Sections 24 and 26 to
30 of the 2013 Act, we notice that practical absurdities and
anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an
award in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act commencing
from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the
awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.
This would mitigate against the underlying legislative intent
behind prescription of time for making of an award in respect of
saved acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed 1894
Act, which is twofold : (i) to give sufficient time to the
authorities to determine compensation payable under the 2013
Act; and (ii) to ensure early and expedited payment to the
landowners by reducing the period from two years under
Section 11-A of the 1894 Act to twelve months under Section
25 of the 2013 Act. In case of declarations issued in January
2012, on application of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act, the time
to determine compensation under the 2013 Act would vary
from a day to a month, and while in cases where the
declarations were issued within twelve months of the repeal of
the 1894 Act, the landowners would be at a disadvantage as an
award beyond the twelve-month period specified in Section 25
of the 2013 Act would be valid. In the first set of cases, given
the onerous factual and legal exercise involved in determination
of compensation and the need to issue notification under
Section 26(2) of the 2013 Act, publication of the awards would
be impractical. Hasty and incorrect awards would be deleterious
for the landowners. If the awards are not pronounced, the
acquisition proceedings would lapse defeating the legislative
intent behind Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act to save such
proceedings. We would, therefore, exercise our choice to arrive
at a just, fair and harmonious construction consistent with the
legislative intent.
30. A rational approach so as to further the object and purpose
of Sections 24 and 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act is required. We are
conscious that Section 25 refers to publication of a notification
under Section 19 as the starting point of limitation. In the
context of clause (a) to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act there
would be no notification under Section 19, but declaration
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. When the declarations under
Section 6 are valid as on 1-1-2014, it is necessary to give
effect to the legislative intention and reckon the starting point.
In the context of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, declarations
under Section 6 of the 1894 Act are no different and serve the
same purpose as the declarations under Section 19 of the 2013
Act.
31. Consequently, we hold that in cases covered by clause (a)
to Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act, the limitation period for
passing/making of an award under Section 25 of the 2013 Act
would commence from 1-1-2014, that is, the date when the
2013 Act came into force. Awards passed under clause (a) to
Section 24(1) would be valid if made within twelve months
from 1-1-2014. This dictum is subject to the caveat stated in
paras 20 to 23 [Ed.: This precise caveat could not be found in
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[2026:RJ-JP:27168] (24 of 25) [WRW-66/2019]paras 20 to 23. However, para 14 and para 24 may be referred
to as being closest in reference.] (supra) that a declaration
which has lapsed in terms of Section 11-A of the 1894 Act
before or on 31-12-2013 would not get revived.
56. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold as under:
56.1. Section 25 of the 2013 Act would apply to the awards
made and published under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.
56.2. The limitation period for passing/making of an award
under Section 24(1)(a) in terms of Section 25 of the 2013 Act
would commence from 1-1-2014, that is, the date when the
2013 Act came into force.”
35. Principles laid down in the above judgment by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court can be summarised as following:
(i) Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 is a complete transitional code
governing acquisition proceedings in which no award had been
passed before 01.01.2014;
(ii) Such proceedings do not lapse merely because the award was
not made before commencement of the 2013 Act;
(iii) all further stages of acquisition are governed by the provisions of
the 2013 Act;
(iv) the limitation for making the award is regulated by Section 25 of
the 2013 Act and not by Section 11A of the repealed Land
Acquisition Act, 1894;
(v) the period prescribed under Section 25 of the Act of 2013 begins
to run from 01.01.2014;
(vi) Section 11A of the 1894 Act does not survive or continue to
operate in proceedings covered by Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of
2013.
36. In the considered opinion of this Court, once it is admitted
that no award existed on 01.01.2014 and the award ultimately came
to be passed only on 01.03.2017, the inevitable consequence is that
the award was made beyond the period recognised by law. The
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respondents having failed to establish any legally sustainable ground
for exclusion or extension of time, the award cannot be sustained.
37. The writ petitions as well as the review petitions,
therefore, deserve to be allowed and the same are hereby allowed.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the award dated 01.03.2017
having been passed in violation of the mandate of Section 24(1)(a)
read with Section 25 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013, is unsustainable in law and is therefore quashed.
Consequently, entire acquisition proceedings relating to such award
and founded upon the said award are hereby set aside.
38. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
39. Office is directed to place a copy of this judgment on
record of each connected petitions.
(ANAND SHARMA),J
MANOJ NARWANI/111-126/
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