Himachal Pradesh High Court
Laxmi Pradhan vs State Of H.P. And Others on 18 July, 2026
Author: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Bench: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
2026:HHC:29444-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.2028 of 2011
Decided on: 18th July, 2026
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Laxmi Pradhan .....Petitioner
.
Versus
State of H.P. and others .....Respondents
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Coram
of
Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the Petitioner: Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate with
rt Mr. Tarun Brakta, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Y.P.S. Dhaulta, Additional
Advocate General, for respondents
No.1 and 2.
Mr. Abhinav Thakur, Advocate vice
Mr. Jeevesh Sharma, Advocate, for
respondent No.3.
Respondents No.4 and 5 stand
deleted.
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Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge
Petitioner is a subsequent purchaser of the land
that was granted by the respondent-State to the
predecessor of respondent No.3. She has laid challenge to
the order dated 27.12.1999 passed by respondent No.2,
holding that the original grantee was not eligible for the
1
Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.
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grant of land. Accordingly, patta issued in favour of the
original grantee was cancelled and withdrawn. The land in
question was ordered to be resumed by the State
.
Government free from all encumbrances with further
direction to the State to take possession of the land.
2. Respondent No.3 is son of late Sh. Mathru. On
13.08.1975, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil) Theog, District
Shimla sanctioned land comprised in Khasra No.427/61/3,
of
measuring 5 bighas, situated at Mauza Bago-Sandhu,
Tehsil Theog, District Shimla in favour of Sh. Mathru under
rt
the Himachal Pradesh Grant of Nautor Land to Landless
and other eligible persons Scheme, 1975 (in short
‘Scheme’). Mutation was attested in favour of the grantee on
26.06.1977. On the basis of a complaint moved by
respondent No.5, a case was registered in the year 1999 to
verify as to whether the above described land was sold by
the original grantee to respondent No.4 in contravention to
the provisions of the Scheme and also to verify as to
whether the original grantee had cultivated the land within
the two years’ period as provided in the Scheme. Vide
impugned order dated 27.12.1999, respondent No.2-the
Deputy Commissioner, Shimla held that:-
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(i). The grantee was not an eligible person as per the
provisions of the Scheme at the time the land was
allotted to him.
(ii). The subject land had been alienated to respondent
.
No.3 before the period of 20 years stipulated under
the Scheme, thereby violating the provisions of para
11 of the Scheme.
Petitioner had purchased the subject land from
respondent No.4 under sale deed No.241, registered on
of
17.06.1998. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order
passed by respondent No.2, she has preferred this writ
rt
petition. Petitioner is still stated to be in possession of the
subject land.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
considered the case file.
4. The first reason given by respondent No.2,
ordering resumption of the subject land in favour of the
State Government, cannot be held to be justified. The land
was granted to the predecessor of respondent No.3 under
the Scheme on 13.08.1975. It is not the case of the
respondent-State that at the time of grant of land, the
grantee had concealed any information or projected some
false facts before the State in order to seek the grant.
Respondent No.2 has relied upon following Clause 9-A of
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the Scheme to conclude that in case grantee was not
eligible for allotment of the land, then such grant (allotment
of land) could be cancelled at any time as and when the
.
illegality comes to the notice of the competent authority:-
“9-A. -Revision;- If at any time, it comes to the
notice of the Deputy Commissioner either through an
application made by any person or otherwise, that theallotment of any land under this scheme was made to a
person who was not entitled or eligible for such
allotment or the allotment was wrong on any other
grounds, he may call for the record of the case and afterof
making such enquiries as he thinks proper in person or
through a Revenue Officer subordinate to him and after
giving an opportunity to the parties concerned, he may
cancel the grant of land and make such other orders in
rt
connection therewith as he deems necessary in the
circumstances of the case.”
The above clause cannot be read in abstract
terms to hold that ‘anytime’ would include any indefinite
period whatsoever. The clause though empowers the
Deputy Commissioner to take appropriate action in
accordance with law once it comes to his notice that the
person concerned was not entitled or eligible for allotment,
to cancel the grant of land and to pass such other orders as
deemed necessary in the circumstances of the case,
however, such power is not an absolute power to be
exercised without any regard to limitation of time for
exercise of such power.
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Hon’ble Apex Court in Joint Collector Ranga
Reddy District and another Versus D. Narsing Rao and
others2 held that the competent authorities cannot alter or
.
reopen long standing land records after an inordinate delay,
even if there is no explicitly prescribed time limit in the
governing statute. Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the
decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Collie
Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy3 that statutory powers
of
exercisable ‘at any time’ must be exercised within a
reasonable period, preventing arbitrary interference with
rt
long-settled land rights. Relevant portion from the decision
reads as under:-
“12.5. In the decision in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya
Coolie Sangham vs. K. Suresh Reddy and others thisCourt while dealing with suo motu power of revision
under Section 50-B(4) of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act,
1950 held as follows: (SCC pp. 676-77, para 9)“9. …… In the absence of necessary and
sufficient particulars pleaded as regards fraud andthe date or period of discovery of fraud and more so
when the contention that the suo motu power could
be exercised within a reasonable period from thedate of discovery of fraud was not urged, the
learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench
of the High Court were right in not examining the
question of fraud alleged to have been committed
by the non-official respondents. Use of the words
‘at any time’ in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the
Act only indicates that no specific period of
limitation is prescribed within which the suo motu2
(2015) 3 SCC 695
3
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2026:HHC:29444-DBpower could be exercised reckoning or starting from
a particular date advisedly and contextually.
Exercise of suo motu power depended on facts and
circumstances of each case. In cases of fraud, this
power could be exercised within a reasonable time
from the date of detection or discovery of fraud.
.
While exercising such power, several factors need
to be kept in mind such as effect on the rights of the
third parties over the immovable property due to
passage of considerable time, change of hands by
subsequent bona fide transfers, the orders
attaining finality under the provisions of other Acts
(such as the Land Ceiling Act). Hence, it appears
that without stating from what date the period of
limitation starts and within what period the suo
of
motu power is to be exercised, in sub-section (4) of
Section 50-B of the Act, the words “at any time” are
used so that the suo motu power could be exercised
within reasonable period from the date of discovery
of fraud depending on facts and circumstances of
rt
each case in the context of the statute and nature of
rights of the parties. Use of the words ‘at any time’
in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act cannot
be rigidly read letter by letter. It must be read and
construed contextually and reasonably. If one has
to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary
meaning of the words ‘at any time’, the suo motu
power under subsection (4) of Section 50-B of the
Act could be exercised even after decades and then
it would lead to anomalous position leading to
uncertainty and complications seriously affecting
the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable
properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of
the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the
orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo
motu power at any time only means that no specific
period such as days, months or years are not
prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But
that does not mean that at any time should be
unguided and arbitrary. In this view, ‘at any time’
must be understood as within a reasonable time
depending on the facts and circumstances of each
case in the absence of prescribed period of
limitation.”
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In the instant case, the land was allotted to the
predecessor of respondent No.3 under the Scheme on
13.08.1975. Power to cancel the allotment was exercised in
.
the year 1999. This was too late in the day for the
respondent-State to exercise such power. There would be
situations where after the prescribed prohibition period
under the Scheme, the grantee would have lawfully
transferred the land, thereby creating third party rights. It
of
cannot be held that power under Clause 9-A of the Scheme,
can be exercised without any regard of time, whatsoever or
rt
even after the prohibition period gets over. The power is
exercisable within a reasonable time depending upon the
attending facts and circumstances of the case. In the
instant case, after about 25 years of the allotment of land
(sanction of grant) in favour of the predecessor of
respondent No.3, it was not open for respondent No.2 to
hold in purported exercise of powers under Clause 9-A of
the Scheme that the predecessor of respondent No.3 was
not eligible for the allotment. By this time ownership of land
had also undergone change.
The second reason assigned by respondent No.2
for ordering resumption of the land in favour of the State is
the transfer apparently effected by the grantee in favour of
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respondent No.4 prior to the prohibited 20 years period
stipulated in the Scheme. Clause 11 of the Scheme that has
been relied by respondent No.2 for ordering resumption of
.
the subject land in favour of the respondent-State reads as
under:-
“11. Restriction on transfer.- The grantee shall
not transfer the land granted under this Scheme to any
person within a period of 20 years from the date of
taking over possession of the land by him. In the event
of contravention of the provisions of this para the grantof
shall be liable to be resumed by the State Government
and no further allotment of land should be made to him
thereafter. Similarly if he fails to break up the land
within a period of 2 years from the date of taking over
rt
of the possession the grant shall be liable to be
resumed:
Provided that the land granted under this
scheme shall not be subject to fragmentation by way of
partition, transfer or by any other mean. The Revenue
Officer shall record these conditions in the mutation
orders to be passed by him. His orders shall further berecorded in the remarks column of the jamabandi in
which the mutation pertaining to the land is
incorporated.
Provided the allottee may transfer the land by
way of mortgage without possession in favour of
Primary Agricultural Cooperative Credit Society, a Bankas defined in the H.P. Agricultural Credit Operations
and Miscellaneous provisions (Banks) Act 1972 (Act
No.7 of 1973) for the purpose of raising loans fordevelopment of such land, raising of crops, purchase of
bullocks, seed and fertilizers etc. for bringing the land
under cultivation.”
It is not in dispute that period of 20 years was
incorporated in Clause 11 vide notification dated
09.12.1987. The notification thus came much after the land
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was allotted to the predecessor of respondent No.3, i.e.
13.08.1975. By the time, period of 20 years was substituted
in Clause 11 of the Scheme, the mutation of the subject
.
land had also been attested in favour of the predecessor of
respondent No.3, i.e. on 26.06.1977.
Pursuant to the orders passed in this writ
petition from time to time, respondent-State has placed on
record instructions dated 16.04.2026, 29.05.2026 and
of
16.06.2026. In terms of these instructions, prohibited
period of 20 years, during which the grantee could not
rt
alienate/transfer the nautor land, was incorporated in
Clause 11 of the 1975 Scheme vide notification dated
09.12.1987. The said notification was clarified vide office
letter dated 02.12.1991 issued by the Financial
Commissioner-cum-Secretary (Revenue) to the Government
of Himachal Pradesh, conveying that prohibition qua
transfer of nautor land for a period of 20 years imposed vide
notification dated 09.12.1987, would have prospective
operation, i.e. on the lands allotted after the issuance of
notification and not qua the lands allotted before the
notification dated 09.12.1987. It is further to be noticed
that the revenue record of the subject land appended
alongwith the office instructions does not contain any note
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(red entry), reflecting prohibition of transfer of such land for
a period of 20 years. It is the admitted case of the parties
that at the time of grant of land to the predecessor of
.
respondent No.3, restriction on transfer imposed vide
Clause 11 of the Scheme was for a period of 15 years. This
15 years’ period from the date of grant ended on
12.08.1990. The subject land was admittedly transferred by
the predecessor of respondent No.3 after the expiry of 15
of
years period. Thus, the second reason assigned for ordering
resumption of land in favour of the State also does not hold
rt
good.
5. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is
allowed. Impugned order dated 27.12.1999 passed by
respondent No.2 is quashed and set aside. Pending
miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.
Jyotsna Rewal Dua
July 18, 2026 Judge
Mukesh
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