Chattisgarh High Court
Lakeshwar Sahu vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 23 July, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
CGHC010397612025 2026:CGHC:31397-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 2885 of 2025
1 - Lakeshwar Sahu S/o Shri Kamlesh Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Bana,
P.S. Urla, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
2 - Dayashankar Banjare S/o Santosh Banjare Aged About 20 Years R/o
Lodhipara, P.S. Pandari, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station
Devendra Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.)
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioners : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate
Hon’ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
23/07/2026
VED
1. Heard Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, learned counsel for the petitioners
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Digitally signed
as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Govt. Advocate for the
by VED
PRAKASH
DEWANGAN
Date:
2026.07.27 respondent/State.
17:43:09 +0530
2
2. By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioners have called in question
the legality and validity of FIR bearing Crime No. 41/2025 registered at
Police Station Devendra Nagar, Raipur for the offences punishable
under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco
Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade
and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003
(hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA Act, 2003’), the consequential charge-
sheet (Challan No. 31/2025 for the offence under Sections 4 and 21(1)
of the COTPA Act, 2003, the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur taking cognizance, and
all consequential criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 13563 of
2025 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur.
3. The present petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:
“(1) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased
to quash and set-aside the impugned FIR dated
09.02.2025, registered against petitioners bearing
Crime No. 41 of 2025 (impugned FIR is part of
impugned Final Report, bearing Challan No. 44 of
2025, certified copy filed as Annexure P/1),
registered at Police Station Devendra Nagar,
District Raipur, for the offences punishable under
Sections 4A and 21(1) of the Cigarettes and Other
Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement
and Regulation of Trade and Commerce,
Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003.
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(2) That this Hon’ble Court may further kindly be
pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned
Final Report, bearing Challan No. 44 of 2025
dated 19.03.2025 (Annexure P/1), filed against the
petitioners, before Learned JMFC, Raipur, arising
out of the impugned FIR No. 41/2025, for the
offence punishable under Sections 4A and 21(1) of
the Act, 2003.
(3) That this Hon’ble Court may further kindly be
pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned
order dated 28.03.2025 vide which the Learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, has taken
cognizance of the offences punishable under
Section 4A and 21(1) of the Act, 2003, against the
petitioners, and also directed for the registration of
case before Court. This Hon’ble Court may further
kindly be pleased to quash/set aside the
sequential proceedings (order sheets), passed in
the Criminal Case No. 13563 of 2025.
(4) This Hon’ble Court be further pleased to pass
such other orders as it may deem fit under the
facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of
the petitioners against the respondent.”
4. The facts, in brief, are that on the basis of a secret information received
by Police Station Devendra Nagar, Raipur, a raid was conducted on
09.02.2025 at the Watch Press Complex, Blinkit Dark Store, Devendra
Nagar Raipur, Raipur, where certain hookah-related materials, including
hookah pipes, papers and flavours, valued at ₹15,000/- and electronic
devices like computer, laptop, etc. amounting to ₹1,50,000/- (total
amounting to ₹1,65,000/-) were seized. At the relevant time, petitioner
4
No.1 was working as the Deputy Manager and petitioner No.2 as a
Delivery Boy in the said establishment. On the allegation that the seized
articles were being illegally stored and supplied, FIR bearing Crime
No.41/2025 was registered against the petitioners on 09.02.2025 for the
offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act,
2003. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet
(Challan No. 44/2025 for the offence under Section 4 and 21(1) of the
COTPA Act, 2003), whereupon the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class, Raipur, by order dated 28.03.2025, took cognizance of the
aforesaid offences. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred the
present petition seeking quashment of the FIR, charge-sheet, the order
taking cognizance and all consequential criminal proceedings.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are
merely employees of Blinkit Company, petitioner No.1 being the Deputy
Manager and petitioner No.2 being a Delivery Boy, and had no
ownership, control or knowledge regarding the hookah-related articles
seized from the dark store. It is contended that the seized articles were
only stored in packed condition for logistics and delivery purposes and
that the petitioners were neither operating nor running any hookah bar.
He would submit that, although the charge sheet has been filed under
Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, but the provisions of
COTPA Act has been amended and Sections 4A and 21A has been
inserted by the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition
of Advertising and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production,
Supply and Distribution) (Chhattisgarh Amendment) Act, 2021, Act
No. 1 of 2023 w.e.f. 10.02.2023 (hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA
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Amendment Act, 2021‘). Referring to Sections 4A and 21A of the
COTPA Amendment Act, 2021, learned counsel submits that the said
provisions prohibit the opening or running of a hookah bar and do not
criminalize the mere storage or delivery of hookah-related materials. It is
further argued that even if the allegations contained in the FIR and the
material collected during investigation are accepted in their entirety, no
offence under the aforesaid provisions is made out against the
petitioners. It is, therefore, submitted that continuation of the criminal
proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, warranting
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for quashing the
impugned FIR, charge-sheet, order taking cognizance and all
consequential proceedings.
6. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that
the FIR was registered on the basis of credible information regarding
illegal storage and supply of hookah-related materials from the Blinkit
dark store. It is contended that during the raid, hookah-related articles
were seized from the premises where petitioner No.1 was working as
the Deputy Manager and petitioner No.2 as the Delivery Boy, and since
the petitioners failed to produce any valid documents authorizing the
storage of such articles, a prima facie case for the offences punishable
under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 (Sections 4A and
21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) was found to be made out. It
is further submitted that, after due investigation, charge-sheet has
already been filed and the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has
taken cognizance of the offences. According to the learned State
6
counsel, the allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences
and the issues raised by the petitioners involve disputed questions of
fact which are matters of trial. It is, therefore, submitted that no case is
made out for exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the
petition deserves to be dismissed.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival
submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with
utmost circumspection.
8. Considering the facts of the present case, the question arises here as to
whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected
during investigation, even if accepted in their entirety, constitute the
offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003
(Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021). It is
necessary here to take notice of relevant provisions of Sections 4 and
21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 and Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA
Amendment Act, 2021, which reads as under:-
Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003
“4. Prohibition of smoking in a public place.-
No person shall smoke in any public place:
Provided that in a hotel having thirty rooms or a
restaurant having seating capacity of thirty
persons or more and in the airports, a separate
provision for smoking area or space may be
made.
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21. Punishment for smoking in certain
places.-
(1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of
section 4 shall be punishable with fine which may
extend to two hundred rupees.
Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA
Amendment Act, 2021)
4A. Prohibition of hookah bar -Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, no person shall,
either on his own or on behalf of any other
person, open or run any hookah bar or serve
hookah to customers in any place including the
eating house.
Explanation.-The term “eating house” means any
place where food or refreshment of any kind are
provided for visitors, and sold for consumption.
21A. Punishment for running hookah bar.–
Whoever contravenes the provisions of section
4A shall be punishable with imprisonment which
may extend to three years but which shall not be
less that one year and with fine which may extend
to fifty thousand rupees but which shall not be
less than ten thousand rupees.
9. The allegations against the petitioners are not in dispute. The
prosecution case itself is that the petitioners were working as Deputy
Manager and Delivery Boy, respectively, in the Blinkit dark store from
where hookah-related articles were seized. There is no allegation in the
FIR, seizure memo or charge-sheet that the petitioners had opened,
established, managed or were running any hookah bar, or that the
8
premises in question was being used for serving hookah for
consumption by customers. Rather, the allegations merely indicate that
hookah-related materials were found stored in the dark store of Blinkit.
10. Section 4 of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 4A of the COTPA
Amendment Act, 2021 specifically prohibits any person from opening or
running a hookah bar in any place including an eating house. Section
21(1) of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 21A of the COTPA Amendment
Act, 2021 merely prescribes the punishment for contravention of Section
4 of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 4A of the COTPA Amendment Act,
2021 respectively. Thus, the essential ingredient of the offence is the
opening or running of a hookah bar. Mere possession, storage or
transportation of hookah-related accessories, in the absence of any
allegation that the accused was operating or facilitating a hookah bar,
does not satisfy the ingredients of the offence. The prosecution has not
placed any material to show that hookah was being served or consumed
at the premises or that the petitioners were operating any hookah bar.
Consequently, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted as true,
the ingredients of Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003
( Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) are
conspicuously absent.
11. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme Court
held that inherent powers can be exercised where the allegations in the
complaint or FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the
offence alleged. The said principle continues to govern the exercise of
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., now Section 528 of the
9
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. In para 6 of the judgment,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
“6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it
is necessary to consider the nature and scope of
the inherent power of the High Court under
Section 561-A of the Code. The said section
saves the inherent power of the High Court to
make such orders as may be necessary to give
effect to any order under this Code or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that
this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard
to matters specifically covered by the other
provisions of the Code. In the present case the
Magistrate before whom the police report has
been filed under Section 173 of the Code has yet
not applied his mind to the merits of the said
report and it may be assumed in favour of the
appellant that his request for the quashing of the
proceedings is not at the present stage covered
by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-
established that the inherent jurisdiction of the
High Court can be exercised to quash
proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal
proceedings instituted against an accused person
must be tried under the provisions of the Code,
and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere
with the said proceedings at an interlocutory
stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern
the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However,
10we may indicate some categories of cases where
the inherent jurisdiction can and should be
exercised for quashing the proceedings. There
may be cases where it may be possible for the
High Court to take the view that the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings against an
accused person may amount to the abuse of the
process of the Court or that the quashing of the
impugned proceedings would secure the ends of
justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in
respect of an offence alleged to have been
committed by an accused person and it
manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance of the said
proceeding the High Court would be justified in
quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence
of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish
cases under this category. Cases may also arise
where the allegations in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety, do
not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases
no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a
matter merely of looking at the complaint or the
first information report to decide whether the
offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases
it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold
that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the
process of the criminal court to be issued against
the accused person. A third category of cases in
which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court
can be successfully invoked may also arise. In
cases falling under this category the allegations
made against the accused person do constitute
offence alleged but there is either no legal
11evidence adduced in support of the case or
evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
prove the charge. In dealing with this class of
cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction
between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is manifestly
and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made
and cases where there is legal evidence which on
its appreciation may or may not support the
accusation in question. In exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court
would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is
the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it
would not be open to any party to invoke the High
Court’s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a
reasonable appreciation of the evidence the
accusation made against the accused would not
be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature
and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court under section 561-A in the matter of
quashing criminal proceedings and that is the
effect of the judicial decisions on the point (vide :
In Re : Shripad G. Chandavarkar, Jagat Chandra
Mozumdar V. Queen empress, Shanker singh
(Dr) V. State of punjab, Nripendra Bhusan Ray V.
Gobind bandhu Majumdar and Ramanathan
Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar)”
12. The scope of interference by the High Court while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction is no longer res integra. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon’ble Supreme Court illustratively held
that criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed where the allegations
made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their
12
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or where the
uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail to disclose the
commission of any offence. The present case squarely falls within the
said categories.
13. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749,
the Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused in a criminal
case is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be permitted to be set
into motion as a matter of course. Courts are duty-bound to ensure that
the allegations disclose the commission of an offence before permitting
criminal prosecution to continue.
14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and
others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2016 (9) SCC 1, has held
that-:
“35. While discussing the scope and ambit of
Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been
taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv
Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein it was held
as under: (SCC pp. 347-49, paras 29-30)
29. The issue being examined in the instant
case is the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to
quash the initiation of the prosecution
against an accused at the stage of issuing
process, or at the stage of committal, or
even at the stage of framing of charges.
These are all stages before the
commencement of the actual trial. The
same parameters would naturally be
13available for later stages as well. The
power vested in the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to
hereinabove, would have far-reaching
consequences inasmuch as it would negate
the prosecution’s/complainant’s case
without allowing the prosecution/
complainant to lead evidence. Such a
determination must always be rendered
with caution, care and circumspection. To
invoke its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be
fully satisfied that the material produced by
the accused is such that would lead to the
conclusion that his/their defence is based
on sound, reasonable, and indubitable
facts; the material produced is such as
would rule out and displace the assertions
contained in the charges levelled against
the accused; and the material produced is
such as would clearly reject and overrule
the veracity of the allegations contained in
the accusations levelled by the
prosecution/complainant. It should be
sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the
accusations levelled by the prosecution/
complainant, without the necessity of
recording any evidence. For this the
material relied upon by the defence should
not have been refuted, or alternatively,
cannot be justifiably refuted, being material
of sterling and impeccable quality. The
material relied upon by the accused should
be such as would persuade a reasonable
person to dismiss and condemn the actual
14basis of the accusations as false. In such a
situation, the judicial conscience of the
High Court would persuade it to exercise its
power under Section 482 CrPC to quash
such criminal proceedings, for that would
prevent abuse of process of the court, and
secure the ends of justice.
30. Based on the factors canvassed in the
foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate
the following steps to determine the
veracity of a prayer for quashment raised
by an accused by invoking the power
vested in the High Court under Section 482
CrPC:
30.1. Step one: whether the material relied
upon by the accused is sound, reasonable,
and indubitable i.e. the material is of
sterling and impeccable quality?
30.2. Step two whether the material relied
upon by the accused would rule out the
assertions contained in the charges
levelled against the accused i.e. the
material is sufficient to reject and overrule
the factual assertions contained in the
complaint i.e. the material is such as would
persuade a reasonable person to dismiss
and condemn the factual basis of the
accusations as false?
30.3. Step three: whether the material
relied upon by the accused has not been
refuted by the prosecution/complainant;
and/or the material is such that it cannot be
15
justifiably refuted by the prosecution/
complainant?
30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with
the trial would result in an abuse of process
of the court, and would not serve the ends
of justice?
30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the
affirmative, the judicial conscience of the
High Court should persuade it to quash
such criminal proceedings in exercise of
power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC.
Such exercise of power, besides doing
justice to the accused, would save precious
court time, which would otherwise be
wasted in holding such a trial (as well as
proceedings arising therefrom) specially
when it is clear that the same would not
conclude in the conviction of the accused.”
15. Likewise, in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, while cautioning that the power of
quashing should be exercised sparingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
simultaneously reiterated that where the allegations in the FIR do not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, or where the
essential ingredients of the alleged offence are absent, the High Court
would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse
of the process of law. It has been held that :-
“13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings
has to be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare
cases and the court cannot be justified in
16embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in
the FIR/complaint, unless the allegations are so
patently absurd and inherently improbable so that
no prudent person can ever reach such a
conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers
of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction
on the Court to act according to its whims or
caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent
powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for
stage nor can it “soft-pedal the course of justice” at
a crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. The
provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of
India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as “CrPC“) are
a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it.
The power of judicial review is discretionary,
however, it must be exercised to prevent the
miscarriage of justice and for correcting some
grave errors and to ensure that stream of
administration of justice remains clean and pure.
However, there are no limits of power of the Court,
but the more the power, the more due care and
caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers.
(Vide State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, Pepsi
Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, G. Sagar
Suri v. State of U.P.31 and Ajay Mitra v. State of
M.P. 32)”
16. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case,
this Court finds that the allegations in the FIR and the material collected
during investigation merely disclose recovery of hookah-related articles
from a Blinkit dark store where the petitioners were admittedly
employees. There is no allegation or material suggesting that the
17
petitioners had opened or were running a hookah bar or that the
premises was being used for serving hookah to customers. Therefore,
the foundational ingredients required for attracting Sections 4 and 21(1)
of COTPA Act, 2003 (Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment
Act, 2021) are wholly absent. Continuation of the criminal proceedings in
such circumstances would amount to permitting prosecution despite the
absence of the basic ingredients of the alleged offence, which would
constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.
17. Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed.
The FIR bearing Crime No. 41/2025 registered at Police Station
Devendra Nagar, Raipur, for the offences punishable under Sections 4
and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, the consequential charge-sheet
(Challan No. 44/2025 for the offence under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the
COTPA Act, 2003), the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur taking cognizance thereof, and all
consequential criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 13563 of 2025
pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur are
hereby quashed.
18. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved
