Kuleshwar Yadav @ Kaleshwar Yadav @ … vs Union Of India on 21 July, 2026

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    Jharkhand High Court

    Kuleshwar Yadav @ Kaleshwar Yadav @ … vs Union Of India on 21 July, 2026

    Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

    Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad

                                                    2026:JHHC:21721-DB
    
    
    
    
             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                       W.P.(Cr.) (DB) No.121 of 2026
                                    -----
          Kuleshwar Yadav @ Kaleshwar Yadav @ Koleshwar Yadav, aged about
          54 years, Son of Late Moti Yadav, Resident of Village-Kolhuwa, PO-
          Jamtar, P.S-Bashishthnagar, District-Chatra, Jharkhand
                                                        ...      ... Petitioner
                                          Versus
    1.    Union of India.
    2.    The Additional Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison &
          Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at
          Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O & P.S Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
    3.    The Director General of Police, Jharkhand, having its office at Police
          Head Quarter, Dhurwa, PO & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
    4.    The Deputy Commissioner, Chatra, having its office at Police Head
          Quarter, Dhurwa, P.O & PS-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
    5.    The Superintendent of Police, Chatra, at Chatra, PO& PS Chatra, District-
          Chatra.
    6.    The Officer-in-Charge, Bashishthnagar Police Station, at PO & PS-
          Bashishthnagar, District-Chatra.
                                                        ...      ...         Respondents
                                          -------
          CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
                           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
                                          -------
          For the Petitioner  : Mr. Rishi Pallav, Advocate
          For the Respondents : Mr. Achyut Keshav, Sr. AAG
                                Mr. Shubham Gautam, AC to Sr. AAG
                                          -------
          C.A.V. on 10.07.2026                    Pronounced on 21/07/2026
          Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
    

    1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the

    Constitution of India for quashing of the order dated 15.01.2026

    SPONSORED

    (Annexure-1) passed by respondent no.2, the Additional Principal Secretary,

    Department of Home, Prison & Disaster Management, Government of

    Jharkhand, whereby direction was passed for detention of the petitioner under

    Section 3(i) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

    Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred to as the

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    Act,1988) in Birsa Munda Central Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi and further prayer has

    also been made to stay the operation of the impugned order dated 15.01.2026.

    Factual Matrix

    2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition,

    which are required to be enumerated, read as under: –

    i. The respondent No. 2 has issued the order dated 15.01.2026 in

    exercise of the power conferred under Section 3(1) PITNDPS

    Act, 1988 with a view to prevent the petitioner from engaging in

    Illicit Trafficking of NDPS in future and accordingly directed

    the petitioner to be detained and kept in Birsa Munda Central

    Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi. The grounds of detention have separately

    been issued on 15.01.2026 itself on the basis of the facts brought

    by the District Administration, Chatra, wherein, reference of ten

    criminal cases have been made which are as under: –

    (i) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.10/14 dated 03.02.2014,

    (ii) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.79/18 dated 21.11.2018,

    (iii) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.51/2021 dated 24.05.2021,

    (iv) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.05/2025 dated 19.01.2025,

    (v) Simaria P.S Case No.05/2008 dated 04.01.2008,

    (vi) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.45/2007 dated 26.08.2007,

    (vii) Bashisthnagar P.S Case No.24/25 dated 21.07.2025,

    (viii) Bashisthnagar P.S Diary Entry No.17/25 dated 23.07.2025,

    (ix) Bashisthnagar P.S Diary Entry No.20/25 dated

    26.07.2025, and

    (x) Bashisthnagar P.S Diary Entry No.18/25 dated

    31.07.2025.

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    ii. The order of detention was passed on 15.01.2026 against the

    petitioner, however, the same was served to him after

    30.01.2026 while he was languishing in judicial custody in

    Chatra Jail, Chatra in connection with Kunda P.S. Case No.

    01/2001, Corresponding to S.T No.380/2018.

    iii. The petitioner has faced trial in Bashishthnagar P.S Case

    No.10/2014 and has been acquitted by the learned trial Court

    vide judgment dated 17.01.2026. It has further been stated that

    the petitioner has also been acquitted in Bashishthnagar P.S Case

    No.79/2018 vide judgment dated 03.02.2026.

    iv. The petitioner has already been enlarged on bail in

    Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.5/2025 by order dated 11.06.2025

    passed in Misc. Criminal Application No.1001/2025 by the

    learned trial Court whereas in Bashishthnagar P.S Case

    No.51/2021, he has been enlarged on bail vide order dated

    10.09.2025 in B.A No.7717/2025 by the Hon’ble High Court.

    v. Simariya P.S. Case No. 05/2008 and Bashisthnagar P.S. Case

    No. 45/2007 are admittedly not cases under the NDPS Act. In

    Simariya P.S. Case No. 05/2008, the petitioner has already been

    enlarged on bail by the Hon’ble High Court in B.A

    No. 4830/2025, whereas in Bashisthnagar P.S. Case No.

    45/2007, the petitioner has never been remanded to custody till

    date. The said cases, therefore, neither disclose any involvement

    of the petitioner in illicit traffic of narcotic drugs nor establish

    any live or proximate link warranting preventive detention under

    the PITNDPS Act. Consequently, reliance upon such unrelated

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    and irrelevant cases for passing the detention order dated

    15.01.2026 is impermissible in law, rendering the impugned

    detention order arbitrary, void and sustainable.

    3. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of detention and orders of

    extension of detention, the present writ petition has been preferred.

    Submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner:

    4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has taken the following

    grounds in assailing the impugned decision: –

    (i) The writ petitioner has illegally been confined without any

    subjective satisfaction of the competent authority as also the

    Advisory Board has confirmed the decision of confinement without

    taking into consideration the issue of subjective satisfaction of the

    competent authority.

    (ii) The issue of subjective satisfaction, in the facts of the present case,

    is relevant since the writ petitioner was made accused in connection

    with the cases of illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and

    psychotropic substances. In the detention order dated 15.01.2026,

    there is reference of ten criminal cases referred hereinabove, but in

    Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.10/2014 vide judgment dated

    17.01.2026 and Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.79/2018 vide

    judgment dated 03.02.2026, petitioner has been acquitted by the

    learned Trial Court. In addition to that, the petitioner had been

    enlarged on bail in Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.51/2021 and

    Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.5/2025, by Court of Law. Therefore,

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    it is a case where the sanctioning authority cannot be said to have

    the subjective satisfaction.

    (iii) It has also contended that the Station Diary entries relied upon in

    the grounds of detention, namely Bashisthnagar P.S. Station Diary

    No. 24/2005 dated 21.07.2025, Station Diary No. 17/2005 dated

    23.07.2025, Station Diary No. 20/2005 dated 26.07.2025 and

    Station Diary No. 18/2005 dated 31.07.2025, are merely internal

    police diary entries. It is well settled that such Station Diary entries,

    having no evidentiary value in the eye of law, cannot form the basis

    of subjective satisfaction for invoking preventive detention.

    (iv) It is a case where the petitioner although has been ordered to be

    detained vide order dated 15.01.2026 but the said impugned order

    was served to the petitioner on 30.01.2026, i.e., after lapse of about

    more than fifteen days which raises considerable doubt in the case

    of detaining authorities.

    (v) It has been contended that there are no direct or specific

    allegations against the petitioner, rather his implication has arisen

    merely on the basis of secret information or alleged confessional

    statements of co-accused, which, in absence of corroboration, has

    no evidentiary value in the eyes of law.

    (vi) It has been contended that the cases lodged against the petitioner do

    not establish any direct, proximate or live link between the alleged

    past activities of the petitioner and, therefore, the impugned

    detention order suffers from non-application of mind and without

    substantive satisfaction as required under law.

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    (vii) It has also been contended that Simariya P.S Case No.05/2008 and

    Bashisthnagar PS case No.45/2007 are admittedly not cases under

    the NDPS Act and, as such, the aforesaid cases neither disclose any

    involvement of the petitioner in illicit traffic or narcotic drugs nor

    establish any live or proximate link warranting preventive detention

    under the PITNDPS Act. Therefore, reliance upon such unrelated

    and irrelevant cases for passing the detention order dated

    15.01.2026 is impermissible in law.

    (viii) In order to buttress the aforesaid arguments, the learned counsel for

    the petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble

    Apex Court in case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011)5 SCC

    244; Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur, (2012) 2

    SCC 176; Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 2 SCC

    81; Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana and others, (2023)9

    SCC 587 and Charitra Kumar Dangi @ Chalitar Dangi V. State

    of Jharkhand [ W.P(Cr.) No.557 of 2024].

    5. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that

    the order of detention, therefore, suffers from an error and, hence, not

    sustainable in the eye of law.

    Submission of the learned counsel for the State:

    6. Per contra, Mr. Achyut Keshav, learned AAG appearing for the

    respondents, on the basis of the counter affidavit has taken the following

    grounds in support of his pleadings:

    (i) There is no error in the impugned order, since, the petitioner was

    found to be habitual in trafficking of the narcotics which would be

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    evident from the impugned order wherein ten cases registered under

    the NDPS Act are pending against the petitioner.

    (ii) It has been contended that on the proposal sent by the S.P, Chatra

    vide Memo No.847/DCB, dated 04.12.2025, the Deputy

    Commissioner, Chatra vide its letter no.1517 dated 22.12.2025

    submitted the proposal to the Principal Secretary, Department of

    Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Jharkhand for detention

    of the petitioner invoking the provision of section 3(1) of the

    Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

    Substances Act, 1988 (PITNDPS Act, 1988).

    (iii) It has been contended that at the time of passing detention order, the

    petitioner was not acquitted from charge in any of the four cases

    registered against him under NDPS Act as in Bashishthnagar P.S

    Case No.10/2014, he was acquitted on 17.01.2026 and in

    Bashishthnagar P.S Case No.79/2018, the petitioner was acquitted

    on 03.02.2026, whereas the detention order has been passed prior

    to that, i.e., on 15.01.2026.

    (iv) It has also been contended that still two cases, i.e., Bashisth Nagar

    P.S Case No.51/21 and Bashisth Nagar P.S Case No.05/25, which

    pertains to the NDPS Act, are pending against the petitioner.

    (v) It has been submitted that the petitioner is a habitual offender as he

    deals in illegal trafficking of narcotic drugs and, as such, various

    cases have been registered against the petitioner at different time,

    under the PITNDPS Act, 1988. Therefore, it cannot be said that

    petitioner has been charge sheeted in all these cases with ulterior

    motive and he has been implicated on the basis of confession of any

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    particular co-accused which indicate the involvement of the

    petitioner in illicit drug trade.

    (vi) It has been contended that after receipt of proposal of the Deputy

    Commissioner, Chatra, the respondent no.2 after examining and

    being satisfied with the materials contained in the said proposal has

    passed the impugned order of detention against the petitioner under

    section 3(i) of the PITNDPS Act, 1988 which needs no interference.

    (vii) It has been canvassed that since the petitioner was already in jail

    custody in Chatra Jail and, as such, the ground of detention has been

    served to him on 30.01.2026 within the stipulated period.

    (viii) It has been contended that the said detention order was considered

    by the learned Advisory Board and on 17.03.2026 in which the

    petitioner was heard by the learned Advisory Board and it was

    opined by the learned Advisory Board that “the Detenu has stated

    that he has been served with a copy of the detention order” and the

    learned Advisory Board further opined that “after considering the

    entire matter, we are satisfied that sufficient cause is made out for

    the detention of the detenue.”

    (ix) Referring the aforesaid, the learned counsel for the state has

    submitted that the detention order is in accordance with law and, as

    such, it needs no interference.

    (x) It has been contended that after aforesaid opinion of the learned

    Advisory Board, the detention order dated 15.01.2026 has been

    confirmed under section 9(f) of the Act,1988 and the period of

    detention has been fixed as one year from the date of detention

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    under section 11 of the Act,1988 vide Departmental Order No.

    1300, dated 30.03.2026 which is sustainable in the eyes of law.

    (xi) It has been contended that the fact of the case of Charitra Kumar

    Dangi @ Chalitar Dangi V. State of Jharkhand (supra) is different

    from the case of this petitioner. In the case of Charitra Kumar

    Dangi, detenue was acquitted from the charges framed against him

    in all the cases registered against him including the cases under

    NDPS Act whereas in the present case, the petitioner has been

    acquitted in two cases only out of four cases lodged against him

    under the NDPS Act and further the said acquittal orders were

    passed after the passing of the impugned order of detention,

    therefore the ratio of the said case will not be applicable in the fact

    and circumstances of the instant case.

    (xii) It has been contended that there is no inordinate delay between

    proposal of detention, issuance of order of detention and complying

    the order of detention and, as such, it cannot be said that live and

    proximate link between past activities and detention order do not

    establish.

    (xiii) Learned counsel has further submitted that it is also incorrect on the

    part of the petitioner to take the ground that there is no subjective

    satisfaction of the detaining authority rather, each and every aspect

    of the matter has been taken into consideration by the competent

    sanctioning authority which on being deliberated by the Advisory

    Board has upheld the decision. When two authorities have upheld

    the issue of confining the petitioner in detention, it cannot be said

    that there is no subjective satisfaction.

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    7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/State, based upon the

    aforesaid grounds, have submitted that it is, therefore, not a case where the

    order of detention is said to suffer from an error.

    Analysis

    8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the

    order of detention as also the pleadings made on behalf of the petitioner and

    the State as available in the writ petition and the counter affidavits.

    9. The issues which require consideration herein are –

    (i) Whether the grant of bail to the petitioner in pending cases and acquittal

    in some cases, registered under the NDPS Act, is ground for his release

    from the preventive detention passed under section3(1) of the Prevention

    of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,

    1988?

    (ii) Whether there is violation of section 3(3) of the Prevention of Illicit

    Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 in

    communicating ground of detention to the petitioner?

    10. But, before considering the said issues, the statutory provision as

    contained under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

    Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 with its object and intent needs to be

    referred herein.

    11. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 has been

    enacted keeping in view that in recent years, India has been facing a problem

    of transit traffic in illicit drugs. The spillover from such traffic has caused

    problems of abuse and addiction. This trend has created an illicit demand for

    drugs within the country which may result in the increase of illicit cultivation

    and manufacture of drugs. Although a number of legislative, administrative

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    and other preventive measures, including the deterrent penal provisions in the

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Act, 1985, have been taken by

    the Government, the transit traffic in illicit drugs had not been completely

    eliminated. It was, therefore, felt that a preventive detention law should be

    enacted with a view to effectively immobilising the traffickers. The

    Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities

    Act, 1974 provides for preventive detention in relation to smuggling of drugs

    and psychotropic substances, but it cannot be invoked to deal with persons

    engaged in illicit traffic of drugs and psychotropic substances within the

    country. It was, therefore, felt that a separate legislation should be enacted for

    preventive detention of persons engaged in any kind of illicit traffic in narcotic

    drugs and psychotropic substances.

    12. The relevant provisions which require consideration are Sections 3, 6,

    9 and 11 of the Act,1988, which are necessary to be referred herein which read

    hereunder as :-

    “3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.-(I) The Central
    Government or a State Government, or any officer of the Central
    Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that
    Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by
    that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the
    rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the
    purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with
    respect to any person (including a foreigner) that, with a view to
    preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and
    psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do, make an order
    directing that such person be detained.

    (2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government
    or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State
    Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government
    a report in respect of the order.

    (3) For the purposes of clause (5) of Article 22 of the
    Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of
    a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made

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    shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not
    later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons
    to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of
    detention.

    6. Grounds of detention severable.-Where a person has been detained
    in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3
    which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention
    shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds
    and accordingly-

    (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative
    merely because one or some of the grounds is or are-

    (i) vague,

    (ii) non-existent,

    (iii) not relevant,

    (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or

    (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,
    and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer
    making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub-section
    (I) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and
    made the order of detention;

    (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall
    be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-
    section (I) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section with
    reference to the remaining ground or grounds.

    9. Advisory Boards.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4)
    and subclause (c) of clause (7) of article 22 of the Constitution,-

    (a) the Central Government’ and each State Government shall,
    whenever necessary, constitute one or more Advisory Boards each of
    which shall consist of a Chairman and two other persons possessing the
    qualifications specified in sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of article 22 of
    the Constitution;

    (b) save as otherwise provided in section 10, the appropriate
    Government shall, within five weeks from the date of detention of a
    person under a detention order, make a reference in respect thereof to
    the Advisory Board constituted under clause (a) to enable the Advisory
    Board to make the report under sub-clause (a) of clause (4) of article
    22
    of the Constitution;

    (c) the Advisory Board to which a reference is made under clause

    (b) shall after considering the reference and the materials placed before
    it and after calling for such further information as it may deem
    necessary from the appropriate Government or from any person, called
    for the purpose through the appropriate Government or from the person
    concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to

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    do or if the person concerned desires to be heard in person, after
    hearing him in person, prepare its report specifying in a separate
    paragraph thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient
    cause for the detention of the person concerned and submit the same
    within eleven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned;

    (d) when there is a difference of opinion among the members
    forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such
    members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board;

    (e) a person against whom an order of detention has been made
    under this Act shall not be entitled to appear by any legal practitioner
    in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board and
    the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that
    part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is
    specified, shall be confidential;

    (f) in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there
    is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the
    appropriate Government may confirm the detention order and continue
    the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit and
    in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is in its
    opinion no sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned,
    the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause
    the person to be released forthwith.

    11. Maximum period of detention.-The maximum period for which any
    person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which
    the provisions of section 10 do not apply and which has been confirmed
    under clause (f) of section 9 shall be one year from the date of detention,
    and the maximum period for which any person may be detained in
    pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of section 10
    apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section 9, read
    with sub-section (2) of section 10, shall be two years from the date of
    detention:

    Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
    affect the power of appropriate Government in either case to revoke or
    modify the detention order at any earlier time.”

    13. It is evident that the Act, 1988 has been enacted since India has been

    facing a problem of transit traffic in illicit drugs. It was, therefore, felt that a

    preventive detention law should be enacted with a view to effectively

    immobilising the traffickers. The Central Government and the State

    Governments have been empowered to make orders of detention with respect

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    to any person in respect of whom an order of detention is made under the

    Ordinance at any time before the 31st July, 1990 may be detained without

    obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board for a period not exceeding one

    year from the date of his detention if the detaining authority is satisfied that

    such person is engaged, or is likely to engage, in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs

    and psychotropic substances in any area highly vulnerable to such illicit

    traffic.

    14. Further, the “illicit traffic” has been defined as under Section 2(e) of

    the Act, 1988 which reads hereunder as: –

    “2. (e) “illicit traffic”, in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic
    substances, means-

    (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant;

    (ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant;

    (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase,
    transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import
    inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or
    transhipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;

    (iv) dealing in any activities in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances
    other than those provided in sub-clauses (i) to (iii); or

    (v) handling or letting any premises for the carrying on of any of the
    activities referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iv),

    other than those permitted under the Naroctic Drugs and Psychotropic
    Substances Act, 1985 (61 of 1985) or any rule or order made, or any
    condition of any licence, term or authorisation issued, thereunder and
    includes-

    (1) financing, directly or indirectly, any of the aforementioned activities:
    (2) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance of or in support of doing any
    of the aforementioned activities; and
    (3) harbouring persons engaged in any of the aforementioned activities:”

    15. Hence, Section 3 of the Act, 1988 provides power to make order

    detaining certain persons wherefrom it is evident that the competent authority

    if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner) that, with a view

    to preventing him from engaging in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and

    psychotropic substances, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that

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    such person be detained. But, for the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the

    Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a

    detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be

    made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five

    days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in

    writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention.

    16. Further, Section 9 of the Act, 1988 provides constitution of an Advisory

    Board with an intent to achieve the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (4)

    and subclause (c) of clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India with

    the conferment of power upon the Advisory Board that if any reference has

    been made and the materials placed before it and after calling for such further

    information as it may deem necessary from the appropriate Government or

    from any person, called for the purpose through the appropriate Government

    or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it

    essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard in person, after

    hearing him in person, prepare its report specifying in a separate paragraph

    thereof its opinion as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the

    detention of the person concerned and submit the same within eleven weeks

    from the date of detention of the person concerned.

    17. The maximum period of detention has been provided under Section 11

    of the Act, 1988 and as provided therein any person may be detained in

    pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions of section 10 do not

    apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section 9 shall be one

    year from the date of detention, and the maximum period for which any person

    may be detained in pursuance of any detention order to which the provisions

    of section 10 apply and which has been confirmed under clause (f) of section

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    9, read with sub-section (2) of section 10, shall be two years from the date of

    detention.

    18. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid statutory provisions, the factual

    aspect of the present case is to be considered in order to consider the issue as

    formulated hereinabove.

    Re: Issue No.(I)

    19. Regarding issue no. (I), i.e. whether the grant of bail to the petitioner

    in pending cases and acquittal in some cases, registered under the NDPS Act,

    is ground for his release from the preventive detention passed under

    section3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and

    Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988? the petitioner has raised ground that

    petitioner is already on bail or has been acquitted by the Court of law, in the

    NDPS cases registered against him and the said cases were relied by the

    detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention dated

    15.01.2026 and, hence, detention order cannot be sustained.

    20. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, it is admitted case

    that the order of detention was passed on 15.01.2026 and petitioner was

    detained on 30.01.2026 and after confirmation by the Advisory Board, the

    detention order dated 15.01.2026 was confirmed and under section 11 of the

    Act, petitioner was ordered to be detained for a period of one year from his

    date of detention, i.e., 30.01.2026.

    21. This court, from perusal of record, finds that in the proposal submitted

    by the Deputy Commissioner, Chatra, vide letter No. 1517 dated 22.12.2025,

    to the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Prison and Disaster

    Management, Jharkhand, for detention of the petitioner, there is inter alia

    reference of four NDPS cases registered against the petitioner, i.e,

    16
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 10/2014 dated 03.02.2014; Bashishthnagar P.S.

    Case no. 79/2018 dated 21.11.2018; Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 51/2021

    dated 24.05.2021 and Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 5/2025 dated 19.01.2025.

    22. In Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 10/2014 and Bashishthnagar P.S. Case

    no. 79/2018, petitioner has been acquitted by the learned Trial Court by order

    dated 17.01.2026 and 03.02.2026 respectively. Further, in Bashishthnagar

    P.S. Case no. 51/2021 and in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 5/2025, petitioner

    has been enlarged on bail by order dated 10.09.2025 and 11.06.2025

    respectively.

    23. Hence, out of the four NDPS cases registered against the petitioner,

    petitioner has been acquitted in two cases and he has been enlarged on bail in

    two cases.

    24. In the present case, from the ground of detention communicated to

    the petitioner, it is apparent that in the pending case, i.e., Bashishthnagar

    P.S. Case no. 51/2021, petitioner is involved in recovery of 200 kg of

    poppy straw and in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 5/2025, allegation against

    the petitioner is of opium cultivation in the forest area.

    25. From, ground of detention, it also appears that out of the two pending

    cases registered against the petitioner under the NDPS Act, oldest case

    registered against the petitioner was in the year 2021 being Bashishthnagar

    P.S. Case no. 51/2021 concerning in recovery of 200 kg of poppy straw.

    Thereafter, petitioner did not repent and again after four years in 2025,

    petitioner was found indulge in poppy cultivation in the forest area and for

    this Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 5/2025, was registered against him.

    26. Hence, so far as release of the petitioner on bail, in the two pending

    cases, i.e., Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 51/2021 and in Bashishthnagar

    17
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    P.S. Case no. 5/2025, registered under the NDPS Act is concerned, this

    Court finds that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority

    that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to maintenance of

    public order and in such circumstances, based on the relevant materials and

    satisfying itself, that it would not be possible to control his habituality in

    continuing the criminal activities by resorting the normal procedures, the

    Detaining Authority had passed an impugned order detaining him under

    the Act,1988.

    27. Further, the ground of bail cannot be said to affect the decision taken

    by the competent authority of detention, rather the accusation so made in

    the First Information Report is to be seen for the purpose to have the

    subjective satisfaction of the nature of accusation made in the said FIR.

    28. Since the detention order is to be passed by the competent authority

    anticipating the criminality of the concerned and it would be evident from

    the accusation made in the ground of detention communicated to the

    petitioner vide memo no. 122 dated 15.01.2026, (Annexure-1) passed by

    the Respondent no. 2-Additional Principal Secretary, Department of

    Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand,

    Ranchi, wherein inter alia aforesaid two pending NDPS cases registered

    against the petitioner under the NDPS Act is mentioned.

    29. The consideration of coming from judicial custody by virtue of order

    passed by the court to release on bail has been taken into consideration by

    the Hon’ble Apex Court in D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of

    Karnataka and others reported in (2011) 10 SCC 215 wherein detenue

    had challenged his detention order. The Hon’ble Apex Court in this case

    had noted in paragraph-17 that the even after release on bail detenue again

    18
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    started indulging in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the

    public life, damaging public property, etc. and hence, detenue appeal was

    dismissed. Further in paragraph-20 of the aforesaid judgment, the Hon’ble

    Apex Court had noted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority

    in passing the detention order against the detenue, for ready reference

    Paragraph-17 and 20 of D.M. Nagaraja(supra) case is quoted herein

    below –

    “17. All the abovementioned details which have been correctly stated
    in the detention order clearly show that the appellant is not amenable
    to ordinary course of law. It also shows that even after his release on
    bail from the prison on various occasions, he again started indulging
    in the same type of offences, particularly, threatening the public life,
    damaging public property, etc. All these aspects have been meticulously
    considered by the detaining authority and after finding that in order to
    maintain public order, since his activities are prejudicial to the public,
    causing harm and danger, the detaining authority detained him as
    “goonda” under Karnataka Act 12 of 1985 for a period of 12 months
    and the same was rightly approved by the Advisory Board and the State
    Government. Inasmuch as the detaining authority has taken note of all
    the relevant materials and strictly followed all the safeguards as
    provided in the Act ensuring the liberty of the detenue, we are in entire
    agreement with the decision of the detaining authority as well as the
    impugned order of the High Court affirming the same.”

    xxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx

    20. In the case on hand, we have already extracted criminality, criminal
    activities starting from the age of 30 and details relating to eleven cases
    mentioned in the grounds of detention. It is not in dispute that in one
    case he has been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous
    imprisonment for a term of nine years. He had been acquitted in two
    cases and four cases are pending against him wherein he was granted
    bail by the courts. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
    authority that in spite of his continuous activities causing threat to
    maintenance of public order, he was getting bail one after another and
    indulging in the same activities. In such circumstances, based on the
    relevant materials and satisfying itself, namely, that it would not be
    possible to control his habituality in continuing the criminal activities

    19
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    by resorting to normal procedure, the detaining authority passed an
    order detaining him under Act 12 of 1985.”

    30. Further, regarding acquittal of the petitioner in two NDPS cases, this

    Court finds that the impugned detention order is dated 15.01.2026 and

    subsequently petitioner was acquitted in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no.

    10/2014 and Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 79/2018, by the learned Trial

    Court by order dated 17.01.2026 and 03.02.2026 respectively. Hence, on

    the date of passing of the impugned detention order dated 15.01.2026,

    petitioner was not acquitted from the said charges.

    31. Therefore, the authority concerned while passing the impugned

    detention order which was passed on 15.01.2026 has taken into

    consideration the entire history of accusation against the petitioner and

    only thereafter has passed the order of detention. Hence, satisfaction has

    been arrived by the detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live

    and proximate link between the past conduct of a petitioner and material

    which is not stale.

    32. Thus, from the impugned detention order dated 15.01.2026

    (Annexure-1), it is evident that the petitioner is habitually involved in

    offences relating to Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic substance, and

    further on the basis of subjective satisfaction the detaining authority has

    arrived to conclusion that the well-organized manner in which such pre-

    judicial activities have been carried on and nexus between dates of

    incidents and passing of the detention order and the said observation is

    according to the ratio led down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

    D.M Nagaraja Versus Government of Karnataka and others(supra)

    20
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    therefore, the said observation of the detaining authority cannot be said to

    be suffer from an error.

    33. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the Khudiram

    Das v. State of West Bengal(supra), and has submitted that satisfaction

    recorded by the detaining authority is based on incomplete and irrelevant

    material as acquittal dated 17.01.2026 and 03.02.2026 passed in

    Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 10/2014 and Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no.

    79/2018 respectively, being vital and proximate development was not

    considered.

    34. But, judgment of Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal(supra), is

    not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the present case as

    impugned detention order is dated 15.01.2026 and subsequently petitioner

    was acquitted in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 10/2014, by order dated

    17.01.2026 and in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 79/2018, by order dated

    03.02.2026, hence, at the time of passing of the impugned detention order,

    petitioner was not acquitted of the charges.

    35. Accordingly, Issue No.I has been answered herein.

    Re: Issue No. (II)

    36. Regarding the second issue i.e. whether there is violation of section

    3(3) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

    Substances Act, 1988 in communicating ground of detention to the

    petitioner, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that

    impugned detention order has been passed on 15.01.2026, but the ground

    of detention was communicated the petitioner on 30.01.2026.

    37. Section 3(3) of the Act,1988 provides that for the purpose of clause

    (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person

    21
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    detained in pursuance of a detention order, the grounds on which the order

    has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but

    ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and

    for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the

    date of detention.

    38. Thus, as per statutory provision, enumerated in section 3(3) of the

    Act,1988, time for communicating the ground of detention to the detenue

    commences from the date when detenue is taken in detention and it shall

    be communicated to the detenue within five days from the date of detention

    and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing,

    not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention. However, even under

    exceptional circumstances, the communication shall not be made later than

    fifteen days from the date of detention.

    39. The “grounds of detention” communicated under Section 3(3) must

    include all the basic facts, material documents, and statements relied upon

    by the detaining authority to reach its subjective satisfaction. The scope of

    this communication is to enable the detenu to make an effective,

    purposeful, and timely representation to the competent authorities and the

    Advisory Board. If the relevant materials or legible copies of the

    documents relied upon are not supplied within the stipulated period, the

    detenu’s right to make an effective representation is frustrated, rendering

    the detention illegal.

    40. The provision serves as a vital check and balance. While the Act,

    1988, grants the executive extraordinary powers of preventive detention to

    combat the menace of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic

    substances, Section 3(3) ensures constitutional accountability. The

    22
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, while generally afforded

    judicial deference, is subject to strict judicial scrutiny regarding adherence

    to these procedural safeguards. Any lapse in compliance with the statutory

    timelines results in the infringement of the detenu’s personal liberty under

    Article 21 of the Constitution of India, leading to the quashing of the

    detention order.

    41. In the instant writ petition, petitioner has admitted that detention

    order was served upon him on 30.01.2026, while he was lodged on Chatera

    Jail in connection with Kunda P.S. Case no. 01/2001corropponding to S.T.

    No. 380/2018.

    42. Hence, in the present case petitioner was detained under the

    impugned order on 30.01.2026 and on the same day i.e. on 30.01.2026

    ground of detention was communicated to the petitioner, which is within

    five days as per statutory mandate provided under Section 3(3) of the

    Act,1988 and such communication falls well within the statutory period of

    five days as mandated under Section 3(3) of the Act, 1988, and this fact

    stands substantiated by Annexure-E filed on behalf of the

    respondent/State.

    43. Hence, there is no violation of section 3(3) of the Prevention of Illicit

    Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 in

    communicating ground of detention to the petitioner.

    44. Accordingly, issue no. (II) has been answered.

    45. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 6 of the

    Act,1988, has no application to the facts of the present case and in this

    regard learned counsel has cited judgment passed by the co-ordinate Bench

    23
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    of this Court in case of Charitra Kumar Dangi @ Chalitar Dangi V. State

    of Jharkhand” (supra).

    46. In this regard, this Court finds that Section 6 of the Act,1988, deals

    with the situation when grounds of detention are severable. Section 6

    provided that where a person has been detained on two or more grounds,

    such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on

    each of such grounds and such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or

    inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds are vague, non-

    existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with

    such person, or invalid for any other reason whatsoever. It will be deemed

    that if one of the ground falls within the aforesaid categories, then it shall

    be deemed that the order of the detention is passed in reference to the

    remaining ground.

    47. Thus, the statutory text stipulates that if a person has been detained

    under a preventive detention order issued pursuant to sub-section (1) of

    Section 3 of the PITNDPS Act, and such an order has been made on two

    or more grounds, the order of detention is to be treated as having been

    made separately on each of those grounds.

    48. In ordinary administrative law, if an order is based on subjective

    satisfaction arising from multiple grounds, the invalidity of one ground can

    strike down the entire order because a court cannot easily determine if the

    authority would have reached the same satisfaction based on the surviving

    grounds alone. Section 6 creates a statutory exception to this rule. It

    ensures that a preventive detention order under Section 3(1) does not

    automatically fail in its entirety if one or more of the multiple grounds cited

    are found to be defective, vague, irrelevant, or non-existent. Thus, Section

    24
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    6 supports the legislative intent by allowing the detention to stand on any

    remaining sound grounds, thereby preventing the release of individuals

    involved in drug trafficking due to technical defects in some of the stated

    reasons.

    49. In the preceding paragraph it has already been discussed that two

    cases, i.e., in Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 51/2021 and in Bashishthnagar

    P.S. Case no. 5/2025, registered under the NDPS Act are pending against

    the petitioner. In the counter affidavit it has been stated that

    Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 51/2021, is related to recovery of 200 KG of

    Poppy Straw and the case is in Evidence stage and Bashishthnagar P.S.

    Case no. 5/2025, which is related to Opium Cultivation, Charge sheet has

    been submitted.

    50. In the present case detaining authority has noted in impugned

    detention order that it is necessary to detain the petitioner to forbade him

    from indulging in smuggling/illegal production of Narcotic Drugs and

    Psychotropic Substances in future. Hence, in the present case ground of

    detention is based on relevant and cogent material, which cannot be

    discarded.

    51. The fact of the judgment of the case passed by co-ordinate Bench of

    this Court in Charitra Kumar Dangi @ Chalitar Dangi V. State of

    Jharkhand [ W.P(Cr.) No.557 of 2024], which is being relied on by the

    learned counsel for the petitioner, was that four cases were mentioned in

    the detention order against the detenue out of which three cases were

    related to NDPS Act and one case was related to offences under IPC. The

    co-ordinate Bench of this Court had noted that detenue was acquitted in

    the three cases related to NDPS Act and in the case related the offences

    25
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    under the IPC, detenue was convicted under section 147,148,332,324,427

    and 504 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment by

    the learned Trial Court. But, the Appellate Court had modified the

    judgment and had convicted him under Section 323,353 and 149 of IPC

    and released him after due admonition as per provision of the Probation of

    the Offenders Act.

    52. Hence, a co-ordinate Bench noted that detention order was based on

    incomplete materials and the basis of satisfaction was incomplete and there

    was only one ground of detention, there is no applicability of section 6 of

    the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

    Substances Act, 1988.

    53. But, in the present case two cases, i.e., Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no.

    51/2021, relating to recovery of 200 KG of Poppy Straw and

    Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 5/2025, concerning Opium Cultivation,

    registered under the NDPS Act are pending against the petitioner.

    54. Hence, in the present case, ground of detention is based on relevant

    and cogent material, which is not vague, therefore, impugned order of

    detention said to be validly passed by taking the unambiguous ground.

    55. Further, Judgment of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu(supra) relied on

    by the petitioner is not applicable in the facts and circumstance of the

    present case as in the present case though petitioner has been acquitted in

    two NDPS cases registered against him, but, even then also two cases, i.e,

    Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no. 51/2021 and Bashishthnagar P.S. Case no.

    5/2025, which are also registered under the NDPS Act against the

    petitioner are pending. Hence, satisfaction has been arrived by the

    26
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    detaining authority bearing in mind existence of live and proximate link

    between the past conduct of a petitioner and material which is not stale.

    56. So far as question of applicability of the ratio rendered by the

    Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ameena Begum vs. State of Telangana

    and others, (supra) is concerned, it is evident that in the said case the

    Hon’ble Apex Court has held that a Constitutional Court when called upon

    to test the legality of orders of preventive detention would be entitled to

    examine whether the order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit

    subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such satisfaction

    as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon which validity of the

    exercise of the power is predicated, would be the sine qua non for the

    exercise of the power not being satisfied. For ready reference the relevant

    paragraph is being quoted herein which reads as under:

    “27. Be that as it may, culling out the principles of law flowing
    from all the relevant decisions in the field, our understanding
    of the law for deciding the legality of an order of preventive
    detention is that even without appropriate pleadings to assail
    such an order, if circumstances appear therefrom raising a
    doubt of the detaining authority misconceiving his own
    powers, the Court ought not to shut its eyes; even not venturing
    to make any attempt to investigate the sufficiency of the
    materials, an enquiry can be made by the Court into the
    authority’s notions of his power. Without being remotely
    concerned about the sufficiency or otherwise of the materials
    on which detention has been ordered, the Court would be
    justified to draw a conclusion, on proof from the order itself,
    that the detaining authority failed to realise the extent of his
    own powers. This is quite apart from questioning the action
    for want of sufficient materials that were before the detaining
    authority. The authority for the detention is the order of
    detention itself, which the detenu or the Court can read. Such
    a reading of the order would disclose the manner in which the

    27
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    activity of the detenu was viewed by the detaining authority to
    be prejudicial to maintenance of public order and what exactly
    he intended should not be permitted to happen. Any order of a
    detaining authority evincing that the same runs beyond his
    powers, as are actually conferred, would not amount to a valid
    order made under the governing preventive detention law and
    be vulnerable on a challenge being laid.

    28. In the circumstances of a given case, a constitutional court
    when called upon to test the legality of orders of preventive
    detention would be entitled to examine whether:

    28.1. The order is based on the requisite satisfaction, albeit
    subjective, of the detaining authority, for, the absence of such
    satisfaction as to the existence of a matter of fact or law, upon
    which validity of the exercise of the power is predicated, would
    be the sine qua non for the exercise of the power not being
    satisfied;

    28.2. In reaching such requisite satisfaction, the detaining
    authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances
    and the same is not based on material extraneous to the scope
    and purpose of the statute;

    28.3. Power has been exercised for achieving the purpose for
    which it has been conferred, or exercised for an improper
    purpose, not authorised by the statute, and is therefore ultra
    vires;

    28.4. The detaining authority has acted independently or
    under the dictation of another body;

    28.5. The detaining authority, by reason of self-created rules
    of policy or in any other manner not authorised by the
    governing statute, has disabled itself from applying its mind to
    the facts of each individual case;

    28.6. The satisfaction of the detaining authority rests on
    materials which are of rationally probative value, and the
    detaining authority has given due regard to the matters as per
    the statutory mandate;

    28.7. The satisfaction has been arrived at bearing in mind
    existence of a live and proximate link between the past conduct
    of a person and the imperative need to detain him or is based
    on
    28.8. The ground(s) for reaching the requisite satisfaction
    is/are such which an individual, with some degree of

    28
    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    rationality and prudence, would consider as connected with
    the fact and relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry in
    respect whereof the satisfaction is to be reached;
    28.9. The grounds on which the order of preventive detention
    rests are not vague but are precise, pertinent and relevant
    which, with sufficient clarity, inform the detenu the
    satisfaction for the detention, giving him the opportunity to
    make a suitable representation; and
    28.10. The timelines, as provided under the law, have been
    strictly adhered to.”

    57. There is no dispute as to the settled position of law laid down by the

    Hon’ble Apex Court. Applying the said guidelines to the facts of the

    present case, this Court finds that it is apparent from the impugned order

    that the detention order has been passed by the competent authority on the

    basis of anticipated criminality of the petitioner. This is evident from the

    accusations set forth in the grounds of detention communicated to the

    petitioner vide Memo No. 122 dated 15.01.2026 (Annexure-1), issued by

    Respondent No. 2, the Additional Principal Secretary, Department of

    Home, Prison and Disaster Management, Government of Jharkhand,

    Ranchi, wherein, inter alia, reference is made to the two pending NDPS

    cases registered against the petitioner under the NDPS Act.

    58. It is, thus, clear that the authority concerned has duly considered the

    material available on record and has passed the impugned detention order

    based upon its subjective satisfaction. In reaching such satisfaction, the

    detaining authority has applied its mind to all relevant circumstances,

    without reliance upon any extraneous material beyond the scope and

    purpose of the statute. Accordingly, the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble

    Apex Court stands fully complied with herein.

    29

    2026:JHHC:21721-DB

    59. On the basis of discussions made hereinabove, this Court, therefore,

    is of the view that the impugned order of detention needs no interference.

    60. Accordingly, the detention order dated 15.01.2026 passed by the

    Respondent No.2, are hereby sustained and upheld.

    61. The instant writ petition stands dismissed.

    62. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

    (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

    I agree.

    (Sanjay Prasad, J.)

    (Sanjay Prasad, J.)

    Sudhir
    Dated:21/07/2026
    Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
    AFR

    Uploaded on 22/07/2026

    30



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