Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kuldeep Singh And Another vs State Of Punjab on 24 March, 2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
168 CRM-M-25731-2023
Date of decision: 24.03.2026
Date of uploading: 24.03.2026
Kuldeep Singh and another ....Petitioner
V/s
State of Punjab
....Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. R.S. Sidhu, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Adhiraj Singh, AAG, Punjab.
*****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)
1. The petition in hand has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
with the following substantive prayer:
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed the present petition may kindly be
allowed and FIR No.48 dated 24.02.2020 under Section 174-A Indian Penal
Code, 1860, Police Station Sadar Tarn Taran, District Tarn Taran
(Annexure P-2) be quashed in the interest of justice.”
2. The impugned FIR (as set out in the petition in hand) reads thus:-
“Present – Ms. Jagjit Walia, APP for the state. Accused Kuldeep
Singh and Baljinder Kaur proclaimed offenders. Statement of serving
official has been recorded today. Period of 30 days has also been elapsed.
Accused Kuldeep Singh and Baljinder Kaur not turned up in the court. As
such, accused Kuldeep Singh and Baljinder Kaur is declared proclaimed
offenders. Necessary intimation in this regard be sent to concerned police
station & accused be produced before the court as and when they
surrendered or arrested by the police. File be consigned to the record room,
after due compliance. Copy of this order be forwarded to Station House
Officer police station concerned to enable him to initiate proceedings
against the accused U/s 174-A of Indian Penal Code. Pronounced on :- 2nd
day of November, 2019 SD/- Amandeep Kaur (UID PB 0207) Addl. Chief
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CRM-M-25731-2023 2Judicial Magistrate Tarn Taran. Endorsement No. 432 Date 06.11.2019
Copy of this ordered to be forwarded to SHO PS Sadar Tarn Taran for
compliance. Police Station today: At this time above order no. 432 dated
06.11.2019 of the court of Smt. Amandeep Kaur ACJM/TT is received
through post Kuldeep Singh son of Ajaib Singh resident of Dhandrian
District Sangrur and Baljinder Kaur wife of Kuldeep Singh resident of
Dhandrian District Sangrur, against whom case no. 42 dated 17.02.2018,
offence 420, 120-B I.P.C, Police Station Sadar Tarn Taran, was pending in
the court, order is passed by Ld Judge to register the case on being absent
in court from the hearing. On this above case is registered under above
sections and copy of the original order alongwith copy of the F.I.R is
handed over to I, ASI for further investigation. I am going to busy in the
investigation. Report has been sent to control room through E Mail
Closing Rapat No. 30, Time 02:50 PM. Dated 24.02.2020.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the
impugned FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal case filed against the petitioners
(herein) under Sections 420, 120-B IPC in proceedings whereof the petitioner
was declared as a proclaimed person & hence the impugned FIR came to be
got registered against the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioners has
argued that the order as also the proceedings declaring the petitioners as
proclaimed person are manifestly illegal and against the mandatory provisions
of law. It has been further iterated that the FIR registered for the offences
under Sections 420, 120-B IPC has already been quashed in CRM-M-21002-
2023, vide order dated 28.08.2023, as the rival parties had entered into a
compromise/settlement and hence no useful purpose would be served by
continuation of the proceedings qua the impugned FIR.
On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the
petitioner has pressed for grant of petition in hand.
4. Learned State counsel has filed short reply by way of affidavit of
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sub-Division Khadur Sahib, Camp at
Goindwal Sahib, District Tarn Taran. Learned State counsel while raising
arguments in tandem with the said reply has opposed the claim of the
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CRM-M-25731-2023 3
petitioners seeking quashing of the FIR in question. While refuting the case
of the petitioner, detailed arguments concerning the merits of the case were
made and it is argued that the offence alleged against the petitioners is serious
and heinous. Learned State counsel has submitted that the Police has
conducted fair and proper investigation and after completion of the same, final
report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C., 1973 was presented before the competent
Court of jurisdiction. Furthermore, it has been submitted by the learned State
counsel that the petitioners were served through non-bailable warrants but
they did not appear which compelled the Court below to declare them
proclaimed person. Instead of surrendering before the competent Court, the
petitioners have chosen to file the instant petition which clearly reflects his
conduct that they were fully aware of the proceedings and the coercive
measures undertaken by the Court below to secure their presence. Moreover,
it has been stated that the learned Court below followed the procedure as laid-
down under Section 82 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 in letter and spirit and no
discrepancy whatsoever is forthcoming from the records of the case.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have
perused the paper-book.
6. The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present
petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising
therefrom) under Section 174-A of the IPC deserves to be quashed in the
factual matrix of the present case.
7. At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a
judgment of this Court passed in CRM-M-51049-2019 titled as Mohammad
Hanif Attari vs. State of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023; relevant whereof
reads as under:
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CRM-M-25731-2023 4“3. In view the fact that after the principle proceedings in which the petitioner
was declared Proclaimed Offender stand concluded, the question would arise
is: ‘whether in the given circumstances, proceedings under Section 174A of the
IPC pursuant to FIR No.425 dated 17th of November, 2017 can be allowed to
continue.
4. The question framed ibid is no more res integra and already stands answered
by Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-43813-2018 titled as “BaldevChand Bansal v. State of Haryana and another” vide order dated 29.01.2019,
which held as under:
“Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.64 dated
15.02.2017 filed under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code
registered at Police Station Sector-5, Panchkula and all other
subsequent proceedings arising thereof as well as order dated
24.10.2016 passed by the trial Court vide which a direction was
issued to register the aforesaid FIR.”
XX XXX XXXX
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions
rendered by this Court in “Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli
and another (supra), 2017, (3) L.A.R.584, Microqual Techno
Limited and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2015 (32) RCR
(Criminal) 790 and “Rajneesh Khanna v. State of Haryana and
another” 2017 (3) L.A.R. 555 wherein in an identical circumstance,
this Court has held that since the main petition filed under Section
138 of the Act stands withdrawn in view of an amicable settlement
between the parties, therefore, continuation of proceedings under
Section 174A of IPC shall be nothing but an abuse of the process of
law.
XX XXX XXXX
In view of the same, I find merit in the present petition and
accordingly, present petition is allowed and the impugned order
dated 24.10.2016 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class,
Panchkula as well as FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 registered under
Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector-5,
Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof, are
hereby quashed.”
5. Same is the view of another Co-ordinate Bench in the “Ashok Madaan v.
State of Haryana and another” reported as 2020 (4) RCR (Criminal) 87,
wherein it has been held that:
“No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently
argued that the offence under Section 174A I.P.C. is independent of
the main case, therefore, merely because the main case has been4 of 9
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CRM-M-25731-2023 5dismissed for want of prosecution, the present petition cannot be
allowed, however, keeping in view the fact that the present FIR was
registered only on account of absence from the proceedings in the
main case which had been subsequently regularised by the court
while granting bail to the petitioner, the default stood condoned. In
such circumstances, continuation of proceedings under Section
174A LP.C. shall be abuse of the process of court.
7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 446 dated
21.08.2017, registered under Section 174A I.PC. at Police Station
Kotwali, District Faridabad, as well as consequential proceedings
shall stand quashed.”
7.1. More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled
as Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another, Criminal Appeal No.4359
of 2024 decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:
“7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is nullified
i.e., the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of subsequent
developments is no longer required to be presented before a Court of law.
Then, can the prosecution still proceed against such a person for having not
appeared before a Court during the time that the process was in effect. The
answer is in the affirmative. We say so for the following reasons:-
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails to
appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by
proclamation…”. This implies that the very instance at which a
person is directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section
comes into play;
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the
instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section,
and therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent of Section
82, Cr.P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be
initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be started
post the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the said
proclamation is no longer in effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e.,
that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh Bhatia
v.State (NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023; Divya Verma
v. State 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr. v. State
GNCT of Delhi & Anr. Crl. M.C. No.1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May,
2022 For the reasons afore-stated, we agree with the findings made5 of 9
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CRM-M-25731-2023 6in these judgments/orders. At the same time, it stands clarified that
we have not commented on the merits of the cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is
indeed stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in
connection with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is
initiated and in the said offence the accused stands, subsequently,
acquitted, it would be permissible in law for the Court seized of the
trial under such offence, to take note of such a development and treat
the same as a ground to draw the proceedings to a close, should
such a prayer be made and the circumstances of the case so warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent,
substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation
under Section 82, Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence.
xxxxxxxxx”
However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned
FIR (therein) under Section 174-A of the IPC since, inter alia, the original
offence in the form of criminal complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, 1881
in the said case had been settled and withdrawn by the rival parties.
8. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary
powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate
that it should not apply the law in an austere, academic and exacting technical
manner, without considering its practical implications. The Law is not merely
a set of programmed, nailed-to-the-ground rules, to be applied without
context. It must be enforced, while bearing in mind, that its purpose is to
ensure substantive justice between the parties. The statutory provision of
Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio decidendi of the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daljit Singh‘s case (supra),
unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the IPC does not
proprio vigore become liable to be quashed, in case the rival parties have
entered into a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has been
compromised and quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the same
time, the factum of the criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of proceedings
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CRM-M-25731-2023 7whereof) having been compromised/settled, is indubitably, a relevant factor
to be considered while dealing with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also
proceedings emanating therefrom) under Section 174-A of IPC. It would
tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness, proportionality, and
justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may sometimes lead to
unjust outcomes that also contradict the law’s underlined purpose. Therefore,
the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of Law
with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach underscores
Law’s role as an apparatus for fostering societal harmony and addressing the
real-world complexities, efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere
literal/technical compliance.
9. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/Section
482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process
and securing the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal
in nature and a genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may
intervene to quash the criminal proceedings, recognizing the continuation
thereof would be non-productive and unjust in the given circumstances. The
inherent powers of a High Court are powers which are incidental replete
powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would be obliged to sit still and
helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused for the purposes of
injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High Court, it is its
very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such
power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers
of a High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible
amplitude. These inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High
Court which ought to be, and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to
maintain its authority to prevent the process of law/Courts being obstructed or
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CRM-M-25731-2023 8
abused. It is a trite posit of jurisprudence that though laws attempt to deal with
all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of circumstances which shape
events and the imperfections of language make it impossible to lay down
provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact arises. A High Court
which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable manner, should
therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which, though not
expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent injustice
or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these
plenary power(s) is the authority; in fact the seminal duty and responsibility
of a High Court; to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of
administering justice, in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and
effective manner. In other words; Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless
powers, which a High Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just
and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process
of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice nay substantial justice
between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
10. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and
circumstances of the case in hand; especially the original offence being an
offence under Sections 420, 120-B IPC, the original offence alleged to have
been committed in the year 2018, the subject matter of the original offence
having been settled amicably between the parties and the original FIR having
been quashed on the basis of compromise vide order dated 28.08.2023 passed
in CRM-M-21002-2023; this Court deems it appropriate that the impugned
FIR as also all proceedings emanating therefrom deserve to be quashed.
11. It is, hence, directed as under:
(i) The FIR No.48 dated 24.02.2020 under Section 174-A Indian
Penal Code, 1860, Police Station Sadar Tarn Taran, District Tarn Taran
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CRM-M-25731-2023 9(Annexure P-2) and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom stand
quashed.
(ii) All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
March 24, 2026
Naveen
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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