Punjab-Haryana High Court
Kuldeep Gochhwal vs State Of Haryana on 7 August, 2026
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241
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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Kuldeep Gochhwal
.Petitioner
....Petitioner
versus
State of Haryana
....Respondent
Date of Decision: August 07,
07, 2026
Date of Uploading: August 07,
07, 2026
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present:-
Present: Mr. Rishilal, Advocate for the petitioner
(presence
presence marked through video-
video-conferencing
conferencing).
Mr. Deepak Kumar Grewal, DAG Haryana.
*****
SUMEET GOEL,
GOEL, J. (ORAL)
The substantive prayer made in the petition in hand reads thus:
“It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the present petition be
allowed and FIR No.789 dated 10.12.2021 registered under sections 174 174-A
A of
IPC, registered at Police Station Karnal Civil Line, District Karnal may kindly be
quashed.”
2. The impugned FIR (as set out in the petition in hand) reads thus:
“GM-88033
88033 KF IN THE COURT OF SH. ANIL KUMAR YADAV,
JMIC KARNAL CRL NO 3671/18, DATE OF INSTT. 28.08.18, DATE OF
DECISION- 18.01.20 Axis Bank Ltd. a Bank, incorporated and registered under
the Companies Act, 1956 having its Registered Office at Trishul, 3rd Floor
Opposite Samarteswar Temple, Law Garde, Ellis Bridge, Ahmedabad Ahmedabad-308006,
308006,
Gujrat and one of its branch office at Mall Road, Karnal through its Authorized
Person/ Special power of Attorney Holder Hari Om…. Complainant Versus
KULDEEP GOCHHWAL S/O DARYAOO SINGH, R/O H.N. K 100/2,
VRINDAWAN COLONY, BHAGWANPUR, RAIGARH, CHATTISGARH
496001…….Accused Complaint under Section 138/142 of the Negotiable
instruments Act (As Amended up to Date) Read With Section 357 of The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 Axis Bank Ltd. Vs. Kuldeep Gochwal Present: Sh.
Amish Goel, Id. counsel for the complainant. 5832 5832-2018
2018 Today the case was
fixed for presencee of accused as well as for filing the list of property of accused.
Statement of Tamili/police official to the effect has already been separately
recorded. Case has been called out several times since morning but the accused
inspite of lapse of more than 300 days from the date of publication of above said
proclamation has failed to appear before this court. Even the necessary
compliance of section 83 of Cr.P.C has been made as complainant/id. Counsel for
complainant has suffered a statement to the effect thathatt he could not lay hand on
the property of accused despite making best efforts. Therefore, in view of the
failure on the part of accused to appear in the court inspite of lapse of more than
30 days from the date of publication of above said proclamation ac accused
cused is
MAHAVIR SINGH hereby declared as proclaimed person. The evidence of the complainant under
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2Section 299Cr.P.C. is hereby closed by court order. Intimation in this regard be
sent to P.O. Staff, office of SSP Karnal. A copy of this order be given dasti to the
Naib Court/parocar for forwarding of the same to the SHO concerned after
proper receipt to register an FIR against the accused u/s 174A of IPC and send
the copy of FIR to this court within a period of three days. File be consigned to
record-room with direction to put a badge on it so that the same can be placed
before the court on arrest or surrender of the accused.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned
FIR, has its genesis, in a criminal complaint filed against the petitioner (herein) under
Section 138 of the NI Act, in proceedings whereof the petitioner was declared as a
proclaimed person & hence the impugned FIR came to be registered against the
petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner could not
appear in the complaint case as the petitioner was having business in Raigarh,
Chhatisgarh and had travelled outside the State to search better business opportunity,
thus, the petitioner had no prior information regarding the complaint in question and
had also not been served with any notice. Learned counsel has further submitted that
thereafter, the petitioner was declared as proclaimed person. Learned counsel has also
submitted that upon gaining the knowledge about pendency of complaint in question,
he appeared before the concerned trial Court and was admitted to bail. Thereafter, the
petitioner paid all the claim/ money to the complainant – Bank and nothing remains
due. Learned counsel has further submitted that on 11.06.2025, counsel for the
complainant – Bank suffered a statement in the complaint case before the trial Court
and pursuant to which, vide order dated 11.06.2025 (Annexure P-3), the complaint in
question was dismissed as withdrawn by the learned trial Court.
3.1. It has been further iterated that since the criminal complaint under
Section 138 of NI Act, has already been withdrawn as the rival parties had entered
into a compromise, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by continuation of
the proceedings qua the impugned FIR. To buttress this aspect of his argument,
learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the order dated 11.06.2025
(Annexure P-3) passed by the JMIC, Karnal, which reads thus:
“File taken up today as an application to withdraw the complaint.
Complainant appeared and suffered a statement that compromise has been
effected between parties and as per the instructions of the complainant he does
not want to proceed with the present complaint and withdraw the same. Heard.
MAHAVIR SINGH
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authenticity of this order/ judgment
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3Keeping in view the above statement, present complaint is hereby dismissed as
withdrawn. File be consigned to record room after due compliance.”
On the strength of above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner
has pressed for grant of petition in hand.
4. Learned State counsel has filed reply by way of an affidavit dated
04.04.2026, in Court today, which is taken on record. Raising submissions in tandem
with the said reply, learned State counsel has opposed the petition in hand. He,
however, does not dispute the fact that the parties have amicably resolved the matter
and the main complaint stands dismissed as withdrawn.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and have perused the
paper-book.
6. The seminal question that arises for consideration in the present
petition is as to whether the impugned FIR (as also proceedings arising therefrom)
under Section 209 of BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the IPC) deserves to be
quashed in the factual matrix of the present case.
7. At this juncture; it would be apposite to refer herein to a judgment of
this Court passed in CRM-
CRM-M-51049-
51049-2019 titled as Mohammad Hanif Attari
Attari vs. State
of Haryana, decided on 06.07.2023;
06.07.2023 relevant whereof reads as under:
“3. In view the fact that after the principle proceedings in which the petitioner was declared
Proclaimed Offender stand concluded, the question would arise is: ‘whether in the given
circumstances, proceedings under Section 174A of the IPC pursuant to FIR No.425 dated
17th of November, 2017 can be allowed to continue.
4. The question framed ibid is no more res integra and already stands answered by Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in CRM-M-43813-2018 titled as “Baldev Chand Bansal v. State
of Haryana and another” vide order dated 29.01.2019, which held as under:
“Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017 filed
under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station Sector-
5, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof as well as
order dated 24.10.2016 passed by the trial Court vide which a direction was
issued to register the aforesaid FIR.”
XX XXX XXXX
Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decisions rendered by this
Court in “Vikas Sharma v. Gurpreet Singh Kohli and another (supra), 2017, (3)
L.A.R.584, Microqual Techno Limited and others v. State of Haryana and
another, 2015 (32) RCR (Criminal) 790 and “Rajneesh Khanna v. State of
Haryana and another” 2017 (3) L.A.R. 555 wherein in an identical circumstance,
this Court has held that since the main petition filed under Section 138 of the
Act stands withdrawn in view of an amicable settlement between the parties,
therefore, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A of IPC shall be
nothing but an abuse of the process of law.
XX XXX XXXX
In view of the same, I find merit in the present petition and accordingly, present
petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 24.10.2016 passed by Judicial
Magistrate, 1st Class, Panchkula as well as FIR No.64 dated 15.02.2017
registered under Section 174A of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector-
MAHAVIR SINGH
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authenticity of this order/ judgment
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45, Panchkula and all other subsequent proceedings arising thereof, are hereby
quashed.”
5. Same is the view of another Co-ordinate Bench in the “Ashok Madaan v. State of
Haryana and another” reported as 2020 (4) RCR (Criminal) 87, wherein it has been held that:
“No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that
the offence under Section 174A I.P.C. is independent of the main case,
therefore, merely because the main case has been dismissed for want of
prosecution, the present petition cannot be allowed, however, keeping in view
the fact that the present FIR was registered only on account of absence from the
proceedings in the main case which had been subsequently regularised by the
court while granting bail to the petitioner, the default stood condoned. In such
circumstances, continuation of proceedings under Section 174A LP.C. shall be
abuse of the process of court.
7. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No. 446 dated 21.08.2017,
registered under Section 174A I.PC. at Police Station Kotwali, District
Faridabad, as well as consequential proceedings shall stand quashed.”
7.1. More recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as
Daljit Singh vs. State of Haryana and Another,
Another Criminal Appeal No.4359 of 2024
decided on 02.01.2025; has held that:
“7.3 Now, what happens if the status under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is nullified i.e.,
the person subjected to such proclamation, by virtue of subsequent developments
is no longer required to be presented before a Court of law. Then, can the
prosecution still proceed against such a person for having not appeared before a
Court during the time that the process was in effect. The answer is in the
affirmative. We say so for the following reasons:-
(i) The language of Section 174A, IPC says “whoever fails to
appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by
proclamation…”. This implies that the very instance at which a person is
directed to appear, and he does not do so, this Section comes into play;
(ii) What further flows from the language employed is that the
instance of non-appearance becomes an infraction of the Section, and
therefore, prosecution therefor would be independent of Section 82,
Cr.P.C. being in effect;
(iii) So, while proceedings under Section 174A IPC cannot be
initiated independent of Section 82, Cr.P.C., i.e., can only be started post
the issuance of proclamation, they can continue if the said proclamation
is no longer in effect.
(iv) We find that the Delhi High Court has taken this view, i.e.,
that Section 174A, IPC is a stand-alone offence in Mukesh Bhatia v.State
(NCT of Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1023; Divya Verma v. State 2023
SCC OnLine Del 2619; Sameena & Anr. v. State GNCT of Delhi & Anr.
Crl. M.C. No.1470 of 2021, Dated 17th May, 2022 For the reasons afore-
stated, we agree with the findings made in these judgments/orders. At the
same time, it stands clarified that we have not commented on the merits
of the cases.
(v) Granted that the offence prescribed in Section 174A IPC is indeed
stand-alone, given that it arises out of an original offence in connection
with which proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is initiated and in the
said offence the accused stands, subsequently, acquitted, it would be
permissible in law for the Court seized of the trial under such offence, to
take note of such a development and treat the same as a ground to draw
the proceedings to a close, should such a prayer be made and the
circumstances of the case so warrant.
8. In conclusion, we hold that Section 174A IPC is an independent,
substantive offence, that can continue even if the proclamation under Section 82,
Cr.P.C. is extinguished. It is a stand-alone offence. xxxxxxxxx”
However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the impugned FIR
MAHAVIR SINGH (therein) under Section 209 of the BNS (erstwhile Section 174-A of the IPC) since,
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5inter alia, the original offence in the form of criminal complaint under Section 138 of
NI Act, 1881 in the said case had been settled and withdrawn by the rival parties.
8. It is for the High Court, while exercising its innate plenary powers
under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023/ 428 of Cr.P.C., 1973, to ratiocinate that it should
not apply the law in an austere, academic and exacting technical manner, without
considering its practical implications. The law is not merely a set of programmed,
nailed-to-the-ground rules, to be applied without context. It must be enforced, while
bearing in mind, that its purpose is to ensure substantive justice between the parties.
The statutory provision of Section 174-A of IPC, when perused in the light of ratio
decidendi of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Daljit Singh‘s case
(supra), unequivocally shows that an FIR under Section 174-A of the IPC does not
proprio vigore become liable to be quashed, in case the rival parties have entered into
a compromise and such criminal complaint/FIR has been compromised and
quashed/withdrawn accordingly. However, at the same time, the factum of the
criminal complaint/FIR (in furtherance of proceedings whereof) having been
compromised/settled, is indubitably, a relevant factor to be considered while dealing
with a plea for quashing of an FIR (as also proceedings emanating therefrom) under
Section 174-A of IPC. This fact assumes greater significance considering that the
initial proceedings pertain exclusively to a private criminal complaint under Section
138 of NI Act, 1881, which the legislature has expressly classified as a compoundable
offence. Such litigation, especially in the backdrop of original offence having been
compromised will have an adverse impact on the overburdened Court-dockets.
Allowing such prosecution, when initial complaint has been settled/withdrawn would
undermine the legislative intent and distort the remedial nature of Section 138 of NI
Act of 1881. It would tantamount to contravening the principles of fairness,
proportionality, and justice in criminal proceedings. A literal interpretation may
sometimes lead to unjust outcomes that also contradict the law’s underlined purpose.
Therefore, the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction must balance the letter of law
with its spirit, ensuring fair and equitable results. This approach underscores law’s
MAHAVIR SINGH
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6
role as an apparatus for fostering societal harmony and addressing the real-world
complexities, efficaciously as also effectively, rather than mere literal/technical
compliance.
9. The inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, 2023/ Section 482
Cr.P.C., 1973 is primarily aimed at preventing abuse of judicial process and securing
the ends of justice. Thus, when the dispute is essentially personal in nature and a
genuine compromise has been reached, the High Court may intervene to quash the
criminal proceedings, recognizing the continuation thereof would be non-productive
and unjust in the given circumstances. The inherent powers of a High Court are
powers which are incidental replete powers, which if did not so exist, the Court would
be obliged to sit still and helplessly see the process of law and Courts being abused
for the purposes of injustice. In other words; such power(s) is intrinsic to a High
Court, it is its very life-blood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such
power(s), a High Court would have form but lack the substance. These powers of a
High Court hence deserve to be construed with the widest possible amplitude. These
inherent powers are in consonance with the nature of a High Court which ought to be,
and has in fact been, invested with power(s) to maintain its authority to prevent the
process of law/Courts being obstructed or abused. It is a trite posits of jurisprudence
that though laws attempt to deal with all cases that may arise, the infinite variety of
circumstances which shape events and the imperfections of language make it
impossible to lay down provisions capable of governing every case, which in fact
arises. A High Court which exists for the furtherance of justice in an indefatigable
manner, should therefore, have unfettered power(s) to deal with situations which,
though not expressly provided for by the law, need to be dealt with, to prevent
injustice or the abuse of the process of law and Courts. The juridical basis of these
plenary power(s) is the authority, in fact the seminal duty and responsibility of a High
Court, to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice,
in accordance with law, in a regular, orderly and effective manner. In other words;
Section 528 of BNSS, 2023 reflects peerless powers, which a High Court may draw
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upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the
observance of the due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice
nay substantial justice between the parties and to secure the ends of justice.
10. Keeping in view the entirety of the attending facts and circumstances of
the case in hand; especially the original offence being an offence under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881, the original offence alleged to have been
committed in the year 2018, the subject matter of the original offence having been
settled amicably between the parties and the criminal complaint under Section 138 of
the NI Act having been withdrawn on the basis of such settlement/compromise; this
Court deems it appropriate that the impugned FIR as also all proceedings emanating
therefrom deserve to be quashed.
11. It is, hence, directed as under:
(i) Instant petition is allowed;
allowed
(ii) The FIR No.789 dated 10.12.2021, under Section 174-A of IPC,
registered at Police Station Karnal Civil Line, District Karnal (Aannexure P-1), stands
quashed qua the petitioner;
(iii) All pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
August 07,
07, 2026
mahavir
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
MAHAVIR SINGH
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authenticity of this order/ judgment
