TATE OF KERALA
S
REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, KOCHI – 682 031
SRI. RAJEEV K. SR.PP
THIS
CRIMINAL
APPEAL
HAVING
COME
UP
FOR
ADMISSION
ON
30.06.2026, THE COURT ON 14.07.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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UDGMENT
J
Dated this the 14th day of July, 2026
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
This criminal appeal ispreferredimpugningthejudgmentoftheAdditional
Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha, in S.C. No.215 of 2012. The appellants stood for
trialfortheoffencespunishableunderSections341and302r/w34oftheIndian
Penal Code.
2. ThelearnedSessionsJudgefoundaccusedNos.1and3guiltyofthe
offencesunderSections341,302r/w34ofIPC, convictedandsentencedthemto
undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,00,000/- each and in
defaultofpaymentoffine,toundergorigorousimprisonmentforthreeyearseach
for the offence under Section 302 r/w 34 of IPC. They were also sentenced to
undergosimpleimprisonmentforoneweekeachfortheoffenceundersection341
r/w 34 of the IPC.
Prosecution case
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.04.1999, thedeceased
ShajimonwenttothefruitstallatAmbalapuzharunbyPW7andpurchasedsome
datesfromhisshop. Accordingtotheprosecution,eventhoughthedeceasedhad
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paidthepriceofthedatespurchased,PW7mistakenlydemandedthepriceofthe
datesfromhimagain,whichledtoanaltercationbetweenthem. Theprosecution
further alleges that, at that time, the accused Nos. 1 and 3, standing nearby,
intervened and ordered the deceased to pay the price of dates to PW7. The
prosecutionfurtherallegesthattherewasanaltercationbetweentheaccusedNos.
1to3andtheShajimonatthattime. Duetotheinterventionofsomelocalpeople
whogatheredatthesceneofoccurrence,thematterwassettledamicably. Butat
that time, the 1st accused warned thedeceasedShajimonthattheywouldcome
back after a short while and left the place.
4. Theprosecutionfurtherallegesthatatabout3a.m.,on11.04.1999,
while the ceremonial procession of Ambalapuzha temple reached in front of
Manakkattupalli Illam, the accused Nos.1to3approachedShajimonandA2and
A3 caught hold of his hands. Inthemeanwhile,the1staccusedtookMO3knife
fromtheloinofhisdhotiandinflictedstabinjuriesonthechestandotherpartsof
thebodyofShajimon.Inthemeantime,the2ndaccusedtookMO4knifefromthe
loin of his dhoti and inflicted stab injuries on the back side of the deceased
Shajimon.PW1,thefatheroftheinjured,alongwithPWs2and3,tooktheinjured
ShajimontotheMedicalCollegeHospital,Alappuzha.Shajimonsuccumbedtothe
injuries while undergoing treatment at Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha, on
16.04.1999.
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Registration of FIR and the Investigation
5. On the basis of Ext. P1 the FIS lodged by PW1 (Kumaru), PW25
(K.R. Anirudhan), the Sub Inspector of Police, Ambalapuzha Police Station,
registered Ext.P7 FIR on 11.04.1999.
6. PW25 took up the investigation on that day itself. Thereafter, he
proceeded to the place of occurrence at 2.30 p.m. and prepared Ext.P2 Scene
mahazar of the place of occurrence in the presence of the witnesses. He,
thereafter,questionedcertainwitnesses.HefiledExt.P8reporttoaddsection307
of IPC, and to delete section 308 of IPC, and to proceed with the investigation.
PW25 seized the dresses worn by the deceased, MO1 (Dhoti) and MO2 (Shirt),
after preparing Ext.P3 seizure Mahazar. He conducted asearchinthehousesof
AccusedNos.1and2afterpreparingExts.P9andP10searchmemos.Thereafter,
he prepared Exts. P11 and P12 search lists. CW37 (C.V. Sali) conducted further
investigation. After completing the investigation, he laid the charge sheet before
the jurisdictional magistrate.
7. CW37 passed away before the commencement of the trial. PW29
(Vidhyadhara Kumar), who accompanied CW37 during the investigation and was
acquainted with the signature of CW37, was examined to prove the facts
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pertainingtotheinvestigation.Accordingtohim,on17.04.1999,CW37conducted
the inquest of the deceased and prepared Ext. P15 inquest report. Onthesame
day, Ext. P16 report adding Section 302 of IPC was filed. PW29furtherdeposed
that CW37 arrested the accused Nos. 1 to 3 at around 5.00 am on 19.04.1999
after preparingExt.P17arrestmemoandExts.P18to20custodymemos.PW29
has recorded the confession statement oftheaccusedinhishandwriting.Onthe
basis of the information given by the accused No.1, and as led by the accused,
MO3 knife was recovered after preparing Ext. P4 mahazar. On the basis of the
information given by the accused No.2, and as led by him, MO4 knife was
recovered after preparing Ext. P6 mahazar. Thereafter, CW37 prepared Ext.P21
Property list and Ext. P23 forwarding note. After completing the investigation
charge sheet was laid before the jurisdictional Magistrate.
Proceedings in the trial court
8. The learned Magistrate, after completing the preliminary steps,
committed the case to the Court of Session, Alappuzha. The learned Sessions
Judge made over the case to the Additional Sessions Court-III, Alappuzha. The
learned Additional Sessions Judge framed the charge after hearing both sides.
When the charge was read over and explained totheaccused,theypleadednot
guiltyandclaimedtobetried.Theaccuseddeniedtheincriminatingcircumstances
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put to them and maintained the stand of innocence.
9. Inordertoprovethechargeagainsttheaccused,PWs.1to29were
examined,andExts.P1toP24weremarked. MOs.1to4werealsoidentifiedand
marked. After the close of theprosecutionevidence,theaccusedwereexamined
under Section 313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They denied the
incriminating circumstances levelled against them and pleaded innocence. No
evidencewasadducedfromthesideofdefence.ThelearnedSessionsJudge,after
a full-fledged trial, convicted and sentenced the appellant/accused as aforesaid.
Impugning the findingsofthelearnedSessionsJudge,theaccusedpreferredthis
appeal.
The contentions of the appellants
10. Sri.B.RamanPillai,thelearnedSeniorCounselfortheappellants,as
instructed by Sri. M. Sunil Kumar, submitted that the impugned judgment of the
learned Sessions Judge is patently illegal and unsustainable.
11. Thelearnedcounselsubmittedthatallthematerialwitnessesturned
hostile totheprosecutioninthiscase.Eventhefatherofthedeceased,PW1,did
not support the prosecutionnarrative. Thelearnedcounselwouldfurthersubmit
thattheavailableevidenceonrecordisdeficienttosustainaconvictionagainstthe
appellants/accused. Thelearnedcounselwouldfurthersubmitthatthetrialcourt
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oughttohavefoundthatthecontentsofExt.P1F.I.Statementcouldbeusedonly
for contradicting PW1, the maker. Instead,thetrialcourthaswronglyconstrued
the contents of Ext.P1 Statement as a dying declaration, forgetting the fact that
the same was denied by PW1.
12. The learned counsel would then point out that the trial court has
illegally considered the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C. as gospel truth when they denied the same while giving evidence in the
box. The learned counsel furthersubmittedthatthelearnedSessionsJudgehas
putcertainquestionstothewitnessesandelicitedsomeanswers. Relyingonthe
answersgivenbythewitnesses,thetrialcourthasarrivedataconclusionthatthe
previousstatementsofthewitnessesaretrue. Thecourseadoptedbythelearned
Sessions Judge is erroneous as it flouts the settled legal principles.
13. The learned counsel argued that the trial Judge has referred to
certain judgments of the ApexCourtandappliedthemtothefactsoftheinstant
case without properly ascertaining the factual matrix of this case. The learned
SeniorCounselwouldfurthersubmitthattheconclusionarrivedatbythelearned
Sessions Judge is without any legal evidence, but on the basis of surmises,
conjectures, assumptions, and presumptions. The learned Sessions Judge
discardedthefactthattheprosecutioncaseisbuiltondirectevidence,andfound
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that the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused is complete
and fully established. The said approach of thelearnedSessionsJudgeisillegal
and improper.
14. The learned counsel would further submit that the trial court has
wronglyplacedtheburdenontheshouldersoftheaccused,ignoringthestatutory
provisions and cardinal principles of law.
15. Thelearnedcounselpointedoutthattheoffencewasallegedtohave
takenplaceon11.04.1999andthetrialwasconductedafterthelapseofabout12
years. The investigatingoffice,CW37,wasnotexaminedbytheprosecution.Itis
further submitted that it is a case wherenoneoftheocularwitnessessupported
the prosecution’s version. PW29, who merely accompanied the Investigating
Officer during the investigation, was examined to mark the documents. The
learned counsel argued that the non-examination of the Investigating Officer,
consideringthepeculiarfactsandcircumstancesofthecase,isfataltothecaseof
the prosecution.
16. The learned Counsel has pointed out that the trial court failed to
proceedwiththetrialinafairandtransparentmannerandinsteadproceededwith
thetrialwithapresumptionofguiltoftheaccusedfromtheverybeginningofthe
trial,whichisimpermissibleinlaw.ItissubmittedthatthelearnedSessionsJudge
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has failed to take into consideration the various omissions, discrepancies, and
inconsistenciesintheevidenceadducedbytheprosecution,whichmateriallyaffect
the credibility and reliability of the prosecution case.
17. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Sessions
Judge has failed to consider the fact that the prosecution has not adduced any
material evidence to link or connect the accused with the alleged crime. It is
further submitted that the alleged confession of the deceased wasnotprovedin
accordance with law.
18. Accordingtothelearnedseniorcounsel,theprosecutionhasfailedto
provethechargebeyondreasonabledoubt. Itissubmittedthattheprosecution
has no definite, concrete, and consistent case regarding the identity of the
accused persons, the weapons allegedly used in the incident,andthemannerin
which the crime was committed.
The contentions of the Prosecution.
19. On the other hand, Sri. Rajeev K, the learned Senior Public
Prosecutor, submitted that the prosecution has succeeded in proving the charge
against the appellants beyond any reasonabledoubt. Thetrialcourtappreciated
the evidence in the correct perspective and arrived at a proper conclusion. The
learned Public Prosecutor submitted that that part of the evidence of hostile
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witnesses can be relied on by the Court to sustain the conviction against the
appellant. Therefore, no interference, whatsoever, is warranted in this matter.
The evidence let in by the prosecution
20. IntheinstantCase,PWs.1to14,PW22andPW23turnedhostileto
the prosecution.
21. PW1 (Kumaru) is the father of the deceased Shajimon. He stated
that he does not remember the dateofdeathofhisson. Hisdeathoccurredon
the day of ’Aarattu’ in connection with the festival of Ambalapuzha Sree Krishna
Swamy Temple. He further stated that at about 3:00 a.m. on that fateful day,
somebodycametohishouseandtoldhimthathissongotinjuredandwastaken
toMedicalCollegeHospital,Alappuzha. Ongettingthisinformation,herushedto
thehospitalinanautorickshaw. Whenhereachedthere,hissonwastakentothe
operation theatre. Afterconductingthesurgery,hissonwasshiftedtotheward.
Thereafter, hedidnotspeak. Hedeposedthathissonsuccumbedtotheinjuries
sevendaysaftertheincident,whileundergoingtreatment. Hecametoknowthat
therewasanaltercationandconsequently,hissongotinjured. Hedoesnotknow
howtheincidentoccurred. Heputhissignatureonapaperbroughtbythepolice.
He admitted his signature in Ext.P1 FIS.
22. According to him, he did not state anything tothepoliceaboutthe
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alleged incident. Since he did not support the prosecution case, permission was
grantedtotheProsecutortoputleadingquestionstothewitness. Thecasediary
contradictions of the witness were brought on record by the prosecution. He
denied the suggestion thathissontoldhimthatoneKannanandanotherperson
caught hold of him and Luttappi Shaji stabbed him. The stand of the witness
during the examination was that he had no occasion to see the injured
immediately after theincidentattheplaceofoccurrence,andhissondidnottell
him anything about the incident.
23. PW2(Shaji)isaneyewitnesstotheincident. Hetestifiedthathehas
not seen the alleged incident. AsPW2didnotsupporttheprosecutioncase,the
ProsecutorwaspermittedtoputleadingquestionstohimunderSection154ofthe
Indian Evidence Act. He denied that he gaveapreviousstatementtothepolice
on 11.04.1999. Though the case diary contradictions were brought on recordby
the Prosecutor, it was not seen marked.
24. PW3 (Asokan) is an auto driver by profession. He denied having
seen the incident. He would further say that he did not give statement to the
police.
25. PW4(SunilKumar)isanotheroccurrencewitnesstotheincident. He
isacoolieworker. Hewouldsaythatthedeceasedandhisfatherwerenotknown
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to him. He did not go to the ’Aarattu’ ulsavam of Sree Krishna Swamy Temple,
Alappuzha, in 1999. He is not aware whether a person died in 1999duringthe
festivalofSreeKrishnaSwamyTemple. Accordingtohim,hecametoknowabout
the murder when he got a summons from the police one month back.
26. PW5 (Sajimon) wasanautorickshawdriverbyprofessionduringthe
relevant period. He stated that he had not seen the incidentthatresultedinthe
death of Shajimon. He would further say that he does not know the accused
Nos.1 to 3. He added that he saw the accused for the first time in the court.
27. PW6(Ashokan)isanautorickshawdriverbyprofession. Hedeposed
that the deceased Shajimon was also an autorickshaw driver. Heparticipatedin
the cremation of the deceased. According to him, the incident occurred on the
’Aarattu’ day of the festivaloftheAmbalapuzhatemple. HeheardthatShajimon
died in an altercation which occurred in connection with the ’Aarattu
Ezhunnallippu’. Hewouldalsosaythathesawtheaccusedforthefirsttimeinthe
court. He denied to have seen the incident.
28. PW7 (Abdul Nizar), the owner of thefruitshop,whowasexamined
toprovethemotiveforthecrimeandtheallegedaltercationthathappenedonthe
previous night of the incident. PW7 was also not a loyal witness. He statedthat
the deceased Shajimon and his father, PW1, are not known to him. He further
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deposed that no altercation had happened between Shajimon and him, and the
consequential brawl between the said Shajimon and the accused.
29. PW8 (Ashokan), the owner of a hotel situated near the place of
occurrence,andPW9(NarayananKutty),theowneroftheMILMAboothlocatedin
thevicinityoftheplaceofoccurrence,werealsoturnedhostiletotheprosecution.
Bothwitnessesdeposedthattheydidnotknowanythingabouttheincident.They
further stated that the accused were notknowntothemandthattheyhadseen
them for the first time in the court. PW10 (Sreedevi), the wife of PW9, was
examined to prove that she witnessed someone taking the injured in an
autorickshaw. She did not support the case of the prosecution.
30. Likewise,PW11andPW12,thenearbyshopowners,andPW13,who
had allegedly seen the transportation of the injured to the hospital, were also
deviated from their previous statements while giving evidence in court.
31. PW14 (Manoj), an autorickshaw driver, who wasexaminedtoprove
the transportation of the injured to the hospital. He also did not support the
prosecution story.
32. PW15 (Madhu) is the tempo driverinwhichthedeceasedShajimon
was taken to Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha. He deposed that he took the
one injured to MCH, Alappuzha, but he did not know who the injured person was.
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33. PW16(Venukuttan)andPW26(Venugopal)weretheattestorstoExt.
P2, scene mahazar.TheyadmittedtheirsignaturesinExt.P2.Accordingtothem,
theyputtheirsignaturesonawhitepaperasdirectedbythepolice. Theyfurther
deposed that they had noprioracquaintancewiththeaccusedandsawthemfor
the first time in the dock.
34. PW17(Madhukuttan)andPW21(Harikuttan)areattestorstoExt.P3
Seizure mahazar for the recovery of MO1 and MO2, the dresses worn by the
deceasedShajimon.TheystatedthatthedeceasedShajimon,wasknowntothem.
TheyadmittedtheirsignaturesinExt.P3,themahazarpreparedfortheseizureof
the dresses of the deceased, and identified MO1 (Dothi) and MO2 (Shirt).
35. PW18 (Ratheesh) is a relative ofthedeceased.Hedeposedthathe
handedovertothepolicethedresses(MO1andMO2)thatthedeceasedworeat
the time of the occurrence. He further deposed that the dresses were obtained
from the hospital. He identified MO1 and MO2 but deposed that he does not
remember accurately whether thedressshowntohimwasthesamedresswhich
was handed over by him. He further stated he did not know who stabbed the
deceased Shajimon.
36. PW19(Bijumon)wastheattestertoExt.P4seizuremahazarthrough
whichthepoliceseizedMO3knifeattheinstanceofthe1staccused. Hedeposed
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that he knew the deceased Shajimon, who died in a brawl during the Arattu
festivalofAmbalapuzhaSreeKrishnaSwamyTemple.Headmittedhissignaturein
Ext. P4 recovery mahazar for MO3 (knife). He deposed that he had signed the
documentattheAmbalapuzhaPoliceStation.Hestatedthathehadnotwitnessed
therecoveryoftheweaponattheinstanceoftheaccusedinthepresenceofthe
police.
37. PW22 (Jayaraj) and PW23 (Praveen) are the witnesses to Ext. P6
recoverymahazarthroughwhichtheInvestigatingOfficerseizedtheMO4knifeat
the instance of accused No.2. They did not support the prosecution.
38. PW20 (Dr. Kailasnath) was the doctor who examined the deceased
Shajimon at the Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha, and issued Ext. P5 wound
certificate.
39. PW27 (Dr. Abraham Daniel) was the Asst. Professor of Forensic
Medicine at Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha,whoconductedthepostmortem
examinationofthedeceasedShajimonandissuedExt.P13postmortemcertificate.
Henotedasmanyas9antemorteminjuriesonthebodyofthedeceased. Hehas
noted the following ante mortem injuries:
1. ”Suturedincisedwound21cmperpendicularlyplacedontheleftside
offrontofabdomen1cmoutertomidline.Itsupperendwas1cm
belowlowerendofsternumandlowerendatthelevelofumbilicus.
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The wound enterd the abdominal cavity. (Surgical)
2. Sutured incised wound 11cmhorizontallyplacedontheleftsideof
front of abdomen. Its outer end was8cmawayfromleftnippleat
the4’oclockposition.Theinnerendmergedwiththeupperendof
injury No.1 (Surgically modified original injury)
3. Incised wound 1.5cm oblique on the left sideoffrontofabdomen
11cm away from umblicus in the 2’o clock position. The wound
enteredtheabdominalcavity.(Surgicaldrainagewound)Insidethe
abdominalcavitysmallintestineshowedasuturedwound4cmlong
270cm. away from its origin.
4. Foursmallsuturedwoundsskindeep(sizevaryfrom1.5cmto3cm)
over an area 7x6cmonthefrontofleftforearm9cmbelowelbow.
The margins of the wound appeared clean cut.
5. Twosmallsuturedwoundsskindeep(sizevaryfrom0.5cmto2cm)
over an area 2x2cm onthebackofleftforearm4cmbelowelbow.
Margins of wound appeared cleancut.
6. Linearabrasion5cmobliqueonthebackofleftforearm14cmbelow
elbow.
7. Abrasion 1.5x1cm on the front of left elbow
8. Sutured wound 2.5cm long skin deep on the left side of back of
trunk 7cm below lower endofscapula.Marginofwoundappeared
clean cut
9. Abrasion 2×0.8cm on the left side of back of trunk at the level of
lower end of scapula”
40. PW27 opined that the cause of deathwasthestabinjurysustained
totheabdomen.HefurtherstatedthatinjuryNo.2wasafatalone.Theinjurycan
be caused by a knife and also by a sharp-edged weapon. Hefurtherstatedthat
injury No. 2 can be caused by stabbing with the knife producedinthiscase.He
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further deposed that injury No. 2 was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause
death.
41. PW29 (Vidhyadhara Kumar) was the constable, Ambalapuzha Police
Station,whoaccompaniedCW37intheinvestigationandwasacquaintedwiththe
handwriting of CW37. PW29deposedthatheisacquaintedwiththesignatureof
CW37.HerecordedExt.P1FISofPW1.Herecordedthebodynoteofthedeceased
Shajimon. According to him, he was present when CW37 examined the material
witnesses. Ext. P9 and Ext.P10 search memos were prepared by him, and he
accompanied PW25 in the search. Thereafter,Exts.P11andP12searchlistswere
preparedinhishandwriting.On11.04.1999,whenPW18handedoverthedresses
of the deceased, he was present and he prepared Ext.P3mahazarandheisan
attestor to the same. He also identified MOs. 1 and 2. Ext. P8 section adding
report was also recorded in hishandwriting.HeaccompaniedCW37tothescene
oftheoccurrence.PW29furtherdeposedthatExt.P15inquestreportwasprepared
in his handwriting and he accompanied CW37 at the time of the inquest. He
stated that he was also presentatthetimeofthearrestofAccusedNos.1to3.
He identified the accused in the dock.
Judicial Evaluation
42. ThefirstquestiontobedecidediswhetherthedeathofShajimonis
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ahomicideornot. PW27,Dr.AbrahamDaniel,whoconductedtheautopsyofthe
body of the deceased, noted asmanyas 9antemorteminjuriesonthebodyof
the deceased. He opined that injury No.2, the stab on the abdomen, was the
cause of death. According to Dr. Abraham Daniel, the injuries noted in the
postmortemcertificatearesufficientintheordinarycoursetocausethedeathofa
person. In view of the categorical and unequivocal evidence of Dr. Abraham
Daniel, we are of the view that the death of Shajimon is a homicide.
43. Now,thecrucialquestionsthatarosebeforeusarewhoinflictedthe
stab injuries on the deceased and whether there is any evidence to prove the
involvement of the appellants in the alleged crime.
44. Now weshallproceedtoevaluatetheevidenceadducedinthecase
in the light of thesubmissionsadvancedbythelearnedcounselfortheappellant
and the learned Public Prosecutor to ascertain whether the prosecution has
succeeded in proving the charge against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
45. ThelearnedcounselhaspointedoutthatthelearnedSessionsJudge
has convicted andsentencedtheaccusedonthebasisofthestatementrecorded
under Section 161 of theCodeofCriminalProcedureandnotonthebasisofthe
substantive evidence adduced before the court. The procedure adopted by the
learned Sessions Judge is illegal and impermissible.
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46. In Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P1, the Apex Court heldthat,.a
statement recorded by the police during an investigation is not substantive
evidence and cannot be used for any purpose except to contradict the witness.
The relevant Paragraphs ofTahsildar Singh(Supra)are extracted hereunder:
”15. As the words in the section declare the intention of the
legislature, we shall now proceed to construe the section giving the
words used therein their natural and ordinary sense.
6. The object of the main section as the history of itslegislation
shows and the decided cases indicate is to impose a general bar
againsttheuseofstatementmadebeforethepoliceandtheenacting
clauseincleartermssaysthatnostatementmadebyanypersontoa
police officer or any record thereof, or anypartofsuchstatementor
record, be used for any purpose. The words are clear and
unambiguous. The proviso engrafts an exception on the general
prohibition and that is, the said statement in writingmaybeusedto
contradictawitnessinthemannerprovidedbyS.145oftheEvidence
Act. We have already noticedfromthehistoryofthesectionthatthe
enacting clause was mainly intended to protect the interests of
accused. At the state of investigation, statements of witnesses are
taken in a haphazard manner. The police officer in the course of his
investigationfindshimselfmoreofteninthemidstofanexcitedcrowd
and babel of voices raised all round. In such an atmosphere, unlike
that in a Court of Law, he is expected to hear the statements of
witnesses and record separately the statement of each one ofthem.
Generally herecordsonlyasummaryofthestatementswhichappear
to him to be relevant. These statements are, therefore, only a
summaryofwhatawitnesssaysandveryoftenperfunctory.Indeed,in
view of the aforesaid facts, there is a statutory prohibition against
police officers taking the signature of the person making the
statement,indicatingtherebythatthestatementisnotintendedtobe
binding on the witness or an assurance by him that it is a correct
statement.
7.Atthesametime,itbeingtheearliestrecordofthestatementof
a witness soon after the incident, any contradiction found therein
1
1959 SCC OnLine SC 17
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ouldbeofimmensehelptoanaccusedtodiscreditthetestimonyof
w
a witness making the statement. The Section was, therefore,
conceived in an attempt to find a happy ’via media’,namely,whileit
enacts an absolute bar against the statement made before a police
officerbeingusedforanypurposewhatsoever,itenablestheaccused
to rely upon it for a limited purposeofcontradictingawitnessinthe
mannerprovidedbyS.145oftheEvidenceActbydrawinghisattention
topartsofthestatementintendedforcontradiction.Itcannotbeused
forcorroborationofaprosecutionoradefencewitnessorevenaCourt
witness. Nor can it be used for contradicting a defence or a Court
witness.Shortlystated,thereisageneralbaragainstitsusesubjectto
a limited exception in the interest of the accused, and theexception
cannot obviously be used to cross the bar”.
47. InR.Shajiv.StateofKerala2,theApexCourtheldthatevidence
given in a court under oath has great sanctity, which is why the same is called
substantive evidence. Statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. can beusedonlyfor
the purpose of contradiction, and statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be
used for both corroboration and contradiction.
48. InParvatSinghv.StateofM.P.3,theApexCourtreiteratedthat,
as per the settled proposition of law, a statement recorded under Section 161
Cr.P.C.isinadmissibleinevidenceandcannotberelieduponorusedtoconvictthe
accused. As per the settled proposition of law, the statement recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. can be used only to prove the contradictions and/or omissions.
49. In Renuka Prasad v. State4, the Apex Court held that the
2
( 2013) 14 SCC 266
3
(2020) 4 SCC 33
4
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1074
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statements made by the Investigating Officers regarding the motive, conspiracy
andpreparationcomesoutastheprosecutionstory,asdiscerniblefromtheS.161
statements of various witnesses who were questioned by the police during
investigation; which statements are wholly inadmissibleunderS.162oftheCrPC.
Merely because the Investigating Officers spoke of such statements havingbeen
made by the witnesses during investigation, does not give them any credibility,
enabling acceptance, unless the witnesses themselves spoke of such motive or
acts of commission or omission or instances from which conspiracy could be
inferred as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable doubt. We are
unable to find either the motive, the conspiracy or the preparation or even the
crime itself to have been established in Court, at the trial throughthewitnesses
examined before Court. The relevant paragraphs of Renuka Prasad (Supra),
read as follows:
”17. The High Court has placed heavy reliance on the
testimoniesofPW’s83,84and87,theIOs,withtheassertionthatthey
were unshaken in cross-examination and reliance was placed on the
affirmationofthestatementsmadebythewitnessesunderSection161,
whichthewitnessesdidnotspeakthemselvesinthebox,atthetrial.We
cannot but observe that, though reliance is said to be placed on the
testimony of the IOs’thiswouldinfactbearelianceplacedonSection
161statementsasspokenofbytheIOswhichisegregiouslywrong.The
High Court in paragraph 85 speaks of the affirmation of statements
given by witnesses examined by PW87 and records that though these
were denied by the witnesses, a reading of the cross-examination of
PW87 indicates that she had not been discredited andthesuggestions
made to herincrossweredenied.Therelianceplacedonthesocalled
voluntary statements of the accused and the statements made under
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ection 161 as recorded by PW87, based on the decisions afore-cited
S
cannot be countenanced.
***********************
26. The statements made by the IOs regarding the motive,
c onspiracy and preparation comes out as the prosecution story, as
discernible from the Section 161 statements of various witnesses who
were questioned by the police during investigation; which statements
arewhollyinadmissibleunderSection162oftheCr.P.C.Merelybecause
the IOs spoke of such statements having been made bythewitnesses
during investigation, does not give them any credibility, enabling
acceptance, unless the witnesses themselves spoke of such motive or
actsofcommissionoromissionorinstancesfromwhichconspiracycould
be inferred as also the preparation, established beyond reasonable
doubt. We are unable to find either the motive, the conspiracy or the
preparationoreventhecrimeitselftohavebeenestablishedinCourt,at
the trial through the witnesses examined before Court. The witnesses
had turned hostile, for reasons best known to themselves. The only
inference possible, on the witnesses turning hostile is that either they
havebeenpersuadedforreasonsunknownorcoercedintoresilingfrom
thestatementsmadeunderSection161orthattheyhadnotmadesuch
statementsbeforepoliceofficers.Merelybecausethestorycameoutof
themouthoftheIO,itcannotbebelievedandalegalsanctitygivento
it, higher than that provided to Section 161 statements under Section
162 of the Cr. P.C. “
50. In the instant case, all the material witnesses turned hostile to the
prosecution. However, the learned Sessions Judge had relied on the 161
statementsofthewitnessestoformthebasisforconviction. ThelearnedSessions
Judgehasfloutedtheelementaryandfundamentalprinciplesoflawwhilearriving
at the conclusion as to the guilt of the accused.
51. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is
thatthelearnedSessionsJudgehasusedthecontentsofExt.P1F.I.Statementas
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evidence. PW1, the maker of the F.I. Statement, while on box, denied that he
gave a statement to police narrating the facts leading to the death of his son.
According to PW1, the father of the deceased, he simply put his signature on a
whitepaperasinstructedbythepolice. Hefurtherstatedthathehadnotseenhis
son attheplaceofoccurrence,immediatelyaftertheincident. Accordingtohim,
he directly went to Medical College Hospital, Alappuzha, where his son was
admittedandtreated. ThedeceasedShajimonneverspoketohimabouthowthe
incident occurred or the names of the persons who inflicted injuries on him.
52. ButthelearnedSessionsJudgehasconsideredtheF.I.Statementof
PW1 as substantive evidence anditwastreatedasadyingdeclarationtoconvict
the accused.
53. Yet another argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellants is that the trial court ought not have accepted the testimonies of the
hostile witnesses to form the basis for conviction. The learned counsel has
pointed out that all the witnesses have completely resiled from their previous
statements,andthereisnothingonrecordtoarriveatafindingastotheguiltof
theaccused. However,thetrialcourthasputsomequestionstothewitnessesand
concluded that the witnesses are lying. The trial court took theviewthatthose
parts of the evidence of the hostile witnesses that support the prosecution case
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can be relied on to sustain the conviction.
54. Beforeproceedingfurther,itwouldbeappositetorefertothesettled
legal position regarding the evidentiary value of the testimony of a hostile witness.
55. In Bhagwan Singhv.StateofHaryana5, theApexheldthatthe
court gave permission to the prosecutor to cross-examine his own witness, thus
characterisinghimas,whatisdescribedasahostilewitness,doesnotcompletely
efface his evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trialandthereisno
legalbartobaseaconvictionuponhistestimonyifcorroboratedbyotherreliable
evidence.
56. InKhujjiv.StateofM.P.6,athree-judgebenchoftheApexCourt,
placingrelianceonBhagwanSingh(Supra),RabindraKumarDeyv.Stateof
Orissa7 andSyadAkbarv.StateofKarnataka8 reiteratedthattheevidenceof
a prosecution witness cannot be rejected intotomerelybecausetheprosecution
chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such
witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether, but
thesamecanbeacceptedtotheextenttheirversionisfoundtobedependableon
a careful scrutiny thereof.
5
( 1976) 1 SCC 389
6
(1991) 3 SCC 627
7
(1976) 4 SCC 233
8
(1980) 1 SCC 30
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57. The Apex Court in Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of
Gujarat9, also reiterated that it is settled law that evidence of a hostilewitness
canalsobereliedupontotheextenttowhichitsupportstheprosecutionversion.
Evidence of such witness cannot betreatedaswashedofftherecord.Itremains
admissible in the trial and there is no legal bar to base his conviction upon his
testimony if corroborated by other reliable evidence.
58. The law is wellsettledthatthetestimonyofahostilewitnessisnot
to be discarded in toto merely because the witness has been declared hostile.
Suchevidenceremainsadmissibleandmaybeacceptedtotheextentitisfoundto
be trustworthy and corroborated byotherreliableevidence,eithertosupportthe
prosecution or to benefit the accused.
59. Bearinginmindthelawregardingtheevidentiaryvalueofthehostile
witness, wehavecarefullyexaminedtheevidenceonrecord. However,weareof
theconsideredopinionthatallthematerialwitnesses,PWs.1to14,gaveevidence
negatingtheinvolvementandtheroleoftheaccusedinthecrime. Theirevidence
was in total variance with their previous statement. The dicta laid down in the
above-referred cases are applicable only in cases wherein the witnesses partly
supportedtheprosecutionandpartlysupportedtheaccused. Intheinstantcase,
theirevidencewastotallyagainsttheprosecution. Insuchcircumstances,thereis
9
(1999) 8 SCC 624
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no question of placing reliance on their evidence to form the basis for conviction.
60. The learned counsel for the appellant urgedthatthetrialcourthad
failed to note that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt. In Kali Ram v. State of H.P.10, the Apex Court placing
reliance on Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra11 observed
that one of the cardinal principles which has always to be kept in view in our
systemofadministrationofjusticeforcriminalcasesisthatapersonarraignedas
anaccusedispresumedtobeinnocentunlessthatpresumptionisrebuttedbythe
prosecutionbyproductionofevidenceasmayshowhimtobeguiltyoftheoffence
with which heischarged.Theburdenofprovingtheguiltoftheaccusedisupon
the prosecution and unless it relieves itself of that burden, the courts cannot
record a finding of the guilt of the accused. There are certain cases in which
statutory presumptions arise regarding the guilt of the accused, but the burden
eveninthosecasesisupontheprosecutiontoprovetheexistenceoffactswhich
have to be present before the presumption can be drawn. Once those facts are
shown by the prosecution to exist,theCourtcanraisethestatutorypresumption
anditwould,insuchanevent,befortheaccusedtorebutthepresumption.The
onus, even in such cases, upon the accused is notasheavyasisnormallyupon
the prosecution to prove the guiltoftheaccused.Ifsomematerialisbroughton
10
(1973) 2 SCC 808
11
(1973) 2 SCC 793
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therecordconsistentwiththeinnocenceoftheaccused,whichmayreasonablybe
true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be
entitled to acquittal.
61. However, the learnedSessionsJudgehasignoredanddiscardedthe
elementaryandfundamentalprinciplefollowedinthiscountrythattheprosecution
hastoallegeandprovethechargeagainsttheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubt.
Instead, the learned Sessions Judge went on to hold thatitistheburdenofthe
accusedtoprovehowtheirnameappearsintheFISandFIR. Inotherwords,the
learned Sessions Judge has wrongly fixed the burden on the shoulders of the
accused, which is illegal and impermissible.
62. Yetanotherpointurgedbythecounselfortheappellantisthatthe
learnedSessionsJudgehasarrivedattheconclusionofguiltoftheappellanton
thebasisofsurmises,conjecture,andassumptionsratherthanthelegalevidence
adduced by the prosecution.
63. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that mere suspicion,
irrespective ofitsdegree,cannotconstituteorsubstituteforproof.Thisdoctrine
has been consistently reaffirmed through a series of judicial precedents,
establishing that proof must be grounded in admissible evidencedemonstrating
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that suspicion alone is insufficient to
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sustainaconviction.[SeeNarasappav.StateofKarnataka12, Anilv.State
of Maharashtra13, Sangili @ Sanganathan v. State of Tamil Nadu14,
Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh15, Raja Naykar v. State of
Chhattisgarh16,and Renuka Prasad(Supra).]
64. In State of Chhattisgarh v. Ashok Bhoi17, the Apex Court
observed that itistruethatJusticecannotbemadesterileonthepleathatitis
better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty
escapeonfancifuldoubtsisnotdoingjusticeaccordingtothelaw.However,itis
also well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
65. After a careful and meticulous analysis of evidence on record, we
are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the
chargeagainsttheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubt.Noevidenceisforthcoming
toprovethattheaccusedwerepresentatthesceneoftheoccurrenceandthey
inflictedthestabinjuriesonthedeceased. ThelearnedSessionsJudgehasalso
initiated proceedings under Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
against PW1, holding that he knowingly gave false evidence in a court of law.
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we feel that the learned
12
( 2007) 10 SCC 770
13
(2013) 12 SCC 441
14
2014 (10) SCC 264
15
(2019) 4 SCC 522
16
(2024) 3 SCC 481
17
2025 KHC OnLine 6220
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Sessions Judge was not justified in invoking its powers under Section 344 of
Cr.P.C. Therefore, theinitiationofproceedingsbythelearnedSessionsJudgeis
hereby set aside and quashed.
In the result,
(i) Criminal Appeal No.140/2019 is allowed.
(ii) The impugned judgment of the learned Additional Sessions
Court-III, Alappuzha, in S.C. No.215 of 2012 is set aside.
(iii) The appellants/accused are acquitted and they are set at liberty
forthwith, if their custody is not required for any other case.
(iv)The bail bond, if any, executed by the accused stand cancelled.
(v) Fine, if any, paid by them shall be refunded.
d/-
S
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V,
JUDGE
d/-
S
K.V. JAYAKUMAR,
JUDGE
Jvt/msp
